THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MAS 
SACHUSETTS  proposes  to  publish  the  papers 
which  have  been  read  at  its  meetings  in  a 
series  of  volumes  under  the  following  titles  :  — 

1.  CAMPAIGNS   IN  VIRGINIA,   1861-1862. 

A  new  and  enlarged  edition  of  "  The  Peninsular 
Campaign  of  General  McClellan  in  1862,"  issued  by 
the  Society  in  1881.  (Published.) 

2.  THE     VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN    OF   1862    under    Gen 

eral   Pope.      A  new  edition  of  the  volume  issued  in 
1886.     (Published. ) 

3.  ANTIETAM    TO   GETTYSBURG. 

4.  THE   CAMPAIGN   IN  VIRGINIA   IN    1864. 

The  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor 

5.  PETERSBURG. 

6.  THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  VIRGINIA  IN   1864,  1865. 

Cedar  Creek  to  Appomattox. 

7.  CAMPAIGNS    IN    KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE. 

April,  1862,  to  November,  1863. 

8.  THE    CAMPAIGN    IN  GEORGIA. 

May  to  December,  1864. 

9.  OPERATIONS   IN   THE  CAROLINAS,    1861-1863. 
10.    CRITICAL     SKETCHES     OF      SOME     OF     THE 

FEDERAL  AND  CON  FEDERATE  COMMANDERS. 
(Published  June ,  1895.) 

Each  volume  will  be  sold  separately.  Price  per  vol 
ume  (8vo),  $2.00. 

Published  for  the  Society  by 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND   COMPANY, 

BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK. 


PAPERS 

OF   THE 

MILITARY    HISTORICAL   SOCIETY   OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 

VOLUME  10 

CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  SOME  OF  THE 

FEDERAL  AND  CONFEDERATE 

COMMANDERS 


CRITICAL  SKETCHES 


OF    SOME   OF 


THE  FEDERAL  AND  CONFEDERATE 
COMMANDERS 


EDITED   BY 

THEODORE   F.  DWIGHT 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS  BY 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN   AND   COMPANY 

BOSTON   AND    NEW   YORK 


1895 


Copyright,  1895, 
BY  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 


All  rights  reserved. 


THE  papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of 
Massachusetts,  for  the  most  part,  have  not  been  prepared  to 
accord  with  a  preconcerted  plan,  or  with  a  view  to  publica 
tion.  In  the  process  of  classification  they  have  arranged 
themselves  in  distinctive  groups,  as  set  forth  in  the  scheme 
which  appears  herein  opposite  the  title-page,  illustrating, 
somewhat  connectedly,  the  operations  of  the  armies  in  Vir 
ginia  and  of  other  armies  in  other  parts  of  the  wide  region 
of  war. 

The  memoirs  in  this  volume  form,  in  a  measure,  an  epi 
tome  of  the  history  of  the  four  years  of  conflict,  as  seen  from 
different  points  of  view,  in  special  relation  to  the  leaders  and 
commanders  of  the  greater  campaigns,  and  will  serve  as  an 
introduction  to  the  monographs  on  those  campaigns  in  the 
volumes  which  will  follow  in  due  season. 

Had  the  project  of  the  volume  been  earlier  conceived,  an 
effort  would  have  been  made  to  obtain  similar  critical  esti 
mates  of  other  distinguished  commanders,  upon  whom,  in 
crucial  moments,  the  fortunes  of  the  North  and  of  the  South 
depended ;  to  supply  some  of  the  deficiencies  in  the  archives 
of  the  Society,  in  this  respect,  and  to  extend  the  range  of 
view,  Mr.  Ropes  has  kindly  permitted  the  addition  of  five  re 
views  printed  by  him  in  the  "  Atlantic  Monthly  "  and  "  Scrib- 
ner's  Magazine."  To  the  publishers  of  the  magazines  ac 
knowledgment  for  the  privilege  of  republishing  these  reviews 
is  gratefully  made. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


LIST  OF  BOOKS  CITED 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq.  ........       1 

GENERAL   GRANT 

By  COLONEL  THEODORE  A.  DODGE          ......    21 

GENERAL  HANCOCK 

By  GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER          ......    47 

GENERAL  HUMPHREYS 

By  GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON      .......    69 

GENERAL   McCLELLAN 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq.  ,         .....     97 

GENERAL  SHERMAN 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq  .........  125 

GENERAL  STUART 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq  .....        .....  153 

GENERAL  THOMAS 

By  COLONEL  HENRY  STONE     ........  163 

GENERAL  THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD 

By  COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE      ......  209 

THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq  ..........  245 

INDEX         .............  273 

OFFICERS    OF    THE    MILITARY    HISTORICAL    SOCIETY    OF 
MASSACHUSETTS,  1876-1895  ........  321 

LIST  OF  MEMBERS  OF  THE  SOCIETY,   1895         .        .        .        .322 

LIST  OF  REPORTS    AND    PAPERS  READ    BEFORE    THE   SO 
CIETY,  1876-1895        ..........  339 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME, 

AND  THE  FORMS  OF  REFERENCE. 

THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY.  October,  1891.  No.  408,  Vol.  LXVIII.  "68 
Atlantic  Monthly." 

BADEAU.  Military  History  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  from  April  1861,  to  April 
1865.  By  Adam  Badeau.  3  vols.  New  York,  1868-1881.  "  Badeau." 

CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.     12  vols.     Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland.     By  Henry  M.  Cist.     Vol.  VII.     "  Cist." 
The  Virginia  Campaiga  of  '64  and  '65.     By  Andrew  A.  Humphreys.    Vol. 
XII.     "  12  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War." 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR.  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War.  Supplement  to  Senate  Report  No.  142  (of  the  38th  Congress,  2d 
Session).  2  vols.  Washington,  1886.  [Printed  with  the  Documents  of  the 
39th  Congress,  1st  Session.  Vol.  1  contains  reports  of  Major-General  W.  T. 
Sherman,  and  of  Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas,  each  paged  distinctively.] 
"  C.  W.  1  Sup.  Sherman's  Report."  "  C.  W.  1  Sup.  Thomas's  Report." 

GRANT.  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant.  2  vols.  New  York.  "  Grant's 
Memoirs." 

McCLELLAN,  C.  General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys  at  Malvern  Hill,  Va.,  July 
1,  1862,  and  at  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  December  13,  1862.  A  Memoir  by  Cars- 
well  McClellan.  St.  Paul :  Privately  printed,  1888.  34  pages.  "  McClel- 
lan's  Humphreys." 

MCCLELLAN,  G.  B.  McClellan's  Own  Story.  The  War  for  the  Union;  the 
Soldiers  who  fought  it ;  the  Civilians  who  directed  it,  and  his  relations  to  it 
and  to  them.  By  George  B.  McClellan,  late  Major-General  commanding  the 
Armies.  New  York,  1887.  "  0.  S." 

MCCLELLAN,  H.  B.  The  Life  and  Campaigns  of  Major-General  J.  E.  B.  Stu 
art,  Commander  of  the  Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  By  H. 
B.  McClellan.  Boston  and  New  York,  1885. 

NICOLAY  AND  HAY.  Abraham  Lincoln  :  a  History.  By  John  G.  Nicolay  and 
John  Hay.  10  vols.  New  York,  1890.  "  N.  &  H." 

RIPLEY.  The  War  with  Mexico.  By  R.  S.  Ripley.  2  vols.  New  York,  1849. 
"  Ripley." 

ROMAN.  The  Military  Operations  of  General  Beauregard  in  the  War  between 
the  States,  1861  to  1865.  Including  a  brief  Personal  Sketch  and  a  Narrative 
of  his  Services  in  the  War  with  Mexico,  1846-48.  By  Alfred  Roman.  2  vols. 
New  York,  1884.  "  Roman's  Beauregard." 

SHERMAN.  Memoirs  of  General  William  T.  Sherman.  By  Himself.  2  vols. 
New  York,  1875.  "  Sherman's  Memoirs." 


BOOKS   CITED  IN  THIS   VOLUME 


SWINTON.     The  Twelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War :  A  History  of  the  Eastern 

and  Western  Campaigns,  in  Relation  to  the  Actions  that  decided  their  Issue. 

By  William  Swinton.     New  York,  1807.     "Swinton.     Decisive  Battles." 

TUKCHIN.     Chickamauga.     By  John  B.  Turchin.     Chicago,  1888.     "  Turchin." 

VAN    HOKNE.     History  of   the  Army  of   the  Cumberland,  its   Organization, 

Campaigns  and  Battles,  written  at  the  Request  of  Major-General  George  H. 

Thomas,   chiefly  from  his  Private  Military  Journal  and  Official  and  other 

Documents  furnished  by  him.     By  Thomas  B.  Van  Home,  U.  S.  A.     2  vols., 

and  Atlas.     Cincinnati,  1875.     "  Van  Home,  A.  of  C." 

VAN  HOKNE.     The  Life  of  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas.     By  Thomas  B. 

Van  Home,  U.  S.  A.     New  York,  1882.     "  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas." 
WALKER.     History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
By   Francis   A.  Walker,   Brevet   Brig.-Gen.,   U.   S.  V.     New   York,    1886. 
"  Walker's  2d  Corps." 

WAR  RECORDS.  The  War  of  the  Rebellion:  a  Compilation  of  the  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies.  Prepared  under  the  direc 
tion  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  by  Bvt.  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  N.  Scott,  Third 
U.  S.  Artillery,  and  published  pursuant  to  Act  of  Congress,  approved  June 
16,  1880.  Series  I.  Vols.  I.-XLVL,  Part  I.  95  vols.  Washington :  Gov 
ernment  Printing  Office,  1880-1894.  "  W.  R." 

Until  the  publication  of  Vol.  XXIV.,  Part  I.,  the  volumes  bore  only  the 
particular  series  designations  in  Roman  numerals.  As  the  references  to  the 
earlier  volumes  have  been  made  in  this  book  by  their  serial  numbers,  a  table 
harmonizing  the  same  with  their  series  designations  is  here  given  for  the  con 
venience  of  the  student. 


Series  Nos. 

I..  . 

II.  .  . 

III.  .  . 

IV.  .  . 
V.  .  . 

VI..  . 

VII..  . 

VIII. .  . 
IX.. 


Serial  Nos.      Series  Nos. 


Serial  Nos. 


X. 


XI. 


XII. 


XIII. 


1 

2 

.  3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Parti 10 

Part  II 11 

Parti 12 

Part  II 13 

Part  III 14 

Parti 15 

Part  II 16 

Part  II.,  part  II 17 

Part  III 18 

.  19 


XIX. 


XIV 20 

XV 21 

Part  1 22 

Part  II 23 

XVTT    (Parti 24 

XVIL  1  Part  II 25 

XVIII 26 

Parti 27 

Part  II 28 

j  Part  1 29 

(Part  II 30 

31 

Parti 32 

Part  II 33 

Part  1 34 

}  Part  II 35 

(Parti 36 

XXIV.  )  Part  II 37 

(  Part  III.  .  .  38 


XXI. 
XXII. 

XXIII. 


GENEEAL  BEAUREGARD. 

BY 

JOHN   CODMAN   ROPES. 


Eeprinted  by  permission  from  the  "Atlantic  Monthly,"  for  April,  1SS4. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGAKD. 


WE  have  before  us  the  military  operations  of  General 
Beauregard l  detailed  in  two  large  octavos.  A  considerable 
part  of  each  volume  consists  of  an  appendix,  containing  official 
and  other  documents,  many  of  them  of  great  interest.  There 
are  excellent  indices  at  the  end  of  the  second  volume,  both  of 
the  text  and  the  documents.  There  are  two  portraits  of  the 
subject  of  the  memoir. 

Colonel  Roman  has  written  a  careful  and  exhaustive  bio 
graphy  of  his  chief.  Beauregard,  in  the  preface,  indorses 
all  his  statements  and  comments,  excepting  only  his  eulogi- 
ums  upon  Beauregard  himself.  The  book  is,  we  are  obliged 
to  say,  unnecessarily  long ;  there  is  a  good  deal  of  repetition 
in  it,  and  many  episodes,  especially  those  involving  the  per 
sonal  differences  between  General  Beauregard  and  President 
Davis,  are,  in  our  judgment,  dwelt  upon  with  needless  par 
ticularity.  But  the  work  is  unquestionably  a  very  valuable 
contribution  to  the  history  of  the  late  war ;  and  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  student,  it  may  well  be  that,  looking  at  it 
as  in  great  part  consisting  of  memoires  pour  servir,  there  is 
no  excess  either  of  material  or  of  comment. 

No  officer  in  the  Confederate  service  had  such  a  varied 
experience  as  Beauregard.  From  the  capture  of  Fort  Sumter 

1  The  Military  Operations  of  General  Beauregard  in  the  War  between  the 
States,  1861  to  1865.  Including  a  brief  personal  sketch  and  a  narrative  of  his 
services  in  the  war  with  Mexico,  1846-48.  By  Alfred  Roman,  formerly  Colonel 
of  the  18th  Louisiana  Volunteers,  afterwards  Aide -de-Camp  and  Inspector- 
General  on  the  staff  of  General  Beauregard.  In  two  volumes.  New  York: 
Harper  &  Brothers.  1884. 


4         CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

to  the  surrender  of  Johnston,  he  was  almost  constantly  in 
active  service,  and  it  was  his  fortune  to  be  connected  with 
several  of  the  most  important  and  picturesque  events  of  the 
war.  It  was  under  his  direction  and  control  that  the  militia 
of  South  Carolina  surrounded  Fort  Sumter  with  their  bat 
teries  and  compelled  its  surrender.  It  was  he  who,  with 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  fought  and  won  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Eun,  the  cause  of  so  much  unfounded  rejoicing,  and 
the  parent  of  so  much  vain  confidence.  It  was  he  who,  with 
General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  planned  and  carried  out  the 
brilliant  and  almost  completely  successful  attack  upon  Grant's 
position  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  the  first  of  a  series  of  hard- 
fought,  sanguinary,  and  indecisive  engagements,  of  which  our 
war  furnished  so  many  examples.  It  was  through  Beaure- 
gard's  indomitable  spirit  and  masterly  engineering  skill  that 
Fort  Sumter  and  Charleston  were  so  stoutly  defended  against 
the  ironclads  of  Admiral  Dahlgren  and  the  batteries  of  Gen 
eral  Gillmore.  It  was  due  to  Beauregard's  obstinate  resolu 
tion  that  Petersburg  was  not  taken  on  the  16th  and  17th  of 
June,  1864,  and  the  evacuation  of  Richmond  anticipated  by 
nearly  a  year.  Finally,  we  find  him  again  associated  with 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  collecting  the  scattered  and  decimated 
forces  of  the  tottering  Confederacy,  in  the  vain  hope  of  arrest 
ing  Sherman's  march  through  the  Carolinas,  until  the  surren 
der  at  Greensboro'  ended  the  career  begun  at  Sumter  and 
Bull  Run.  Wherever  we  see  him  we  find  him  active,  enter 
prising,  daring,  —  in  fact,  to  the  verge  of  rashness  ;  extremely 
methodical  also,  and  most  industrious.  He  impresses  us  as 
a  man  devoted  to  his  profession,  and  simply  to  his  profession. 
He  does  not  seem  to  have  been  hampered  by  any  of  those 
feelings  of  responsibility,  arising  from  a  mingling  of  the 
duties  of  soldier  and  statesman,  which  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  undoubtedly  influenced  the  judgment  of  some  of  the 
most  prominent  generals  on  either  side.  Beauregard  appears 
always  to  have  preserved  a  perfectly  clear  military  head ;  he 


GENERAL    BEAUREGARD  5 

was  always  capable  of  advising  the  most  unwelcome  measures, 
when  he  thought  they  were  demanded  by  the  situation  ;  to 
him  Richmond  even,  and  Charleston,  were  only  squares  on  the 
military  chessboard.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  advert  to 
this  subject  further  on.  Let  us  now  briefly  follow  General 
Beauregard  through  the  war. 

After  his  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter,  with  which  we  will 
not  detain  the  reader,  we  find  Beauregard  in  command  of  the 
main  body  of  the  Confederate  forces  at  Manassas  Junction, 
and  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  command  of  the  troops  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  The  principal  Federal  army,  under 
McDowell,  lay  in  front  of  Beauregard.  Patterson,  in  the 
Valley,  confronted  Johnston.  The  enemy  had  adopted,  under 
the  advice  of  General  Lee,  a  strictly  defensive  policy.  Beau- 
regard,  on  the  other  hand,  advised,  as  early  as  the  12th  of 
June,  that  Johnston  should  unite  his  forces  with  the  main 
body,  and  that  an  effort  should  be  made  to  capture  Alexan 
dria  and  Arlington  Heights.  But  this  suggestion  was  not 
received  by  the  President  with  favor,1  and  things  went  on  in 
the  same  way  for  another  month,  when  it  became  evident  that 
the  National  forces  intended  taking  the  offensive  at  an  early 
day,  and  equally  plain,  at  least  to  General  Beauregard,  that 
the  advance  would  be  made  against  his  army  at  Manassas, 
and  not  against  Johnston's  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  He 
therefore  recommended  the  immediate  transfer  of  the  latter 
force  to  the  main  army.  He  sent  an  aide  to  Richmond  on 
July  14  to  represent  the  danger  of  a  Federal  advance  with 
overwhelming  numbers  and  to  urge  that  he  should  be  re-en 
forced  by  the  bulk  of  Johnston's  army.  As  soon  as  this 
should  be  done,  he  proposed  to  take  the  offensive  against  the 
Federals  in  front  of  Washington.  But  Davis  and  Lee  de 
clined  to  act  upon  the  suggestion.  They  may,  as  Colonel 
Roman  claims,  have  been  wrong ;  but  it  strikes  us  as  probable 
that  the  extremely  sanguine  hue  which  Beauregard  gave  to 

1  2  W.  R.,  923. 


6         CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

his  project,  and  the  predictions  of  unlimited  success  which 
he  authorized  his  aide  to  make  to  the  President  and  General 
Lee,  —  such  as  "  exterminating  "  Scott  and  McDowell,  "  driv 
ing  them  into  the  Potomac,"  then  going  to  the  Valley  and 
"  destroying "  Patterson,  and  after  this  had  been  achieved 
re-enforcing  Garnett  in  West  Virginia  and  defeating  McClel- 
lan,  and  finally  crossing  into  Maryland,  "  arousing  the  people  " 
and  attacking  Washington,  —  may  have  had  a  good  deal  to  do 
with  their  hesitation  to  take  the  first  step  which  Beauregard 
proposed,  the  transfer  to  the  army  at  Manassas  of  the  bulk  of 
the  forces  in  the  Valley.  In  fact,  Beauregard's  imagination, 
while  it  often  enabled  him  to  foresee  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  with  really  astonishing  accuracy,  and  to  find  ways  and 
means  of  counteracting  them,  was  generally  allowed  too  prom 
inent  a  place  in  his  projects.  Beauregard  had  a  great  deal 
of  the  sanguine  and  excitable  nature  of  a  Frenchman  about 
him ;  and  this  quality,  together  with  his  never-failing  and  al 
ways  expressed  belief  that  the  course  which  he  advocated 
would  be  followed  by  complete  and  overwhelming  success,  un 
doubtedly  jarred  upon  the  nerves  of  the  elderly  Anglo-Saxon 
military  men,  Davis,  Lee,  Johnston,  and  the  rest  with  whom 
he  had  to  do,  and  created  in  their  minds  a  feeling  of  distrust, 
which  most  of  our  readers  will  not  fail  to  understand,  and 
even,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  sympathize  with.  Still,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Davis  and  his  advisers  allowed  their 
prejudices  to  carry  them  too  far.  Beauregard,  in  his  advice 
to  them  at  this  time,  as  afterwards  on  other  and  also  impor 
tant  occasions,  was  supplying  a  want  which  none  of  them 
could  supply.  In  imagination,  in  enterprise,  in  daring,  he 
was  their  superior.  His  suggestions  were,  moreover,  the 
suggestions  of  a  trained  military  mind,  in  possession  of  all  the 
facts  of  the  case  which  could  be  at  that  time  ascertained ;  and 
so  far  as  concerned  the  first  step  which  he  recommended,  — 
that  the  bulk  of  Johnston's  forces  should  be  at  once  trans 
ferred  to  his  own  command,  —  he  was  not  only  right,  but  the 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  7 

peril  against  which  he  was  urging  them  to  provide  was  even 
more  imminent  than  any  one  then  supposed. 

Beauregard's  advice,  as  we  have  seen,  was  given  on  Sun 
day,  the  14th.  On  Tuesday,  the  16th,  McDowell  began  his 
march.  On  the  17th  he  occupied  Fairfax  Court  House. 
Not  till  then  was  Johnston  ordered  to  join  Beauregard,  and 
no  part  of  his  troops  arrived  till  the  20th.  A  portion,  as 
is  well  known,  came  up  on  Sunday  afternoon,  the  21st,  while 
the  battle  was  in  full  progress  ;  and  had  McDowell  been  able 
to  adhere  to  his  original  plan  of  attacking  the  enemy's  right, 
at  Blackburn's  and  Mitchell's  Fords,  and  below  them,  the 
battle  must  have  taken  place  before  a  single  regiment  of 
Johnston's  command  had  reached  Manassas  Junction,  or 
Beauregard  must  have  fallen  back  without  a  fight,  which  is 
perhaps  more  probable. 

It  appears  that  the  idea  of  a  pursuit  of  the  Federal  forces 
after  the  rout  at  Bull  Run  was  never  entertained,  either  by 
Davis,  Johnston,  or  Beauregard ;  the  want  of  transportation 
rendered  it  out  of  the  question.  But  about  the  last  of  Sep 
tember,  1861,  both  Johnston  and  Beauregard  strongly  urged 
that  the  strength  of  the  army  should  be  raised  to  sixty  thou 
sand  men,  and  that  the  war  should  be  carried  into  Maryland. 
The  plan  was  to  cross  at  Edwards's  or  Conrad's  Ferry,  and 
then  to  march  on  Washington  ;  relying  on  the  greater  cohe 
sion  and  elan  of  the  Southern  army  to  defeat  the  then  raw 
troops  of  General  McClellan.  But  Mr.  Davis  refused  his 
assent,  and  the  project  was  abandoned. 

We  next  find  Beauregard  sent  to  the  West,  where  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  had  suffered  serious  reverses.  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson  had  been  taken,  with  many  guns  and  thousands 
of  prisoners.  The  States  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  had 
been  nearly  abandoned ;  the  Mississippi  had  been  opened  as 
far  as  Island  No.  10  ;  the  Confederate  forces  had  been  widely 
separated.  In  this  state  of  things,  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
conceived  the  brilliant  plan  of  reuniting  at  the  earliest  mo- 


8         CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

nient  the  wings  of  the  army ;  calling  up  all  outlying  detach 
ments  and  all  possible  re-enforcements,  and  attacking  the 
Federal  army  under  Grant  before  it  could  be  augmented  by 
the  forces  of  Buell.  We  do  not  care  to  discuss  the  question 
how  the  merit  of  this  plan  is  to  be  apportioned.  Suffice  it  to 
say  that  both  commanders  entered  heartily  into  it,  and  that 
their  daring  scheme  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Confederate 
cause  in  the  West  was  gallantly  supported  by  their  troops. 
The  battle  of  Shiloh,  fought  on  April  6,  7,  1862,  was  a  battle 
of  the  old-fashioned  kind,  —  a  pitched  battle  ;  and  after  the 
advantage  which  the  Confederates  derived  from  their  surprise 
of  our  army  had  been  exhausted,  it  was  a  very  hard-fought 
battle.  It  was  a  new  experience  to  the  troops  on  both  sides, 
and  was  an  education  in  itself. 

Beauregard  has  been  criticised  for  not  having  accomplished 
more  on  the  first  day  ;  but  we  fail  to  see  that  anything  more 
was  possible. 

Corinth,  a  very  important  railway  and  strategic  centre,  to 
which  Beauregard  retreated  after  the  battle,  was  held  against 
Halleck  and  his  greatly  superior  force  until  May  30,  when 
Beauregard  drew  off  his  army  in  excellent  order  and  condition, 
His  health  now  requiring  attention,  he  was  relieved  from 
duty.  We  find  him  next  at  Charleston,  where  he  arrived  in 
September  of  the  same  year.  Here  he  wras  already  well 
known  and  highly  thought  of  ;  and  here,  too,  was  a  chance  for 
him  to  display  those  resources  of  engineering  art  which  he 
possessed  in  so  great  a  degree.  The  autumn  and  winter  were 
occupied  in  providing  for  the  assaults  which  were  sure  to  be 
made  in  the  ensuing  spring.  Beauregard's  activity,  indus 
try  and  skill  were  never  displayed  on  a  better  field.  Finally 
the  long-expected  blow  was  delivered.  On  April  7,  1863, 
Admiral  Dupont,  with  a  fleet  of  ironclads,  attacked  Fort 
Sumter;  but  after  some  hours  of  gallant  and  determined 
fighting,  the  ships  were  obliged  to  confess  themselves  beaten 
by  the  forts. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  9 

Two  months  after  this  event  General  Gillmore  superseded 
General  Hunter  in  charge  of  the  land  operations  against 
Charleston.  We  observe  that  General  Beauregard  considers 
that  his  plan  of  attack  was  faulty.  "  It  was  fortunate,"  says 
Colonel  Roman,  speaking  the  views  of  General  Beauregard, 
"  that,  shortly  afterwards,  the  new  commanding  general,  on 
whose  daring  and  engineering  ability  the  North  greatly  relied, 
preferred  making  his  attack  by  Morris  Island,  instead  of 
on  the  broad  and  weak  front  of  James  Island,  where  he  might 
have  penetrated  our  long,  attenuated  lines,  and  taken  Charles 
ton  in  flank  and  rear.  Nothing  then  could  have  prevented 
Sumter  from  falling;  for  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  General 
Gillmore  would  have  immediately  increased  the  armament  at 
and  around  Fort  Johnson,  and  have  thus  completely  com 
manded  the  interior  harbor.  The  possession  of  Charleston 
and  of  all  the  South  Carolina  seacoast  would  have  followed 
as  a  necessary  sequence."  It  is  not  for  us  to  decide  between 
two  such  authorities,  but  merely  to  state  the  different  views. 
That  Gillmore' s  opponent  should  entertain  the  view  that  his 
plan  was  a  faulty  one  in  its  conception  is  certainly  an  inter 
esting  fact. 

Whether  General  Gillmore  did  or  did  not  adopt  the  proper 
line  of  attack,  it  is  undeniable  that  Beauregard  foiled  him  in 
his  efforts  to  take  Sumter  and  to  capture  Charleston.  Sumter, 
its  batteries  silenced,  was,  it  is  true,  reduced  to  something  very 
much  resembling  a  pile  of  stones  and  rubbish  ;  but  the  Confed 
erate  flag  on  the  flagstaff  on  its  summit  was  daily  saluted, 
night  and  morning,  until  the  march  of  Sherman  through 
South  Carolina  forced  the  evacuation  of  Charleston  and  its 
forts.  And  the  book  before  us  gives  an  interesting  account 
of  the  marvellous  daring,  and  the  equally  marvellous  engineer 
ing  skill  and  fertility  of  resource,  by  which  the  cradle  of 
secession  was  for  so  long  a  period  defended  against  its  power 
ful  antagonists. 

By   the    spring   of   1864    the   Federal  operations   against 


10      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Charleston  had  virtually  ceased.  It  was  considered  impracti 
cable  to  effect  anything  further  without  the  aid  of  a  more 
powerful  land  force ;  and  the  plans  of  the  government  con 
templated  the  employment  in  Virginia  of  General  Gillmore 
himself,  and  of  a  large  portion  of  the  troops  which  he  had 
been  commanding  in  the  Department  of  the  South.  In  April 
Beauregard  was  also  ordered  to  Virginia,  to  assist  in  the  de 
fence  of  Richmond. 

General  Grant,  who  had  recently  been  placed  at  the  head 
of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  had  determined  to 
accompany  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  march  from  the 
Rapidaii  upon  Richmond.  He  had  also  prepared  an  auxiliary 
expedition  under  General  Butler,  which  should  land  at  City 
Point,  where  the  Appomattox  empties  into  the  James. 
Butler  was  instructed  to  make  Richmond  his  "  objective 
point."  l 

Of  all  this,  nothing,  of  course,  was  known  at  Richmond. 
But  the  somewhat  ostentatious  reorganization  of  the  Ninth 
Corps,  at  Annapolis,  awakened  the  suspicions  of  General 
Beauregard.  He  scented  danger  in  the  air.  He  felt  sure 
that  the  Federal  Generals  intended  to  make  a  bold  and  vigor 
ous  campaign,  and  he  was  fully  alive  to  the  exposed  condition 
of  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  But  at  this  moment,  just  on  the 
eve  of  the  campaign,  just  when  the  Confederate  government 
should  have  been  completing  their  preparations  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  capital  and  its  approaches,  he  finds  they  have 
denuded  Petersburg  of  troops  in  an  ill-advised  attempt  to  re 
capture  Newbern,  North  Carolina.  On  the  22d  of  April, 
1864,  he  arrived  at  Weldon ;  on  the  25th  he  urged  upon 
General  Bragg,  then  commanding  the  forces  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  under  the  supervision  of  President  Davis,  the  proba 
bility  of  an  immediate  attack  upon  Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
and  the  danger  of  scattering  the  forces  of  the  department. 
But  his  representations  were  of  no  avail.  Full  of  the 
1  67  W.  R..  16. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  11 

project  of  repossessing  themselves  of  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina,  the  administration  disregarded  Beauregard's  ad 
vice,  until,  on  the  4th  of  May,  Butler,  with  30,000  men, 
had  landed  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  Then,  indeed,  there  was 
a  hurried  concentration.  From  Plymouth  and  the  Neuse, 
from  Wilmington  and  from  Charleston,  troops  were  hurried 
up  to  Richmond  "  with  the  greatest  despatch."  "  There 
was,"  as  Davis  said  in  his  telegram  of  May  4,  "  not  an  hour 
to  lose." 

Fortunately  for  the  Confederates,  the  expedition  to  Ber 
muda  Hundred  was  not  under  the  direction  of  an  able  and 
enterprising  soldier.  There  was  a  delay  of  a  few  days  before 
anything  was  even  attempted,  and  then  the  attempt  was  a  poor 
affair.  Two  good  officers  of  the  regular  army,  commanded  by 
a  civilian  general,  did  not  make  a  strong  board  of  direction. 
Beauregard  had  leisure  to  collect  his  forces.  By  the  time  he 
was  ready  to  strike  —  for  his  usual  policy,  and  it  was  generally 
a  good  one,  and  it  proved  an  especially  wise  one  in  the  present 
case,  was  to  take  the  offensive  —  he  found  that  our  troops 
had  advanced  towards  Richmond  from  Bermuda  Hundred, 
had  taken  possession  of  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
railroad,  and  were  facing  north ;  their  line  extending  from 
the  river  on  the  right,  not  far  from  Drury's  Bluff,  to  a 
point  beyond  the  railroad  in  a  westerly  direction.  Between 
this  line  and  Richmond  was  the  little  army  of  Beauregard. 
In  Petersburg  was  a  Confederate  division  under  Major- 
General  Whiting.  Beauregard's  plan  was  to  make  his  main 
attack  on  our  extreme  right,  close  to  the  river,  and  so  cut  us 
off  from  our  base  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  while  Whiting's 
division  was  to  assault  us  in  rear.  The  result  was  a  serious 
defeat  for  our  forces,  which  would  doubtless  have  been  a 
more  crushing  one  had  Whiting's  division  participated  in  the 
action.  But  owing,  it  is  said,  to  the  fault  of  that  officer,  this 
part  of  the  plan  was  not  carried  out. 

The    outcome   of    this    brilliant   affair   was   that    General 


12       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Butler's  operations  came  abruptly  to  an  end.  He  retired  to 
Bermuda  Hundred,  fortifying  the  short  neck  of  land  between 
the  James  and  the  Appomattox  which  constituted  the  westerly 
line  of  his  position ;  and,  when  Beauregard  had  constructed 
a  like  series  of  works  opposite  to  his,  "his  army,"  to  use 
General  Grant's  celebrated  phrase,  "  though  in  a  position  of 
great  security,  was  as  completely  shut  off  from  further  opera 
tions  directly  against  Richmond  as  if  it  had  been  in  a  bottle 
strongly  corked."  1  Having  for  the  time  being  thus  disposed 
of  the  immediate  danger,  Beauregard  made,  on  the  18th  of 
May,  one  of  his  characteristic  proposals  to  the  Confederate 
war  department. 

Lee  and  Grant  were  confronting  each  other  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  some  fifty  or  sixty  miles  from  Richmond.  This  pro 
position  shows  so  well  the  military  sagacity  of  Beauregard  that 
we  venture  to  copy  the  greater  part  of  his  letter  :  — 

"  Memorandum.  The  crisis  demands  prompt  and  decisive 
action.  The  two  armies  are  now  too  far  apart  to  secure 
success,  unless  we  consent  to  give  up  Petersburg,  and  thus 
place  the  capital  in  jeopardy.  If  General  Lee  will  fall  back 
behind  the  Chickahominy,  engaging  the  enemy  so  as  to  draw 
him  on,  General  Beauregard  can  bring  up  15,000  men  to 
unite  with  Breckinridge  [who  had  been  sent  for  from  the 
Valley]  and  fall  upon  the  enemy's  flank  with  over  20,000 
effectives,  thus  rendering  Grant's  defeat  certain  and  decisive, 
and  in  time  to  enable  General  Beauregard  to  return  with 
re-enforcements  from  General  Lee  to  drive  Butler  from 
before  Petersburg  and  from  his  present  position  in  advance 
of  Bermuda  Hundred.  Petersburg  and  Richmond  could  be 
held  three  days,  or  four  at  most,  by  the  forces  left  there 
for  that  purpose.  Without  such  concentration  nothing 
decisive  can  be  effected,  and  the  picture  presented  is  one 
of  ultimate  starvation.  Without  concentration  General  Lee 
must  eventually  fall  back  before  Grant's  heavy  re-enforce- 

i  G7  W.  R.,  20. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  13 

ments,  whereas  the  plan  presented  merely  anticipates  this 
movement  for  offensive  purposes."  l 

It  certainly  may  be  said  that,  had  this  plan  been  carried 
out,  the  battle  would  have  been  fought  when  the  army  under 
Grant  was  by  no  means  as  strong  as  it  was  on  the  day  of 
Cold  Harbor.  But  whether  the  united  forces  of  Lee  and 
Beauregard  could  have  inflicted  a  "  decisive  "  defeat  upon  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  entrenched  as  it  would  unquestionably 
have  been,  we  take  the  liberty,  pace  General  Beauregard, 
to  doubt.  Yet  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  what  he 
predicted  in  this  memorandum  actually  came  to  pass.  True 
it  was  that  without  such  a  concentration  as  he  urged  nothing 
could  be  effected,  and  that  "  the  picture  presented  was  one 
of  ultimate  starvation  ; "  that  is,  of  inaction  and  decay, 
resulting  in  inevitable  and  utter  failure.  It  may  well  be  that 
Beauregard's  counsel  was  not  only  bold  but  wise. 

No  attention  seems  to  have  been  paid  to  it,2  however,  and 
the  armies  of  Grant  and  Lee  occupied  a  fortnight  in  getting 
down  to  Cold  Harbor  ;  the  re-enforcements  received  by  Grant 
during  this  time  largely  exceeding  those  received  by  Lee.  To 
fight  his  great  battle  Grant  took  the  Eighteenth  Corps  away 
from  Bermuda  Hundred.  After  he  had  delivered  his  ill- 
advised  assault  on  the  lines  of  Cold  Harbor,  there  was  for 
a  time  a  lull  in  the  progress  of  the  campaign.  But  this  was 
merely  to  concert  a  scheme,  by  which  Grant  hoped  to  seize 
Petersburg  with  his  whole  army,  while  Lee  was  still  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  James.  This  masterly  movement,  the 
successful  accomplishment  of  which  has  been  generally 
overlooked  in  considering  the  extremely  unsatisfactory  per 
formances  of  the  Federal  army  after  it  had  arrived  before 
Petersburg,  was  begun  on  the  12th  of  June. 

1  68  W.  R.,  1021. 

2  It  was  sent  to  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War,  by  Bragg,  May  19  (68  W.  R., 
1023),    with  adverse  comments  for  President  Davis    (/&.,  1024)  ;  and  Seddon 
took  no  action  on  the  plan  (76.,  1025). 


14      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

General  Grant  saw  that  unless  he  could  induce  General 
Lee  to  believe  that  he  was  aiming  at  Richmond  his  object 
would  not  be  achieved.  Therefore,  after  breaking  camp  at 
Cold  Harbor,  he  manoeuvred  so  skilfully  on  the  Chickahominy 
and  near  Charles  City  Cross  Roads  that  he  completely  deceived 
his  adversary,  both  as  to  his  whereabouts  and  his  intentions. 
Smith's  corps,  the  Eighteenth,  was  put  on  transports,  and 
sent  back  to  Bermuda  Hundred,  where  it  arrived  on  the 
14th,  and  moved  at  once  upon  Petersburg.  A  pontoon 
bridge  was  laid  across  the  James  at  Windmill  Point,  below 
the  junction  with  the  Appomattox,  and  the  Second  Corps, 
tinder  General  Hancock,  despite  an  entirely  unnecessary 
delay  at  the  crossing,  for  which  nobody  seems  to  have  been 
responsible,  reached,  with  two  divisions,  the  outer  works  of 
Petersburg  about  dark  on  the  15th,  just  after  Smith,  who 
had  come  up  before  noon,  had  succeeded  in  capturing  them. 

Ever  since  the  7th,  Beauregard  had  foreseen  this  movement 
of  Grant's.  He  had  been  obliged  to  weaken  his  small  force 
by  sending  Hoke's  division  and  two  brigades  of  Johnston's 
division  to  Lee,  in  anticipation  of  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  ; 
and  all  that  he  had  to  depend  upon  was  the  remainder  of 
Johnston's  division,  which  was  in  front  of  Bermuda  Hundred, 
and  Wise's  brigade,  Dearing's  cavalry,  and  a  few  militia  at 
Petersburg.  On  the  7th  he  begged  Bragg  to  return  his 
troops  from  Lee's  army,  expressing  his  belief  that  "  Grant 
.  .  .  doubtless  intends  operations  against  Richmond  along 
James  River,  probably  on  south  side." l  On  the  9th  lie 
wrote  a  careful  memorandum  to  General  Bragg,  suggesting 
that  Grant  would  probably  operate  from  Bermuda  Hundred 
as  a  base  against  Petersburg.2  At  last,  on  the  very  morning 
when  Smith's  corps  appeared  before  Petersburg,  Hoke's 
division  was  allowed  to  leave  Drury's  Bluff  for  Petersburg. 
It  arrived  just  in  time  for  one  of  its  brigades  to  participate 
in  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  of  Wise  from  the  outer 
1  09  W.  R.,  878.  ~2  Ib.,  880. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  15 

line,  which  Smith  had  broken  in  the  afternoon.  Beauregard 
instantly  decided  that  the  enemy's  main  attack  was  against 
Petersburg,  and  he  at  once  withdrew  Johnston's  division 
from  the  lines  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  Gracie's  brigade  also 
arrived  from  Lee's  army.  His  forces  did  not  exceed  15,000 
men.  Colonel  Roman  puts  them  at  a  "  total  effective  of 
about  10,000  men,"  but  we  think  the  larger  number  is  nearer 
the  fact. 

But  not  only  were  the  Eighteenth  Corps  and  two  divisions 
of  the  Second  Corps  the  assailants  of  Petersburg.  On  the 
morning  of  the  16th  of  June  the  remaining  division  of  the 
Second  Corps  appeared,  and,  soon  after,  the  Ninth  Corps, 
one  division  (Neill's)  of  the  Sixth  (the  other  two  being  sent 
to  Bermuda  Hundred) ,  and,  later  in  the  day,  the  Fifth  Corps. 
One  division  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  was,  however,  sent  to 
Bermuda  Hundred. 

Beauregard' s  little  force  maintained  such  a  firm  front,  and 
held  still  such  advanced  positions,  that  the  Federal  generals 
were  deceived  as  to  its  strength.  It  was  not  till  dark  on 
the  16th  that  an  assault  was  ordered.  It  was  measurably 
successful.  But  although  a  portion  of  the  lines  was  carried, 
the  remainder  was  obstinately  held,  and  attempt  after  attempt 
was  made  during  the  night  to  recover  the  lost  ground.  The 
next  morning,  the  17th,  Potter's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
made  a  brilliant  assault  on  the  left  of  our  line,  capturing 
guns  and  prisoners ;  but  there  was  no  proper  provision  to 
support  the  attack,  although  the  Fifth  Corps  was  lying  idle  on 
the  left  of  the  Ninth.  The  other  two  white  divisions  of  the 
Ninth  Corps  were  put  in  during  the  day  and  evening ;  but 
they  were  put  in  one  after  the  other,  without  being  supported 
to  any  effective  degree  either  by  each  other  or  by  the  corps  on 
the  left  and  right,  the  Fifth  and  Second.  The  first  division 
of  the  Ninth  Corps,  for  instance,  made  a  brilliant  charge  at 
dusk,  and  captured  the  enemy's  works ;  but  it  was  allowed  to 
be  driven  out  again,  for  want  of  re-enforcements  and  ammu- 


16       CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

nition.  On  our  right,  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  won  some 
important  ground,  but  their  generals  seem  to  have  remained 
satisfied  with  very  inadequate  results.  In  fact,  while  allow 
ance  must  of  course  be  made  for  the  fatigue  of  the  troops, 
it  is  really  impossible  to  understand  the  utter  failure  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  improve  its  golden  opportunity  of 
taking  Petersburg  on  June  16  and  17,  except  on  the  hypo 
thesis  that  Beauregard's  handling  of  his  forces  completely 
deceived  our  commanders.  His  policy  was  so  daring  that 
his  adversaries  supposed  they  were  fighting  the  whole  or 
a  large  part  of  the  army  of  General  Lee.  No  one  could 
imagine  that  with  12,000  or  15,000  men  a  general  would  un 
dertake  to  hold  such  an  extended  front,  to  stick  so  obstinately 
to  weak  and  untenable  positions,  to  try  repeatedly  by  des 
perate  counter- assaults  to  recapture  the  ground  which  had 
been  wrested  from  him.  The  tactics  of  the  Confederate 
general  were  bold  indeed.  Had  the  Fifth  Corps,  at  any  time 
while  the  rest  of  the  army  was  engaging  Beauregard's  forces, 
marched  up  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Eoad  into  Petersburg,  the 
whole  game  would  have  been  up.  But  this  seems  not  to 
have  been  even  thought  of.  We  repeat  that  it  is  no  wonder 
that  the  unaccountable  failure  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  accomplish  anything  of  moment  during  these  two  days 
has  obscured  the  brilliant  strategy  by  which  the  army  had 
these  two  days  given  to  it  in  which  to  make  itself  master  of 
Petersburg. 

For,  during  all  this  time,  Lee  was  on  the  north  side  of 
the  James,  fully  expecting  that  Grant  intended  a  direct 
move  on  Richmond.  Able  as  Lee  undoubtedly  was,  he  failed 
on  this  occasion  to  divine  his  opponent's  scheme.  Nor 
could  Beauregard  rouse  him  to  a  sense  of  the  danger  of 
the  situation.  Despatch  after  despatch,  aide  after  aide,  were 
sent  to  Richmond  ;  but  the  alarming  news  they  brought  was 
attributed  to  Beauregard's  too  fertile  imagination.  Among 
the  most  curious  stories  in  the  book  are  those  of  the  staff 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  17 

officers  whom  Beauregard  sent  at  this  time  to  General  Lee. 
It  was  not  till  Beauregard  telegraphed,  on  the  17th,  that, 
unless  re-enforced,  he  would  have  to  evacuate  Petersburg 
by  noon  of  the  next  day,  that  Lee  consented  to  move  to 
Petersburg ;  and  even  then  he  expressed  himself  as  "  not  yet 
satisfied  of  General  Grant's  movements."1 

On  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the  18th,  accordingly,  Gen 
eral  Lee's  army  began  to  appear.  On  that  day  the  same 
fatality  pursued  the  Federal  leaders  as  had  marked  their 
doings  for  the  preceding  forty-eight  hours.  Meade's  order  to 
attack  at  daybreak,  which  could  have  been  and  ought  to  have 
been  carried  out  to  the  letter,  would  even  then  have  gained 
us  the  possession  of  Petersburg.  When  our  troops  moved, 
early  on  Saturday  morning,  they  found  the  lines  of  the  night 
before  abandoned  ;  in  pressing  on,  they  allowed  themselves  to 
be  detained  by  the  enemy's  skirmishers  ;  finally,  they  arrived 
in  front  of  the  formidable  positions,  near  the  city  itself,  on 
which  Beauregard,  with  excellent  judgment,  had  placed  his 
little  force,  and  which  were  the  positions  held  to  the  end  of 
the  war.  Here  our  corps  commanders  saw  fit  to  halt ;  and 
while  they  were  thus  delaying  in  front  of  the  thin  lines  of 
Beauregard,  —  which  at  that  moment  they  could  either  have 
broken  by  a  direct  assault,  or  have  turned  by  way  of  the 
Jerusalem  Road,  —  the  gallant  little  force  which  had  so  well 
defended  Petersburg  was  re-enforced  by  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  At  half  past  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  appeared 
General  Lee  himself,  at  the  head  of  Kershaw's  division. 
And  when,  after  a  sufficient  time  had  been  spent  in  making 
preparation,  the  Federal  army  delivered  their  assault,  it  was 
a  total  failure.  Despite  of  the  greatest  courage  and  self- 
devotion  on  the  part  of  both  officers  and  men,  we  were 
repulsed  at  every  point  with  great  slaughter.  Our  want  of 
enterprise  had  cost  us  dear. 

Beauregard  was  in  Petersburg  at  the  time  of  the  explosion 

1  2  Roman's  Beauregard,  582 ;  cf.  81  W.  R.,  C64. 


18       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

of  the  mine,  on  the  30th  of  July,  1864,  and  Colonel  Roman 
gives  ns  much  that  is  interesting  and  valuable  in  regard  to 
that  most  unfortunate  day. 

In  the  autumn  of  1864,  Beauregard  was  again  sent  to  the 
West,  to  command  the  armies  of  Hood  and  Taylor.  His 
authority  over  these  officers  seems  not  to  have  been  very 
clearly  denned.  He  certainly  took  no  active  part  in  the 
disastrous  campaign  of  General  Hood. 

But  in  the  winter  and  early  spring  of  1865  we  find  him, 
at  first  alone,  afterward*  with  his  old  comrade,  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  working  hard  to  get  together  a  respectable  force, 
to  arrest  the  progress  of  Sherman  in  the  Caroliiias.  Matters 
were  at  a  desperate  pass  for  the  Southern  cause.  The 
"  march  to  the  sea  "  gave  the  Federals  two  armies  on  the 
Atlantic  coast.  Sherman  left  Savannah  on  the  1st  of 
February,  on  his  march  northward,  and  to  the  armies  of 
Grant  and  Lee  "  there  came,"  as  Swinton  well  says,  "  rolling 
across  the  plains  of  the  Caroliiias,  beating  nearer  and  nearer, 
the  drums  of  Champion's  Hill  and  Shiloh !  "  1  Unless  Sherman 
could  be  stopped,  the  Confederacy  was  doomed.  On  the  other 
hand,  such  was  the  weariness  of  the  war  in  the  North  and  in 
Europe,  and  so  precarious  seemed  the  condition  of  the  Federal 
finances,  that  a  severe  defeat  inflicted  upon  Sherman,  while 
in  the  Caroliiias,  might  yet,  so  some  sagacious  men  thought, 
restore  the  fallen  fortunes  of  the  South.  It  might  accomplish 
for  the  Confederacy  what  was  accomplished  for  the  colonies 
by  the  bloody  and  indecisive  battle  of  Guilford  Court 
House,  which  Greene  forced  upon  Comwallis  in  March,  1781. 

But  to  effect  this  required  the  instant  adoption  of  a 
policy  of  concentration.  Augusta,  Columbia,  Goldsboro', 
Wilmington,  Charleston,  —  even,  as  Beauregard  thought, 
Richmond  itself,  —  should  be  abandoned  at  once.  Any  and 
every  sacrifice  of  local  feeling  should  be  unhesitatingly  made. 
No  associations  were  too  sacred  to  be  given  up,  if  only  a  force 
1  Swinton,  Decisive  Battles,  480. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  19 

could  be  raised  capable  of  coping  with  Sherman's  powerful 
and  well-appointed  army.  This  policy  Beauregard  strongly 
advocated.  He  soon,  however,  found  obstacles  in  his  way. 
The  Confederacy  had  deeply  felt  the  loss  of  Savannah.  But 
to  abandon  Charleston  was  too  terrible  even  to  think  of. 
General  Hardee  doubted  and  delayed  at  the  last  moment. 
Davis  ordered  him  to  postpone  the  evacuation  of  the  city  as 
long  as  was  prudent,  hoping  "  to  save  the  pain  of  seeing  it 
pass  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy."  From  causes  like  this, 
Beauregard' s  policy  was  blocked  at  every  stage ;  the  result 
fell  far  short  of  his  hopes.  Sherman,  in  the  mean  time,  was 
steadily  pursuing  his  onward  course.  He  compelled  the 
evacuation  of  Augusta,  Columbia,  Charleston  and  Wilming 
ton,  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  his  admirable  strategy. 
He  completely  deceived  his  adversaries  as  to  his  real  inten 
tions  ;  he  kept  them  separated  from  each  other  ;  and  it  was 
not  until  his  masterly  march  from  Savannah  to  Goldsboro' 
was  well-nigh  completed  that  Johnston,  who  had  succeeded 
Beauregard  in  command,  was  able  to  strike  the  well-meant 
but  feeble  blows  of  Bentonville  and  Averysboro'.  Sherman 
had  deserved  his  success. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Richmond  and  the  surrender  of 
General  Lee,  Mr.  Davis  had  an  interview  with  Johnston 
and  Beauregard  at  Greensboro',  North  Carolina.  Of  this 
interview  General  Johnston,  in  the  appendix  to  the  second 
volume,1  gives  a  curious  account.  The  military  men  were  all 
of  a  mind.  They  considered  the  situation  as  hopeless,  and 
so  expressed  themselves.  With  them  agreed  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Breckinridge,  and  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet 
except  the  President  and  Mr.  Benjamin.  The  latter,  General 
Johnston  says,  "  repeated  something  very  like  Sempronius's 
speech  for  war.  Mr.  Davis,"  the  General  goes  on  to  say, 
"  received  these  suggestions  of  mine  as  if  annoyed  by  them." 
Beauregard  reports  that  the  President  said  that  the  struggle 

1  2  Roman's  Beauregard,  664. 


20       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

could  still  be  carried  on  to  a  successful  issue  by  bringing  out 
all  the  latent  resources  of  the  Confederacy,  and,  if  necessary, 
by  crossing  the  Mississippi  and  uniting  with  Kirby  Smith's 
forces.  But  he  was  finally  compelled  to  hear  reason,  and 
General  Johnston  was  permitted  to  open  negotiations  with 
Sherman. 

Here  we  leave  our  subject.  It  needs  not  to  be  said  that 
Colonel  Roman's  book  is  a  very  important  contribution  to  our 
history  ;  that  no  library  which  aims  at  getting  together  the 
important  works  on  the  late  war  can  omit  it.  It  is  long, 
and  it  is  written  with  more  minuteness  on  certain  topics 
than  seems  to  us  to  be  necessary.  But  there  may  well  be 
questions  in  the  investigation  of  which  one  would  find  that 
these  pains  had  all  been  well  bestowed.  The  book  bears 
throughout  abundant  evidence  of  a  very  strong  feeling 
against  the  late  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
We  have  purposely  refrained  from  bringing  this  feature 
into  prominence ;  nor  do  we  deem  it  necessary  to  say  more 
here  than  that  the  reader  will  find  in  this  work  many  grave 
charges  of  inefficiency,  obstinacy  and  prejudice  against  the 
administration  of  Mr.  Davis,  and  a  good  deal  of  evidence  in 
their  favor. 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER 

BY 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE, 

BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,  U.  S.  A. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  April  14, 1884. 


The  following  are  the  titles  of  books  by  Colonel  Dodge,  concerning  the  Civil 
War:  — 

A  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL  WAR.    Boston :  James  R.  Osgood  and 

Company.     1883. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.     Second  edition.    Boston:   Ticknor 

and  Company.     1881. 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER. 


THE  proper  rank  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant  as  a  soldier  is  far 
from  easy  to  determine.  Possessing  in  an  eminent  degree 
some  of  the  qualifications  which  go  to  make  up  a  great 
captain,  he  yet  showed  during  his  military  career,  on  more 
than  one  occasion,  a  singular  lack  of  aptitude  in  using  what 
are  recognized  as  the  best  methods  of  modern  war.  His 
few  brilliant  successes  were  won  against  generals  of  confes 
sedly  second-rate  capacity ;  and  when  he  met  opponents  of 
acknowledged  strength,  he  accomplished  the  results  he  aimed 
at  only  with  the  aid  of  largely  preponderating  forces.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  Grant  did  accomplish  a  vast  work 
during  our  Civil  War  ;  but  are  we  to  ascribe  his  achievements 
to  his  own  military  skill,  or  to  attendant  favorable  conditions  ? 
Recognizing  as  fully  as  any  one  the  eminent  services  of 
General  Grant,  mindful  of  that  singularly  self-contained 
power  which  compelled  from  all  his  subordinates  an  unreserved 
and  trusting  admiration,  the  few  suggestions  laid  before  you 
in  this  paper  are  made  rather  with  the  purpose  of  calling 
out  the  views  of  others  than  as  throwing  any  additional 
light  on  this  much  mooted  question.  As  a  mere  question, 
it  is  of  interest.  General  Grant  was  the  finally  successful 
leader  of  our  armies  during  one  of  the  greatest  of  modern 
wars ;  he  commanded  in  civilized  warfare  greater  armies  than 
any  other  general  ever  led ;  he  won  where  all  before  him 
had  failed.  Despite  all  which,  there  is  more  disagreement 
as  to  the  ability  shown  in  his  campaigns  than  exists  with 
reference  to  those  of  any  other  of  our  generals.  If  no  more 


24      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

can  be  done,  it  is  well  to  gather  together  all  the  elements 
which  go  to  make  up  a  satisfactory  record  of  his  talent  as  a 
soldier.  Much  that  will  be  said  is  by  no  means  new ;  but 
the  mere  assembling  of  some  facts  and  opinions  may  lead 
others  to  arrive  at  a  more  satisfactory  conclusion.  A  hasty 
glance  at  Grant's  history,  from  1861  to  1865,  though  it  must 
of  necessity  be  extremely  superficial,  is  perhaps  the  easiest 
method  of  arriving  at  this  end. 

The  affair  at  Behnont  (November,  1861)  was  the  first 
occasion  on  which  Grant  measured  swords  with  the  enemy. 
There  appears  to  have  been  no  controlling  reason  for  this 
expedition.  In  all  of  Grant's  subsequent  work,  he  seems  to 
have  had  in  view  a  very  definite  object  which  he  was  wont 
often  to  pursue  in  the  face  of  difficulties,  and  which  would 
have  sent  most  other  men  to  the  right-about.  The  alleged 
purpose  of  the  Behnont  demonstration  was  to  prevent  Polk  at 
Columbus  from  sending  re-enforcements  to  Price  in  Missouri ; 
but  an  attack  on  Columbus  itself  would  appear  to  have  been 
the  proper  way  to  accomplish  this  result.  Belmont  was  at 
the  mercy  of  the  guns  of  Columbus,  and  could  under  no 
circumstances  be  held.  It  almost  seems  as  if  the  excuse  for 
the  expedition  was  that  of  the  man  in  Scripture  who  had 
bought  two  yoke  of  oxen,  and  must  fain  go  and  try  them. 
Grant  had  been  entrusted  with  new  weapons.  He  thought 
to  essay  them  before  venturing  into  a  serious  affray.  As  a 
simple  demonstration,  the  affair  was  not  noteworthy.  Nor 
does  it  shed  any  light  upon  our  subject  of  inquiry,  except 
that  it  early  showed  that  Grant  possessed  coolness  and  self- 
reliance. 

Despite  his  impassive  exterior,  Grant  was  really  of  a 
restless  disposition.  Perhaps  his  most  prominent  quality, 
except  the  dogged  persistence  he  so  constantly  exhibited,  was 
his  desire  to  be  always  at  work,  pushing  the  enemy  at  some 
point.  He  never  seemed  to  need  recuperation  for  himself ;  he 
was  apparently  never  overtaxed ;  he  worked  with  the  weapons 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  25 

he  found  at  hand.  He  never  asked  for  re-enforcements  ;  and 
he  was  wont  to  deny  his  troops  those  periods  of  rest  which  it 
was  a  not  always  happy  rule  in  all  our  other  armies  to  afford 
them  in  such  ample  measure. 

Some  attempt  has  been  made  to  deny  Grant  the  credit  of 
the  successes  against  the  Confederate  first  line  of  defence, 
broken  in  February,  1862,  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson ; 
but  he  may  be  safely  awarded  a  goodly  share  thereof.  The 
capture  of  Fort  Henry  is  deserving  of  notice  only  in  that 
Tilghman  delayed  the  Federal  advance  till  the  bulk  of  his 
force  had  escaped.  The  affair  was  not  of  long  duration  and 
it  reflects  no  discredit  on  Grant  that  he  was  there  thwarted. 
The  attack  on  Fort  Donelson  was  stubborn.  Grant  undertook 
the  work  with  a  force  less  than  that  of  the  enemy,  though 
he  was  later  re-enforced  to  an  effective  beyond  theirs.  The 
obstacles  were  considerable,  both  of  ground  and  weather, 
and  he  led  but  the  rawest  of  troops.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  fighting  was  spirited,  and  creditable  in  the  extreme  to 
new  levies,  as  shown  by  the  loss  of  2300  men.  But  Grant's 
victory  here  was  primarily  due  to  the  divided  responsibilities 
of  the  threefold  command  of  the  Confederates.  Such  men 
as  Floyd,  Buckner  and  Pillow  were  scarcely  worthy  of  being 
called  adversaries,  while  the  scene  before  the  surrender,  in 
which  each  of  these  three  men  sought  to  cast  the  responsi 
bility  from  off  his  own  shoulders,  was  disgraceful  indeed. 
Compared  with  the  field  of  Bull  Run,  seven  months  earlier, 
with  vastly  greener  troops,  the  fighting  showed  nothing  to 
excite  remark.  Even  Badeau  acknowledges  that  the  North 
overrated  the  means  by  the  result,  —  the  cause  by  the  effect. 
But  the  success  won  .its  usual  and  proper  result.  It  is 
success  which  must  always  command  reward.  Grant  was  the 
hero  of  the  nation. 

The  only  battle,  until  the  campaign  of  1864,  in  which 
Grant  measured  weapons  with  a  truly  great  soldier,  now 
shortly  supervened.  Grant  had  advanced  up  the  Tennessee 


26       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Eiver,  and  massed  his  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing  as  a  threat 
to  Corinth.  The  place  was  well  chosen.  Buell  was  ordered 
by  Halleck,  who  controlled  this  department,  across  country 
from  Nashville  to  join  forces  with  Grant.  It  was  purposed 
to  make  a  descent  upon  the  Confederate  army.  The  enemy 
was  commanded  by  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  was  perhaps 
the  most  promising  soldier  in  the  enemy's  ranks.  Johnston 
was  not  wont  to  await  attack,  and  decided  to  fall  upon  Grant 
before  the  arrival  of  Buell.  This  he  did  (April  6,  1862) 
with  a  vehemence  and  initial  success  which  goes  far  to  nullify 
the  claim  of  even  General  Sherman,  that  the  army  was  not 
surprised.  At  a  later  period  in  the  war,  that  there  was 
a  surprise  would  not  have  been  denied.  If  the  attack  was 
actually  expected,  it  was  strange  that  Grant  should  be  absent 
—  as  he  was  never  far  from  the  post  of  danger  —  and 
stranger  still,  that  the  outpost  service,  even  in  those  early 
days,  should  have  been  so  raggedly  performed.  The  event  at 
least  was  to  roll  up  the  Union  army  as  it  were  a  scroll ;  and, 
had  not  Johnston  been  killed  before  completing  his  victory, 
it  would  have  gone  hard  with  our  forces,  huddled,  as  they 
were,  into  the  swamp  of  Snake  Creek.  Probably  few  troops 
were  ever  worse  demoralized  than  all  but  a  small  leaven  of 
Sherman's  men,  on  the  evening  of  that  day.  So  far,  Grant 
had  been  defeated  by  Johnston.  Beauregard  succeeded  to  the 
Confederate  command.  This  officer  arrogates  to  himself  the 
victory  of  Bull  Run ;  but  Beauregard  was  actually  defeated 
at  Bull  Run.  It  was  Joe  Johnston's  fresh  troops  which 
turned  Beauregard's  disaster  into  a  Southern  victory.  Nor 
can  any  person,  unless  a  fulsome  biographer,  be  found  who 
will  rank  Beauregard  high  as  a  soldier.  His  mistake  at 
Shiloh  was  certainly  Grant's  salvation.  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston  would  never  have  sounded  the  recall  at  the  moment 
of  victory.  He  would  have  pushed  home  to  the  bitter  end. 
But  Beauregard  lost  his  opportunity,  and  called  off  his  men, 
thinking  to  complete  the  work  on  the  morrow.  Such  morrows 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  27 

never  come.  During  this  breathing  spell  Buell  arrived,  and 
the  tide  of  success  was  turned. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh  which  can  be 
warped  into  a  creditable  showing  for  Grant.  He  was  not 
ready  for  battle,  his  troops  were  not  well  in  hand,  and  until 
his  splendid  opponent  fell  he  was  badly  worsted.  He  was 
saved  only  by  the  happy  mistake  of  a  second-rate  general, 
and  the  still  happier  arrival  of  fresh  and  well-drilled  troops. 
For  some  months  prior  to  and  succeeding  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  Grant  was  under  a  cloud.  Accused  of  disobeying 
orders  and  of  sundry  acts  militating  against  the  martinet-like 
punctilio  of  Halleck,  he  was  censured,  relieved  of  command, 
thrust  one  side  while  nominally  Halleck's  second  and  generally 
hustled  about  in  an  irritating  and  altogether  unreasonable 
fashion.  He  bore  his  trials  well,  however,  though  more  than 
once  tempted  to  throw  up  the  game.  No  man  throughout 
our  war  rendered  more  generous  service,  forgetful  of  self 
in  every  instance  where  he  could  accomplish  good  for  the 
cause,  than  Grant.  In  minor  stations,  as  well  as  in  supreme 
command,  this  trait  was  prominent.  This  testimony  to  his 
credit  cannot  be  gainsaid. 

Halleck's  promotion  to  Washington  again  gave  Grant  his 
head.  From  now  on  he  made  it  his  sole  aim  to  open  the 
Mississippi.  Upon  neither  the  battle  of  luka  nor  the  battle 
of  Corinth  can  satisfactory  comment  be  made.  The  former 
was  an  attack  by  Grant  with  divided  forces,  which  failed 
to  co-operate,  and  allowed  Price  to  escape.  The  latter  was 
perhaps  as  much  Rosecrans's  work  as  Grant's,  and  was 
success  but  narrowly  achieved.  Grant  cannot  be  judged  with 
fairness  by  these  smaller  operations. 

The  main  obstacle  to  the  navigation  of  the  great  river  was 
Vicksburg.  This  fortress  continued  to  be  Grant's  objective 
for  three  quarters  of  a  year  (November,  1862,  to  July,  1863). 
The  capture  of  Vicksburg  from  the  south  had  been  attempted 
by  Williams  in  the  spring  of  1862,  and  Farragut  had  been  up 


28      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

the  river  and  had  run  the  batteries  to  and  fro.  The  canal 
scheme  had  been  inaugurated  by  Williams,  but  was  abandoned 
when  he  returned  to  Baton  Rouge.  It  was  in  November, 
1862,  when  Grant  suggested  the  capture  of  Vicksburg  from 
his  own  base,  to  the  General-in-Chief.  Some  50,000  men 
were  in  this  vicinity.  At  Washington  a  scheme  was  on  the 
carpet  to  give  McClernand  sole  command  of  an  expedition 
down  the  Mississippi.  Meanwhile  Grant  was  maturing  his 
plans  for  an  advance  on  Vicksburg  overland. 

A  careful  study  of  the  conditions  involved,  as  well  as  the 
subsequent  operations,  seems  to  indicate  as  the  best  route 
from  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  to  Vicksburg,  one 
following  along  the  line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
or  preferably,  the  Mississippi  Central.  The  latter  had,  to  be 
sure,  several  good  defensive  lines,  such  as  the  Tallahatchie 
and  Yallobusha,  but  these  were  susceptible  of  being  turned 
by  their  head  waters,  and  the  right  of  an  advancing  army 
was  well  protected  by  the  Yazoo  lowlands.  Grenada  could 
have  been  made  an  excellent  secondary  depot,  and  the  entire 
northern  part  of  Mississippi  would  have  been '  rendered 
tributary  to  our  armies  instead  of  to  our  enemy.  Later, 
when  Grant  was  in  the  midst  of  his  eccentric  circuit  south  of 
Vicksburg,  every  one  came  to  this  conclusion.  Success  alone 
justified  Grant's  manoeuvre ;  and  by  the  difficulties  so  hardly 
overcome,  an  advance  overland  in  one  body  is  clearly  shown 
to  have  had  more  to  commend  it  than  any  other  plan.  But 
at  that  time,  Grant  appears  to  have  considered  a  division  of 
forces  advantageous  instead  of  faulty.  luka  had  failed  of  any 
results  worth  mention  for  this  very  reason,  but  Grant  did  not 
bear  this  in  mind.  He  contemplated,  in  fact  inaugurated,  a 
march  with  combined  forces  overland,  but  the  poor  supply 
of  rolling-stock  along  the  railroad  appears  to  have  determined 
him  otherwise;  and  lest  McClernand  should  take  from  his 
control  the  Mississippi  expedition,  he  put  into  immediate 
execution  a  dual  plan,  consisting  of  an  attack  from  the  river 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  29 

by  Sherman,  in  connection  with  an  advance  along  the  railroad 
by  his  own  army. 

This  scheme  fairly  bristled  with  elements  of  failure.  No 
possible  communication  during  the  march  or  at  the  time 
of  attack  could  be  had  between  the  supposed  co-operating 
forces.  In  case  of  disaster  to  the  one,  the  other  could  neither 
have  warning  to  retreat  nor  opportunity  to  assist.  Neither 
army  was  in  sufficient  force  to  attack  the  city  single-handed. 
The  distance  that  each  had  to  travel  was  so  great  that  the 
common  delays  of  land  or  water  transportation  would  put 
simultaneous  aggressive  operations  quite  out  of  the  question. 
It  was  almost  beyond  reason  to  expect  the  two  plans  to  work 
together.  If  either  had  been  a  mere  diversion  to  draw  the 
enemy's  opposition  from  the  other,  the  idea  might  have  been 
a  fair  one ;  but  both  expeditions  were  in  the  nature  of  attacks 
in  force,  and  of  about  equal  strength.  The  opportunities 
for  the  enemy  were  brilliant.  Grant  did  not  believe,  at 
that  time,  that  an  army  could  be  subsisted  on  the  country, 
and  feared  that  he  could  not  ration  his  men  on  the  scanty 
means  afforded  by  the  railroad.  Moreover,  the  McClernand 
imbroglio  was  threatening  and  no  doubt  weighed  heavily  in 
Grant's  deliberations.  Still  all  this  cannot  be  held  to  excuse 
the  adoption  of  what  is  the  worst  possible  scheme  in  all  cases. 
A  division  of  forces  requires  a  background  of  good  luck.  It 
cannot  face  bad  fortune  or  accidents. 

The  result  of  these  isolated  expeditions  was  disastrous. 
Sherman  reached  Chickasaw  Bayou,  and,  supposing  Grant  to 
be  either  close  at  hand,  or  else  to  be  holding  Pemberton  on 
the  line  of  the  Yallobusha,  he  unsuccessfully  thrust  his  army 
in  upon  well-manned  defences.  Grant  meanwhile,  for  lack 
of  the  very  divisions  Sherman  had  carried  off,  had  seen  his 
communications  cut  at  Holly  Springs,  and  had  been  sent 
whirling  back  to  his  base  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad.  We  can  be  scarcely  expected  to  agree  with  Badeau 
in  the  following  adulation:  "From  Belmont,  the  initial 


30       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

battle  of  his  career,  lie  [Grant]  had  never  been  driven  from 
the  field,  and  had  never  receded  a  step  in  any  of  his  cam 
paigns,  except  at  Holly  Springs,  and  then  the  rebels  were 
in  retreat  before  him,  and  Grant,  unable  to  follow  them  up 
fast  enough  to  overtake  them,  withdrew,  only  to  advance  on 
another  line."  :  When  will  biographers  learn  to  appreciate 
the  harm  they  inflict  upon  their  heroes  by  comments  such  as 
these  ? 

Grant  possessed  in  marvellous  degree  the  power  of  bearing 
up  against  bad  luck  and  disappointment.  He  showed  many 
of  the  characteristics  of  a  great  man ;  added  the  true  military 
instinct,  and  he  would  have  been  a  great  soldier;  but  the 
latter  trait  is  more  difficult  to  unearth,  it  did  not  come  to 
the  surface  in  this  campaign.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
capacity  to  do  the  best  thing  at  the  right  moment  is  the 
test  of  all  skill,  and  the  technical  rules  of  strategy  must 
be  secondary  to  this  one  thing.  Perhaps  Stonewall  Jackson 
was  the  best  instance  of  this  truism.  But  it  is  well  to  weigh 
accurately  each  rule  which  is  shown  by  the  experience 
of  the  greatest  soldiers  to  be  of  value,  before  we  throw  it 
aside  in  the  special  case  before  us.  It  has  been  intimated 
by  some  critics  that  in  a  wooded  country  like  ours,  the  well- 
worn  rules  of  strategy  may  be  laid  aside  for  others  suggested 
by  the  occasion ;  but  there  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  our 
war  which  goes  to  show  this  true.  The  tactics  of  the  battle 
field,  particularly  those  of  the  fighting  line,  must  of  necessity 
be  as  much  modified  by  topographical  reasons  as  they 
are  by  improved  weapons ;  but  the  rules  of  strategy  are  as 
everlasting  as  the  rules  of  logic. 

With  characteristic  pertinacity,  despite  his  backset,  so 
soon  as  McClernand  had  been  eliminated  from  his  problem 
(January,  1863),  Grant  set  his  face  again  toward  Vicksburg. 
This  time  he  determined  to  operate  on  the  Mississippi  line, 
and  to  reach  the  hills  which  command  the  town  by  the  route 

1  3  Bacleau,  041. 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  31 

which  Sherman  had  fruitlessly  essayed  to  tread.  This  was 
better  than  the  former  plan,  but  presented  fewer  advantages 
than  the  overland  march.  It  is  very  apparent  that  Grant 
had  no  definite  idea  how  to  compass  the  capture  of  Vicksburg, 
when  he  established  himself  at  Young's  Point.  In  this 
he  was  perhaps  not  singular.  It  was  unusual  with  our 
generals  to  have  an  elaborately  wrought  plan  of  operations. 
In  fact  it  was  the  elaborate  plans  which  uniformly  failed. 
For  many  weary  weeks  after  the  base  of  the  army  had  been 
firmly  established,  Grant  was  busy  trying  scheme  after 
scheme  which  might  enable  him  to  locate  himself  on  the 
bluffs  to  the  north  of  the  town.  These  are  the  keys  to 
Vicksburg.  Indications  are  by  no  means  wanting  that  he 
himself  began  to  regret  that  he  had  not  adopted  the  overland 
route.  His  position  was  a  trying  one.  The  fickle  public 
was  all  but  ready  to  tire  of  him  also,  as  it  had  on  lesser 
pretexts  of  so  many  of  his  brother  soldiers ;  for  a  year  he  had 
been  floundering  about,  with  no  substantial  success  to  show. 
Something  was  demanded  of  him,  if  he  would  not  forfeit  the 
people's  confidence. 

Grant  was  called  on  to  look  the  matter  squarely  in  the  face. 
Assault  promised  ill  success  from  any  point,  while  involving 
the  certainty  of  heavy  losses.  To  go  back  and  try  the  really 
most  feasible  route  seemed  like  failure  acknowledged,  and 
would  therefore  be  politically  ruinous,  though  strategically 
sound.  To  turn  Pemberton's  left  was  a  desperate  undertak 
ing.  Its  only  merit  lay  in  that  it  showed  no  sign  of  turning 
back.  Supplies  must  come  by  a  most  circuitous  route,  liable 
to  fatal  interruption,  and  the  fleet  must  run  the  Vicksburg 
batteries.  Choice  was  difficult ;  but,  with  his  usual  disregard 
of  obstacles,  Grant  adopted  the  latter  plan.  He  could  face  a 
difficult  problem  rather  than  a  simple  one.  His  courage  grew 
with  opposition.  He  never  feared  to  assume  any  risk.  In 
this  case  success  proved  it  a  virtue.  Not  so  a  year  later  in 
Virginia.  This  type  of  courage  often  lacks  the  tempering 


32      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

element  of  intelligent  caution.  Having  launched  his  army  on 
its  perilous  mission,  the  work  was  done  with  vigor,  and  it 
succeeded.  But  Grant's  success,  like  not  a  few  of  Napoleon's, 
was  now  aided  by  his  opponent's  incapacity.  Had  Lee  and 
Jackson  been  in  his  front,  his  triumph  would  have  been  hardly 
earned.  Johnston  had  31,000  men  "  for  duty."  Pemberton 
began  the  campaign  with  some  50,000.  Imagine  the  two 
great  Virginia  soldiers,  one  within  a  well-fortified  city  in 
Grant's  front,  the  other  in  the  open,  on  his  rear.  Would 
the  loss  of  8,000  men  have  measured  the  fighting  during  a 
campaign  and  siege  of  two  months  ?  Was  that  the  measure 
of  Grant's  thirty  days'  march  from  the  Eappahannock  to  the 
Chickahominy  ?  Would  40,000  men  have  been  cooped  up  by 
an  opposing  force  not  much  greater  ?  Would  such  an  army 
have  surrendered  without  grievous  bloodshed?  The  1864 
campaign  in  Virginia  answers  these  queries  all  too  plainly. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  Johnston  was  a  good  soldier  ;  but, 
with  all  his  ability,  he  was  never  distinguished  as  a  fighter. 
His  tendency  was  dilatory;  he  was  never  quite  ready  to 
attack.  With  a  force  all  but  equal  to  Grant's,  he  made 
no  attempt  to  cut,  the  knot  of  the  difficulty.  To  be  sure 
he  felt  no  great  reliance  on  Pemberton ;  but  he  owed  more 
assistance  to  the  troops  in  Vicksburg  than  he  rendered.  He 
had  it  within  his  power  to  nullify  Grant's  campaign. 

Still  Vicksburg  fell  and  Grant  won  the  great  success  of 
the  war.  Though  equal  forces  at  this  moment  in  the  East 
were  suffering  thrice  his  loss,  it  was  only  to  repel  invasion. 
There  were  no  such  trophies,  no  such  wholesale  captures.  By 
whatever  means,  Grant's  was  the  apparent  triumph  ;  and  he 
received  his  well-earned  laurels  in  the  plaudits  of  the  people. 

Grant's  field  was  now  enlarged  to  take  in  the  Chattanooga 
operations.  Rosecrans  had  obtained  a  foothold  in  that  city ; 
but  the  enemy  held  us  in  a  quasi  state  of  siege,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  drive  him  from  our  front.  Grant's  restless 
activity  would  not  allow  him  to  sit  down  and  wait.  After 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  33 

some  initial  operations  already  devised  by  Rosecrans,  by 
which  the  city  was  revictualled,  he  undertook  a  descent 
upon  Bragg  in  force  (November,  1863).  His  plans  for  the 
battle  of  Chattanooga  were  to  hold  Bragg  with  demonstrations 
on  his  left  at  Lookout  Mountain,  and  in  the  centre  across 
Chattanooga  Valley;  while  Sherman,  with  abundant  force, 
should  assail  his  right  at  the  north  end  of  Mission  Ridge. 
The  design  was  good ;  and  it  was  natural  that  Grant  should 
entrust  Sherman  with  the  main  task.  He  knew  him  well 
and  felt  him  equal  to  the  work  cut  out ;  but  matters  fell  out 
differently  from  what  Grant  expected.  Sherman  was  held 
in  check  at  Tunnel  Hill,  partly  by  natural  obstacles,  while 
Hooker  actually  turned  Bragg's  left  at  Lookout  Mountain ; 
and  Thomas's  men,  all  but  in  contravention  of  orders, 
captured  Mission  Ridge  in  the  centre,  and  at  once  relieved 
the  pressure  on  Sherman.  The  losses  show  what  part  of  the 
army  did  the  fighting :  Sherman's  loss  was  1500  ;  Thomas's, 
4000  ;  Hooker's  was  the  least  heavy. 

In  this  battle  of  Chattanooga,  then,  it  was  to  a  certain 
extent  in  the  wake  of  accident  that  there  came  success. 
Grant's  plan  had  worked  to  a  given  point,  and  then  failed, 
because  Sherman  could  make  no  further  headway.  Thomas's 
attack  was  intended  to  be  a  mere  demonstration,  to  draw 
away,  if  might  be,  some  of  the  enemy's  forces  from  Sherman's 
front.  Instead  of  such  limited  work,  however,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  broke  Bragg's  centre,  and  it  was  this  which 
won  the  battle.  It  is  certain  that,  had  these  gallant  men 
not  reached  their  goal,  some  one  would  have  been  severely 
held  to  blame  for  their  thus  exceeding  their  appointed  task. 
There  is  nothing  in  this  battle  which  shows  any  remarkable 
trait  in  Grant.  He  deserves  and  will  always  have  the  credit 
of  pushing  his  work  with  speed  and  vigor ;  and  no  doubt 
he  would  have  accomplished  his  end  even  if  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  not  so  brilliantly  captured  Mission  Ridge. 
We  are,  however,  not  seeking  evidence  of  ordinary  but  of 


34      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

extraordinary  skill.  His  opponent  here  was  by  no  means  a 
noteworthy  soldier.  Braxton  Bragg,  though  possessing  some 
excellent  qualities,  was  always  defeated,  and  that  by  our  own 
unsuccessful  generals;  his  opposition  to  Grant's  attack  at 
Chattanooga  was  not  obstinate.  The  total  loss  was  small 
compared  with  the  outcome  of  the  battle. 

Up  to  this  point,  in  fact,  except  at  Shiloh,  Grant  had 
accomplished  the  most  substantial  results  with  the  most 
moderate  losses ;  the  public  did  not  gauge  the  meagre  quality 
of  the  opposition ;  they  saw  only  what  had  been  gained,  and 
valued  the  man  accordingly.  At  Belmont,  Grant  had  lost  600 
men ;  at  Shiloh,  his  one  great  battle  hitherto,  12,000  ;  at  luka, 
1000;  at  Corinth,  2500;  in  the  long  Vicksburg  campaign, 
8000 ;  at  Chattanooga,  some  6000.  Except  at  Shiloh,  then, 
measuring  the  bitterness  of  the  fighting  by  the  loss,  Grant 
had  never  yet  been  hard  put  to  it.  Compared  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  with  its  3000  hors  de  combat  at  Bull 
Run;  2200  at  Williamsburg ;  nearly  6000  at  Fair  Oaks; 
16,000  in  the  Seven  Days' ;  15,000  in  Pope's  campaign ; 
12,500  at  Antietam;  13,000  at  Fredericksburg ;  17,000  at 
Chancellorsville  ;  23,000  at  Gettysburg,  —  these  losses  give 
small  chance  indeed  to  underrate  the  East!  Even  Badeau 
acknowledges  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  the 
best  led  and  strongest  army  in  the  Confederacy;  steadier 
under  defeat  as  well  as  in  success,  than  any  other. 

It  is  passing  strange,  then,  that  Grant,  as  at  this  time  he 
undoubtedly  did,  should  have  believed  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  never  been  fought  aufond;  that  he  should  have 
imagined  that  Lee  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  could 
be  beaten  by  the  same  methods  as  Pemberton  and  Bragg. 
But  such  was  the  fact,  and  Grant,  on  his  taking  up  the  work 
of  the  Eastern  strategic  field  (March,  1864),  set  himself  the 
task  to  make  the  rugged  old  army  do  that  which  he  thought 
it  never  yet  had  done.  Grant  at  this  time  openly  gave  his 
preference  to  hard  blows  over  manoeuvring.  "  Continuous 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  35 

hammering  "  was  inscribed  upon  his  shield.  His  belief  seems 
to  have  been  that  the  use  of  skilful  tactics  is  a  symptom  of 
pusillanimity.  Other  and  greater  soldiers  have  sometimes  for 
a  while  been  subject  to  this  delusion ;  but  they  have  never 
needed  such  fearful  lessons  to  teach  them  their  mistake. 
Grant  was  to  discover  his  error  in  his  first  clash  of  arms,  and 
to  recognize  the  fact  that  he  had  never  yet  faced  a  captain 
such  as  was  the  man  who  through  so  many  campaigns  had 
borne  the  proud  banner  of  the  South  on  the  Old  Dominion 
soil ;  that  he  had  never  led  stouter  hearts  against  more  valiant 
foes. 

Grant's  first  tussle  with  Lee,  in  the  Wilderness,  should 
have  opened  his  eyes  to  the  falsity  of  his  theory.  His  loss  of 
15,000  men  without  gain  of  any  kind  to  any  other  mind  would 
have  been  appalling ;  but  though  "  Grant  acknowledged 
that  the  fighting  was  the  hardest  he  had  ever  known,  for 
Shiloh  was  not  comparable  with  the  Wilderness,"  he,  says 
his  biographer,  "  was  not  discouraged  after  this  battle." 
That  indeed  proved  that  he  was  stanch.  But  had  he  learned 
a  lesson  ?  That  would  have  shown  him  to  be  discreet. 
According  to  Badeau,  Lee  was  not  an  able  soldier.  This 
writer  speaks  of  Lee's  "  feebleness  in  offensive  action  "  in  the 
Wilderness  attack,  and  states  it  as  his  opinion  that  while 
"  bold  in  conception,  even  in  attempt,  ...  in  execution 
he  was  weak."  l  Assuming  this  to  be  just,  where  does  it 
place  Grant,  who  then  led  all  but  two  to  one  of  Lee's 
effective,  and  of  material  quite  as  gallant  ?  Badeau  recognizes 
this  natural  conclusion,  but  he  endeavors  to  rid  himself  of 
its  effect  by  heaping  blame  on  Grant's  lieutenants,  from 
Meade  down,  for  every  failure  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
despite  fighting  such  as  Grant  had  never  yet  conceived. 
Even  Hancock  "could  inspire,  but  apparently  not  control 
his  soldiers.  In  the  Wilderness,  all  the  splendid  results 
of  his  success  on  the  6th  of  May,  were  lost  by  this  same 

1  2  Badeau,  129-130. 


36       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

incapacity."  *  Apart  from  what  we  know  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  generals,  will  this  line  of  argument  ever  prove 
Grant  worthy  to  sit  with  Caesar,  Napoleon  and  Frederick  ? 
Having  found  that  Lee  could  check  any  direct  advance  upon 
his  lines,  Grant  concluded  to  resort  to  what  might  have  saved 
him  much,  a  short  three  days  before.  He  moved  by  the  flank 
on  Spottsylvania ;  Lee  anticipated  him  by  one  of  those  lucky 
accidents  common  to  war,  Anderson  happening  to  march  at 
night  instead  of  waiting  for  daybreak. 

In  a  paper  of  which  Grant  is  the  subject,  we  cannot  refrain 
from  constantly  quoting  Badeau.  This  eulogist  naturally 
puts  things  (in  however  mistaken  a  manner)  in  such  light  as  if 
possible  to  work  in  Grant's  favor,  and  it  is  a  fair  inference 
that  Badeau' s  points  are  more  or  less  inspired  by  Grant  him 
self;  though  we  may  surely  absolve  Grant  from  any  share 
in  Badeau's  adulation.  With  reference  to  this  check,  Badeau 
claims  that  Lee  ordered  Anderson  to  Spottsylvania  under  a 
mistaken  conception  of  Grant's  intentions.  "  Yet  these  very 
mistakes  were  destined  to  thwart  the  well-laid  scheme  of  the 
national  general."  2 .  .  .  "  Lee,  however,  could  claim  no  credit 
for  having  out-generalled  his  rival.  He  had  utterly  misappre 
hended  Grant's  design.  .  .  .  But  if  fortune  was  thus  thrust 
upon  Lee  by  his  lieutenants,  it  was  just  the  other  way  with 
Grant.  He  had  been  baffled  by  the  same  accidents  that  had 
assisted  his  adversary,  and  by  circumstances  which  his  own 
generals  should  have  rendered  impossible."  3  And  straight 
way  all  the  blame  is  held  to  fall  from  the  shoulders  of  the 
captain  to  those  of  his  lieutenants.  How  indeed  is  Badeau  to 
make  Grant  a  great  soldier  by  so  belittling  his  opponent? 
But  Lee  had  indeed  "  stumbled  into  a  good  position."  4  Had 
Grant  so  done,  in  what  glowing  terms  would  Badeau  have 
characterized  the  achievement. 

Up  to  this  moment  Grant's  hard  blows  had  only  punished 

i  2  Badeau,  183.  2  jjt>  140. 

8  J&-,  145.  4  Ib.,  146. 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  37 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Lee,  as  he  found  to  his  sorrow, 
was  of  other  stuff  than  his  quondam  adversaries ;  Grant  had 
met  his  match  in  all  but  material  resources.  Among  Grant's 
qualities  was  wonderful  staying  power.  Up  to  a  certain 
point  this  is  one  of  the  highest  virtues  of  a  soldier,  but  it 
can  be  pushed  too  far.  Grant  was  altogether  too  blind  to 
the  advantages  of  combining  manoeuvring  with  direct  assault. 
He  could  not  believe  that  Lee  had  even  greater  endurance 
than  himself ;  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  could 
much  longer  resist  his  massed  blows.  He  had  yet  to  learn 
how  tough  was  the  grain  of  that  wonderful  body  of  men. 
The  result  of  this  mistaken  estimate  followed  in  the  attack  on 
the  Salient  in  Lee's  centre,  with  another  still  more  grievous 
check  as  a  result.  An  assailant  labors  under  the  disadvan 
tage  of  attacking  intrenchments.  To  offset  this  he  is  able 
secretly  to  mass  his  men  and  attack  a  single  point,  while 
his  enemy  must  keep  all  portions  of  his  line  equally  manned 
until  he  divines  where  the  blow  is  to  fall.  To  attack  with 
out  studying  your  opponent's  position  is  to  throw  away  this 
manifest  advantage,  to  refuse  to  add  skill  to  mere  strength 
of  arm.  The  attacks  at  this  point  appear  all  to  have  been 
given  like  blows  in  the  dark.  The  lamentable  work  at 
Spottsylvania  Badeau  sums  up  as  follows  :  "  Every  manoeuvre 
had  a  meaning,  every  assault  was  timed.  There  was  no  blind 
butting  at  the  enemy,  but  a  constant  endeavor  to  discover  his 
weak  points,  and  to  strike  him  between  the  joints." 1  Upon 
Meade  is  placed  the  blame  of  not  following  up  successful 
attacks. 

Grant  might  readily  have  flanked  the  enemy  out  of  his 
position ;  but  he  could  not  give  up  the  contest.  His  inflex 
ible  nature  would  not  allow  him  to  yield  to  Lee.  He 
knew  Lee  to  be  vastly  his  inferior  in  men,  and  was  unable 
to  believe  that  he  could  not  be  crushed  by  weight  alone. 
For  a  week  succeeding  he  made  partial  attacks  at  all  points, 

1  2  Badeau,  168. 


38      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

shifting  divisions  from  place  to  place  along  the  line,  seeking 
a  weak  point  in  the  harness  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  through  which  to  thrust  his  weapon.  Lee  met 
his  every  onset.  No  impression  could  be  made. 

In  this  short  campaign  of  little  over  two  weeks,  Grant 
lost  37,500  men,  nearly  one  in  three  of  his  "  for  duty " 
force.  He  accomplished  nothing  which  manoeuvring  could 
not  have  compassed,  unless  he  had  weakened  the  moral  of 
his  antagonist  more  than  his  own.  This  he  had  not  done ; 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  elated  at  its  successful 
defence.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  disheartened  at  its 
losses  with  so  little  tangible  result. 

Courage  is  a  common  virtue  in  the  soldier.  That  combina 
tion  of  physical  and  moral  courage  which  enables  a  general 
to  inflict,  and  unflinchingly  to  resist,  heavy  blows  is  the  rarest 
and  best ;  but  this  courage  must  be  tempered  with  skill,  to 
be  of  the  greatest  use,  and  skill  implies  a  discreet  use  of 
power.  Though  it  was  Falstaff  hiding  behind  his  shield  at 
the  battle  of  Shrewsbury  who  exclaimed  that  the  better 
part  of  valor  is  discretion,  yet  there  is,  for  the  commanding 
general  of  a  great  army,  a  far  deeper  meaning  in  these 
pregnant  words. 

Grant  had  failed  to  make  any  impression  upon  Lee.  He 
must  resort  again  to  the  manoeuvring  he  contemns.  While 
Grant  was  thus  decimating  the  troops  under  his  immediate 
eye,  the  minor  armies  were  moving  towards  the  common 
centre.  As  only  Butler's  force  reached  its  goal,  these  minor 
forces  need  not  be  brought  up,  except  to  call  attention  to  the 
system  of  divided  attacks  to  which  Grant  still  adhered.  So 
far  as  Butler  was  concerned,  Badeau  leaves  us  to  suppose  that 
Grant  had  ordered  him  to  capture  Petersburg,  as  a  first  step 
in  the  advance  on  Kichmond,  with  the  James  River  as  a 
base ;  but  Grant's  orders  to  Butler  were  very  vague,  and  he 
could  scarcely  have  supposed  that  Butler  would  look  upon 
Petersburg  as  a  sine  qua  non  in  his  problem,  even  if  the 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  39 

same  orders  to  a  more  skilled  soldier  could  be  twisted  into 
meaning  so  much.  The  same  uncertainty  as  to  what  his 
eventual  operations  would  be  appeared  here,  as  was  seen  in 
the  Yicksburg  campaign.  If  Grant  really  expected  to  use 
the  James  River  route,  he  should  definitely  have  ordered  the 
capture  of  Petersburg.  McClellan  had  pointed  out  its  value. 
The  map  plainly  showed  it  to  be  essential.  It  does  not  appear 
that  Grant  at  this  time  paid  much  heed  to  the  James  River 
plan.  He  believed  that  he  could  demolish  Lee  on  the 
northern  route.  Thus  Butler's  share  in  the  programme  failed 
of  any  good  end.  When  he  was  finally  "bottled  up"  at 
Bermuda  Hundred,  Grant  re-enforced  his  own  depleted  ranks 
by  the  bulk  of  his  command.  The  stalemate  inflicted  by  Lee 
on  Grant  at  the  North  Anna  was  so  complete,  that  every  one 
must  recognize  which  was  the  abler  tactician.  But  in  with 
drawing  from  a  field  where  he  lay  with  forces  so  divided,  that, 
had  not  Lee  been  obliged  to  husband  his  men  to  the  last 
degree,  it  might  have  gone  hard  with  him,  Grant  showed 
clearly  an  ability  to  manoeuvre,  which  it  is  a  pity  indeed  he 
had  not  sooner  used.  There  again  was  he  forced  to  recognize 
that  his  antagonist  could  meet  his  most  skilful  movements  as 
well  as  his  stoutest  blows ;  and  again  he  moved  by  the  left, 
but  again  to  find  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  drawn  up 
athwart  his  path  at  Cold  Harbor. 

Grant  was  impelled  to  try  one  more  blow.  His  faith 
was  still  strong  that  he  could  break  Lee's  lines  by  sheer  vis 
inertice.  This  might  still  be  possible  if  he  would  call  to  his 
aid  the  resources  of  grand  tactics.  He  ought  to  have  sought 
the  key  of  his  enemy's  position,  and  to  have  massed  his 
assault  there ;  but,  unlike  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  had 
not  learned  the  wonderful  vitality  of  Lee  and  his  veterans. 
Orders  were  once  more  issued  to  attack  along  the  whole  line 
at  4.30  A.  M.  on  June  2.  The  want  of  definite  plan  was 
painfully  apparent.  Skilful  manoeuvring  might  more  than 
once  have  placed  Lee  where  he  would  have  to  be  the  assault- 


40       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

ing  party,  or  forfeit  his  stake ;  but  nothing  of  the  kind  is 
apparent.  Grant,  in  his  despatches,  stated  that  Lee  would 
not  come  out  of  his  intrenchments  to  fight ;  but  Grant  had 
never  tried  the  proper  means  to  make  him  do  so.  In  lieu  of 
moving  upon  Lee's  communications,  and  thus  compelling  him 
to  leave  his  works  for  the  open,  Grant  had  constantly  hurled 
his  men  against  field-works  which  he  should  have  learned,  by 
the  experience  he  had  recently  been  through,  that  he  could 
not  take.  Grant's  method  was  just  what  Lee  preferred.  He 
was  right  in  not  coming  out  of  his  intrenchments  to  fight. 
Moreover,  an  "  assault  all  along  the  line "  was  useless ;  to 
obtain  advantages  from  the  great  loss  of  life  which  was  inevi 
table,  the  dominating  point  of  the  line  should  have  been 
developed,  and  the  assault  massed  there.  No  reserves  were 
apparently  ready  to  follow  up  any  advantages  which  might 
be  gained.  The  extreme  care  in  arranging  details  which 
should  have  been  exercised  was  not  to  be  seen.  No  picked 
troops  were  selected  for  the  heaviest  work.  The  orders  were 
only  for  an  "  assault  all  along  the  line."  The  rank  and  file 
did  not  even  know  that  Cold  Harbor  was  to  be  a  battle. 
The  old  method  of  selecting  your  point  of  attack,  picking 
your  troops  and  properly  supporting  them,  is  by  no  means 
obsolete.  But  Grant  did  not  deem  its  use  advisable.  We 
all  admire  the  splendid  fighting  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
at  the  Wilderness,  at  Spottsylvania,  at  Cold  Harbor ;  but, 
like  the  Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade,  "  c'est  magnifique,  — 
mais  ce  n'est  pas  la  guerre !  " 

The  object  of  Grant's  overland  campaign,  had  been  to 
capture  or  destroy  Lee's  army.  He  had  done  neither  ;  'but 
he  had  lost  60,000  men  in  five  weeks,  without  inflicting 
corresponding  loss  upon  the  enemy.  The  Second  Corps 
alone  had  lost  400  men  a  day,  from  the  time  of  leaving  the 
Eappahannock.  The  full  significance  of  this  is  apparent 
when  the  force  of  each  army  at  the  inception  of  the  campaign 
is  called  to  mind.  Grant  had  numbered  122,000  men ;  Lee 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  41 

had  but  62,000.  The  fearful  loss,  equal  to  his  adversary's 
entire  force,  was  the  result  of  assaults  in  mass,  undertaken 
without  the  aid  of  that  skill  which  a  great  soldier  never 
neglects  to  employ.  Whenever  Grant  resorted  to  manoeuvring, 
he  succeeded  measurably.  Whenever  he  attacked  all  along 
the  line,  he  failed  utterly. 

The  theory  has  been  advanced  that  there  had  to  be  about  so 
much  hammering,  about  so  much  loss  of  life  and  consumption 
of  energy  and  material,  before  we  could  hope  to  end  the 
war ;  that,  so  long  as  the  South  had  any  men  or  means,  the 
struggle  would  continue.  There  is  a  groundwork  of  truth  in 
this  proposition.  The  Confederacy  was  practically  exhausted 
before  it  yielded  ;  but  the  corollary  is  likewise  true.  If  the 
South  would  certainly  succumb  when  exhausted,  it  behooved 
us,  on  merely  humanitarian  grounds,  to  fight  on  conditions  so 
nearly  equal  as  to  inflict  the  same  loss  upon  the  enemy  as  we 
ourselves  must  suffer.  This  had  not  been  done;  and  the 
student  of  this  final  campaign  in  Virginia  looks  in  vain  for 
the  master-stroke  by  which  our  forces,  numbering  two  to  one 
of  the  enemy,  could  compel  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  without  losses  to  us  greater  in  number  than 
the  total  effective  of  that  gallant  body.  Lee  undoubtedly 
was  fighting  at  a  great  advantage,  on  interior  lines,  in  his 
own  State,  on  the  defence  ;  but  how  was  he  overmatched  in 
force ! 

Criticism  cannot  depreciate  the  really  great  qualities  or 
eminent  services  of  General  Grant.  His  task  was  one  to 
tax  a  Bonaparte.  That  he  was  unable  to  put  an  end  to  the 
struggle  by  means  less  costly  in  lives  and  material,  if  not 
indeed  by  some  brilliant  feat  of  arms,  cannot  detract  from  the 
praise  actually  his  due  for  determined,  unflinching  courage. 
It  rather  adds  to  the  laurels  of  Lee.  It  cannot  be  asserted 
that  any  other  Northern  general  could  have  accomplished 
more  against  the  genius  of  this  soldier.  It  was  Grant  who, 
in  the  face  of  the  gravest  difficulties,  political  and  military, 


42      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

was  able  to  hold  the  confidence  of  the  nation  and  to 
prevent  that  party  at  the  North  which  was  clamoring  for 
peace,  from  wrecking  our  success  now  all  but  won.  But  his 
truest  admirers,  indeed,  he  himself,  admit  Cold  Harbor  to 
have  been  a  grievous  mistake.  And  all  who  appreciate  at  its 
solid  worth  such  ability  as  a  soldier  as  Grant  possessed,  regret 
that  in  this  great  struggle  with  Lee  he  should  have  failed  to 
employ  the  full  resources  which  were  his  in  abundance. 

Again  to  turn  for  a  moment  to  Badeau's  slurs  upon  Lee. 
He  "was  vigilant,  but  not  bold."1  "Whenever  he  was 
obliged  to  assume  the  offensive,  he  failed."  "No  disparity 
of  numbers  can  account  for  his  timidity."  '  A  Fabian  policy 
"  was  indeed  the  natural  policy  for  a  second-rate  commander ; 
but  a  man  of  genius  or  audacity  should  have  massed  his 
forces  and  hurled  them  on  the  divided  enemy."  2  But  "  Lee 
was  unable  by  some  great  stroke  to  divide  and  conquer  his 
enemy."  3  If  Lee  was  so  lacking  in  ability,  where  must  the 
average  thinker  class  Grant  ?  This  is  by  no  means  a  difficult 
problem  for  Badeau.  He  unhesitatingly  meets  it  by  assert 
ive  dicta,  "the  national  leader,"  quotha!  "lost  no  chance, 
saw  every  mistake  made,  and  seized  every  opportunity."4 
"His  nature  indeed  seemed  like  a  sword,  drawn  only  in 
the  field  or  in  emergencies.  At  ordinary  times  a  scabbard 
concealed  the  sharpness  and  temper  of  the  blade ;  but  when 
this  was  thrown  aside,  amid  the  smoke  and  din  of  battle,  the 
weapon  flashed,  and  thrust,  and  smote  —  and  won."5  Let  it 
not  be  supposed  that  these  quotations  are  made  in  a  spirit 
of  irony  or  unfairness ;  they  are  of  use  in  weighing  the 
subject  of  this  paper.  If  an  advocate,  so  inspired  as  it  is 
fair  to  presume  Badeau  to  have  been,  must  resort  to  such 
rodomontade  as  this,  it  may  well  be  believed  that  no  proper 
military  defence  of  the  1864  campaign  could  be  conjured 
up  while  the  biography  of  General  Grant  was  being  penned. 

Grant's  transfer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  James 

was  ably  done,  and  in  mid-June  the  forces  were  put  over  to 

1  2  Badeau,  219.        2  16.,  220.        8  16.,  221.        *  16.,  319.        6  Ib.,  21-22. 


GRANT  AS  A   SOLDIER  43 

the  south  side.  It  is  curious,  however,  that  even  at  this  time, 
when  the  new  line  of  operations  had  been  fully  determined 
upon,  Grant  should  still  have  given  no  positive  orders  for  the 
capture  of  Petersburg.  This  city  was  an  advanced  fortress 
which  protected  the  communications  of  Richmond  with  the 
interior ;  it  was  a  strategic  point  of  the  greatest  value.  No 
operations  on  the  James  could  be  secure  without  its  posses 
sion  ;  but  neither  Hancock,  who  was  first  ordered  forward  in 
this  direction,  nor  indeed  Meade,  appears  to  have  known  that 
Grant  intended  that  Petersburg  should  at  once  be  captured. 
Specific  orders  to  this  effect  had  certainly  not  been  issued, 
and  Grant's  lieutenants  had  been  taught  to  wait  for  such. 
Grant's  habit  was  to  keep  his  own  counsel,  and  his  subordi 
nates  learned  his  purpose  only  from  his  instructions  for  the 
work  immediately  in  hand.  Before  the  proper  order  came, 
Lee  had  thrown  some  old  troops  into  the  city;  for  nearly 
ten  months  (June,  1864,  to  March,  1865)  Grant  sat  down 
before  this  place.  There  is  a  wearisome  sameness  to  the 
operations  during  this  period ;  they  all  tended  to  an  extension 
of  our  left  to  secure  such  a  foothold  as  would  enable  us  to 
cut  Lee  off  from  his  source  of  supply.  There  was  no 
attempt  to  work  on  any  other  plan.  It  almost  looks  as  if 
Grant,  finally  convinced  that  Lee  was  more  than  his  match 
in  the  open,  had  deliberately  concluded  to  bide  his  time  until 
starvation  should  do  the  work,  himself  could  not.  This,  his 
abundant  resources  and  the  confidence  reposed  in  him,  would 
enable  him  to  do.  The  people  had  learned  that  some  one 
man  must  be  entrusted  with  supreme  control,  and  Grant  had 
the  good  fortune  to  keep  alive  the  reliance  of  the  nation  on 
his  vigor  and  skilful  management. 

Grant  might  perhaps  have  made  more  headway  by  leaving 
a  sufficient  part  of  his  army  in  the  trenches  in  front  of 
Petersburg,  and  by  moving  with  a  heavy  force  far  to  the 
west  upon  Lee's  communications ;  or,  if  it  were  determined  to 
capture  the  place  a  main  forte,  by  making  a  massed  attack  on 


44       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

some  point  in  the  centre,  after  suitable  mining  operations  had 
weakened  Lee's  defences  and  prepared  for  such  an  operation. 
But  the  only  assault  of  this  kind  which  was  made  was  so 
lamentably  managed  that  of  necessity  it  failed.  That, 
however,  by  110  means  proved  that  the  plan  itself  was 
inoperative ;  but  we  search  in  vain  for  anything  approaching 
a  brilliant  feat  of  arms.  The  end  came  finally  by  natural 
means.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  died  of  inanition,  in 
the  last  ditch,  as  it  had  threatened  to  do,  a  starved,  haggard 
skeleton  of  its  old  proud  self.  It  had  lost  all  save  honor. 

It  is  difficult,  then,  to  see  upon  what  foundation  to  build 
the  claim  that,  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term,  Grant  was  a 
great  soldier.  He  never  won  a  battle  when  the  fighting  was 
desperate.  At  Shiloh  Grant  was  defeated.  It  was  Buell 
and  he  combined,  aided  by  Beauregard's  incapacity,  which 
turned  the  tide  on  that  field.  In  every  struggle  with  Lee, 
until  the  end,  when  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  no 
longer  itself,  he  was  worsted.  He  never  conducted  a  cam 
paign  to  which  one  may  point  as  a  model  for  the  student. 
His  successes  appear  invariably  to  be  due  to  extraneous 
conditions  working  to  a  happy  result.  He  never  met  an 
opponent  of  recognized  ability  but  he  failed  to  accomplish 
the  end  he  aimed  at.  Tried  by  the  measure  of  the  great 
captains,  there  is  not  on  record  a  brilliant  operation  on  a 
large  scale  of  which  Grant  is  the  hero. 

The  one  difficult  fact  to  reconcile  with  this  estimate  of 
Grant  is  the  ready  obedience  and  support  and  admiration  he 
compelled  from  all  his  lieutenants  and  fellow  soldiers.  How 
much  of  this  was  due  to  frank  appreciation  of  Grant  as  a 
soldier,  how  much  to  his  strong  qualities  of  character,  and 
above  all  how  much  to  the  instinctive  habit  of  obedience  of 
his  subordinates,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  The  fact  remains  to 
Grant's  credit,  that  his  generals  all  yielded  him  as  honest 
service  as  they  did  generous  approbation.  That  Grant 
showed  himself  to  be  a  great  man  is  easy  of  demonstration. 


GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER  45 

He  possessed  courage  of  the  stanchest  type.  Defeat  might 
be  thrust  upon  him,  but  it  never  weighed  him  down.  If  he 
could  not  conquer,  neither  could  he  be  conquered.  He 
would  have  been  unequalled  in  a  defensive  campaign.  To 
lose  a  battle  only  made  him  more  elastic  in  his  determination 
to  retrieve  his  loss;  this  quality  alone,  in  the  degree  to 
which  it  was  ingrained  in  Grant,  stamps  greatness  upon  any 
man  who  is  occupied  with  national  interests.  We  all  know 
that  the  greatest  of  men  may  never  happen  to  be  placed 
where  their  powers  can  find  adequate  scope.  Opportunity 
is  the  coefficient  of  genius;  but  to  Grant,  happily,  was 
committed  the  management  of  the  vastest  of  issues. 

Grant  was  an  honest,  unselfish  patriot.  He  won  the 
nation's  suffrages  for  the  chief  command  by  the  fortune  of 
having  been  where  persistent  energy  could,  with  the  aid  of 
a  fair  share  of  military  talent,  accomplish  large  results. 
With  rare  good  fortune  he  was  removed,  both  by  character 
and  surroundings,  from  the  besetting  danger  of  political 
favoritism.  What  he  was  able  to  do,  he  was  always  given 
the  chance  to  do.  His  command  was  never  endangered  by 
the  clamor  of  political  opponents.  Had  Grant's  early  duties 
cast  his  lot  upon  the  Eastern  field,  he  never  exhibited  that 
which  leads  one  to  believe  that  he  would  have  been  eminently 
successful.  But  his  work  was  fortunately  in  the  West, 
where  great  successes  sometimes  followed  moderate  effort ; 
while  in  Virginia  the  heaviest  of  sacrifices  rarely  won  more 
than  ephemeral  gain.  And  it  is  universally  admitted  to-day 
that  the  difficult  military  problem  during  our  Civil  War  lay 
between  the  Appalachian  and  the  Atlantic. 

If  we  cannot  claim  for  Ulysses  S.  Grant  a  place  upon  the 
roll  of  great  commanders,  we  none  the  less  owe  him  our 
grateful  admiration  for  the  great  task  which  he  actually  did 
accomplish.  It  was  his  constancy  under  defeat,  his  calm 
weighing  of  the  value  of  victory,  his  cool  determination  to  do 
the  work  he  had  set  himself  to  do,  apart  from  all  considera- 


46      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

tions  of  self,  and  for  duty's  sake  alone,  which  centred  all 
Northern  efforts  to  close  our  fratricidal  struggle  in  a  willing 
ness  to  trust  this  man.  Though  he  may  not  have  shown  the 
salient  qualities  of  a  Bonaparte,  a  Wellington,  or  a  Yon 
Moltke,  he  is  none  the  less  part  of  the  history  of  this  country, 
and  he  will  justly  go  down  to  posterity  as  the  man  who, 
through  good  and  ill  fortune  alike,  unflinchingly  bore  the 
banners  of  the  North,  despite  many  a  doubtful  hour,  to  a  final 
happy  issue.  He  deservedly  ranks  as  one  of  the  greatest  of 
Americans. 


THE  MILITARY  CHARACTER  AND  SERVICES 

OP 
MAJOR-GENERAL 

WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK. 

BY 

FRANCIS  A.   WALKER, 

BEEVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL, 
U.  S.  V. 


Bead  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  February  13, 1888. 


The  following1  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  by  General  Walker  concern 
ing  the  Civil  War  :  — 

GENERAL  HANCOCK.  Great  Commanders  Series.  New  York :  D.  Appleton  & 
Co.  1894. 

HANCOCK  IN  THE  WAK  OF  THE  REBELLION.  A  Paper  read  at  a  Meeting  of 
the  New  York  Commandery  [of  the  Loyal  Legion],  February  4,  1891. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS  IN  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
.  .  .  New  York :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1886. 

AN  ORATION  delivered  ...  at  the  Soldiers'  Monument  Dedication  in  North 
Brookfield,  January  19,  1870.  Worcester :  Goddard  &  Nye,  printers.  1870. 

ORATION  before  the  City  Government  and  Citizens  of  Boston,  at  a  Meeting 
held  at  Tremont  Temple,  December  18,  1888.  [In]  A  Memorial  of  Philip 
Henry  Sheridan  from  the  City  of  Boston.  Boston  :  Printed  by  Order  of  the 
City  Council,  1889. 

ORATION  [at  the  Twenty-first  Annual  Reunion  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  held  at  Portland,  Maine,  July  3d  and  4th,  1890].  Report  of 
Proceedings  [pp.  18-32],  New  York:  Macgowan  &  Slipper.  1890. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  CHARLES  DEVENS,  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massa 
chusetts.  Tarn  Marte  quam  Mercuric.  An  Address  delivered  before  the 
Commandery  of  the  State  of  Massachusetts  Military  Order  of  the  Loyal 
Legion  of  the  United  States,  March  19,  1891.  Boston :  Press  of  Rockwell  & 
Churchill.  1891. 


GENERAL  HANCOCK. 


IN  the  early 'afternoon  of  the  3d  of  July,  1863,  a  brigade 
of  Vermont  troops,  new  to  battle,  lay  under  arms  along 
Cemetery  Ridge,  watching  the  march  of  a  Confederate  column, 
which,  panoplied  in  all  the  majesty  and  terror  of  war,  was 
bearing  down  upon  the  centre  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
They  had  borne  their  share  of  the  hideous  cannonade, 
intended  to  shake  the  nerve  of  the  Union  forces,  when  140 
guns  opened  at  a  signal  and  for  an  hour  and  a  half  scourged 
the  plain  and  the  low  crest  on  which  our  troops  lay,  until  the 
very  earth  seemed  to  shake,  and  the  air  was  full  of  bursting 
shells  and  their  whistling  fragments  carrying  death  to  every 
quarter.  They  had  seen  the  Confederate  column  forming  in 
the  edge  of  the  woods  on  Seminary  Ridge ;  50  hardy  battalions 
wheeling  into  place,  brigade  after  brigade  breaking  from 
cover  to  join  the  desperate  enterprise,  while  the  Confederate 
chieftains,  with  their  staffs,  galloped  along  the  lines  to  give  the 
last  orders,  then  took  their  stations  at  the  head  of  their  troops. 
They  had  seen  that  column,  14,000  strong,  launched  by  a 
word,  its  right  directed  against  themselves,  and  had  clutched 
their  muskets  tighter,  with  quivering  hands  and  throbbing 
hearts,  as  their  thoughts  ran  swiftly  on  to  the  encounter  so 
soon  to  come,  in  this  their  first  battle.  They  had  seen 
Veazey's  16th  regiment  driven  in  from  the  skirmish  line,  as 
the  stones  and  timbers  of  a  broken  dam  are  swept  onward 
before  the  mountainous  flood  of  waters.  At  half  infantry 
range,  they  had  opened  fire  on  the  brigade  of  Kemper,  form 
ing  Pickett's  right,  a  fire  all  the  more  deadly  because  the 
men  who  there  wielded  the  musket  had  from  boyhood  been 


50       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

accustomed  to  use  the  rifle  along  the  wooded  slopes  or  among 
the  grassy  vales  of  the  Green  Mountains.  With  mingled 
feelings  of  relief,  for  they  were  human,  and  of  regret,  for  they 
were  brave,  they  had  seen  the  Confederates  sheer  abruptly 
off  to  the  north,  partly  as  the  effect  of  the  withering  volleys 
poured  among  them  by  the  men  of  Stannard  and  Gates, 
partly  as  the  result  of  the  original  direction  of  the  column 
of  assault  upon  the  "clump  of  trees"  on  Gibbon's  line, 
partly  in  consequence  of  that  instinctive  tendency  to  close  in 
upon  the  centre  which  besets  all  assaulting  columns.  While, 
then,  in  hope  and  doubt  and  fear,  these  brave  Vermonters 
awaited  the  result  of  that  terrible  collision,  seeing  themselves 
apparently  excluded,  by  the  changed  direction  given  to  the 
Confederate  column,  from  further  participation  in  the  great 
struggle,  there  rode  between  their  lines  a  general  officer  of 
princely  port  and  of  a  singularly  bold  and  commanding  aspect. 
It  was  Hancock,  come  to  throw  the  Vermont  brigade  upon 
the  flank  of  the  Confederate  column  already  pressing  up  the 
slope  on  which  stood  the  troops  of  Gibbon  and  Alexander 
Hays.  It  was  a  place  where  no  mounted  man  had  for  hours 
been  seen.  It  was  a  place  where  no  mounted  man  could  for 
five  minutes  hope  to  live  ;  and,  even  as  Randall's  Thirteenth 
Regiment,  followed  fast  by  the  Sixteenth,  flung  itself  forward, 
changing  front  on  the  right  company,  and  opened  upon  the 
flank  of  the  Confederate  column,  that  stately  figure  suddenly 
drooped,  the  fire  died  out  of  that  imperious  eye,  and  the 
heroic  leader  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
there,  on  the  front  line  of  battle,  fell  stricken  to  the 
ground.  Yet,  even  so,  this  prince  of  soldiers  could  not  relin 
quish  the  charge  entrusted  to  him.  Raising  himself  upon  his 
elbow,  to  look  over  the  low,  tumble-down  stone  wall  by  which 
he  lay,  he  watched  with  filmy  eyes  the  progress  of  the  fight ;  in 
a  feeble  and  faltering  voice  issued  his  orders  to  commanders 
and  staff,  and  only  when  the  mighty  column  which,  forty 
minutes  before,  emerged  from  the  woods  on  Seminary  Ridge 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  51 

had  collapsed  under  the  flank  attack  of  Stannard  and  the 
advance  of  Webb,  Harrow  and  Hall,  suffered  himself  to  be 
borne  from  the  field. 

That  gallant  soldier,  that  brilliant  tactician,  that  born 
leader  of  men,  has  passed  away  from  earth ;  and  I  know  of 
no  more  fitting  subject  for  the  veterans  of  the  war  for  the 
Union  to  contemplate  to-day,  than  the  military  character  and 
services  of  Winfield  Scott  Hancock.  The  outbreak  of  the 
war  found  Hancock,  then  in  the  thirty-eighth  year  of  his  age, 
a  captain  in  the  regular  army,  in  charge  of  the  quartermaster's 
depot  at  Los  Angeles,  on  the  Pacific  coast.  Christened  with 
the  name  of  America's  greatest  living  soldier,  graduated  from 
the  Military  Academy  in  1844,  he  had  joined  Scott's  column 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  later  battles  of  the  marvellous 
campaign  which  ended  in  the  capture  of  the  Mexican  capital. 
At  Molino  del  Rey  he  was  in  the  column  of  attack  with 
Longs treet,  Pickett  and  Armistead, — men  whom  he  was  to 
encounter,  sixteen  years  later,  in  another  and  more  memorable 
assault ;  and  was  brevetted  for  his  gallantry  at  Contreras 
and  Cherubusco.  In  the  long  interval  which  followed  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  Hancock  saw  much  instructive  service 
as  aide-de-camp  to  General  Clark  upon  the  Great  Plains, 
as  quartermaster  during  the  troubles  with  the  Seminoles  in 
Florida,  in  the  border  war  in  Kansas,  in  the  Utah  expedition 
of  Harney,  and  upon  the  Pacific  coast.  Absolutely  destitute 
of  asceticism,  always  of  hearty  fellowship,  fond  of  ease  and 
given  to  good  cheer,  his  stirring  ambition,  his  intense  interest 
in  his  profession,  and  his  high  standard  of  duty  rendered 
these  fourteen  years  one  long  term  of  military  education.  I 
doubt  if  there  was  an  officer  in  the  United  States  Army,  who, 
during  that  period  while  political,  social  and  industrial  forces 
were  preparing  the  war  of  secession,  learned  so  much,  or,  to 
use  the  phrase  of  trade,  "  turned  over  his  capital "  so  often. 
Hancock  was  not  by  nature  a  man  of  lofty  intellectuality. 
He  had  courage,  —  fiery,  enthusiastic  courage ;  positive,  active, 


52       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

unfaltering  loyalty  to  country  and  to  comrade  ;  he  had  indus 
try  beyond  measure ;  the  ambition  that  stirs  to  do  great 
deeds  and  be  worthy  of  high  promotion ;  the  power  of  patient 
labor,  that  has  been  called  genius ;  above  all,  an  unrest 
while  anything  remained  to  be  done,  a  dissatisfaction  with 
what  was  incomplete,  a  repugnance  at  what  was  slovenly, 
coarse,  or  half-made-up.  I  am  disposed  to  believe  that  this 
period  of  Hancock's  life  was  passed  to  even  better  advantage 
than  if  it  had  comprised  active  operations  on  the  large  scale 
against  a  powerful  enemy.  The  time  was  to  come,  all  too 
soon,  when  lives  were  to  be  thrown  away  by  thousands  and 
money  by  millions ;  when  orders  of  infinite  consequence  wrere 
to  be  given  as  the  result  of  one  glance  over  a  field  as  restless 
as  the  ocean  after  a  storm;  when  the  conjectures  of  an 
officer  on  the  picket-line  were  to  govern  the  movements  of 
twenty  thousand  men  on  the  morrow.  Meanwhile  the  future 
commander  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  of  the  left  wing  at 
Gettysburg  and  in  the  Wilderness,  was  being  trained  for  his 
high  duties  by  conducting  the  orders  and  correspondence  of  a 
military  department ;  fitting  out  expeditions  of  a  company  or 
a  squadron  ;  supplying  outlying  posts  ;  making  long  marches 
with  a  column  that  would  scarcely  have  served,  a  few  years 
later,  for  his  headquarters  escort ;  and  conducting  the  business 
of  a  quartermaster's  depot  on  the  plains  or  on  the  Pacific 
coast.  To  a  man  who  is  willing  to  do  things  just  so  well  that 
they  will  pass  without  censure  from  his  superiors,  caring 
himself  only  for  pay-day  and  poker,  such  a  scale  of  operations 
is  cramping  and  dwarfing.  To  a  man  who  is  trying  to  do 
everything  at  its  best,  who  is  studying  his  business  and 
accumulating  experience  against  the  day  of  larger  things, 
there  is  no  practice  more  instructive,  enlarging,  and  strength 
ening,  if  not  pursued  too  long. 

It  followed  that  the  outbreak  of  the  war  found  Hancock 
singularly  well  endowed  and  equipped  for  the  responsibilities 
and  duties  that  were  to  devolve  upon  him.  What  he  knew  of 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  53 

infantry  and  could  do  with  infantry,  let  Williamsburg  and 
Fredericksburg  and  Gettysburg  and  the  Salient  at  Spottsyl- 
vania  testify.  While  he  was  not  master  of  the  science  of 
logistics  like  Meade  and  Humphreys,  he  could  conduct  a 
long  march,  over  bad  roads,  with  artillery  and  trains,  better, 
in  my  humble  judgment,  than  any  other  officer  of  the  war, 
federal  or  Confederate.  In  a  somewhat  protracted  experience, 
I  never  but  once  knew  the  Second  Corps,  while  under  his 
command,  no  matter  how  extreme  the  distance  or  severe  the 
conditions,  by  day  or  by  night,  arrive  at  its  destination  in 
bad  form,  straggled  and  broken ;  and  its  marches  were  often 
very  long  and  trying,  as  on  the  29th  of  July,  1862,  when  the 
corps  made  thirty-two  miles,  on  a  single  road,  with  artillery 
and  trains.  In  the  supply  of  troops,  Hancock,  as  the  result 
of  thorough  training  and  downright  hard  work,  and  with 
the  aid  of  one  of  the  most  capable  quartermasters  of  the 
Volunteer  service,  Colonel  Eichard  N.  Batchelder,1  achieved 
almost  the  highest  possible  success.  A  distinguished  member 
of  this  Society,  General  and  Judge  Devens,  has  justly  said  that 
110  army  was  ever  so  well  fed  and  well  clothed  as  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac ;  and  I  venture  to  add  that,  of  all  the  corps 
of  that  army  not  one  was  as  well  fed  or  clothed  as  the 
Second ;  nor  do  I  fear  that  any  old  soldier  here  present  will 
dissent  from  the  opinion  that  regular  rations,  well  shaped 
shoes,  and  warm  blankets  bear  a  very  positive  relation  to  good 
marching  and  hard  fighting.  Of  the  uses  of  cavalry  and 
artillery  Hancock  knew  enough,  first,  not  to  think,  like  many 
high  commanding  officers,  that  he  knew  everything,  or  to  lead 
him  to  interfere  in  the  conduct  of  those  charged  with  these 
highly  specialized  services ;  and,  secondly,  to  recognize  good 
work  whenever  and  by  whomsoever  done.  It  was  but  recently 
that  that  admirable  cavalry  officer,  General  David  M.  Gregg, 
of  Pennsylvania,  said  to  me  that  he  had  never  known  another 

1  Since  the  date  of  this  paper,  appointed  Quartermaster-General  of  the 
United  States  Army. 


54      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

infantry  commander  with  whom  he  found  it  equally  satisfac 
tory  to  serve  in  the  field. 

Finally,  Hancock's  experience  before  the  war  had  made 
him  a  perfect  master  of  the  Regulations,  of  the  procedure 
proper  to  every  department  of  the  army  and  to  every  occasion 
of  the  service,  and  of  the  forms  of  military  correspondence 
and  record.  A  master,  I  say,  not  a  slave ;  for  while  no  man 
understood  better  the  beneficial  uses  of  red  tape,  no  one 
knew  better  how  to  cut  red  tape  when  the  occasion  required. 
An  essayist,  Lord  Macaulay,  I  think,  in  satirizing  the  adop 
tion  in  the  English  language  of  certain  Latin  terms,  asks  us 
to  imagine  a  Roman  Consul,  in  his  rank  and  pomp  and 
warlike  habiliments,  seated  in  a  back  office  in  Bordeaux,  a 
goose-quill  over  his  ear,  making  out  invoices  for  the  skippers 
of  merchant  vessels.  But  the  union  of  martial  and  civic 
functions  need  not  be  ludicrous.  It  would  be  hard  to  believe 
that  Scipio  at  Zama  looked  one  inch  more  the  commander 
than  Hancock  at  Fredericksburg  or  Gettysburg,  or  bore 
himself  more  knightly  and  heroically  in  danger  and  hardship, 
in  weariness  and  wounds  ;  yet  Hancock  was  the  greatest 
hand  at  "papers"  the  army  ever  knew.  My  head  aches, 
now,  from  the  long  night  vigils,  when,  after  some  weary 
march  or  fight,  we  pored  for  hours  over  reports  and  returns, 
and  discussed  minute  points  of  the  Regulations  apropos 
of  the  correspondence  appertaining  to  seventy  or  ninety 
regiments  and  batteries.  It  is  usual  to  make  flings  at  this 
sort  of  work  and  express  contempt  for  "  papers  "  and  regu 
lations  and  red  tape ;  but  it  is  more  likely  that  a  mill  or 
factory  or  railroad  will  be  well  managed,  whose  accounts 
and  correspondence  are  always  in  arrears,  in  confusion,  in 
error,  than  that  a  brigade  or  division  or  corps  will  be  well 
administered  under  the  same  conditions.  The  need  of  order 
and  system  is  even  greater  in  the  latter  than  in  the  former 
case.  This  Hancock  perfectly  understood.  He  deemed  it 
no  less  important  a  part  of  his  duty  to  study  the  state  of 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  55 

his  command  through  the  morning  reports  and  the  monthly 
returns,  than  on  the  field  of  review  ;  and  he  knew  that  he 
could  administer  a  tonic  to  a  sickly  regiment  through  the 
order  book  and  the  letter  book  not  less  effectually  than  at 
Sunday  morning  inspection. 

Such,  in  his  qualifications  for  service,  was  Hancock  as, 
at  his  own  request,  he  was  ordered  East,  in  the  summer  of 
1861,  that  he  might  take  an  active  part  in  the  war  which 
had  broken  out,  amid  such  direful  portents,  on  the  Atlantic 
slope.  For  him  there  was  not  a  moment  of  hesitation  or  of 
indifference  as  to  the  coming  struggle.  To  the  very  centre 
of  his  being  he  was  loyal  to  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  ; 
and  he  never  valued  his  commission  in  the  army  so  highly  as 
when  it  gave  him  a  place  in  the  front  rank  of  their  defenders. 
He  knew  too  many  of  the  men  who,  like  his  friend  Armistead, 
had  reluctantly  and  painfully  broken  the  main  ties  of  their 
lives  in  taking  the  other  side,  to  indulge  in  cheap  talk  about 
traitors  and  sour-apple  trees;  he  knew  too  much  of  the 
Southern  temper  to  make  light  of  the  task  before  the  nation, 
or  to  predict  a  holiday  parade  for  the  Union  armies ;  but  with 
all  his  soul  he  stood  by  the  Union  and  the  government,  and 
never  did  his  faith  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of  that  cause 
waver,  even  amid  disappointment,  disaster,  and  disgrace. 

On  his  first  arrival  in  the  East,  he  was  assigned  to  duty 
with  General  Anderson,  of  Fort  Sumter  fame ;  but  he  was 
himself  so  manifestly  a  commander,  in  every  lineament,  in 
every  motion,  that  it  was  seen  to  be  absurd  to  keep  such  a 
soldier  on  staff-duty,  when  an  army  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
was  to  be  officered ;  and  on  the  23d  of  September,  he  was 
made  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  and  assigned  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  No  commander  ever  more  carefully 
prepared  in  camp  for  success  in  the  field  than  Hancock  did, 
here  <and  through  all  his  subsequent  career.  Doubtless,  most 
who  have  any  impression  whatever  regarding  Hancock,  per 
sonally,  think  of  him  as  a  kind  of  meteor  on  the  battlefield ; 


56       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

an  object  of  admiration  or  of  terror  ;  flashing  hither  and 
thither;  achieving  his  triumphs  by  sheer  brilliancy  of 
bearing,  force  of  intuition,  and  mysterious  power  over  men. 
In  fact,  it  was  with  infinite  labor  that  he  forged  the  weapon 
his  hand  was  to  wield  with  such  effect.  He  knew  that  the 
greater  the  force  exerted,  the  more  likely  was  the  sword  to 
break  under  the  blow,  unless  it  were  perfectly  wrought ;  and 
it  was  with  care  and  pains  inexpressible  that  he  shaped 
and  tempered  it  for  the  coming  conflict.  If  at  Williamsburg, 
in  his  first  encounter  with  the  enemy,  he  met  and  easily 
vanquished  the  Confederate  column  sent  against  him,  led,  on 
one  wing,  by  D.  H.  Hill,  and  on  the  other,  by  Jubal  Early, 
two  of  the  ablest  commanders  of  that  army,  it  was  not  more 
by  reason  of  the  great  tactical  skill,  calm  courage,  and  majestic 
bearing  which  forever  stamped  upon  him  McClellaii's  epithet, 
Superb,  than  by  reason  of  the  long  and  careful  training  to 
which  his  troops  had  been  subjected. 

Of  Hancock  in  the  winter  camps  of  1861,  two  things 
especially  require  to  be  said :  First,  while  he  was  a  strict  and 
even  stern  disciplinarian,  he  was  wholly  incapable  of  any 
of  those  silly  brutalities  which  a  few  officers  of  the  regular 
army  who  were  set  over  volunteer  regiments,  and  many 
volunteer  officers  who  thought  they  were  imitating  regular 
army  methods,  indulged  in  during  the  first  year  of  the  war. 
Secondly,  although  a  "regular"  in  every  fibre  of  his  being, 
Hancock  was  altogether  destitute  of  that  snobbishness 
regarding  volunteers  which  was  exhibited  by  so  many  small 
minds,  in  so  many  high  places,  during  the  first  year  of  the 
Rebellion.  He  recognized  the  fact  that  the  war  was  to  be 
waged  by  volunteers.  He  saw  that  it  was  of  supreme 
importance  to  promote  the  self-respect  and  self-confidence  of 
volunteer  regiments ;  to  lead  them  to  think  that  they  could 
do  anything,  and  were  the  equals  of  anybody ;  and  that  to  be 
everlastingly  talking  about  the  regular  army,  as  so  many 
were,  bewailing  the  lack  of  its  methods  and  forms,  instituting 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  57 

odious  comparisons,  and  sneering  at  the  deficiencies  of  the 
new  troops,  was  a  very  poor  way  of  accomplishing  that  object. 

Hancock  not  only  did  not  sneer  at  volunteers,  he  did  not 
even  patronize  them.  He  made  them  feel  by  his  evident 
respect,  his  hearty  greeting,  his  warm  approval  of  everything 
they  did  well,  that  he  regarded  them  as  being  just  as  fully, 
just  as  truly,  just  as  honorably,  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
Army,  as  if  they  belonged  to  the  old  Sixth  Infantry.  Such 
was  the  spirit  in  which  Hancock  met  his  new  command.  We 
know  with  what  assiduity,  patience  and  good  feeling,  what 
almost  pathetic  eagerness  to  learn  and  to  imitate,  the  volun 
teers  of  1861  sought  to  fit  themselves  for  their  part  in  the 
great  struggle.  Hancock's  thorough  and  cordial  acceptance 
of  volunteers  was  seen,  again,  in  his  choice  of  staff  officers 
throughout  the  war.  Even  after  he  had  become  a  corps 
commander,  he  showed  no  disposition  to  take  an  officer  of  the 
regular  army,  as  such.  Mitchell  and  Bingham,  Batchelder 
and  Wilson,  Brownson  and  Livermore,  Miller  and  Parker, 
were  good  enough  for  him. 

At  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  Hancock's  brigade,  then  in  the 
Sixth  Corps,  was  not  called  to  take  a  part ;  but,  while  Porter 
was  waging  his  bitter  fight  against  odds,  at  Gaines's  Mill, 
Hancock's  brigade  was  engaged  in  holding  back  the  enemy 
who  sought  to  break  in  our  lines  near  the  Chickahominy. 
On  the  following  day,  while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
beginning  the  first  march  of  that  dreary  retreat  to  the 
James,  the  enemy  again  threw  themselves  upon  Hancock's 
lines,  but  were  beaten  off  by  the  prompt  and  resolute  action 
of  his  well-trained  regiments.  On  both  these  occasions 
Hancock  displayed  that  high  degree  of  tactical  skill  which 
so  strongly  characterized  his  later  work  in  command  of  a 
division,  of  a  corps,  and  of  a  wing  of  the  army.  The  eve 
of  Antietam  found  Hancock  easily  the  most  conspicuous 
brigade  leader  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ;  so  that  there  was 
hardly  a  question  who  should  succeed  to  the  command  of  the 


58       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

First  Division  of  the  Second  Corps,  when,  at  noon  of  that 
memorable  clay,  tidings  were  borne  to  general  headquarters 
that  the  gallant  Richardson  had  fallen,  never  to  mount  horse 
or  draw  sword  more.  At  once  Hancock  was  sent  for,  in  haste, 
from  his  brigade  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  despatched  to  take 
command  of  Stunner's  old  division,  as  it  lay  under  arms, 
after  its  desperate  battle  around  Piper's  House. 

It  is  always  more  or  less  of  an  experiment  to  promote 
even  a  capable  and  efficient  brigadier  to  the  command  of  a 
division.  It  may  be  that  the  natural  range  of  his  powers  will 
be  found  to  have  been  exceeded.  Even  should  he,  in  time, 
grow  up  to  the  position,  it  is  most  likely  that  the  new  charge 
will  be  exercised  at  first  with  too  much  either  of  timidity  or  of 
rashness,  with  somewhat  less  than  a  full  grasp  of  the  situation, 
with  comparative  feebleness  of  authority  and  influence  over 
the  unfamiliar  body.  No  such  painful  interval  of  self -distrust 
or  of  inadequacy  to  new  and  larger  commands  characterized 
Hancock's  successive  promotions.  The  very  day  he  was 
advanced  from  Captain  and  Quartermaster  to  be  Brigadier- 
General,  he  was,  in  every  sense,  a  general  officer,  confident  of 
his  powers,  rejoicing  in  the  exercise  of  his  functions,  and  fully 
master  of  his  place,  himself,  his  staff  and  his  troops.  An 
hour  after  Hancock  rode  down  the  line  at  Antietam,  to  take 
up  the  sword  that  had  fallen  from  Richardson's  dying  hand, 
one  could  not  have  told,  he  himself  hardly  knew,  that  he  had 
not  commanded  a  division  for  a  year.  So  thoroughly  had  he 
prepared  himself  for  promotion  during  his  service  with  a 
brigade,  so  sure  was  he  of  his  powers,  that  he  stepped  forward 
to  the  higher  command,  upon  the  field  of  battle,  amid  its 
wreck  and  disorder,  without  a  moment  of  hesitation  or  doubt ; 
and  at  once  became  the  leader  of  that  division  as  fully 
and  perfectly  as  Sumner  had  been,  as  Richardson  had  been. 
The  staff  knew  it ;  the  troops  felt  it ;  every  officer  in  his 
place,  and  every  man  in  the  ranks,  was  aware  before  the 
sun  went  down  that  he  belonged  to-  Hancock's  Division.  In 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  59 

the  command  of  that  division,  composed  of  fine  material, 
admirably  moulded  by  the  heroic  Sumner  in  the  winter  camps 
of  1861-62,  and  gifted  with  an  extraordinary  wealth  of 
brilliant  young  soldiers  destined  to  great  careers,  like  Barlow, 
Zook,  Brooke,  Nugent,  Patrick  Kelly,  Miles  and  McKeen, 
Hancock  remained  until  the  10th  of  June,  1863. 

Time  will  not  serve  to  tell  the  story  of  Fredericksburg 
and  Chancellorsville.  Of  Fredericksburg,  where,  on  the 
13th  of  December,  1862,  Hancock  led  the  brigades  of 
Meagher,  Caldwell  and  Zook  out  of  the  city,  through  streets 
commanded  by  the  enemy's  guns  ;  crossed  bridges  by  the  flank, 
at  half  artillery  range  ;  and  there  deploying  his  forces,  moved 
forward  over  a  plain  swept  from  end  to  end  by  direct  and 
enfilading  fires,  up  towards  Marye's  Heights,  against  two  tiers 
of  musketry,  to  within  pistol  shot  of  the  Stone  Wall  which 
was  held  by  four  ranks  of  veteran  riflemen,  only  desisting  from 
the  hopeless  attempt  to  which  he  had  been  assigned  when  his 
gallant  division  had  lost  2013  men,  including  156  commis 
sioned  officers  killed  or  wounded.  Of  Chancellorsville,  where, 
on  the  3d  of  May,  1863,  when  all  others  had  left  the  neigh 
borhood  of  the  Chancellor  House,  Hancock  held  his  division 
in  two  lines  of  battle,  back  to  back,  one  fronting  towards 
Gordonsville  and  the  other  towards  Fredericksburg,  his  artil 
lery  firing  down  the  lane  between  ;  and  so  kept  the  enemy 
at  bay  until  the  roads  leading  to  the  rear  had  been  cleared 
and  the  way  was  open  for  his  own  slow  and  orderly  retreat. 

Each  succeeding  battle  had  but  heightened  Hancock's 
reputation  for  exact  obedience  to  orders,  for  almost  magical 
influence  over  men,  for  great  tactical  skill,  for  unflinching 
resolution,  whether  in  attack  or  defence  ;  while  his  admin 
istrative  ability,  and  the  strict  discipline  of  his  command,  in 
camp  or  on  the  march,  had  clearly  pointed  him  out  as  the 
rising  soldier  of  the  Potomac  Army,  so  that,  when,  on  the  eve 
of  Lee's  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  that  excellent  officer,  Major- 
General  Couch,  relinquished  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  on 


60      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

his  assignment  to  the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna,  every 
eye  instinctively  turned  to  Hancock  as  his  successor.  It  was 
with  a  stern  joy  at  the  fulfilment  of  his  righteous  ambition  ; 
with  a  glad  confidence  in  his  own  powers  ;  yet,  not  the  less, 
with  an  earnest  sense  of  the  responsibility  thus  devolved  upon 
him,  that,  on  the  10th  of  June,  Hancock  first  drew  his  sword 
at  the  head  of  the  corps  which,  in  losing  15,000  men  in  battle, 
had  never  lost  a  color  or  a  gun  ;  whose  fair  fame,  he  was  well 
resolved,  should  never  suffer  wrong  at  his  hands.  Already 
had  his  reputation  so  far  outrun  even  this  high  promotion, 
that,  within  three  weeks  of  the  day  when  he  ceased  to  be  the 
commander  of  a  division,  General  Meade  sent  him  forward  to 
Gettysburg,  to  stay  the  disaster  of  the  opening  battle ;  to 
take  command  of  the  three  corps  at  the  front,  over  two  officers 
his  superiors  in  rank ;  and  to  report  upon  the  suitability  of 
the  position  for  the  concentration  of  the  entire  army. 

In  every  great  career,  whether  civil  or  military,  there  is 
one  day  which  is  peculiarly  memorable  ;  which,  by  reason,  in 
part,  perhaps,  of  favorable  opportunities  or  especially  conspic 
uous  position,  in  part,  also,  through  some  rare  inspiration, 
quickening  the  genius  of  the  statesman  or  the  warrior,  be 
comes  and  remains  to  the  end  the  crown  of  that  career ;  the 
day  which  the  mention  of  that  leader's  name  instinctively 
suggests ;  the  day  to  which,  in  disappointment  or  in  retire 
ment,  his  own  thoughts  go  back  as  the,  to  him,  day  of  days. 
Such  to  Hancock  was  Gettysburg.  From  the  time  when,  by 
his  splendid  resolution,  force  of  character,  and  power  over 
men,  he  checked  the  rout  of  the  first  afternoon,  restored 
order  and  confidence,  and  formed  the  new  lines  which,  were 
to  be  held  unbroken  to  the  end,  down  to  the  hour  when  the 
divisions  of  Gibbon  and  Hays,  leaping  the  stone  walls  and 
rail  fences  which  had  partially  sheltered  them  during  the 
cannonade  and  the  great  charge,  gathered  in  30  Confederate 
colors  and  4000  prisoners  from  the  shattered  divisions  of 
Pettigrew  and  Pickett,  Gettysburg  was  to  Hancock  all  glo- 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  61 

rious  and  fortunate.  Even  the  desperate  wound  lie  received 
in  the  moment  of  victory  scarcely  cast  a  shadow  upon  the 
great  triumph  he  had  achieved  during  the  first  month  of  his 
career  as  the  commander  of  an  army  corps. 

That  the  campaign  of  1864  did  not  bring  a  proportional 
increase  of  fame  was  due  chiefly  to  three  causes.  First,  he 
had  already  reached  an  almost  dangerous  elevation  in  popular 
reputation,  from  which  one  was  far  more  likely  to  fall  than  to 
rise.  Secondly,  Hancock's  Gettysburg  wound  continued, 
almost  from  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  in  May,  till  his 
enforced  departure  from  the  field,  in  November,  to  be  a 
source  of  weakness,  suffering,  and,  at  times,  of  total  disability, 
requiring  him  frequently  to  seek  rest  in  an  ambulance  or 
on  the  ground  when,  according  to  his  habits  as  a  commander, 
he  would  have  been  galloping  over  the  field  or  leading 
the  march  of  his  foremost  division.  Thirdly,  the  species  of 
warfare  that  was  initiated  in  May,  1864,  against  an  enemy 
acting  almost  wholly  on  the  defensive,  behind  breastworks 
protected  by  slashing  and  abatis,  and  largely,  also,  by  swamps  ; 
in  a  region  where  clear  ground  was  highly  exceptional, 
and  where  the  uncleared  ground  was  often  covered  by  dense 
and  stubborn  growths  of  trees  and  underbrush,  through 
which  a  single  woodman  could  with  difficulty  force  his  way, 
was  one  that  offered  few  opportunities  for  brilliant  actions. 
Indeed,  the  campaign  of  1864  was  one  which,  except  in  the 
case  of  a  few  dashing  young  brigade  commanders,  was  to 
destroy  reputations,  and  not  to  make  them.  Sheridan, 
indeed,  won  great  fame  during  the  year,  but  it  was  by  his 
operations  in  the  fertile  and  open  Valley  of  Virginia,  rather 
than  in  the  jungles  of  the  Wilderness  or  of  Spottsylvania,  or 
among  the  swamps  of  the  Totopotomoy  or  the  Chickahominy. 
To  Hancock  the  loss  of  opportunity,  through  the  peculiar 
character  of  the  campaign,  was  greater  than  to  any  other 
commander,  since  those  qualities  in  which  he  pre-eminently 
excelled,  namely,  tactical  skill  and  personal  influence  over  his 


62      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

soldiers  in  critical  moments,  were,  on  most  of  the  battlefields 
of  1864,  largely  neutralized  by  the  nature  of  the  country. 

Yet,  though  that  campaign  afforded  little  opportunity  for 
brilliant  strokes  and  grand  successes,  the  fame  of  Hancock 
suffered  no  diminution  under  its  fearful  trials.  He  it  was 
who,  bringing  his  troops  up  to  the  support  of  Getty's  fine 
division,  on  the  Orange  and  Freclericksburg  Plank  Road,  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th  of  May,  forced  back  the  corps  of 
Hill,  which  had  advanced  to  seize  the  Brock  Road  Junction, 
and  thus  intervene  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Union 
Army.  He  it  was  who,  in  the  early  morning  of  the  6th, 
encountering  with  his  own  divisions  and  those  of  Getty 
and  Wadsworth,  the  corps  of  Hill  and  Longstreet,  fought 
that  great  Battle  on  the  Left,  in  the  Wilderness,  which  has 
become  a  synonym  for  savage  ferocity  and  unrelenting 
determination.  If  the  charge  at  Cold  Harbor  failed  to 
secure  its  object,  the  high-heaped  mounds  of  patriot  dead 
remain  a  monument  of  unsurpassed  valor  and  discipline. 
And  it  was  Hancock's  closely  massed  divisions,  moving  under 
his  eye,  which  broke  into  that  wild,  spontaneous  cheer,  as  the 
red  earth  of  the  Salient  came  into  view,  on  the  early  morning 
of  the  12th  of  May ;  dashed  forward  against  a  storm  of  lead, 
and  leaped  the  Confederate  intrenchments,  capturing  4000 
prisoners,  20  cannon  and  30  standards. 

Some  of  you  remember,  for  you  were  there,  how  from  that 
bloody  dawn  till  twelve  o'clock  at  night,  the  Second  Corps, 
with  the  good  Sixth  fighting  on  its  right,  held  those  captured 
intrenchments  against  the  utmost  efforts  of  Lee's  veteran 
brigades  roused  almost  to  madness  by  the  losses  of  the  early 
morning ;  how  trees  were  cut  down  by  the  fire  of  musketry 
alone ;  how  the  foemen  fired  their  pieces  full  in  each  other's 
faces,  or  gave  bayonet  thrusts  across  the  intrenchments  on 
which  at  times  the  hostile  flags  were  both  planted  ;  how,  again 
and  again,  the  trenches  had  to  be  cleared  of  the  slain,  that  the 
living  might  have  a  place  to  stand.  Over  that  desperate  and 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  63 

protracted  contact,  Hancock  presided,  stern,  strong,  and 
masterful ;  withdrawing  the  shattered  brigades  as  their 
ammunition  became  exhausted,  supplying  their  places  with 
fresh  troops ;  feeding  the  fires  of  battle  all  that  long  day  and 
far  into  the  night,  until  the  Confederates,  at  last  abandoning 
their  attempts  to  retake  the  captured  works,  retired  from  the 
field,  full  twenty  hours  after  the  order  "  forward  "  had  been 
given  to  the  column  of  assault. 

In  the  brilliant  strategic  movement  upon  Petersburg,  and 
in  the  bloody  assaults  which  followed  the  miscarriage  of  the 
attempt  to  seize  the  Cockade  City  before  the  arrival  of  Lee's 
army,  Hancock  took  a  part  which  was  abruptly  terminated 
by  an  outbreak  of  his  Gettysburg  wound.  Recovering 
from  his  disability,  he  conducted  in  July  and  August  two 
expeditions  to  the  north  bank  of  the  James  River,  of 
which  time  will  allow  me  to  speak  only  so  far  as  to  relate 
an  incident  strikingly  characteristic  of  Hancock  and  of  the 
gallant  commander  of  the  Union  cavalry,  who  was,  at  this 
time,  serving  under  Hancock's  orders. 

The  July  expedition  to  Deep  Bottom,  as  it  is  called,  had  in 
view  two  possible  results.  First,  that  the  enemy's  lines  on 
that  side  of  the  river  might  be  found  so  thinly  held  as  to 
allow  our  powerful  corps  of  cavalry,  after  the  Confederate 
infantry  should  have  been  pushed  back  upon  Chapin's  Farm, 
to  capture  Richmond  by  a  rush,  or,  at  least,  cut  up  the  rail 
roads  011  the  north  of  the  city.  Secondly,  that,  failing  in  this, 
the  movement  might  serve  as  a  feint  to  draw  a  large  part 
of  Lee's  army  away  from  Petersburg,  which  the  Fifth,  Ninth 
and  Eighteenth  Corps  were  preparing  to  enter  through  the 
ghastly  avenue  that  was  to  be  laid  open  by  the  explosion  of 
Burnside's  mine.  The  first  object  was  defeated  by  the  rapid 
concentration  of  the  enemy's  forces  ;  but,  as  a  demonstration 
in  favor  of  Burnside,  the  expedition  was  an  overwhelming 
success.  So  alarmed  were  the  Confederates  that  they  drew 
over  to  that  side  the  larger  part  of  their  entire  army.  This, 


64      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

while  favoring  the  projected  assault  upon  Petersburg,  was,  of 
course,  accompanied  by  no  inconsiderable  danger  to  the 
column  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  Critical  as  was  the 
position  on  the  28th,  it  was  rendered  highly  perilous  when  the 
Lieutenant-General,  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  ordered  Mott, 
with  nearly  one  half  the  corps,  back  to  Petersburg.  This  was 
to  leave  two  small  divisions,  scarcely  8000  strong,  to  confront 
overwhelming  odds  throughout  the  succeeding  day.  It  was, 
however,  provided  that  the  cavalry  should  cross  to  the  south 
bank,  leave  the  horses  there,  in  the  charge  of  every  fourth 
cavalryman,  and,  returning,  help  the  infantry  hold  their 
extended  lines.  In  such  a  situation  everything  depended  on 
the  enemy's  obtaining  not  even  a  suggestion  of  the  weakness 
of  our  remaining  column.  To  this  end  the  most  precise 
instructions  were  issued  regarding  the  crossing ;  not  a  man 
was  to  enter  upon  the  bridge  after  the  first  break  of  day. 
Every  subordinate  commander  was  required  to  acknowledge 
receipt  of  these  instructions ;  and  then  headquarters,  worn 
out  by  the  excessive  exertions  of  the  three  preceding  days, 
sank  to  rest.  From  the  sound  sleep  into  which  I  had 
fallen,  I  was  awakened  by  hearing  my  name  called  from  the 
General's  tent.  Running  in,  I  found  Hancock  tossing  on  his 
camp  bed.  "  Colonel,"  he  said,  "  I  am  anxious  about  the 
cavalry.  Go  to  Sheridan  and  say  to  him  that  he  must  see  to 
it  that  not  a  man  goes  upon  the  bridge  after  it  is  light."  I 
jumped  upon  an  orderly's  horse  which  was  kept  saddled  for  an 
emergency,  and  galloped  to  Sheridan's  headquarters.  As  I 
approached,  the  first  voice  that  challenged  me  was,  not  the 
sentinel's,  not  a  staff  officer's,  but  the  voice  of  the  great 
cavalryman  himself.  "  Who  's  that  ?  "  I  gave  my  message. 
"I  was  thinking  of  the  same  thing,"  was  the  reply. 
"  Forsyth,  go  down  to  the  bridge,  and  if  General  Kautz  has 
not  crossed,  tell  him  to  mass  his  division  behind  the  woods." 
Forsyth  and  myself  rode  together  towards  the  bridge.  A 
division  of  cavalry  was  just  entering  upon  it.  Fifteen 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  65 

minutes  more,  and  the  Confederates,  who  had  all  night 
listened  to  the  low  rumbling  sounds  and  the  dull  jarring  of 
the  bridge,  and  from  their  lookouts  had  been  straining  their 
eyes  to  catch  the  direction  of  the  movement,  would  have  seen 
our  troops  passing  to  the  rear,  and  in  all  probability  would 
have  swooped  down  upon  our  little  force,  and  driven  us  into 
the  river.  As  it  turned  out,  when  it  became  light  enough  for 
them  to  see,  what  they  beheld  was  our  dismounted  cavalry 
men  returning  from  the  south  side,  with  their  carbines  over 
their  shoulders,  looking  for  all  the  world  like  honest  infantry, 
seemingly  the  end  of  a  column  which  had  been  crossing  all 
night.  The  effect  was  complete.  The  Confederate  leaders 
did  not  doubt  that  every  brigade  which  could  be  taken  from 
the  Petersburg  lines  had  been  sent  in  haste  across  the  James, 
to  force  a  passage  into  Richmond.  This  illusion,  aided  by 
the  activity  and  audacity  of  our  skirmish  line,  under  Miles, 
not  only  sufficed  to  save  us  from  an  attack  which  could  hardly 
have  failed  to  result  in  our  destruction,  but  held  the  Con 
federate  forces  closely  in  place  twenty  miles  from  Petersburg 
where  the  assault  of  the  30th  of  July  was  impending. 

My  story  carries  its  own  moral.  Here  were  the  two  men 
of  the  Potomac  Army  regarding  whom  it  was  popularly 
supposed  that  they  won  their  successes  by  daring  and 
brilliant  strokes.  Yet  we  see  them  lying  awake  at  night, 
after  incredible  fatigues,  to  ponder  the  chances  of  a  possible 
miscarriage.  In  how  many  critical  moments  of  the  war  did 
the  disappointment  of  well  laid  plans,  if  not  disastrous  defeat, 
result  because  able  and  skilful  officers  deemed  their  duty 
discharged  when  they  had  given  the  appropriate  orders! 
This  was  not  Hancock's  or  Sheridan's  idea  of  a  commander's 
work.  They  believed  in  giving  the  right  orders  and  then 
seeing  them  executed ;  and  it  was  to  this,  fully  as  much 
as  to  their  more  splendid  qualities  of  soldiership,  that  the 
success  of  these  two  chieftains  was  due. 

Time  will  not  serve  to  tell  the  story  of  that  blackest  of 


66       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

days  in  the  calendar  of  the  gallant  leader  of  the  Second  Corps, 
when  on  the  25th  of  August,  after  his  command  had  lost 
20,000  men  in  battle  since  it  crossed  the  Rapidan,  two  of 
his  decimated  divisions,  scarce  6600  strong,  caught  in  the 
ill-constructed  intrenchmeiits  at  Reams'  Station,  were  driven 
from  a  portion  of  their  works  by  repeated  assaults  from 
superior  force,  with  the  loss  of  7  standards,  9  cannon,  and 
1700  prisoners.  The  agony  of  that  day  never  passed  away 
from  the  proud  soldier,  who,  for  the  first  time,  in  spite 
of  superhuman  exertions  and  reckless  exposure  on  his  part, 
saw  his  lines  broken  and  his  guns  taken.  "  Were  I  dead," 
said  Nelson,  "  want  of  frigates  would  be  found  written  on  my 
heart."  So  one  who  was  gifted  to  discern  the  real  forces 
which  in  us  make  for  life  or  for  death,  looking  down  upon  the 
cold  and  pallid  form  of  Hancock  as  he  lay  at  rest  beneath 
the  drooping  flag  of  his  country,  there  on  Governor's  Island 
in  February  of  1886,  would  have  seen  "Reams'  Station" 
written  on  brow,  and  brain,  and  heart,  as  palpable  as  to  the 
common  eye  were  the  scars  of  Gettysburg. 

Nor  can  I  tell  of  the  honorable  expedition  to  the  Boydton 
Road,  in  October,  1864,  which  closed  the  career  of  Hancock 
in  the  field.  During  November,  his  wounds  still  distressing 
him,  it  was  proposed  by  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  that  he  should  relinquish  his  command,  and,  returning  to 
the  North,  during  the  season  when  active  operations  would  be 
impracticable  through  stress  of  weather,  should  raise  a  corps 
to  be  composed  wholly  of  veterans  who  had  served  honorably 
through  one  term  of  enlistment.  This  trust  Hancock 
accepted  in  the  same  spirit  with  which  he  had  received  and, 
so  far  as  lay  in  him,  had  executed  every  commission  and 
order  since  he  left  the  quartermaster's  camp  at  Los  Angeles. 
In  the  opening  of  the  year  he  took  the  field  at  the  head  of 
his  new  command,  officered  by  well  approved  soldiers  like 
Carroll,  Brooke  and  Morgan ;  but  before  he  was  called  to 
encounter  the  enemy,  the  brilliant  combinations  of  Sheridan, 


GENERAL  HANCOCK  67 

Warren  and  Humphreys,  the  sturdy  valor  and  indomitable 
energy  of  Wright  and  Ord,  the  fine  soldiership  and  loyal 
devotion  of  Parke  and  Gibbon,  had  brought  the  long  contest 
to  a  close;  Petersburg  had  fallen,  and  with  it  Richmond, 
the  object  of  four  years'  incessant  fighting;  Lee's  army, 
attempting  to  escape,  had  been  beset  in  flank  and  rear  by 
troops  that  seemed  for  the  time  to  have  lost  the  sense  alike 
of  fatigue  and  of  fear;  battles  had  been  fought  upon  the 
double-quick ;  divisions  and  army  corps  had  marched,  or  run, 
in  deployed  lines  from  daylight  until  dark ;  and,  at  last,  at 
Appomattox  Court  House,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
after  performing  prodigies  of  valor,  surrounded  and  brought 
to  bay  before  five-fold  odds,  surrendered  without  shame,  and 
the  greatest  rebellion  of  modern  times  was  crushed. 

I  wish  I  could  tell  the  hundred  anecdotes  that  come  up 
to  my  mind,  illustrative  of  the  character  of  the  soldier  and 
the  man,  Winfield  Scott  Hancock ;  what  pains  he  took  to 
encourage  young  officers,  so  that  the  juniors  of  his  old  division 
and  of  his  corps  fairly  worshipped  him,  formed  themselves 
on  him,  and  were  ready  to  die  at  his  word;  how  just  and 
honorable  in  dealing  with  the  reputations  of  others,  so  that  I 
have  known  him  keep  a  staff  officer  riding  half  a  day  among 
the  camps  of  the  army,  to  find  out  the  name  of  a  lieutenant 
who,  in  the  heat  of  some  action,  had  brought  him  a  message 
from  another  commander,  that  due  acknowledgment  might  be 
made  of  it  in  his  official  report ;  how  courteous  and  consider 
ate  to  the  unfortunate,  so  that,  when  it  was  my  fate  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates,  Lieutenant-General  A.  P. 
Hill  sent  a  staff  officer  with  the  message  that  he  had  given 
orders  that  I  should  be  treated  with  the  utmost  attention, 
because  General  Hancock  had  been  so  kind  to  his  [Hill's] 
soldiers  when  prisoners;  but  it  is  time  to  bring  this  long 
paper  to  a  close. 


MAJOR-GENERAL 
ANDREW  ATKINSON    HUMPHREYS. 

BY 

JAMES  H.  WILSON, 

BEEVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  A. ;  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  V. 


Head  before  the  Society  on  Tuesday  evening,  March  7, 1893. 


The  following-  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  by  General  Wilson,  concern 
ing1  the  Civil  War :  — 

THE  LIFE  OF  ULYSSES  S.  GRANT.  General  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States. 
By  Charles  A  Dana,  .  .  . ;  and  J.  H.  Wilson.  .  .  .  Published  by  Gurdon, 
Bill  &  Company,  Spring-field,  Mass..  1868. 

THE  LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF  EMORY  UPTON,  Brevet  Major-General  U.  S. 
Army.  By  Peter  S.  Michie.  With  an  Introduction  by  James  Harrison  Wil 
son.  New  York  :  D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1885. 

GENERAL,  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  MEMOIRS,  International  Review.  Vol.  2,  1875, 
pages  779-817. 

LIFE  AND  SERVICES  OF  BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ANDREW  JONATHAN 
ALEXANDER,  United  States  Army.  A  sketch  from  personal  recollections, 
family  letters  and  the  Records  of  the  Great  Rebellion.  New  York,  1877. 

REVIEWS  AND  PAPERS  on  Lincoln  as  Commander-in-Chief,  Ulysses  S.  Grant, 
General  Thomas,  General  McClellan,  General  Sheridan.  General  W.  F.  Smith, 
General  Kilpatrick,  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  General  Ames ;  the  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  The  March  to  the  Sea ;  Franklin  and 
Nashville,  published  in  the  New  York  Sun.  The  pursuit  and  Capture  of 
Jefferson  Davis,  published  in  the  Philadelphia  Times. 

See  List  of  Papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu 
setts  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS. 


THE  great  men  of  history  are  those  who  are  potentially 
connected  with  great  events,  those  who  are  in  supreme 
control  when  great  deeds  are  performed.  It  matters  little 
whether  their  personal  qualities  are  transcendent  or  not  if 
only  they  are  at  the  head  when  striking  and  far-reaching 
changes  are  made  in  the  affairs  of  a  great  nation.  The  roads 
by  which  men  travel  matter  but  little  if  only  the  aim  be  high 
and  the  end  fortunate.  And  yet  no  matter  how  high  the 
aim  nor  how  great  the  faculties  if  they  be  not  used  on  affairs 
of  the  first  importance.  Great  virtues  cannot  make  great 
men  except  in  great  emergencies.  A  man's  success  in  life  is 
compounded  of  his  own  gifts,  his  own  opportunities,  and  the 
way  in  which  he  brings  the  one  to  bear  upon  the  other.  No 
man,  simply  as  a  man,  stands  for  more  than  unity  in  the 
history  of  the  race  of  which  he  is  a  member.  As  the  affairs 
of  races  and  nations  are  greater  than  those  of  individuals,  so 
in  the  life  equation  of  any  man,  be  he  soldier  or  statesman, 
the  greater  factors  and  forces  are  those  which  concern  the 
race  or  the  nation,  and  lie  outside,  above  and  beyond  him. 
If  nature  has  brought  him  forth  at  the  right  time  and 
placed  him  in  the  right  station,  where  great  interests  are  at 
stake  and  great  events  are  happening,  he  may  have  great 
opportunities.  With  great  perspicacity  and  great  resolution 
he  may  seize  upon  them,  and  then  with  great  energy  of  body 
and  mind  and  the  greater  forces  of  his  time  working  with 
him,  and  not  against  him,  he  may  play  a  controlling  part  and 
pass  into  history  as  a  great  man.  Just  what  qualities  of 


72       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

body  or  mind  are  necessary  to  this  result,  no  one  can  say  pre 
cisely.  They  may  differ  as  much  as  times  and  opportunities 
differ.  In  the  Homeric  age,  fortitude  was  looked  upon  as  the 
greatest  of  human  virtues,  the  one  which,  displaying  itself  in 
divine  transports  and  heroic  frenzies,  could  alone  secure  the 
favor  of  the  gods.  But  at  the  same  time,  superstitions  and 
omens  were  the  daily  guides  of  even  the  most  elevated  minds. 
Only  the  loftiest  heroes  rose  superior  to  them.  "You  bid 
me,"  said  Hector  to  Polydamus,  "be  guided  by  the  flight 
of  birds.  But  I  heed  them  not  whether  they  pass  by  the 
right  hand  towards  morning  and  the  sun,  or  by  the  left  hand 
towards  the  vapor  and  the  darkness.  The  only  best  omen  is 
the  defence  of  our  country." 

The  surroundings  of  men  change  with  the  lapse  of  ages. 
Superstition  yields  to  science  and  barbarism  to  civilization ; 
but  human  ideals  and  aspirations  remain  substantially  the 
same.  The  love  of  family,  of  country,  of  power  and  of 
leadership ;  the  hope  of  wealth  and  glory ;  the  feelings  of 
ambition  and  patriotism,  and,  above  all,  the  sense  of  duty, 
are  still  the  master  motives  of  man's  nature.  Life  is  more 
complex,  and  the  interests  of  human  society  are  now  more 
extended  and  more  far-reaching  than  they  have  ever  been 
before ;  but  the  virtues  remain  unchanged  and  unchanging. 
We  Americans  are  accustomed  to  regard  the  period  of  the 
Revolution  as  the  heroic  age  of  the  Republic,  and  to  look  upon 
the  men  of  that  time  as  the  demi-gods  of  our  race ;  but  when 
the  events  of  a  later  day,  and  the  deeds  of  those  who  then 
guided  the  Republic  through  its  civil  and  military  perils,  are 
considered,  may  we  not  fairly  claim  that  the  heroic  age  is 
yet  with  us,  and  that  our  race  is  still  the  bountiful  producer 
of  heroes  ? 

No  one  who  knew  the  principal  leaders  of  our  day,  as  we 
knew  them,  can  doubt  it.  No  one  who  comes  after  us  and 
reads  the  story  of  their  virtues,  of  their  fidelity,  fortitude 
and  persistency,  of  their  honor,  honesty  and  unselfishness,  of 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  73 

their  patient  toil,  their  lofty  aspirations,  their  chivalrous 
modesty,  and,  above  all,  their  sublime  conception  of  duty  to 
themselves  and  to  the  cause  of  national  unity,  can  for  a 
moment  hesitate  to  assign  them  a  high  place  among  the 
heroes  of  our  race.  They  had  their  peculiarities,  their 
idiosyncrasies,  their  limitations,  but  it  may  well  be  doubted 
if  any  period  of  the  world's  history  can  show  a  larger  number 
of  patriots  and  heroes,  a  wider  dissemination  of  the  public 
virtues,  higher  ideals  of  public  duty,  or  more  numerous 
instances  of  pure,  upright  and  courageous  manhood  than  the 
period  of  the  Great  Rebellion ! 

It  was  the  good  fortune  of  the  older  members  of  this 
Society  to  know  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  leading  men  on 
both  sides  of  the  great  struggle,  and  I  venture  to  express  the 
hope  that  they  will  tell  us,  while  yet  they  may,  of  the  per 
sonalities  and  private  lives  of  those  illustrious  men.  So  far, 
the  reports,  narratives  and  histories  give  us  merely  the  driest 
official  details  of  military  movements  and  events.  Nothing, 
or  but  next  to  nothing,  is  said  of  the  individuals,  their 
education,  appearance,  motives,  peculiarities  and  character  ; 
a  little  more  is  told  of  the  quality  of  their  deeds,  and  yet 
not  enough  to  give  us  a  true  idea  of  the  events  in  which 
they  were  concerned.  Those  great  men  —  some  of  them 
were  really  great,  and  more  deserved  to  be  —  while  well 
enough  known  to  us,  who  were  their  companions,  are  almost 
unknown  except  by  name  to  the  public,  and  will  be  entirely 
unknown  to  the  next  generation  unless  something  effective 
is  done  to  rescue  them  from  oblivion.  A  few  chosen  names 
will  be  written  large  on  the  page  of  general  history,  but  the 
personalities  belonging  even  to  them  will  in  spite  of  their 
virtues  and  great  performances  disappear  forever ! 

One  of  the  most  interesting  and  meritorious  characters  of 
this  period  was  Major-General  Andrew  Atkinson  Humphreys, 
the  last  commander  of  the  invincible  Second  Corps.  He  was 
a  gentleman,  a  scientist  and  a  soldier  of  the  highest  quality. 


74      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Our  race  has  produced  no  loftier  specimen  of  manhood; 
modern  education  no  finer  example  of  the  scientific  soldier. 
And  this  is  as  it  should  be,  for  in  Humphreys  it  had  the  best 
of  materials  to  work  upon.  Descended  from  a  Welsh  family, 
four  generations  of  whom  had  lived  in  and  near  Philadelphia, 
and  two  generations  had  been  shipbuilders  and  naval  con 
structors  of  the  highest  rank,  he  came  by  his  qualities 
naturally.  Daniel  Humphreys,  the  great-great-grandfather, 
was  a  Welsh  Quaker  of  substance  and  consideration,  who 
came  to  Pennsylvania  and  became  the  owner  of  a  large  tract 
of  land  at  Haverford  in  1682.  His  grandson  Joshua  was  a 
ship-carpenter,  and  in  the  practice  of  his  trade  soon  became 
widely  known  as  the  leading  shipbuilder  of  his  day.  He 
was  the  first  naval  constructor  and  adviser  of  the  United 
States,  appointed  by  General  Washington,  and  while  in  office 
laid  the  foundation  of  the  supremacy  of  our  wooden  naval 
vessels,  by  conceiving  and  carrying  out  the  idea  that  they 
should  be  larger  and  stronger  and  carry  heavier  guns,  and 
more  of  them,  than  the  current  methods  of  rating  would 
indicate.  He  designed  the  Constitution,  lovingly  remembered 
in  our  annals  as  "  Old  Ironsides,"  the  Chesapeake,  the 
Congress,  the  President  and  the  United  States,  and  built  the 
last-named  ship  in  his  own  yard.  It  is  a  sufficient  tribute  to 
his  genius  to  say,  that  these  vessels  were  the  most  celebrated 
frigates  ever  turned  out  of  any  shipyard  in  the  world,  up  to 
that  time  and  for  many  years  afterwards. 

Joshua's  brother  Charles  early  entered  political  life,  was 
a  member  of  the  Provincial  Assembly  and  of  the  Conti 
nental  Congress  ;  but,  like  John  Dickinson  and  several  other 
worthy  men,  he  voted  against  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence.  Joshua's  son  Clement  was  a  sea-faring  man  who  died 
young.  Another  son,  Samuel,  born  in  Philadelphia  in  1778, 
was  bred  to  his  father's  business,  and  was  employed  before 
he  was  yet  of  age  in  buying  live  oak  for  the  Navy.  In  1815 
he  was  appointed  Chief  Constructor  of  the  Navy,  and  held 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  75 

that  office  till  he  died.  He  was  a  gentleman  of  the  highest 
character  and  public  spirit.  Of  course  he  adhered  to  the 
principle  laid  down  by  his  father  in  naval  construction,  that, 
class  for  class,  those  ships  which  were  of  the  largest  tonnage 
and  strongest  construction  and  threw  the  greatest  weight  of 
metal  from  their  broadsides  would  prove  the  most  successful 
in  battle.  In  1824  the  Emperor  of  Kussia,  through  Mr. 
Ivanoff,  his  Consul-General  at  Philadelphia,  invited  Samuel 
Humphreys  to  enter  his  service,  offering  him  a  princely 
salary,  a  town  and  country  house,  and  a  retinue  of  servants ; 
but  the  proposition  was  declined  with  an  expression  of  doubt 
as  to  his  merits,  and  a  lofty  declaration  of  devotion  and 
duty  to  the  flag  of  his  country. 

This  modest  and  distinguished  man  was  the  father  of 
Andrew  Atkinson  Humphreys,  the  subject  of  this  sketch,  born 
also  at  Philadelphia,  November  2,  1810,  died  at  Washington 
December  27,  1883.  He  graduated  at  the  United  States 
Military  Academy  in  1831,  thirteenth  in  a  class  of  thirty-three 
members.  His  most  distinguished  classmates  were  Professor 
Roswell  Park,  Henry  Clay,  son  of  the  orator  and  statesman 
of  that  name,  Professor  Norton  of  the  Sheffield  Scientific 
School,  Samuel  C.  Ridgeley,  Horatio  P.  Van  Cleve,  William 
H.  Emory,  Bradford  R.  Alden,  Samuel  R.  Curtis  and 
Charles  Whittlesey.  It  will  be  observed  that  there  are  no 
great  names  among  them,  but  Emory  and  Curtis  were  solid 
and  substantial  men,  while  the  others  were  more  or  less 
distinguished  in  the  various  walks  of  life.  Indeed,  if  one 
will  turn  over  the  pages  of  Cullum's  Register  he  will  be  struck 
by  the  fact  that  West  Point  turned  out  during  that  period 
more  distinguished  professors,  divines  and  civil  engineers 
than  soldiers.  Vinton  and  Bledsoe,  the  divines ;  Barnard  and 
Barnes,  the  engineers  ;  Cass,  the  railroad  manager ;  Bailey,  the 
chemist ;  Church  and  Alvord,  the  mathematicians ;  Cullum,  the 
scientist  and  biographer ;  Dupont,  the  powder-maker ;  and 
Humphrey  Marshall,  the  orator,  were  all  graduates  of  that 


76       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

time,  and  none  of  them  achieved  great  military  distinction. 
Lee  and  Meade  were  contemporaries  of  these  men,  and  had  it 
not  been  for  the  Rebellion,  would  have  been  remembered,  so 
long  as  they  were  remembered  at  all,  for  scholarship  and 
scientific  attainments  rather  than  for  military  achievements. 
It  is,  perhaps,  true  that  most  of  these  men  who  remained  in 
the  army  were  rather  too  old  for  active  military  service  when 
the  Rebellion  broke  out.  Humphreys  himself  was  fifty-one  ; 
Lee  was  slightly  older,  while  Meade,  Barnard  and  Cullum 
were  only  a  few  years  younger. 

Humphreys  began  his  active  life  in  the  Second  Artillery, 
and  served  in  garrison,  at  West  Point,  in  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Florida  and  at  Cape  Cod.  He  was  an  excellent 
draughtsman,  and  having  a  decided  turn  for  surveying  and 
engineering  was  frequently  detailed  for  such  work.  He  took 
part  in  the  Seminole  war  and  was  engaged  in  the  battles  of 
Ololdikaha  and  Micanopy,  bearing  himself  bravely  but 
modestly  withal,  and  gaining  experience  and  breadth  of 
view  rather  than  honor.  He  was  a  serious-minded  man, 
whose  tendencies,  as  before  indicated,  were  rather  towards 
engineering  and  science  than  to  the  life  of  the  camp  and 
garrison  as  an  officer  of  artillery  serving  as  infantry.  As  there 
were  but  few  educated  civil  engineers  at  that  time  in  the 
country,  and  as  our  system  of  internal  improvements  was  just 
being  started,  Humphreys,  after  serving  five  years,  resigned 
his  commission  in  the  army  and  at  once  accepted  service 
as  a  civil  engineer  with  Major  Bache,  then  constructing 
lighthouses  on  the  Delaware  Bay. 

The  Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers  was  authorized  by 
Congress  in  1838,  and  in  July  of  that  year  Humphreys  was 
offered  and  accepted  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant.  From  that 
time  forth  he  led  a  most  active,  studious  and  laborious  life, 
serving  on  the  harbor  works  and  defences  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
in  the  Bureau  of  Topographical  Engineers  at  Washington, 
in  the  Florida  war,  on  the  construction  of  a  bridge  at 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  77 

Washington,  again  in  the  Bureau  of  Topographical  Engineers, 
and  then  in  charge  of  the  Coast  Survey  office.  He  reached 
the  rank  of  Captain  in  1848,  and  for  the  next  twelve  years 
had  charge  of  the  surveys  and  examinations  of  the  Mississippi 
River  and  its  delta,  with  a  view  to  the  improvement  of  its 
navigation  and  the  protection  of  its  lowlands  from  inundation. 
In  the  later  years  of  this  great  work,  and  especially  in  the 
preparation  of  his  report  upon  the  Hydraulics  of  the 
Mississippi,  he  had  the  assistance  of  that  distinguished 
scientist  and  soldier,  Henry  L.  Abbot.  The  result  of  their 
joint  labors  brought  their  names  into  distinction  throughout 
the  world,  and  it  is  justly  regarded  as  an  enduring  monument 
to  their  learning  and  ability.  While  on  this  exacting  duty, 
Humphreys  broke  down  and  was  permitted  to  visit  Europe  for 
the  double  purpose  of  restoring  his  health  and  studying  the 
means  of  protecting  delta  rivers  from  overflow.  On  his 
return,  in  1854,  he  was  assigned  to  the  additional  duty  at 
Washington  of  supervising  and  directing  the  explorations  and 
survey  which  Congress  had  authorized  for  the  purpose  of 
deciding  upon  the  location,  feasibility  and  relative  advantage 
of  the  various  routes,  for  a  railroad  or  a  system  of  railroads 
to  connect  the  Mississippi  River  with  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

At  that  time  the  railroad  system  of  this  continent  was  in 
its  youth,  if  not  its  infancy,  and  the  construction  of  a  line  to 
the  Pacific,  as  first  suggested  by  Senator  Breese,  of  Illinois, 
was  deemed  to  be  an  event  of  the  indefinite  future  if  not 
entirely  impossible.  But  Humphreys,  scarcely  yet  recovered 
from  the  breakdown  which  culminated  in  a  sunstroke  in  1851, 
threw  himself  with  his  accustomed  intensity  into  the  task  of 
bringing  the  results  of  the  surveys  into  order.  "  His  mind," 
said  his  friend,  Lieutenant  Abbot,  "  worked  like  a  beautiful 
machine  — neglecting  nothing  and  forgetting  nothing."  His 
preliminary  report  was  finished  before  Congress  adjourned, 
and  contained  such  conclusions  and  recommendations  as 
fully  justified  at  a  later  and  more  important  period  the 


78       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

location  and  construction  of  the  first  line  of  railroad  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean. 

Humphreys  was  one  of  those  men  who  were  never  idle.  He 
worked  night  and  day.  and  the  more  he  worked  the  more  the 
Government  seemed  to  pile  upon  his  willing  shoulders.  In 
1855,  he  was  made  a  member  of  the  Lighthouse  Board,  on 
which  he  served  till  1862.  About  the  same  time  he  was 
made  a  member  of  a  board,  and  afterwards  of  a  commission, 
to  revise  the  programme  of  instruction,  and  to  examine  into 
the  organization  and  system  of  discipline  at  the  Military 
Academy.  The  high  duties  to  which  he  was  assigned  brought 
Mm  in  contact  with  the  leading  men,  and  especially  with  the 
leading  politicians  of  the  day.  He  had  come  to  be  an  author 
ity  on  all  questions  of  science,  and  especially  of  engineering, 
and  was  consulted  freely  on  nearly  all  the  great  public  works 
contemplated  or  carried  on  by  the  Government.  During  the 
decade  preceding  the  Rebellion  no  public  character  wielded  a 
greater  influence  over  the  public  works,  especially  such  as  were 
carried  on  by  the  army,  than  Jefferson  Davis,  Senator  from 
Mississippi,  and  Secretary  of  War.  A  man  of  extraordinary 
industry,  perspicacity  and  decision,  he,  of  course,  discovered 
the  abilities  of  Humphreys,  and  utilized  them  fully.  A 
warm  personal  and  official  friendship  sprang  up  between 
them,  and  when  the  war  broke  out,  it  subjected  Humphreys 
to  a  suspicion  on  the  part  of  those  above  him,  which  was  as 
unjust  as  it  was  injurious.  It  gave  rise  to  the  false  report 
that  Humphreys  was  lukewarm  in  his  loyalty,  and  would  go 
South  and  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  nascent  Confederacy.  That 
a  scientist  and  a  savant  of  his  distinction  would  have  been 
warmly  welcomed  by  Davis  to  the  standard  which  he  had  set 
up,  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  but  that  Humphreys  ever  wavered 
for  a  moment  in  his  loyalty,  or  ever  dreamed  of  giving 
aid  and  comfort  to  the  Rebellion,  there  is  not  the  slightest 
ground  for  supposing.  His  whole  life,  both  before  and 
after  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  gives  the  lie  to  the 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  79 

suggestion,  and  it  may  be  dismissed  as  an  idle  and  baseless 
rumor.  Always  an  observant  and  reflective  man,  he  doubtless 
noted  with  an  anxious  soul  the  signs  of  the  coming  storm ; 
but  that  he  ever  thought  of  avoiding  it,  or  of  playing  any 
other  part  in  it  than  that  of  a  loyal  and  patriotic  soldier, 
no  man  who  had  the  good  fortune  to  know  him  will  ever 
believe. 

The  outbreak  of  the  Eebellion  found  him  in  Washington. 
He  had  passed  his  fiftieth  year.  Never  a  man  of  robust  frame 
or  turbulent  vitality,  his  studious  life  and  profound  study,  no 
less  than  his  age  and  appearance,  had  marked  him  rather  for 
the  cabinet  and  council  than  for  the  field,  and  yet  he  made 
haste  to  seek  active  service,  and  was  assigned  to  duty  with 
McClellan,  when  the  latter  became  General-in-Chief  of  the 
Army.  The  numerous  resignations  which  took  place  at  and 
before  that  time  had  brought  him  to  the  rank  of  Major. 
Shortly  afterwards,  he  was  appointed  Additional  Aide-de-Camp 
with  the  rank  of  Colonel,  and  this  was  followed  in  a  few  weeks 
by  the  commission  of  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers.  He 
accompanied  McClellan  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to 
the  Peninsula,  and  as  Chief  Topographical  Engineer  took  part 
in  all  the  operations  and  battles  of  that  ill-starred  campaign. 
He  it  was  who,  accompanied  by  General  Henry  J.  Hunt, 
Chief  of  Artillery,  selected  and  established  the  impregnable 
line  on  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  fought  and  won  the 
bloody  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  and  it  has  always  been  a 
matter  of  profound  regret  with  those  who  knew  him  best, 
that  he,  instead  of  McClellan,  had  not  been  at  that  time  in 
supreme  command.  The  opportunity  was  one  of  the  greatest 
ever  offered  to  a  commander,  and  if  improved  by  McClellan, 
as  it  should  have  been,  by  a  vigorous  offensive,  might  have  led 
to  the  capture  of  Kichmond  and  to  an  entirely  different  course 
of  events  in  that  unfortunate  year.  McClellan  mentions 
Humphreys,  in  his  Report  of  the  Peninsula  Campaign,  as 
having  performed  his  duty  ably  and  well,  under  great  and 


80      CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

unusual  difficulties,1  but  does  not  give  him  special  credit 
in  connection  with  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill.  Hay  and 
Nicolay,  however,  in  the  Life  of  Lincoln,  assert  positively  that 
it  was  Humphreys  who  selected  the  position  and  indicated 
the  line  upon  which  the  battle  was  fought.2  Colonel  Carswell 
McClellan,  formerly  of  Humphreys'  staff,  brings  out  and 
clearly  establishes  the  fact.3 

On  the  12th  of  September,  1862,  Halleck,  then  General- 
in-Chief,  assigned  Humphreys  to  the  command  of  the  Third 
Division  of  Fitz  John  Porter's  Fifth  Corps,  composed 
entirely  of  new  Pennsylvania  troops,  just  passing  through 
Washington  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  Maryland. 
They  were  poorly  equipped  and  armed,  without  adequate 
transportation  or  rations,  and,  like  all  new  troops,  overstocked 
with  baggage.  Through  his  own  personal  exertions,  and  the 
help  of  a  hastily  improvised  staff,  their  wants  were  supplied 
as  far  as  it  was  possible  to  supply  them,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  14th,  the  division  began  its  march  through  Monocacy  and 
Frederick  to  join  the  army  at  Antietam.  It  arrived  on  the 
field  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  having  marched  twenty- 
three  miles  since  half  past  three  the  afternoon  before.  Prior 
to  leaving  Washington,  however,  Humphreys  received  a  sharp 
note  from  Halleck,  saying,  if  he  "  did  not  join  his  division 
immediately  in  the  field,  he  would  be  arrested/' 4  Inasmuch 
as  he  had  lost  no  time,  but  had  displayed  extraordinary 
energy  in  preparing  his  command  for  the  march,  the  threat 
made  no  change  in  his  movements,  but  it  produced  a  wound 
which  rankled  deeply.  Humphreys,  although  a  man  of  even 
temper  and  gentle  manners,  was  not  the  person  to  submit 
tamely  to  an  outrage  from  any  one.  Ordinarily  as  amiable 
as  a  nun,  he  was  as  fierce  as  a  tiger  when  enraged.  Kindly 
and  considerate  to  others,  he  expected  courteous  treatment 
from  high  and  low  alike,  and  so,  when  the  General-in-Chief 

1  5  W.  R.,  25.  3  McClellan's  Humphreys,  1-9. 

2  5  N.  &  H.,  436-437.  *  27  W.  R.,  368, 372. 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  81 

misjudged  and  insulted  him,  lie  waited  only  for  a  pause  in  the 
campaign  to  request  an  investigation  of  his  conduct  by  a 
court  of  inquiry.  His  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,1  giving 
a  most  spirited  account  of  how  he  had  performed  his  duty  in 
Washington  and  on  the  march,  was  followed  six  days  after 
wards  by  another,  which  not  only  corrected  a  misstatement 
made  by  McClellan,  reflecting  on  the  way  in  which  his  troops 
had  arrived  on  the  field,  but  brought  into  prominence  the 
unusual  celerity  with  which  they  had  marched,  and  the 
fortitude  with  which  these  raw  levies  had  sustained  privation 
and  fatigue.2  These  communications  showed  in  addition 
that  Humphreys  knew  his  rights  and  would  submit  to  no 
injustice  either  to  himself  or  his  command.  It  does  not 
appear  that  any  action  was  ever  taken  on  his  request  for  a 
court  of  inquiry,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it  appear  that 
any  reparation  was  ever  offered  for  the  injustice  done  him 
by  Halleck  and  McClellan. 

The  appearance  of  Humphreys  on  the  bloody  but  doubtful 
field  of  Antietam  was  timely  and  reassuring.  Although 
travel-stained,  he  presented  at  the  head  of  his  enthusiastic 
Pennsylvanians  a  cheerful  and  confident  figure.  He  was 
a  gentleman  of  perfect  manners  and  habits,  who  always  used 
the  regulation  equipments  and  wore  the  regulation  uniform. 
His  gloves  and  footwear  were  faultless  ;  his  fine  and  intelligent 
face  was  clean-shaven,  except  as  to  the  mustache ;  his  eyes 
were  gray  and  full  of  kindliness,  except  when  aroused  by 
anger.  He  was  about  five  feet,  seven  inches  high,  erect  and 
graceful  in  carriage,  and  weighed  at  that  time  not  far  from 
one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds.  There  was  nothing  rough 
or  harsh  about  him.  Calmness,  composure  and  self-confidence, 
without  the  slightest  trace  of  assumption  or  bravado,  were 
apparent  in  every  feature.  Altogether  he  was  as  prepos 
sessing  a  figure  in  whatever  aspect  he  was  viewed  as  could 
be  found  in  that  or  any  other  army.  Like  Caesar  at  a 

i  27  W.  R.,  368.  2  u.,  373. 


82       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

corresponding  age,  his  military  career  was  all  before  him ; 
but  unlike  Ca3sar  he  had  led  only  a  virtuous  and  studious 
life,  without  thirst  for  power,  and  with  no  ambition,  except 
to  serve  his  country  and  to  assist  in  the  maintenance  of  its 
unity,  under  the  Constitution  and  the  laws. 

During  the  torpid  pursuit  of  Lee's  army  into  Virginia, 
Humphreys  took  a  leading  part  whenever  opportunity  offered  •, 
but  nothing  occurred  to  bring  him  into  special  prominence  till 
the  disastrous  battle  of  Fredericksburg  was  fought.  In  the 
assault  of  Marye's  Heights,  rendered  impregnable  by  a  stone 
wall  and  dry  ditch,  or  rifle  trench,  which  skirt  their  base  for 
a  mile,  he  displayed  the  courage  of  a  paladin  combined 
with  the  abilities  of  a  general.  The  ground  over  which  his 
division  was  compelled  to  advance  was  encumbered  by  men 
of  other  organizations,  many  of  whom  were  lying  down  to 
escape  the  destructive  fire  of  the  enemy.  Humphreys,  seeing 
that  musketry  could  accomplish  nothing,  ordered  his  men  to 
draw  the  charges  from  their  guns  and  use  the  bayonet,  and 
by  the  help  of  his  staff,  brigade  and  regimental  commanders 
led  them  over  the  prostrate  forms  of  their  fellow  soldiers, 
and  as  far  towards  the  enemy's  lines  as  it  was  possible  for 
men  to  go  against  such  a  storm  as  the  well-sheltered  rebels 
poured  upon  them.  Horse  after  horse  was  killed  under  him ; 
but  apparently  unconscious  of  danger  he  tried  again  and 
again  to  accomplish  the  impossible  task  which  had  been  so 
inconsiderately  set  for  him.  His  gallantry  and  aggressive 
leadership  were  the  admiration  of  all  who  beheld  him  upon 
that  memorable  occasion.  They  made  him  easily  the  most 
conspicuous  figure  on  the  field  that  day.  In  admiration  for 
his  conduct,  no  less  than  as  a  rebuke  to  others,  Burnside, 
the  army  commander,  in  a  personal  interview  with  the 
President,  strongly  recommended  him  for  promotion  to  the 
rank  of  Major-General.  He  had  richly  deserved  it;  but  the 
reward  was  not  bestowed  upon  him  till  he  had  shown  at 
Chancellorsville,  and  again  at  Gettysburg,  that  he  was  one 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  83 

of  the  most  courageous  and  stubborn  fighters  in  the  army,  as 
well  as  one  of  its  bravest  and  most  competent  generals. 

His  conduct  at  Fredericksburg,  and  his  explanation  of  the 
failure  to  carry  the  enemy's  position,  have  led  to  a  discussion 
between  General  Walker  and  Colonel  McClellan,  into  the 
merits  of  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  here.  It  is 
adverted  to  now  merely  for  the  purpose  of  emphasizing  the 
statement  in  which  all  agree,  that  the  personal  bravery 
and  the  leadership  displayed  upon  that  occasion  were  of  the 
highest  order.  All  who  have  written  about  them,  as  well 
as  all  who  witnessed  them,  concur  in  this  statement.  His 
perfect  intrepidity  and  unshaken  self-possession  are  admirably 
exemplified  by  his  conduct  on  that  occasion.  "As  the  bugle 
sounded  the  charge,"  says  Colonel  McClellan,  "General 
Humphreys  turned  to  his  staff,  and,  bowing  with  uncovered 
head,  remarked  as  quietly  and  pleasantly  as  if  inviting  them 
to  be  seated  around  his  table,  '  Gentlemen,  I  shall  lead  this 
charge ;  I  presume,  of  course,  you  will  wish  to  ride  with  me."  a 
And  they  did  ride  with  him  right  gallantly !  Of  the  seven 
who  started  five  were  dismounted  and  four  wounded  before 
the  charge  ceased.  When  it  is  remembered  that  his  own 
son  was  one  of  the  seven,  and  that  with  unobtrusive  modesty 
he  interposed  himself  as  often  as  possible  between  his  father 
and  the  rebel  fire,2  it  will  be  admitted  that  courage  is  an 
inherited  virtue  in  that  family. 

The  limits  of  this  paper  will  not  permit  a  detailed  account 
of  General  Humphreys'  services  during  the  Chancellorsville 
and  the  Gettysburg  campaigns ;  but  they  were  characterized 
by  the  same  unflagging  energy  and  zeal,  the  same  aggressive 
courage,  and  the  same  clear  military  sense  he  had  always  dis 
played.  Although  it  can  hardly  be  claimed  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  as  a  whole  was  engaged  at  Chancellorsville, 
Humphreys'  division  had  a  bloody  encounter  with  the  enemy 
near  the  Chancellor  House,  and  maintained  its  high  reputation 

1  McCleUan's  Humphreys,  15.  2  16.,  34. 


84      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

for  steadiness  and  courage.  He  disapproved  the  defensive 
attitude  which  Hooker  assumed;  and,  if  he  could  have  had 
his  way,  would  have  fought  an  offensive  aggressive  battle. 
Shortly  after  the  army  withdrew  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Kappahannock,  the  time  of  most  of  Humphreys'  men  having 
expired,  his  division  was  broken  up,  much  to  the  regret 
of  Meade,  who  had  succeeded  Porter  in  command  of  the 
corps,  and  Humphreys  was  transferred  to  Berry's  old  division, 
the  Second  of  the  Third  Corps,  then  under  Sickles. 

In  the  march  to  Gettysburg,  and  in  the  position  assigned  to 
him,  Humphreys  displayed  his  usual  self-reliance  and  ability ; 
and  in  the  battle  added  greatly  to  his  renown.  Having 
shown  his  old  division  at  Fredericksburg  how  to  make  an 
assault,  it  was  now  his  good  fortune  to  show  his  new  division 
how  to  receive  one.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Sickles, 
after  having  taken  position  in  the  general  line,  moved  to  the 
front  about  five  hundred  yards  and  occupied  a  ridge  between 
Cemetery  Hill  and  Round  Top ;  this  exposed  the  entire  corps 
to  great  danger,  inasmuch  as  its  isolated  position  invited 
attack  and  deprived  it  of  ready  support.  It  does  not  appear 
from  any  reports  that  are  accessible  that  Humphreys,  who 
was  without  any  doubt  the  best  topographer  in  either  army, 
was  consulted  in  regard  to  the  selection  of  this  advanced 
line,  but  it  is  perhaps  a  fair  assumption  that  he  did  not 
object  to  it.  It  was  evidently  good  enough  ground  to  fight 
on ;  and  might  have  been  maintained,  had  the  general  line  of 
battle  been  made  to  conform  to,  and  support,  this  part  of  it. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  Humphreys  was  in  no  way  responsible  for 
anything  except  the  defense  of  the  position  to  which  he  had 
been  assigned.  His  duty  was  merely  to  obey  orders  and  fight 
his  division,  which  was  most  fiercely  attacked,  both  in  front 
and  flank,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  second  day.  Speaking  of 
it  himself,  he  said  he  had  never  been  under  a  hotter  fire 
of  artillery  and  musketry  combined.  In  defending  and 
withdrawing  Ins  own  batteries,  in  changing  front  to  rear 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  85 

on  his  right  under  orders,  and  finally  in  falling  back  to  a 
better  position,  in  the  face  of  a  terrible  onslaught  from  the 
enemy,  he  displayed  the  most  stubborn  and  tenacious  courage, 
combined  with  the  most  surprising  capacity  to  meet  the 
emergencies  of  battle.  His  manoeuvres  upon  that  occasion 
were  not  unlike  Sheridan's  at  Stone  River ;  but  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  they  called  for  a  much  higher  order  of 
tactical  skill  on  his  own  part,  and  for  greater  steadiness  and 
coherence  on  the  part  of  his  division.  An  eye-witness  speaks 
in  the  highest  terms  of  Humphreys'  personal  bearing  upon 
that  occasion  :  "  Throwing  himself  into  the  midst  of  the 
battle,"  closely  followed  by  his  staff,  all  of  whom  were  eager 
"  to  ride  with  him  "  upon  this  occasion,  he  was  like  a  knight 
of  old,  ever  seeking  the  thickest  of  the  fight,  sustaining  and 
encouraging  his  men.  In  the  hottest  of  the  conflict  one  of 
his  staff  (Captain  Chester)  convulsively  throwing  up  his  hands, 
called  out,  "  General,  I  'm  shot ; "  whereupon  the  latter, 
who  had  noted  the  gallantry  of  this  officer,  went  at  once  to 
his  assistance,  and  sustained  him  in  his  saddle  till  a  brother 
officer  could  take  him  in  charge  and  conduct  him  to  a 
place  of  safety.  Almost  instantaneously,  a  cannon  shot 
disembowelled  the  wounded  officer's  horse  and  took  off  the 
head  of  the  orderly  who  had  started  to  lead  him  to  the  rear. 
At  the  same  moment,  General  Humphreys'  own  horse, 
already  bleeding  from  seven  bullet  wounds,  was  struck  by 
a  shell,  and,  springing  convulsively  into  the  air,  threw  the 
General  violently  to  the  ground,  but  fortunately  the  fall 
inflicted  no  serious  injury.  Gathering  himself  up  as  best  he 
could,  he  was  soon  remounted  and  engaged  as  calmly  in  the 
exercise  of  his  command  as  if  nothing  unusual  had  happened. 
Nothing  appeared  to  shake  the  nerves  or  to  disturb  the 
equanimity  of  this  remarkable  man.  With  the  gentle  and 
refined  manner  and  habits  of  a  scholar,  he  seemed  to  fairly 
revel  in  the  storm  of  battle.  He  never  sought  shelter  nor 
dismounted  so  long  as  he  could  find  a  horse  to  ride,  and 


86       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

scorned  to  remain  in  the  rear  when  the  slightest  duty  was  to 
be  performed  in  front.  All  who  have  witnessed  his  conduct 
in  battle  concur  in  the  statement  that  it  was  simply  perfect, 
as  if  inspired  solely  by  the  sense  of  duty  and  absolutely 
uninfluenced  by  danger  or  the  sense  of  fear.  No  emergency 
ever  found  him  unprepared,  no  fire  unwilling  to  face  it.  The 
only  wonder  is  that  an  officer  of  such  conspicuous  intrepidity 
should  have  escaped  alive  from  any  battle  in  which  his  troops 
took  part.  By  whatever  scale  it  is  measured,  Gettysburg 
was  a  great  battle.  It  certified  the  quality  of  American 
bravery  as  well  as  American  generalship  to  the  world;  it 
rendered  the  name  of  Meade  and  Hancock  and  Warren  on 
the  one  side  and  of  Lee  and  Longstreet  and  Pickett  on 
the  other,  immortal ;  but  it  also  made  known  to  such  as  will 
read  the  story  that  there  was  no  stouter  heart  in  either  host 
than  that  which  beat  within  the  breast  of  Andrew  Atkinson 
Humphreys. 

It  is  now  known  that  when  Meade's  promotion  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  announced,  his 
first  thought  was  of  Humphreys  for  Chief  of  Staff,  and  that 
he  notified  that  distinguished  officer  that  the  position  was  at 
his  disposition.  It  is  also  known  that  the  latter  declined  the 
honor  offered  him,  in  order  that  he  might  participate  in  the 
impending  battle  with  his  division.  Four  days  after  it  was 
over,  he  accepted  the  position  and  entered  at  once  upon  the 
performance  of  his  onerous  duties.  For  sixteen  months  he 
was  constantly  by  the  side  of  his  friend  and  chief,  supporting 
and  sustaining  him  in  every  trial,  and  relieving  him  of  a 
multitude  of  duties,  by  his  wise  counsel  and  ceaseless  super 
vision  of  details.  It  was  a  period  of  mingled  hope  and 
disappointment,  of  long  marches  and  indecisive  conflicts ; 
but  it  was  also  a  period  of  freedom  from  great  disaster, 
which  showed  that  the  army  was  handled  with  skill  and 
prudence,  if  not  with  conspicuous  ability.  During  this 
period  it  was  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  Lee,  back  to  Virginia, 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  87 

in  the  action  of  Manassas  Gap,  in  the  march  of  the  Rapidan, 
in  the  operations  on  the  Eappahannock  and  the  combat 
at  Bristoe  Station,  in  the  abortive  movement  to  Mine  Run, 
and  finally  in  that  wonderful  series  of  battles  and  marches 
beginning  in  the  Wilderness  and  including  Spottsylvania, 
North  Anna,  Totopotamoy,  Cold  Harbor,  the  passage  of  the 
James,  the  attack  and  siege  of  Petersburg,  and  the  affairs  at 
the  Weldon  Railroad,  Peeble's  Farm,  and  the  Boydton  Plank 
Road. 

Just  what  part  Humphreys,  as  Chief  of  Staff,  took  in 
devising  the  plans  in  accordance  with  which  these  operations 
were  conducted,  or  what  influence  he  had  in  causing  their 
adoption,  it  is  to  be  feared,  can  never  be  definitely  ascer 
tained.  The  official  reports  are  silent  upon  such  questions, 
and  Humphreys  himself,  if  he  ever  made  any  record,  died 
without  giving  it  to  the  world.  In  the  "  Virginia  Campaign 
of  1864  and  1865  " 1  he  says  he  drew  up  two  projects  for  the 
initial  movements  of  the  army,  and  intimated  that  neither 
was  fully  adopted.  A  close  reading  of  the  text  suggests  the 
inference  that  he  would  have  pushed  the  whole  army  through 
the  Wilderness  on  the  first  day's  march,  and  thus  compelled 
Lee  to  give  battle  in  the  open  country  beyond.  This  result 
might  or  might  not  have  been  attained,  and  it  is  possible  that 
it  would  not  have  brought  victory  jto  the  Union  arms,  but, 
however  great  the  hazard  or  the  uncertainty,  one  cannot  help 
wishing  that  the  plans  had  been  arranged  and  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  this  idea. 

It  is  worthy  of  note,  that  the  presence  of  Grant,  as  the 
Lieut  en  ant-General  commanding  all  the  Union  armies,  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  without  assuming  immediate 
command  of  it,  was  unfortunate  in  many  respects.  It 
distributed  instead  of  concentrated  responsibility,  and  fre 
quently  gave  rise  to  delays  in  the  transmission  and  the 
execution  of  orders,  in  uncertainty,  if  not  misunderstanding, 

1  12  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,  12. 


88       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

as  to  details  and  who  should  work  them  out,  and  to  a  lack 
of  harmony  and  coherence  in  their  execution,  which  was 
frequently  fatal  to  success.  Grant,  always  considerate  and 
kindly,  endeavored  as  far  as  possible  to  give  his  orders  in 
general  terms  and  leave  the  details  and  the  execution  to 
Meade  and  his  staff ;  but  with  all  their  loyalty  and  ability,  the 
result  was  in  many  cases  far  from  satisfactory.  Looking  back 
over  the  events  of  that  long  and  unhappy  year,  as  they  are 
now  recorded,  there  seems  to  be  but  little  doubt  that  Grant 
would  have  done  far  better  had  he  assumed  immediate 
command  of  the  army  and  assigned  Meade,  and  even 
Humphreys,  to  the  command  of  corps,  for  which  both  were 
pre-eminently  fitted. 

It  is  almost  useless  to  dwell  upon  the  services  of 
Humphreys  as  Chief  of  Staff,  for  there  are  but  few  materials 
at  our  command  bearing  upon  the  subject.  It  is  known,  of 
course,  that  while  the  grand  and  battle  tactics  of  that 
campaign  were  of  the  simplest  sort,  the  logistics  were  in  many 
respects  of  the  highest  order.  The  dispositions  for  both  direct 
and  flank  movements,  for  the  passage  of  rivers,  for  the  supply 
and  subsistence  of  the  troops,  and  for  the  care  of  the  sick 
and  wounded,  were  generally  as  good  as  it  was  possible  to 
make  them.  In  all  of  these  matters  the  genius  of  Humphreys 
is  apparent,  and  it  is  only  fair  to  assume  that  whatever  was 
wrong  was  due  to  the  dual  system  of  command,  rather  than 
to  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  This  remark  is  particularly  applicable  to  the 
failure  of  the  plan  to  take  Petersburg,  in  connection  with 
which  both  Meade  and  Hancock  are  understood  to  have 
claimed  that  if  they  had  known  that  the  Lieutenant-General 
intended  that  Smith  should  take  Petersburg,  and  that  they 
were  expected  to  co-operate  with  him,  "  Petersburg  would 
have  been  taken."  Without  dwelling  longer  upon  the  inter 
esting  but  obscure  relations  which  subsisted  between  Grant 
and  Meade  and  between  Meade  and  Humphreys,  it  is  proper 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  89 

to  remark  that  Humphreys  was  the  breakwater  and  protector 
of  every  officer  doing  business  with  Meade's  headquarters. 
He  was  patient  and  considerate  with  all,  always  accessible, 
always  scrupulously  kind  and  polite,  and  always  ready  to 
listen  and  explain.  In  every  personal  aspect  he  was  a  model 
Chief  of  Staff,  and  made  every  one  who  approached  him, 
whether  officer  or  private,  feel  that  he  had  found  a  friend  in 
him.  It  is  an  open  secret,  however,  that  as  the  campaign 
approached  its  final  stages,  Grant,  without  making  any 
formal  change  in  the  faulty  organization,  assumed  day  by 
day  a  more  direct  control  over  the  two  armies  and  the  various 
corps  operating  against  Lee.  Perceiving  that  this  would 
ultimately  result  in  his  practical  supercession,  and  that  he 
would  have  less  and  less  use  for  a  Chief  of  Staff  of  such 
ability  and  distinction  as  Humphreys,  Meade  availed  himself 
of  Hancock's  retirement,  on  account  of  wounds  and  disability, 
from  the  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  to  secure  the  place 
for  Humphreys  and  fill  the  vacancy  on  his  staff  by  calling 
General  Alexander  S.  Webb  to  the  place. 

The  change  was  a  welcome  one ;  for,  although  Meade, 
notwithstanding  his  irascible  temper  and  the  embarrassing 
circumstances  by  which  he  was  surrounded,  had  always 
treated  Humphreys  with  marked  kindness  and  consideration, 
it  is  not  to  be  disguised  that  the  latter  longed  for»the  opportu 
nities  of  an  active  command.  In  assuming  his  new  position, 
after  a  natural  expression  of  diffidence  in  succeeding  so 
distinguished  a  soldier  as  Hancock,  he  modestly  added,  "  I 
can  only  promise  you  that  I  shall  try  to  do  my  duty  and 
preserve  your  reputation  unsullied,  relying  upon  you  to  sustain 
me  by  that  skill  and  courage  which  you  have  so  conspicuously 
displayed  011  so  many  fields."  l 

This  change  took  place  on  the  26th  of  November,  1864, 
and  marks  a  new  and  still  more  glorious  era  in  the  career  of 
General  Humphreys.  The  Second  Corps  was  not  a  stranger 
1  89  W.  R.,  714. 


90      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

to  him,  nor  was  lie  to  it.  They  had  known  each  other  long 
and  well,  and  had  perfect  confidence  in  each  other  ;  but  they 
were  destined  to  become  still  better  acquainted  and  to  conceive 
a  still  higher  respect  for  each  other.  Although  General 
Humphreys  as  Chief  of  Staff  had  assured  General  Wilson  on 
the  22d  of  June  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  at 
once  extend  its  left  across  the  railroads  leading  south  from 
Petersburg  to  the  Appomattox,  it  had  as  yet  utterly  failed  to 
do  so,  and  although  those  railroads  had  been  broken  for  nine 
weeks,  at  one  time  so  that  nothing  on  wheels  could  pass  over 
them,  Lee  had  managed  to  draw  his  supplies  regularly  from 
Hicksford,  forty  miles  south  of  Petersburg  on  the  Weldoii 
Eoad,  by  wagons  which  passed  round  and  almost  in  sight  of 
the  left  flank  of  the  Union  army.  It  is  an  interesting  coinci 
dence  that  Humphreys  on  the  6th  of  February,  1865,  nearly 
eight  months  after  Ins  assurances  to  General  Wilson,  began 
the  movement  which  finally  broke  up  this  line  and  marked 
the  beginning  of  the  end.  Gregg's  division  of  cavalry  had 
been  sent  out,  and  the  Third  and  Fifth  Corps  were  ordered 
to  support  his  movement.  Hatcher's  Eun  was  bridged  and 
crossed,  and  a  severe  action  was  had,  which  resulted  in  the 
extension  of  the  Federal  entrenchments  to  the  Vaughan  road. 
Humphreys  held  the  extreme  left,  with  the  Fifth  Corps  in 
close  support.  The  Weldon  railroad  was  at  last  firmly  in 
their  hands  and  the  rebel  supply-line  broken.  On  the  25th 
of  March,  Lee,  aiming  a  counter-blow  at  the  Union  base  of 
supplies  at  City  Point,  sent  Gordon  on  his  desperate  mission 
against  Fort  Stedman.  After  he  was  hurled  back  by  Parke's 
splendid  fighting,  Wright  and  Humphreys,  with  the  Sixth 
and  Third  Corps,  made  a  gallant  ri-poste,  gaining  ground, 
which  enabled  Wright  to  deliver  his  fatal  blow  on  the  2d  of 
April. 

Meanwhile  Grant  had  sent  Sheridan  still  further  out 
towards  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  where  he  was  so  roughly 
handled  by  Pickett  and  Fitz  Lee  on  the  31st.  Again 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  91 

Humphreys  and  Warren  were  in  support,  but  the  rains  had 
commenced,  the  creeks  were  swollen,  and  the  roads  almost 
impassable  with  mud.  Warren  met  with  delay  and  temporary 
disaster ;  but  Humphreys,  with  Miles's  division,  struck  the 
successful  rebels  in  front  and  flank,  and  drove  them  beyond 
the  White  Oak  road,  capturing  three  hundred  prisoners. 
Thus  the  Union  forces  cut  and  held  firm  possession  of 
another  line  of  supply  and  possible  retreat.  On  the  1st  and 
2d  of  April,  Humphreys  carried  the  rebel  works  in  his  front, 
and  pushed  his  leading  division,  again  under  Miles,  to  the 
Southside  Railroad  at  Sutherland's  Station,  thus,  for  the  first 
time  after  the  cavalry  had  broken  it  at  the  same  spot  nine 
months  before,  getting  firm  possession  of  that  railroad  and 
every  closing  avenue  of  retreat  from  Petersburg  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Appomattox  River.  This  movement  towards 
Sutherland's  was  disapproved,  to  the  disgust  of  Humphreys, 
and  Miles  was  recalled  to  join  in  the  direct  advance  upon 
Petersburg.  But  the  game  was  up,  the  rebel  works  had  been 
carried  by  assault,  the  right  of  their  army  overthrown,  and 
their  roads  all  closed.  There  was  nothing  left  for  them  to 
do  but  to  run  for  it ;  and  thanks  to  Humphreys,  still  more 
than  to  Sheridan  or  to  any  other  man,  the  only  roads  for 
retreat  left  open  were  those  on  the  north  side  of  the  river 
by  Bevel's  and  Goode's  bridges  to  -Amelia  Court  House. 

Lee  withdrew  from  Petersburg  on  the  night  of  April  2,  and 
the  next  day  the  pursuit  began,  Sheridan  with  the  cavalry, 
and  the  Fifth  Corps  moving  on  Jetersville ;  Humphreys  with 
the  Second  Corps  to  the  northward,  on  the  road  to  Amelia 
Court  House.  On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  Lee  reached  the 
Court  House,  where  he  lost  a  day  to  let  his  baggage  catch  up. 
The  delay  was  fatal,  for  it  enabled  the  Second  and  Sixth 
Corps  to  join  Sheridan  at  Jetersville,  and  bar  the  road  to 
Burkesville  and  the  south.  The  cavalry  alone  could  not  have 
done  this,  for  the  rebel  infantry  could  have  brushed  it  easily 
out  of  the  way.  But  when  Lee  found  himself  confronted 


92       CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

by  the  Federal  infantry,  he  marched  northward  and  then 
westward,  evidently  hoping  to  pass  round  the  Federal 
left  and  reach  Farmville  or  Eice's  Station.  Humphreys, 
being  in  advance  on  the  left,  was  the  first  to  discover  this 
movement,  and  made  haste  to  follow  the  enemy's  retreating 
footsteps.  The  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  joined  eagerly  in  the 
pursuit,  all  striving  to  their  utmost  to  bring  the  enemy  to 
bay.  A  running  fight  for  fourteen  miles  took  place  between 
pursued  and  pursuers.  "  Lines  of  battle,"  says  Humphreys, 
"followed  closely  on  the  skirmish,  line  with  a  rapidity  and 
nearness  of  connection  that  I  believe  to  be  unexampled,  and 
which  I  confess  astonished  me."  l  Flat  Creek,  a  stream  from 
eighty  to  a  hundred  feet  wide,  scarcely  caused  a  pause  in 
Humphreys'  hurrying  march.  At  Sailor's  Creek  the  gallant 
Gordon  made  a  desperate  stand,  but  was  again  overborne 
with  the  loss  of  three  guns,  thirteen  colors,  seventy  ambu 
lances,  more  than  two  hundred  wagons,  and  many  prisoners. 
Meanwhile  E well's  corps  were  split  off  by  Humphreys,  and 
captured  by  the  cavalry.  After  the  terrible  disaster  of  this 
day,  Longstreet,  who  had  reached  Rice's  Station,  abandoned 
the  hope  of  getting  off  to  the  south,  turned  westward  and 
crossed  again  to  the  north  side  of  the  Appomattox  River  at 
Farmville,  while  Gordon  with  the  other  half  of  the  rebels 
crossed  at  High  Bridge,  thus  dividing  what  there  was  left  of 
Lee's  army. 

At  half  past  five,  on  the  7th,  the  sleepless  Humphreys 
resumed  the  pursuit  by  the  road  nearest  the  river,  and 
reached  High  Bridge  just  as  the  last  rebels  who  had  crossed 
after  blowing  up  the  redoubt,  which  served  as  a  bridgehead, 
were  setting  fire  to  both  the  wagon  bridge  and  the  railroad 
bridge.  Barlow's  division,  directed  by  Humphreys,  led 
by  Barlow  in  person,  succeeded  in  putting  out  the  fire  and 
saving  both  bridges.  The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  whole 
corps  to  cross,  which  it  lost  no  time  in  doing.  Miles's  and 
1  95  W.  R.,  682. 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  93 

De  Trobriand's  divisions  pushed  out  on  the  main  road  for 
Lynchburg,  pressing  heavily  upon  the  enemy's  rear,  while 
Barlow's  division  followed  the  river  by  the  left  hand  westerly 
to  Farmville,  which  he  found  strongly  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
The  rest  of  the  Federal  Army  was  south  of  Farmville,  and 
separated  from  Humphreys  by  the  Appomattox  River,  but 
this  did  not  cause  him  to  stay  his  advance.  At  about  one 
o'clock  he  came  up  with  the  enemy,  strongly  entrenched  and 
covering  both  the  stage  and  plank  roads  leading  through 
Appomattox  Court  House  to  Lynchburg.  Sending  word  to 
Barlow  to  re-establish  connection  with  his  left,  and  requesting 
Meade  to  bring  forward  the  other  corps  of  infantry, 
Humphreys  endeavored  to  find  a  weak  spot  in  the  enemy's 
line;  and,  failing  in  that,  tried  to  turn  his  left.  In  this  he 
was  also  unsuccessful,  shortly  after  which  night  put  an  end  to 
the  conflict. 

During  the  entire  operations  of  the  7th,  Humphreys 
received  no  help  whatever  from  any  other  part  of  the  Federal 
Army,  except  Crook's  cavalry  division,  which  late  in  the  day 
forded  the  river  and  made  a  demonstration  in  his  favor. 
There  is  but  little  doubt  that  the  presence  of  the  other  corps 
of  infantry  would  have  enabled  Humphreys  to  overwhelm 
Lee  and  bring  the  conflict  to  a  close  on  that  day  ;  but  the 
scattered  condition  of  the  pursuing  army,  the  time  lost  in 
transmitting  information,  the  difficulty  of  crossing  the  Appo 
mattox,  and  the  obvious  advantage  of  placing  the  cavalry  and 
at  least  one  corps  of  infantry  athwart  the  road  upon  which 
Lee  was  retreating,  all  intervened  to  prevent  the  realization 
of  Humphreys'  hopes  upon  that  memorable  occasion.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  more  than  probable,  as  claimed  by 
General  Humphreys,  that  if  his  corps  had  not  "crossed  the 
Appomattox  on  the  7th,  he  [Lee]  could  have  reached  New 
Store  that  night,  Appomattox  Station  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  8th,  obtained  rations  there,  and  moved  that  evening 
toward  Lynchburg.  A  march  the  next  day,  the  9th,  would 


94      CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

have  brought  him  to  Lynchburg."  l  Following  the  narrative 
of  General  Walker  in  the  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,2 
it  may  be  fairly  contended  that  Humphreys  compelled  Lee  to 
lose  time  at  "  Farmville  Heights  "  which  he  could  not  regain 
by  night  marches,  kept  him  from  obtaining  the  much 
needed  supplies  waiting  for  him  at  Appomattox  Station,  and 
secured  for  Sheridan  and  Ord  the  opportunity  to  post 
themselves  across  his  path  at  Appomattox  Court  House. 
It  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  Grant's  first  letter  to  Lee 
demanding  the  surrender  of  his  army  was  delivered  from 
Humphreys'  front  about  half  past  seven  on  the  evening  of 
the  7th,  and  that  Lee  returned  his  answer  within  an  hour 
by  the  same  route.  Grant,  Ord  and  Wright  rested  that 
night  at  Farmville,  about  eight  miles  in  rear  of  Humphreys' 
position. 

There  is  but  little  more  to  relate.  Lee  abandoned  his 
position  under  the  cover  of  darkness  and  was  again  followed 
at  half  past  five  the  next  morning  by  Humphreys,  now  sup 
ported  by  Wright  with  the  Sixth  Corps.  Sheridan  with  the 
Cavalry  Corps,  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  the  Army  of  the  James, 
pushed  forward  by  the  road  on  the  south  side  of  the  Appo 
mattox  towards  Appomattox  Station.  His  advanced  division 
under  Custer  reached  there  late  in  the  afternoon,  cutting  the 
last  supply-line  and  capturing  the  trains  containing  the  last 
provisions  the  Confederacy  had  left  for  Lee's  starving  army. 
The  end  came  next  day,  and  Humphreys'  "  foot  cavalry " 
was  in  at  the  death.  His  unerring  instinct  for  the  chase, 
his  terrible  persistency  and  aggressive  temper,  together  with 
the  astonishing  celerity  of  his  movements,  had  enabled  him 
to  outstrip  everything  but  the  cavalry,  and  to  keep  fully 
abreast  with  even  that.  The  details  of  the  surrender,  which 
took  place  on  the  9th,  have  been  told  and  retold  a  hundred 
times,  and  while  their  interest  never  ceases,  the  limits  of 
this  paper  will  not  permit  their  repetition  here ;  but  read  and 

1  12  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,  391.     2  Walker,  685,  et  seq. 


GENERAL  HUMPHREYS  95 

study  the  wonderful  story  as  you  will,  one  fact  cannot  be 
avoided  or  suppressed.  If  Sheridan  was  the  hero  of  the 
cavalry  in  those  splendid  operations,  Humphreys  was  beyond 
all  doubt  the  hero  of  the  infantry.  His  services  in  that 
campaign  brought  him  to  the  very  front  rank  of  corps 
commanders,  and  showed  him  to  be  possessed  of  the  highest 
military  talents.  Had  the  war  continued  there  can  be  but 
little  doubt  that  he  would  have  soon  passed  into  the  list  of 
army  commanders,  wherein,  if  his  life  had  been  spared,  he 
would  most  surely  have  gained  imperishable  renown. 

And  now  let  us  compare  him,  as  far  as  we  may,  with  the 
other  distinguished  men  of  his  own  rank  in  either  army. 
After  this  brief  narrative,  it  will  be  readily  admitted  that  in 
trustworthy  courage  and  professional  skill,  in  battle  or  on 
the  inarch,  he  was  the  equal  of  any  man  on  either  side. 
He  was  certainly  not  surpassed  in  those  virtues  by  either 
Hancock  or  Longstreet,  Sheridan  or  Forrest,  McPherson  or 
Gordon,  Upton  or  Cleburne,  and  no  others  need  be  named 
in  this  comparison.  In  tactical  resources  he  was  also  the 
equal,  if  not  the  superior,  of  any  or  all  of  these  great  soldiers, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Upton.  As  a  disciplinarian 
and  military  administrator  he  was  in  every  respect  as  good  if 
not  better  than  the  best.  He  was  a  far  more  accomplished,  as 
well  as  a  more  aggressive  man,  than  the  lamented  McPherson, 
and  was  his  equal  in  urbanity  and  politeness.  He  had  a 
better  temper  and  a  more  even  and  trustworthy  mental  organ 
ization  than  Sherman,  and,  of  course,  his  scientific  knowledge 
and  equipment  were  much  superior  to  those  of  either  Grant  or 
Thomas.  In  some  respects,  notably  in  modesty,  lofty  pride, 
self-respect,  and  in  quiet  power,  he  resembled  the  latter  most 
strikingly ;  but,  it  is  to  be  observed,  he  was  a  much  quicker 
man  in  his  mental  processes  than  either  of  the  generals  just 
named.  Whether  he  would  have  borne  the  responsibilities 
of  supreme  command  as  Grant  or  Lee  did,  or  of  an  indepen 
dent  army  as  Meade,  Thomas  and  Sheridan  did,  must  forever 


96       CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

remain  a  matter  of  conjecture ;  but  reasoning  from  what  we 
know  of  his  conduct  in  inferior  positions,  it  may  fairly  be 
assumed  that  he  would  have  acquitted  himself  with  credit, 
and  might  have  done  so  with  extraordinary  distinction. 
Certain  it  is  that,  like  the  impatient  runner  in  the  Olympian 
games,  he  would  never  have  merited  the  lash  for  starting  up 
too  soon,  nor,  like  the  laggard,  have  failed  to  deserve  his 
crown  by  being  left  at  the  beginning  of  the  race.  Altogether, 
he  was  a  very  able,  very  loyal,  very  perfect  soldier,  with  all 
the  virtues  of  the  heroic  age  and  none  of  the  vices  or  foibles 
of  the  times  and  profession  to  which  he  belonged.  His  parts 
were  all  in  perfect  harmony  with  each  other,  and  he  with  his 
environment. 

Before  closing  this  paper  it  is  proper  to  remark  that  these 
four  years  of  actual  war,  with  all  the  chances  they  presented 
to  Humphreys  for  distinguishing  himself  as  a  general,  were 
after  all  only  a  glorious  episode  in  the  life  of  a  scholar  and 
a  savant.  When  it  had  passed  he  returned  modestly  to  his 
books  and  his  scientific  employment  and  added  nearly  twenty 
years  more  of  useful  labor,  as  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army,  to 
the  great  sum  of  his  faithful  and  conscientious  services  to  his 
country.  Those  who  knew  him  only  in  his  last  position 
would  never  have  imagined  him  to  have  been  one  of  the  best 
and  stanchest  corps  commanders  on  either  side  of  the 
Great  Kebellion. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES. 


Eeprinted  by  permission  from  the  "Atlantic  Monthly  "for  April,  1887. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN.i 


IN  the  biographical  sketch  of  General  McClellan  which  is 
contributed  by  Mr.  William  C.  Prime,  we  are  informed  that 
the  General  wrote  this  narrative  not  for  the  public,  but  solely 
for  the  information  of  his  children ;  that  "  he  did  not  labor  at 
it  continuously,  with  intent  to  produce  a  book,  but  wrote  as 
the  humor  seized  him."  Any  one  carefully  reading  the  story 
would,  we  think,  be  likely  to  frame  some  such  conjecture  as 
this  as  to  its  genesis.  It  is  an  easy,  flowing  narrative,  not 
logically  or  even  chronologically  arranged,  with  few  precise 
statements  of  the  questions  in  regard  to  which  there  has  been 
so  much  contention,  and  very  little,  if  any,  useful  discussion 
of  the  points  when  they  happen  to  be  reached  in  the  course 
of  the  story.  There  is  not  the  slightest  effort  to  write  from 
any  other  than  McClellan's  own  standpoint.  Never  was  there 
a  controversial  work  in  which  the  other  side  was  more  calmly 
ignored.  There  is  in  McClellan's  mind,  evidently,  no  room 
for  the  exercise  of  such  a  virtue  as  impartiality  in  deal 
ing  with  such  fools  and  knaves  as  the  members  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  cabinet  in  1861  and  1862.  He  has  no  doubt  what 
ever  that  he  was  the  divinely  appointed  man  by  whom  the 
country  was  to  be  saved.  His  egotism  is  simply  colossal,  — 
there  is  no  other  word  for  it.  And  all  is  said  with  such  an 
utter  unconsciousness  of  there  being  anything  absurd  in  his 

1  McClellan's  Own  Story.  The  War  for  the  Union :  the  soldiers  who  fought 
it ;  the  civilians  who  directed  it ;  and  his  relations  to  it  and  to  them.  By  George 
B.  McClellan,  late  Major-General  commanding  the  Armiea.  New  York :  Charles 
L.  Webster  &  Co.  1887. 


100    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

assuming  for  himself  such  a  unique  position,  that  the  book 
must  rank  as  one  of  the  most  characteristic  autobiographies 
ever  written. 

Besides  the  narrative,  we  have  copious  extracts  from 
McClellan's  letters  to  his  wife,  and  surely  nothing  that  has 
ever  been  given  to  the  public  has  disclosed  a  man's  real 
character  more  fully  and  frankly  than  these  letters  disclose 
that  of  General  McClellan.  They  have  all  the  peculiarities 
of  the  autobiography,  only  they  possess  the  flavor  of  the 
time,  and  are  much  more  pointed  in  diction.  They  show  us 
a  highly  emotional  man,  extremely  fond  of  his  family  and  of 
domestic  life,  —  a  man,  too,  of  quick  and  warm  religious 
feelings.  They  show  us  a  man  who  likes  to  have  everybody 
around  him  believe  in  him,  who  loves  his  soldiers  for  their 
manifest  confidence  in  him,  who  has  the  strongest  dislike 
of  all  criticism  and  of  all  supervision,  who  has  an  almost 
puerile  impatience  to  escape  from  the  neighborhood  of 
Washington  to  the  distant  camps  of  the  Peninsula,  where 
the  cheers  of  the  troops  should  replace  the  cold  and  somewhat 
sceptical  talk  of  the  drawing-rooms  and  lobbies  of  the  capital. 

In  fact,  McClellan  is  seen  to  live  very  much  in  a  world  of 
his  own  making.  His  imagination  creates  a  great  part  of  the 
circumstances  which  appear  to  surround  him.  In  his  mind 
the  Confederates  are  always  seeking  to  devour  him ;  they  are 
pressing  him  in  on  every  side.  Were  it  not  for  his  wise  coun 
sel  and  strong  arm,  the  country  would  be  lost.  The  problem 
with  him  is  not  so  much  how  can  the  Rebellion  be  put  down, 
as  how  can  the  country  be  saved.  His  enemies  invariably 
outnumber  him,  sometimes  two  to  one.  Twice  he  saves  the 
capital.  Once  he  saves  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  also. 
No  one,  in  his  judgment,  but  himself  could  have  brought  order 
out  of  the  confusion  which  reigned  after  the  first  Bull  Run. 
Under  no  other  commander  than  himself,  in  his  own  opinion, 
would  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  have  marched  to  drive  the 
enemy  out  of  Maryland  after  the  second  Bull  Run.  It  is 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  101 

needless  to  expose  the  futility  of  such  assumptions.  Their 
truth  is  contradicted  by  the  behavior  of  the  army  on  many  a 
bloody  and  disastrous  field,  long  after  McClellan  had  been 
retired  from  command.  Yet  McClellan  seems  to  cherish  these 
and  the  like  opinions  as  if  there  could  be  no  controversy  as  to 
their  correctness. 

It  is  not  from  the  narrative  of  such  a  man  as  this  that  one 
can  expect  to  learn  the  facts,  and  in  truth  there  is  no  serious 
attempt  to  give  them.  There  are,  so  far  as  we  have  seen, 
absolutely  no  corrections  of  the  many  errors  with  which  his 
Report,  large  portions  of  which,  with  the  accompanying  de 
spatches,  are  incorporated  into  his  narrative,  abounds.  We 
are  not  told  that  the  enemy  did  not,  in  fact,  as  McClellan 
thought  and  said  at  the  time,  outnumber  our  army  during  the 
Seven  Days'  battles.  We  are  still  allowed  to  believe  that  they 
were  u  largely  superior  to  us  in  number  "  at  the  battle  of 
Antietam.  Both  these  estimates  were  known  in  1881,  when 
McClellan  began  the  writing  of  this  book,  to  be  grossly  incor 
rect  ;  but  inasmuch  as  to  change  them  would  involve  a  restate 
ment  of  his  case  against  the  administration,  McClellan  has 
chosen  to  let  the  original  and  erroneous  statements  stand. 

We  have  said  above  that  McClellan  was  greatly  influenced 
by  his  imagination  and  feelings.  Nothing  can  better  illustrate 
this  than  his  neglect  to  obtain  explicit  assurances  from  the 
Navy  Department  and  from  the  naval  officers  on  duty  at 
Fortress  Monroe  in  regard  to  the  co-operation  of  the  navy  in 
the  reduction  of  Yorktown  and  Gloucester.  He  had,  early  in 
the  winter,  set  his  heart  upon  operating  by  the  way  of  the 
lower  Chesapeake  upon  Richmond.  All  the  opposition  to  this 
plan  manifested  by  the  President  and  cabinet  only  served  to 
make  him  more  determined,  more  bound  to  have  his  own  way. 
It  was  an  essential  feature  of  this  plan  that  there  should  be 
"  a  combined  naval  and  land  attack  upon  Yorktown.  .  .  .  the 
navy  should  at  once  concentrate  upon  the  York  River  all  their 
available  and  most  powerful  batteries.  Its  reduction  should 


102    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

not,  in  that  case,  require  many  hours."1  We  pause  an 
instant  to  remark  that  it  is  evident  from  this  statement  that 
McClellan  could  not  have  been  aware,  when  he  wrote  it,  that 
the  works  at  Yorktown  were  at  a  height  of  some  seventy  or 
eighty  feet  above  the  river.  Had  he  known  this,  —  and  he 
surely  ought  to  have  known  it,  —  he  could  not  have  supposed 
for  a  moment  that  the  place  could  be  taken  by  the  fleet.  But 
not  only  did  he  know  nothing  about  the  strength  of  the  place 
against  which  it  was,  to  use  his  own  language,  "  absolutely 
necessary,  for  the  prompt  success  of  this  campaign,  that  the 
navy  should  at  once  throw  its  whole  available  force,"2  but 
when  he  wrote  this  letter  the  Merrimac  had  made  her  appear 
ance,  had  destroyed  the  Congress  and  the  Cumberland,  and 
nothing  but  the  Monitor  coidd  be  relied  upon  to  give  her  bat 
tle.  Letters  passed  between  McClellan  and  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  upon  this  subject.  All  that  was  promised,  so  the  naval 
men  said,  was  that  the  Merrimac  should  not  be  allowed  to  go 
up  York  River.  It  was  stated  explicitly  to  General  McClellan, 
so  they  always  maintained,  that  to  watch  the  Merrimac  would 
require  the  main  portion  of  the  fleet,  and  that  no  naval  force 
could  be  detached  to  attack  the  batteries  at  Yorktown.  In 
his  Report,3  McClellan  denied  these  statements,  and  said  that 
he  discovered  this  to  be  the  case  only  after  his  arrival  at 
Yorktown  ;  that  it  was  "  contrary  to  what  had  been  previously 
stated  to"  him,  "and  materially  affected"  his  "plans."  This 
accusation  is  repeated  in  the  book  before  us.4 

But  Mr.  Prime  has  unearthed  from  McClellan's  papers  a 
letter  to  him  from  General  Barnard,  the  Chief  Engineer  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who  was  sent  to  the  Peninsula 
before  the  army  was  embarked,  on  purpose  to  make  arrange 
ments  with  the  navy.  This  letter,  which,  so  far  as  we  know, 
has  never  elsewhere  been  published,  is  dated  "  Steamship 
Minnesota  [then  in  Hampton  Roads],  March  20,  1862." 
From  it  we  make  the  following  extracts  :  — 

1  5  W.  R.,  58.  2  16.  3  12  W.  R-,  8.  4  O.  S.,  254,  2G4. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  103 

"He  [Flag  Officer  Goldsborough]  says  lie  is  responsible 
to  the  country  for  keeping  down  the  Merrimac,  and  has  per 
fect  confidence  that  he  can  do  it,  but  cannot  spare  from  here 
anything  except  the  following :  — 

"  Victoria —  two  eight-inch  guns  and  one  thirty-two  pound 
Parrott ; 

"  Anacostia,  Freeborn,  Island  Belle  —  Potomac  fleet ; 

"Octoroon — not  yet  arrived;  Fox  calls  her  a  regular 
gunboat  of  four  guns ; 

"  Currituck  —  merchant  steamer  like  the  Potomac  gun 
boats,  I  suppose ; 

"  Daylight  —  merchant  steamer  like  the  Potomac  gun 
boats,  I  suppose  ;  and  two  regular  gunboats  —  the  Chocorua, 
not  yet  arrived,  and  the  Penobscot,  here  —  these  two  carrying 
each  two  eleven-inch  guns. 

"  He,  says  he  carft  furnish  vessels  to  attack  Yorktown 
simultaneously^-  but  he  thinks  what  you  propose  is  easily 
done ;  that  the  vessels  he  mentions  are  fully  adequate  to  cover 
a  landing,  and  that,  with  a  landing  and  an  advance  from 
here,  Yorktown  will  fall."  2 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  naval  officer  in  command  at 
Hampton  Roads  distinctly  telling  the  Chief  Engineer  of 
McClellan's  army  that  the  main  business  of  the  navy  is  to 
"  keep  down  "  the  Merrimac ;  that  consequently  he  can  spare 
but  very  few  vessels  even  for  the  purpose  of  covering  the 
landing  of  McClellan's  army  on  the  Peninsula ;  and  that  he 
certainly  cannot  furnish  ships  with  which  to  attack  the  forts. 
Nothing  could  be  more  explicit,  more  definite,  more  directly 
calculated  to  destroy  any  hope  that  McClellan  might  previ 
ously  have  entertained  of  the  active  co-operation  of  the  navy 
in  the  reduction  of  Yorktown  and  Gloucester. 

This  letter  of  General  Barnard's  must  have  reached 
McClellan  ten  days  before  he  started  for  the  Peninsula. 
What  explanation,  then,  can  be  given  of  his  statements 
before  referred  to? 

1  The  italics  in  all  cases  in  this  paper  are  ours.  2  O.  S.,  246-247. 


104    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

It  is  not  easy,  it  must  be  confessed,  to  frame  any  explana 
tion  or  justification  of  them.  The  excuse  of  forge tfuhiess 
will  hardly  answer,  for  Barnard's  letter  treated  of  a  matter 
of  prime  and  vital  importance.  What  we  believe  about  it  is 
this :  there  are  men  so  peculiarly  constituted  that  when  they 
have  once  set  their  hearts  on  any  project,  they  cannot  bear  to 
consider  the  facts  that  militate  against  their  carrying  it  out ; 
they  are  impatient  and  intolerant  of  them ;  such  facts  either 
completely  fall  out  of  their  minds,  so  to  speak,  as  if  they  had 
never  been  heard  of,  or,  if  they  subsequently  make  themselves 
felt,  they  seem  to  men  of  this  temper  to  have  assumed  an  in 
imical  aspect,  and,  what  is  worse,  inasmuch  as  it  is  impossible 
for  any  man  to  get  angry  with  facts,  such  men  instinctively 
fix  upon  certain  individuals,  whom  they  associate  in  some 
way,  more  or  less  remote,  with  these  unwelcome  facts,  and 
whom  they  always  accuse,  in  their  own.  thought,  at  least,  of 
hostility  or  deception.  Such  a  mind  we  conceive  to  have 
been  that  of  General  McClellan.  Accordingly,  we  find  him, 
in  spite  of  the  explicit  refusal  of  the  navy  to  aid  in  the  reduc 
tion  of  Yorktown  conveyed  to  him  in  General  Barnard's 
letter,  quietly  ignoring  the  situation,  and  proceeding  to  the 
Peninsula  as  if  the  needed  co-operation  had  been  promised, 
and,  finally,  in  his  Report  and  Autobiography  practically 
accusing  Flag  Officer  Goldsborough  of  having  deceived 
him,  of  having  encouraged  him  to  transport  his  army  to  the 
Peninsula  by  promises  which  he  afterwards  refused  to  per 
form,  —  an  accusation  for  which,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is 
not  a  shadow  of  justification. 

In  connection  with  this  subject,  it  is  interesting  to  note 
what  McClellan  says  touching  his  expectations  of  using  the 
James  River  as  a  line  of  supply,  after  the  Merrimac  had 
made  her  appearance.  He  tells  us  in  his  Report l  that  "  the 
appearance  of  the  Merrimac  off  Old  Point  Comfort  and  the 
encounter  with  the  United  States  squadron  011  the  8th  of 
1  5  W.  K.,  50,  51. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  105 

March  threatened  serious  derangement  of  the  plan  for  the 
Peninsula  movement.  But  the  engagement  between  the 
Monitor  and  the  Merrimac  on  the  9th  of  March  demon 
strated  so  satisfactorily  the  power  of  the  former,  and  the 
other  naval  preparations  were  so  extensive  and  formidable, 
that  the  security  of  Fort  Monroe  as  a  base  of  operations  was 
placed  beyond  a  doubt,  and  although  the  James  River  ivas 
closed  to  us,  the  York  River  with  its  tributaries  was  still 
open  as  a  line  of  water  communication  with  the  Fortress. 
The  general  plan,  therefore,  remained  undisturbed,  although 
less  promising  in  its  details  than  when  the  James  River 
was  in  our  control" 

Here  is  a  distinct  admission  that  when  he  determined  on 
the  movement  to  the  Peninsula,  McClellan  knew  that  the 
James  River  would  not  be  open  to  him.  What,  then,  can  we 
make  of  the  following  statement  in  the  Autobiography  ? 
"  This,  then,  was  the  situation  in  which  I  found  myself  on 
the  evening  of  April  5 :  Flag  Officer  Goldsborough  had 
informed  me  that  it  was  not  in  his  power  to  control  the  navi 
gation  of  the  James  River  so  as  to  enable  me  to  use  it  as  a 
line  of  supply,  or  to  cross  it,  or  even  to  cover  my  left  flank ; 
nor  could  he,  as  he  thought,  furnish  any  vessels  to  attack 
the  batteries  of  Yorktown.  ...  I  was  thus  deprived  of  the 
co-operation  of  the  navy  and  left  to  my  own  resources."  * 
And  to  a  similar  statement  made  in  his  Report  he  adds  : 
"  All  this  was  contrary  to  what  had  been  previously  stated 
to  me" 2 

What  can  be  said  in  explanation  or  excuse  of  such  contra 
dictory  statements  ?  One  thing  certainly  may  be  said,  and 
that  is  this :  that  McClellan' s  Own  Story  is  assuredly  not  the 
narrative  of  a  clear-headed,  or  careful,  or  candid  writer.  It 
is  perfectly  plain  that  in  regard  to  the  closing  of  the  James 
River,  as  in  regard  to  the  inability  of  the  navy  to  attack  the 
forts  at  Yorktown,  McClellan  was  abundantly  informed  long 
i  0.  S.,  2C4.  2  12  W.  R.,  8. 


106      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

before  he  embarked  for  the  Peninsula.  He  had  definite 
information  on  both  points.  But  to  this  information  he  gave 
little  or  no  heed.  Notwithstanding  it,  he  determined  to  go. 
Careful  as  he  usually  was  of  his  army,  cautious  as  he  cer 
tainly  was  as  a  rule  in  his  operations,  he  was  so  bent  on  this 
his  favorite  project  that  he  persisted  in  it  even  when  he  knew 
that  the  co-operation  of  the  navy  in  the  manner  and  to  the 
extent  desired  could  not  be  had.  And  he  tells  his  story  in 
such  a  way  as  to  imply  that  the  authorities  of  the  navy  had 
deceived  him  into  going  to  the  Peninsula  by  representing 
that  they  could  keep  the  James  Kiver  open  and  attack  the 
forts,  when  in  truth  they  could  do  neither,  as  they  informed 
him  soon  after  his  arrival.  He  claims  our  sympathy  for  the 
failure  of  the  navy  to  co-operate  effectually  with  him.  His 
imagination  has  so  warped  his  mind  that  he  cannot  think  of 
his  plan  except  as  being  feasible ;  the  facts,  of  which  he  was 
well  aware  before  he  attempted  to  put  it  in  execution,  are  to 
his  mind  not  so  much  facts  as  objections  raised  by  hostile 
and  jealous  opponents  or  half-hearted  supporters.  Instead, 
therefore,  of  a  manly,  clear,  and  unhesitating  acceptance  of 
facts,  as  of  things  which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  evade 
or  to  ignore,  we  have  first  a  period  of  self-deception  in  regard 
to  them,  followed  by  what  seems  very  like  a  disingenuous 
attempt  to  fasten  upon  others  the  blame  of  failures  for  which 
his  own  improvidence  and  obstinacy  were  solely  responsible. 
Enough  has  been  said  to  show  how  little  trust  is  to  be  reposed 
in  this  narrative.  And  were  our  examination  of  the  book 
limited  to  its  value  as  throwing  light  on  General  McClellaii's 
character  and  capacity,  we  would  gladly  drop  the  further  con 
sideration  of  his  wrongs,  and  his  claims  for  sympathy,  and 
his  insinuations  against  others,  and  proceed  at  once  to  the 
more  welcome  task  of  pointing  out  his  services  and  his  merits. 
But  we  cannot  quite  yet  do  this.  His  accusations  against  the 
members  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  cabinet  are  so  fierce,  so  bitter,  that 
they  demand  some  investigation. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  107 

Stated  in  a  few  words,  McClellan's  main  indictment 
against  the  administration  consists  in  the  charge  that  it  de 
prived  him  of  McDowell's  corps  when  he  moved  to  the  Pen 
insula.  Two  out  of  the  four  divisions  of  which  the  corps  was 
composed  were,  it  is  true,  afterwards  sent  him,  one  following 
the  other,  but  the  remainder,  though  sometimes  promised, 
never  came.  The  corps  was  to  have  gone  to  the  Peninsula 
with  the  others  ;  but  after  McClellan  had  gone,  it  was  found 
that,  instead  of  the  forty  or  fifty  thousand  men  whom  he  had 
been  ordered  to  leave  for  the  garrison  of  Washington,  he  had 
left  considerably  less  than  twenty  thousand  men.  We  did 
hope,  before  we  took  up  the  Autobiography,  to  find  in  it  some 
clear  statement  of  McClellan's  own  notion  of  the  way  in 
which  he  had  complied  with  the  President's  order  to  "  leave 
Washington  entirely  secure,"  but  we  have  been  disappointed. 
The  whole  treatment  of  the  subject  is  fragmentary  and  incon 
clusive.  But  that  is  not  all.  McClellan  writes  as  if  the 
whole  subject  of  the  numbers  and  disposition  of  the  troops 
to  be  left  for  the  defence  of  Washington  had  been  put  in  his 
control,  to  be  decided  according  to  his  best  judgment,  and  he 
says  that  the  force  which  he  left  was,  "  under  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case  "  1  sufficient,  and  that  "  the  quality  of  the 
troops  [they  were  mostly  raw  regiments]  was  amply  good  for 
the  purposes  in  view."  The  truth  /was  that  the  subject  was 
no  longer  under  McClellan's  control ;  it  had  been  referred, 
by  the  President's  orders,  to  the  decision  of  the  commander 
of  the  army  and  of  his  corps  commanders,  and  had  been 
passed  upon.  A  majority  of  the  corps  commanders  had 
insisted  on  a  full  garrison  for  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Potomac,  and  that  those  on  the  other  bank  should  be 
occupied,  and  that  there  should  be,  besides,  a  covering  force 
of  twenty-five  thousand  men  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line. 
To  this  decision  McClellan  himself  had  assented.  Now, 
Banks  having  been  called  off  into  the  Valley  with  a  force  of- 

1  0.  S.,  241. 


108    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

thirty-five  thousand  men  by  the  appearance  of  Stonewall 
Jackson,  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  furnish  the  required 
number  for  the  defence  of  Washington,  and  still  carry  the 
four  corps  to  the  Peninsula.  There  were  not  men  enough. 
Nevertheless,  the  defence  of  Washington  was  the  principal 
thing,  in  all  McClellan's  orders.  It  was  only  "  the  remain 
der "  of  the  army  which  he  was  authorized  by  the  President  to 
take  to  the  Peninsula.  McClellan  was  in  the  position  of  an 
executor  whom  the  will  directs  to  pay  certain  definite  pecuni 
ary  legacies,  and  whom  the  will  also  constitutes  the  residuary 
legatee.  What  he  is  entitled  to  is,  of  course,  only  what  is 
left  after  the  legacies  are  paid.  If,  now,  we  conceive  of  such 
an  executor  framing  in  his  own  mind  an  idea  that  he  was 
certain  to  get  such  or  such  a  sum  of  money  as  residuary  lega 
tee  under  that  will,  and  undertaking  to  cut  down  the  pecuni 
ary  legacies,  because,  on  settling  up  the  estate,  he  finds  he 
cannot  pay  them  in  full,  and  yet  retain  for  himself  the 
sum  on  which  his  imagination  has  become  fixed,  we  may 
obtain  a  pretty  accurate  notion  of  the  way  in  which  General 
McClellan  viewed  his  orders  and  performed  his  duties  in  the 
early  spring  of  1862. 

Of  all  this  there  was  probably  a  latent  consciousness  in 
McClellan's  mind.  Accordingly,  we  do  not  find  him  care 
fully  arranging  with  the  authorities  as  to  the  troops  that 
were  to  be  left  in  and  about  Washington,  in  compliance 
with  the  instructions  of  the  President.  On  the  contrary,  he 
does  not  deign  to  give  them  any  information  on  the  subject 
until  he  is  on  board  the  steamer  and  ready  to  start  for  the 
Peninsula.  Then,  and  then  only,  does  he  tell  the  Secretary 
of  War  what  dispositions  he  has  made.  He  unquestionably 
expected  that  these  dispositions  would  be  accepted,  or  at  any 
rate  would  not  be  very  carefully  scrutinized  until  after  he 
should  have  embarked  his  army,  and  that  then  a  speedy  and 
brilliant  success  in  the  field  would  forestall  criticism.  But 
he  reckoned  without  his  host.  From  the  time  the  idea  of 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  109 

removing  the  army  entered  his  head  he  had  entirely  miscon 
ceived  the  nature  of  the  objections  to  his  plan  entertained 
by  the  President  and  his  advisers.  These  objections  were 
fundamental,  and  they  were .  sound.  They  were  not  aimed 
at  McClellan  personally,  as  he  chose  to  imagine.  They  were 
founded  on  a  just  sense  of  the  extreme  importance  to  the 
country  of  preserving  Washington ;  and  on  an  intelligent 
and  rational  aversion  to  see  the  army,  of  which  so  great 
hopes  were  entertained,  transported  to  a  region  where  its 
only  means  of  communication  with  its  sources  of  supply  must 
necessarily  be  by  sea,  the  control  of  which  by  the  United 
States  navy  was,  since  the  appearance  of  the  Merrimac,  by 
no  means  an  assured  thing.  But  of  the  weight  to  which 
these  considerations  were  rightfully  entitled  McClellan  took 
110  account  whatever.  To  his  mind  objections  to  any  plan  of 
his  could  only  spring  from  ignorance  or  malevolence. 

Here  we  pause  a  moment  to  direct  attention  to  one  of 
McClellan's  most  marked  deficiencies.  He  seems,  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  his  military  career,  to  have  been 
well-nigh  incapable  of  dealing  with  the  civil  authorities  in 
any  reasonable  fashion.  Their  lack  of  acquaintance  with  the 
art  of  war,  their  impatience  at  the  delay  which  the  imperfect 
state  of  organization  and  drill  of  his  army  and  the  condition 
of  the  roads  in  a  Virginia  winter  rendered  necessary,  —  for 
all  which  he,  as  a  man  of  the  world,  ought  to  have  been  pre 
pared,  and  ought  to  have  been  ready  and  cheerfully  willing 
to  meet  and  put  up  with,  if  he  could  not  succeed  in  over 
coming  them  by  argument  and  instruction,  —  he  mistook 
either  for  fatuous  stupidity  or  for  malicious  obstructiveness. 
Hence,  to  all  suggestions  or  remonstrances  he  replied  with 
resentment  mingled  with  contempt.  Never  did  a  man  so 
wilfully  and  insanely  throw  away  his  chances  of  success. 
Had  he  been  a  competent  man  of  affairs,  he  would  have 
known  that  no  conjectural  advantages  presented  by  the 
Peninsular  route  over  the  overland  route  could  possibly  make 


110     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

up  for  losing  the  confidence  of  the  administration.  Had  it 
not  been  for  his  incredible  conceit,  he  would  have  found  in 
the  President  and  his  cabinet  men  who,  however  unfamiliar 
they  might  be  with  the  learning  pertaining  to  the  profession 
of  arms,  were  yet  clear-headed,  sensible,  patriotic  men,  who 
would  gladly  have  learned  from  him  what  they  needed  to 
know,  and  would  have  steadily  stood  by  him  in  defeat  or 
victory.  But  McClellan  was  so  eaten  up  with  egotism  that 
he  despised  all  criticism  and  hated  all  semblance  of  opposi 
tion;  he  was,  moreover,  so  blind  to  the  real  truth  of  the 
situation  that  he  thought  that  he  could,  by  putting  off  all 
explanations  until  the  army  had  gone,  escape  the  mortifica 
tion  of  having  to  renounce  his  favorite  plan. 

Here,  however,  he  was  mistaken.  Instead  of  changing 
their  views  about  the  indispensableness  of  maintaining  a 
large  force  in  and  about  Washington,  the  administration, 
on  learning  from  Wadsworth  of  the  paltry  array  on  which 
the  capital  must  now  depend  for  protection,  detained 
McDowell's  corps.  And  although  one  may  think  that,  all 
things  considered,  it  would  have  been  wiser  to  have  over 
looked  McClellan's  disregard  of  his  positive  instructions, 
and  allowed  McDowell  to  go  to  him,  yet  it  is  really  too  clear 
for  argument  that  McClellan  himself  had  no  ground  of  com 
plaint.  He  had  disobeyed  his  orders,  and  for  the  predica 
ment  in  which  he  now  found  himself  he  had  only  himself  to 
blame. 

It  does  not  require  an  exceptional  insight  into  human 
nature  to  guess  the  state  of  McClellan's  mind  and  feelings 
at  this  juncture.  Of  course,  it  needs  not  to  be  said,  he  took 
no  part  of  the  responsibility  to  himself.  In  his  mind,  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  promised  to  him  the  four  corps,  whatever  might 
happen  to  Washington  ;  the  navy  had  agreed  to  keep  open 
the  James  River  and  to  attack  the  batteries  of  Yorktown 
and  Gloucester,  whatever  the  Merrimac  might  undertake  to 
do ;  and  here  he  was,  without  any  fault  of  his  own,  boxed  up, 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  111 

so  to  speak,  on  a  little  tongue  of  exceedingly  marshy  land, 
surrounded  on  three  sides  by  the  sea  and  the  rivers,  with  a 
very  powerful  adversary,  very  strongly  entrenched,  in  front, 
and  he  unable,  for  want  of  the  expected  co-operation  of 
McDowell's  corps  and  the  navy,  to  turn  the  enemy's  posi 
tions  and  advance  towards  his  goal.  He  thus  writes  to  his 
wife  (April  6th) :  "  While  listening  this  P.  M.  to  the  sound 
of  the  guns,  I  received  an  order  detaching  McDowell's  corps 
from  my  command.  It  is  the  most  infamous  thing  that  his 
tory  has  recorded."  (April  8th.)  "  I  have  raised  an  awful 
row  about  McDowell's  corps.  The  President  very  coolly  tel 
egraphed  me  yesterday  that  he  thought  I  had  better  break 
the  enemy's  lines  at  once !  I  was  much  tempted  to  reply 
that  he  had  better  come  and  do  it  himself."  1  (April  llth.) 
"  Don't  worry  about  the  wretches  [the  administration]  ;  they 
have  done  nearly  their  worst,  and  can't  do  much  more.  I 
am  sure  that  I  will  win  in  the  end,  in  spite  of  all  their  ras 
cality.  History  will  present  a  sad  record  of  these  traitors 
who  are  willing  to  sacrifice  the  country  and  its  army  for 
personal  spite  and  personal  aims."  2  (April  21st.)  "  Had 
a  letter  yesterday  from  Francis  B.  Cutting,  of  New  York, 
hoping  that  I  would  not  allow  these  treacherous  hounds  to 
drive  me  from  my  path."  3  (May  3d.)  "  I  feel  that  the  fate 
of  a  nation  depends  upon  me,  and  I  feel  that  I  have  not  one 
single  friend  at  the  seat  of  government."  4 

In  this  unhealthy  frame  of  mind  McClellan  seems  to  have 
remained  all  through  the  Peninsular  campaign.  Sometimes 
his  mood  is  the  heroic  one,  as  where  he  writes  to  the  Presi 
dent  on  May  21 :  "I  believe  that  there  is  a  great  struggle 
before  this  army,  but  I  am  neither  dismayed  nor  discour 
aged  ;  "  6  or  closes  his  gratuitous  letter  of  advice,  on  July  7, 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  on  the  question  of  slavery,  by  the  impressive 
words,  "  I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and  as  I  hope 
for  forgiveness  from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter 
1  0.  S.,  308.  2  16.,  310.  3  Ib.,  313.  4  16.,  317.  5  12  W.  R.,  29. 


112    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

with  sincerity  towards  you  and  from  love  for  my  country."  l 
Sometimes  his  resentment  for  his  supposed  injuries  goes 
beyond  all  bounds,  as  where  he  writes,  on  June  28,  to 
Stanton :  "If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly 
that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you,  or  to  any  other  persons  in 
Washington.  You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this 
army."  2  So  elsewhere,  he  tells  his  wife  that  he  fears  that 
"  those  people "  "  have  done  all  that  cowardice  and  folly 
can  do  to  ruin  our  poor  country."  3 

On  the  other  hand,  he  never  loses  sight  of  his  own  impor 
tance.  On  July  18,  he  writes  this  to  his  wife :  "  If  they 
supersede  me  in  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I 
will  resign  my  commission  at  once.  ...  I  owe  no  gratitude 
to  any  but  my  own  soldiers  here  ;  none  to  the  government 
or  to  the  country.  I  have  done  my  best  for  the  country  ;  I 
expect  nothing  in  return  ;  they  are  my  debtors,  not  I  theirs"  4 
So,  again :  "I  have  had  enough  of  earthly  honors  and  place. 
I  believe  I  can  give  up  all  and  retire  to  privacy  once  more,  a 
better  man  than  when  we  gave  up  our  dear  little  home,  with 
wild  ideas  of  serving  the  country.  I  feel  that  I  have  paid 
her  all  that  I  owe  her.  I  am  sick  and  weary  of  this  business. 
I  am  tired  of  serving  fools.  God  help  my  country  !  lie 
alone  can  save  it."5 

This  from  the  pen  of  a  man  thirty-six  years  old,  who  had 
commanded  an  army  just  one  year.  With  such  inordinate 
ideas  of  his  own  importance,  and  such  incredible  contempt 
for  and  animosity  towards  the  men  who  composed  the  admin 
istration,  did  McClellan  close  his  first  campaign.  From  first 
to  last,  from  the  day  when  he  set  his  foot  in  the  mud  before 
Yorktown  to  the  day  when  he  left  Harrison's  Landing,  we 
look  in  vain  for  any  evidence  of  that  calm,  resolute,  cheerful 
courage,  which,  if  a  man  possess  not,  the  army  is  not  the 
career  for  him.  As  for  his  wretched  talk  about  his  having 

i  12  W.  R.,  74.  2  Ib.,  61.  3  0.  S.,  449. 

*  Ib.,  450451.  -  5  Ib.,  453. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  113 

overpaid  his  debt  to  his  country,  we  cannot  trust  ourselves  to 
speak  of  it  at  all.  To  take  such  an  attitude  as  this,  shows  a 
man's  views  of  duty  to  be  fundamentally  unsound. 

Observe,  again,  the  extraordinary  tone  which  he  assumed 
in  writing  to  Mr.  Stanton  in  regard  to  the  proposed  co-opera- 
tion  of  McDowell's  force.  He  had  gathered,  from  some  ex 
pressions  in  the  despatches  sent  to  him,  that  McDowell  was  to 
hold  an  independent  command  even  after  the  junction  of  his 
corps  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Such  an  arrangement 
was  extremely  distasteful  to  McClellan,  and  he  was  certainly 
quite  right  in  thinking  that  it  would  work  badly.  But  surely 
nothing  can  justify  his  sending  to  the  secretary  such  an  ulti 
matum  as  this  :  "If  I  cannot  fully  control  all  his  troops,  I 
want  none  of  them,  but  would  prefer  to  fight  the  battle  with 
what  I  have,  and  let  others  be  responsible  for  the  results."  * 
This  is  to  make  a  mere  personal  matter  of  the  whole  business. 
However  unfortunate  may  be  the  consequence  of  not  sending 
McDowell  to  join  the  main  army,  McClellan  says  he  prefers 
that  course  rather  than  that  he  should  not  "  fully  control "  all 
McDowell's  troops,  if  they  do  come.  Nothing  could  show  more 
clearly  the  state  of  moral  confusion  into  which  McClellan' s 
mind  had  fallen.  Any  really  clear-headed  man  sees  at  once 
that  if  McClellan  thought  that  McDowell's  joining  him, 
even  although  retaining  the  separate  command  of  his  troops, 
was  likely  to  be  of  benefit  to  the  cause,  it  was  McClellan's 
plain  duty  to  urge  that  McDowell  should  be  sent.  He  might 
remonstrate,  and  he  ought  to  remonstrate,  against  McDowell's 
retaining  any  such  separate  command,  as  an  arrangement 
certain  to  interfere  more  or  less  with  the  success  of  the  opera 
tions  ;  but  unless  he  was  of  opinion  that  it  would  do  more 
harm  than  good  for  a  distinct  corps,  under  its  own  independ 
ent  commander,  to  re-enforce  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he 
had  no  right  to  say,  as  he  did,  that  in  such  a  case  he  would 
rather  McDowell  should  not  come. 

1  O.  S.,  389,  and  12  W.  R.,  48. 


114    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  instance  of  the  peculiar 
working  of  McClellan's  mind  is  his  letter  of  advice  to  Mr. 
Lincoln,  written  from  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  7th  of  July, 
only  a  very  few  days  after  the  close  of  the  Seven  Days'  battles. 
On  the  20th  of  June,  while  he  was  yet  on  the  Chickahominy, 
McClellan  had  asked  permission  to  lay  before  the  President 
his  "  views  as  to  the  present  state  of  military  affairs  through 
out  the  whole  country."  1  To  this  request,  which  no  doubt 
struck  the  President  as  a  rather  remarkable  one,  Mr.  Lincoln 
replied,  more  suo,  that,  "  if  it  would  not  divert  too  much  of  " 
his  (McClellan's)  "  time  and  attention  from  the  army  under  " 
his  "  immediate  command,"  he  woidd  be  glad  to  have  the 
views  laid  before  him.2  Taking  this  permission  in  its  widest 
sense,  McClellan  wrote  his  famous  letter  from  Harrison's 
Landing.3 

No  description  can  do  justice  to  this  performance.  Here 
is  a  man,  with  no  special  means  of  knowledge,  with  no  polit 
ical  experience,  undertaking  gravely  to  urge  the  Government 
"  to  determine  upon  a  civil  and  military  policy  covering  the 
whole  ground  of  our  national  trouble."  This  policy  he  pro 
ceeds  to  lay  down  and  define.  It  is,  we  need  hardly  say,  a 
strictly  conservative  policy.  The  only  important  part  of  the 
letter  is  that  opposing  in  the  strongest  terms  the  "forcible 
abolition  of  slavery."  Unless  the  Government  take  the  right 
ground  on  this  subject,  "  the  effort  to  obtain  the  requisite 
forces  will  be  almost  hopeless.  A  declaration  of  radical 
views,  especially  upon  slavery,  would  rapidly  disintegrate  our 
present  armies."  The  importance  which  McClellan  attached 
to  these  opinions,  which  were  in  much  less  than  a  year  to  be 
proved  utterly  and  preposterously  unsound,  is  shown  by  the 
high-strung  tone  of  this  epistle.  He  commences  with  repre 
senting  the  rebel  army  in  the  front,  "with  the  purpose  of 
overwhelming  us  by  attacking  our  positions,  or  reducing  us 
by  blocking  our  river  communications."  It  is  evidently  a 
i  12  W.  R.,  48.  2  Ib.  3  Ib.,  73 ;  0.  S.,  487. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  115 

case  of  the  lambs  among  the  wolves,  in  McClellan's  eyes. 
Gordon  in  Khartoum  could  not  have  been  much  more  exposed 
to  destruction.  He  closes  by  saying  that  he  may  himself  be 
"on  the  brink  of  eternity,''  and  that  he  has  written  with 
sincerity  towards  the  President  and  love  for  his  country. 

Now  we  are  perfectly  willing  to  concede  to  Mr.  Prime  that 
this  was  not  a  political  document.  It  may  very  likely  not 
have  been  intended  for  political  effect.  But  it  certainly 
shows  a  man  whose  mind  is  heated  and  excited  to  an  unnatu 
ral  degree  by  dwelling  on  matters  which  are  none  of  his  busi 
ness.  Who  was  General  McClellan  that  he  should  volunteer 
his  advice  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  ?  Would 
even  he,  with  all  his  egotism,  have  ventured  on  such  a  step 
as  this  on  the  7th  of  July,  1861  ?  What  had  happened 
during  the  year  to  make  him  a  political  oracle?  Another 
thing  is  shown  with  painful  distinctness,  —  the  very  super 
ficial  knowledge  which  McClellan  had  of  the  motives  and  the 
intentions  of  the  masses  of  the  Northern  people,  in  whose 
minds  the  preservation  or  the  destruction  of  slavery  was 
always,  as  it  was  in  the  mind  of  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  a  sec 
ondary  question,  which  they  were  quite  willing  to  leave  to 
the  decision  of  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  country. 
Whether  the  President  ought  to  have  retained  at  the  head  of 
the  army  an  officer  who  had  thus  notified  him  that,  in  the 
event  of  a  certain  attitude  being  taken  by  the  Government  on 
the  slavery  question,  his  army  would  probably  be  "  disinte 
grated,"  is  a  question  on  which  much  might  be  said.  All 
we  need  to  remark  here  is,  that  there  have  been  Presidents 
of  the  United  States  to  whom  it  would  not  have  been  wise  to 
write  such  a  letter  as  this. 

We  have  seen  that  McClellan  insisted  on  going  to  the 
Peninsula,  although  the  appearance  and  exploits  of  the 
Merrimac  had  closed  the  James  Kiver.  But  on  the  12th  of 
May,  a  few  days  only  after  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  the 
Merrimac  was  destroyed  by  the  Confederates  themselves,  and 


116    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

the  James  was  open  as  far  as  Drury's  Bluff.  The  question  has 
often  been  asked  why  McClellaii  did  not  then  use  the  James 
as  his  line  of  supply,  instead  of  the  York  and  Pamunkey. 
He  tells  us  himself  that  this  was  what  he  would  have  done 
had  McDowell's  corps  been  sent  to  him  by  water,  and  he  has 
no  hesitation  in  expressing  not  only  his  decided  preference 
for  the  James  River  route,  but  his  opinion  l  that  the  failure 
of  the  campaign  was  due  to  his  being  obliged  to  take  up  a 
position  on  both  sides  of  the  Chickahominy,  with  his  line  of 
supply  from  the  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey,  very  imper 
fectly  covered.  He  tells  us  that  his  adoption  of  the  York  and 
Pamunkey  line  instead  of  the  James  River  line  was  due  to 
the  order  of  the  18th  of  May,  in  which  he  was  informed  that 
McDowell  was  to  move  towards  Richmond  to  join  him. 
And  it  may  well  be  conceded  that  until  McDowell  was 
ordered  off  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  intercept  Jackson, 
the  order  of  the  18th  did  require  McClellan's  army  to  be 
on  the  Chickahominy.  But  on  May  24  he  is  told  that 
McDowell's  movement  is  suspended,  and  he  admits  that  he 
could  not  expect  McDowell  to  join  him  "  in  time  to  partici 
pate  in  immediate  operations  in  front  of  Richmond."  2  Why, 
then,  it  may  pertinently  be  asked,  did  he  not  at  once  cross  the 
Peninsula  and  establish  his  base  on  the  James  River?  As 
yet,  he  had  not  entangled  his  army  in  the  swamps  of  the 
Chickahominy.  It  was  then  a  week  before  the  battle  of  Fair 
Oaks.  On  the  James  his  supplies  would  be  furnished  more 
easily,  and  his  access  to  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond  would 
be  unobstructed  by  swamps  or  rivers.  Then  there  was  the 
opportunity  of  crossing  the  James  and  seizing  Petersburg, 
which  he  says  himself  he  was  sure  he  could  have  done.3 

Finally,  the  enemy  were  known   to  be  divided  ;  Jackson 
was  in   the  Valley.     That    the  James  River  was  the  "true 
line  of  operations  "  McClellaii  says  he  was  always  of  opinion. 
Why,  then,  did  he  not  adopt  it  in  the  last  week  in  May  ? 
1  0.  S.,  346.  2  16.,  351.  3  Ib.,  343. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  117 

The  reason  lie  gives  us  is  that  the  order  of  May  18  for 
the  co-operation  of  McDowell  was  only  suspended,  not  re 
voked,  and  that  therefore  he  could  not  abandon  the  northern 
approach  and  his  communications  with  West  Point.1  We 
cannot  accept  this  reason  as  the  true  one.  After  the  de 
spatch  of  the  24th  of  May,  in  which  McClellan  was  informed 
that  McDowell  was  ordered  away  in  chase  of  Jackson,  had 
been  received,  it  seems  to  us  that  McClellan  was  free  to 
adopt  the  line  of  the  James,  if  he  saw  fit  so  to  do.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  very  certain  that  had  he  desired  to  do  so,  and  been 
in  doubt  as  to  the  wishes  of  the  Government,  he  might  have 
asked  the  question  whether  the  order  of  the  18th  was  to  be 
considered  as  in  any  sense  obligatory,  now  that  McDowell 
had  been  sent  off.  But  he  never  asked  the  question.  Had 
he  really  seen  at  the  tune  the  weakness  of  his  position 
athwart  the  Chickahominy  and  the  superior  advantages  of 
operating  from  a  base  on  the  James,  as  he  would  now  have 
us  believe  that  he  then  did,  he  would  have  gone  to  the  James 
the  moment  he  heard  that  McDowell's  promised  co-operation 
had  been  indefinitely  suspended.  At  the  least,  he  would 
have  applied  for  leave  to  do  so.  He  did  neither.  And  with 
his  usual  unwillingness  to  accept  any  blame  for  his  own  con 
duct,  he  most  unfairly  lays  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  the 
entire  responsibility  of  retaining  the  /army  on  the  Chicka 
hominy  from  the  18th  of  May  till  the  28th  of  June.2 

We  have  said  all  that  we  care  to  say  regarding  McClellan's 
claim,  or  assumption,  rather,  that  no  one  but  himself  could 
have  led  the  army  after  the  close  of  the  unfortunate  campaign 
of  General  Pope.  We  have  read  with  care  his  account  of 
the  battle  of  Antietam.  There  is  nothing  to  be  learned  from 
it.  He  does  not  explain  to  our  comprehension  why  the 
battle  was  not  fought  the  day  before.  His  troops  were  all 
up ;  that  is  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  those  who  fought  on  the 
17th.  He  does  not  discuss  the  question  of  the  relative  num- 
1  0.  S.,  364.  2  16.,  481. 


118    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

bers  of  the  armies  in  the  battle,  but  he  does  say  that  we  were 
largely  outnumbered,  which  we  now  know  was  not  the  case. 
He  tells  us  why  he  did  not  renew  the  battle  on  the  18th  in 
language  very  characteristic  of  the  man  :  "I  am  aware  of 
the  fact  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  a  general  is  ex 
pected  to  risk  a  battle  if  he  has  a  reasonable  prospect  of  suc 
cess  ;  but  at  this  critical  juncture  I  should  have  had  a  nar 
row  view  of  the  condition  of  the  country,  had  I  been  willing 
to  hazard  another  battle  with  less  than  an  absolute  assurance 
of  success.  At  that  moment,  —  Virginia  lost,  Washington 
menaced,  Maryland  invaded,  —  the  national  cause  could  afford 
no  risks  of  defeat.  One  battle  lost,  and  almost  all  would 
have  been  lost.  Lee's  army  might  then  have  marched  as 
it  pleased,  on  Washington,  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  or  New 
York.  It  could  have  levied  its  supplies  from  a  fertile  and 
undevastated  country ;  extorted  tribute  from  wealthy  and 
populous  cities ;  and  nowhere  east  of  the  Alleghanies  was 
there  another  organized  force  able  to  arrest  its  march."  1  In 
thus  piling  Pelion  upon  Ossa,  McClellan  has  no  rival  among 
military  writers. 

His  letters  during  the  campaign  are  certainly  among  the 
curiosities  of  military  literature.  The  day  after  the  action  at 
South  Mountain,  he  says :  — 

"  September  15,  Monday,  9.30  A.  M.  Just  sent  you  a 
telegram  informing  you  that  we  yesterday  gained  a  glorious 
and  complete  victory  ;  every  moment  adds  to  its  importance. 
I  am  pushing  everything  after  them  with  the  greatest  rapid 
ity,  and  expect  to  gain  great  results.  I  thank  God  most 
humbly  for  His  great  mercy.  How  glad  I  am  for  my  country 
that  it  is  delivered  from  immediate  peril !  ...  If  I  can 
believe  one-tenth  of  what  is  reported,  God  has  seldom  given 
an  army  a  greater  victory  than  this."  2 

South  Mountain  was  unquestionably  a  brilliant  affair  and 
a  complete  success,  but  there  have  been  greater  victories  even 

1  0.  S.,  618.  2  Ib.,  612. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  119 

than  South  Mountain.  The  next  day  he  has  "  no  doubt 
delivered  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland."  The  day  after 
Antietam  he  writes,  "  Those  in  whose  judgment  I  rely  tell 
me  that  I  fought  the  battle  splendidly  and  that  it  was  a 
masterpiece  of  art."  1  On  the  20th  he  writes,  "  Our  victory 
was  complete,  and  the  disorganized  rebel  army  has  rapidly 
returned  to  Virginia,  its  dreams  of  c  invading  Pennsylvania ' 
dissipated  forever.  I  feel  some  little  pride  in  having,  with  a 
beaten  and  demoralized  army,  defeated  Lee  so  utterly  and 
saved  the  North  so  completely.  Well,  one  of  these  days 
history  will,  I  trust,  do  me  justice  in  deciding  that  it  was 
not  my  fault  that  the  campaign  of  the  Peninsula  was  not  suc 
cessful.  .  .  .  Since  I  left  Washington,  Stanton  has  again 
asserted  that  /,  not  Pope,  lost  the  battle  of  Manassas  No.  2  ! 
...  I  am  tired  of  righting  against  such  disadvantages,  and 
feel  that  it  is  now  time  for  the  country  to  come  to  my  help 
and  remove  these  difficulties  from  my  path.  If  my  country 
men  will  not  open  their  eyes  and  assist  themselves  they  must 
pardon  me  if  I  decline  longer  to  pursue  the  thankless  avoca 
tion  of  serving  them."  And  again,  "  I  feel  that  I  have  done 
all  that  can  be  asked  in  twice  saving  the  country.  If  I 
continue  in  its  service  I  have  at  least  the  right  to  demand  a 
guarantee  that  I  shall  not  be  interfered  with."  2  To  the  same 
effect  on  the  22d :  "  I  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that 
God  has,  in  His  mercy,  a  second  time  made  me  the  instrument 
for  saving  the  nation,  and  am  content  with  the  honor  that 
has  fallen  to  my  lot.  I  have  seen  enough  of  public  life.  No 
motive  of  ambition  can  now  retain  me  in  the  service.  The 
only  thing  that  can  keep  me  there  will  be  the  conviction 
that  my  country  needs  my  services  and  that  circumstances 
make  it  necessary  for  me  to  render  them.  I  am  confident 
that  the  poison  still  rankles  in  the  veins  of  my  enemies  at 
Washington,  and  that  so  long  as  they  live  it  will  remain  there. 
...  I  have  received  no  papers  containing  the  news  of  the 
i  O.S.,  612.  2  J6. ,613,  614. 


120     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

last  battle,  and  do  not  know  the  effect  it  has  produced  on  the 
Northern  mind.  I  trust  it  has  been  a  good  one,  and  that 
I  am  re-established  in  the  confidence  of  the  best  people  of 
the  nation."  1 

All  these  letters  show  McClellan's  mind  to  have  been  in 
anything  but  a  healthy  condition.  They  reveal  to  us  a  man 
exalted  with  an  insufferable  egotism,  viewing  things  all  out  of 
their  due  proportion,  cherishing  the  most  bitter  resentments, 
never  dreaming  of  imputing  to  himself  any  blame  whatso 
ever,  in  a  state  of  hopeless  moral  confusion,  and  practising 
all  sorts  of  deceptions  on  his  own  mind.  For  in  the  bottom 
of  his  soul  General  McClellan  knew  that  Antietam  was  not 
"  a  masterpiece  of  art,"  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
not  a  "  demoralized  "  army,  and  that  Lee  was  not  "  utterly 
defeated,"  still  less  "  disorganized."  But  he  always,  as  we 
before  remarked,  lived  to  a  great  degree  in  a  world  of  his 
own,  created  by  his  own  imagination. 

After  the  battle  of  Antietam,  McClellan  deemed  it  neces 
sary  or  at  least  advisable,  to  refit  and  re-organize  his  army. 
He  was  very  deficient  in  cavalry.  The  troops  were  short  of 
clothing  and  of  some  other  supplies.  Hence  he  posted  his 
army  in  the  neighborhood  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  refused  to 
follow  the  enemy  into  Virginia.  Orders  had  no  effect  upon 
him  whatever.  He  thought  the  army  needed  this  rest  and 
these  supplies,  and  he  now  felt  himself  to  be  strong  enough 
to  have  his  own  way,  and  to  disregard  the  orders  of  the 
President,  and  the  Secretary,  and  General  Halleck.  In  his 
appreciation  of  the  needs  of  the  army  he  may  have  been 
right.  Very  likely  he  was.  But  we  have  never  believed,  and 
we  do  not  believe  now,  that  it  was  an  honest  difference  of 
opinion  about  these  questions,  and  the  like,  that  induced  the 
administration  to  remove  General  McClellan  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  army.  It  was,  in  our  judgment,  the  impossi 
bility  of  establishing  with  him  any  intelligible  relations.  His 
attitude  was  so  heroic,  so  flighty,  so  unpractical,  so  senti- 
i  0.  S.,  614,  615. 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  121 

mental,  so  insubordinate,  that  the  authorities  despaired  of 
ever  coming  to  any  understanding  with  him.  While  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  his  advisers  took  a  cool  and  essentially  correct 
view  of  the  campaign  of  Antietam,  regarding  it  as  a  moder 
ate  success  over  an  enemy  who  had  rashly  exposed  himself  to 
destruction,  and  were  anxiously  expecting  that  some  move 
ment  would  be  made  before  winter  should  set  in,  McClellan 
was  apparently  occupying  himself,  during  the  fine  October 
weather,  with  riding  over  the  field,  and  collecting  information 
for  the  forthcoming  report  of  his  glorious  victory.  To  all 
their  urgent  appeals  McClellan  turned  a  deaf  ear.  There 
is  to  be  found  in  his  despatches  and  letters  at  this  period 
that  mixture  of  resentment  and  contempt  which  we  noticed 
before,  and  to  this  was  now  added  a  new  ingredient,  that  cer 
tainly  did  not  make  the  cup  more  palatable,  —  an  inordinate 
pride  at  having  saved  the  country  from  the  incapables  who 
directed  its  destinies,  and  from  the  sword  of  a  preponderant 
foe.  Had  it  been  a  mere  question  of  shoes  and  horses,  of 
days  or  of  weeks,  McClellan  would  never  have  been  relieved 
after  Antietam.  But  it  was  not.  It  was  found  impossible 
to  get  on  with  a  man  like  McClellan,  to  tolerate  his  preten 
sions,  to  accept  his  versions  of  facts.  As  for  there  ever  hav 
ing  been  any  obstructions  thrown  in  his  way,  all  we  can  say 
is  that  McClellan  utterly  fails  to  give  rise  to  a  suspicion  on 
this  point ;  that  is,  in  our  judgment.  A  more  preposterous 
and  unfounded  theory,  in  our  opinion,  was  never  broached. 

Many  as  were  McClellan's  faults,  however,  it  was  inex 
cusable  to  supplant  him  by  Burnside.  Everybody  who  was  in 
any  degree  behind  the  scenes  knew  of  the  miserable  failure 
which  Burnside  had  made  at  Antietam.  Why  he  should  have 
been  selected  to  command  the  army,  except  that  he  happened 
to  be  next  in  rank  to  McClellan,  no  one  could  imagine  at  the 
time,  and  no  one  has  ever  learned  since.  What  would  have 
happened  if  McClellan  had  been  continued  in  command  it  is 
perhaps  useless  to  conjecture. 


122    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

General  McClellan  undoubtedly  had  as  comprehensive  and 
correct  a  notion  of  what  an  army  should  be,  to  be  really  a 
well-organized  and  efficient  military  force,  as  any  of  our  gen 
erals,  and  possibly  he  may  have  led  them  all  in  this  regard. 
As  an  organizer,  also,  he  was  unquestionably  one  of  our  first 
men,  although  in  this  department  he  was  probably  equalled 
by  Buell  and  Thomas.  Nor  should  we  forget  the  immense 
change  for  the  better  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  wrought 
by  Hooker,  in  the  winter  succeeding  the  bloody  defeat  of 
Fredericksburg.  But  McClellan  surpassed  all  our  officers, 
except,  possibly,  Thomas  and  Sheridan,  in  the  power  of  cre 
ating  confidence  and  enthusiasm  among  the  soldiers.  The 
curious  thing  about  McClellan's  hold  on  his  men  was  that  it 
was  acquired  before  the  army  had  taken  the  field,  while  it  was 
yet  in  the  lines  before  Washington.  And  equally  remarka 
ble  is  the  fact  that  it  was  not  shaken  by  defeat  and  disaster. 
This  enthusiasm,  too,  was  contagious.  In  the  Antietam  cam 
paign  it  was  observed  to  affect  troops  who  had  not  before 
served  under  him.  The  truth  was  that  McClellan  really 
loved  his  men ;  he  was  a  man  of  a  good  deal  of  genuine  senti 
ment  ;  the  position  he  occupied  as  head  of  the  army,  gaining 
it,  as  he  did,  at  one  bound,  —  as  it  were  by  the  decree  of 
destiny,  —  powerfully  affected  his  imagination,  and  from  the 
first  he  accepted  the  role  of  the  friend  and  protector  of  the 
soldiers,  as  well  as  that  of  the  commander  of  the  army.  To 
officers  who  had  risen  from  the  command  of  regiments,  or 
brigades,  or  even  corps,  little  or  nothing  of  this  sort  of  thing 
was  possible  ;  they  had  been  too  near  to  the  men.  With  most 
people,  in  fact,  such  a  strong  feeling  could  never  have  found 
a  place  in  their  minds,  from  sheer  lack  of  sentiment.  But 
no  one  can  read  McClellan's  letters  and  doubt  the  existence 
of  this  affection  on  his  part  for  his  men,  and  his  thorough 
appreciation  and  enjoyment  of  their  attachment  to  and  confi 
dence  in  him.  For  the  soldiers  were  not  slow  to  recognize 
the  fact  that  in  McClellan  they  possessed  a  commander  who 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN  123 

imported  into  the  ordinary  formalities  of  official  and  military 
duty  a  certain  pride  in  them,  in  their  achievements,  and  in 
their  virtues,  a  real  solicitude  for  them,  and  a  warm  interest 
in  their  welfare  and  comfort,  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  the 
other  officers  of  the  army.  To  this  solicitude  and  this  in 
terest  they  responded  with  all  their  hearts,  and  a  personal 
relation  was  unquestionably  established  very  early  between 
McClellan  and  his  soldiers  that  is  almost,  if  not  quite, 
unique  in  the  history  of  war.  It  was,  of  course,  an  element 
of  strength  on  our  side  so  long  as  McClellan  commanded  the 
army,  although  he  never  used  it  on  the  field  of  battle.  With 
him,  war,  in  all  its  processes,  was  a  mere  matter  of  calcu 
lation,  into  which  it  was  only  mischievous  to  allow  sentiment 
of  any  kind  to  enter.  He  thoroughly  enjoyed  this  relation 
to  his  army,  —  it  was,  in  fact,  the  only  thing  he  did  enjoy 
during  his  military  life,  —  but  he  never  made  any  such  use 
of  it  as  Stonewall  Jackson,  for  instance,  did  of  the  hold  which 
he  had  on  his  men. 

Of  McClellan' s  relations  to  the  President  and  the  mem 
bers  of  the  cabinet  we  have  already  spoken.  But  we  may 
say  here  that  enough  and  more  than  enough  is  disclosed  in 
the  volume  before  us  to  account  for  McClellan' s  failure  on 
purely  personal  grounds.  It  is,  in  our  opinion,  impossible 
for  any  one  reading  this  book  to  believe  that  McClellan's 
political  views  had  any  perceptible  influence  on  his  fortunes. 
There  is  no  need  of  lugging  in  any  such  hypothesis.  There 
is  sufficient  in  the  plain  and  undisputed  facts  to  explain 
everything  to  the  comprehension  of  any  one  who  has  seen 
much  of  the  world.  McClellan's  sudden  exaltation  was  more 
than  he  could  bear  ;  he  considered  himself  a  great  man,  — 
the  appointed  saviour  of  his  country.  To  the  natural  and  to- 
be-expected  ignorance  of  military  facts  and  military  reasons 
which  he  met  in  Washington,  he  opposed  the  pride  and  self- 
sufficiency  of  a  specialist,  and  of  a  specialist  who  was,  it 
must  be  confessed,  uncommonly  young  for  his  years.  There 


124    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

was  no  one  in  the  administration  who  could  keep  him  within 
proper  bounds.  Lincoln's  practical  sense  was  embodied  in 
the  uncouth  garb  of  rusticity,  and  all  his  wise  considerateness 
and  wholesome  advice  went  for  nothing.  As  for  the  others, 
their  attitude  received  at  McClellan's  hands  absolutely  no 
toleration.  He  never  even  endeavored  to  put  himself  in  their 
place,  nor,  probably,  could  he  have  done  so,  had  he  tried. 
Hence  arose  inevitably  a  state  of  mutual  suspicion  and  hos 
tility,  which  continued  to  the  time  of  his  removal.  All 
through  this  period  both  sides  made  mistakes,  and  serious 
ones.  But  the  blame  for  the  original  falling  out  must  rest 
with  the  general  who  attempted  to  evade  his  orders,  and  then 
threw  upon  others  the  responsibility  he  ought  manfully  to 
have  shouldered  himself.  Lastly,  let  it  be  remembered  that 
McClellan,  as  it  was,  had  his  fair  share  of  the  favors  of  for 
tune.  No  thanks  to  him,  to  be  sure,  but  the  James  River 
was  opened  to  him  a  week  after  he  had  taken  Yorktown. 
For  all  that  appears,  he  might  have  used  that  admirable  line 
of  operations,  and  escaped  the  unwholesome  swamps  of  the 
Chickahominy  and  the  forced  change  of  base.  No  orders 
from  the  Secretary  of  War  obliged  him  to  suffer  the  Fifth 
Corps  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  main  army  of  Lee  at 
Gaines's  Mill ;  and  nothing  in  the  world  but  his  own  slow 
ness  prevented  his  attacking  Lee  at  Antietam  the  day  before 
Jackson  came  up  from  Harper's  Ferry.  It  is  impossible  to 
get  up  much  sympathy  for  General  McClellan.  And  we  do 
not  think  that  this  book  of  his  will  raise  him  in  the  opinion 
of  his  countrymen. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN. 

BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES. 


Eeprinted  by  permission  from  the  "Atlantic  Monthly"  for  August,  189L 


GENERAL  SHERMAN. 


PROBABLY  no  general  in  the  Union  army  has  been  more 
honored  and  appreciated,  at  least  in  the  Northern  States, 
than  General  Sherman.  His  achievements  in  the  war  were 
perhaps,  on  the  whole,  more  striking  and  brilliant  than  those 
performed  by  any  other  officer,  Federal  or  Confederate. 
They  were  of  a  kind  calculated  powerfully  to  excite  the  im 
agination,  and  they  were  crowned  by  complete  and  dazzling 
success.  Then  he  was  a  man  of  most  marked  and  individual 
traits  of  character.  He  was  bold  in  action  and  in  speech. 
He  possessed  all  the  peculiarly  American  characteristics.  He 
was  not  only  enterprising,  full  of  resources,  aggressive,  but 
he  was  all  this  in  a  way  distinctively  his  own ;  he  was  the 
type  of  the  American  general  in  these  respects.  More  than 
this,  he  took  the  public  into  his  confidence  to  a  degree  that  no 
other  general  ever  thought  of  doing.  Not  that  he  sought 
popularity  by  any  unfair  methods,  but  that  he  could  not  help 
stating  to  the  world  his  views  and  conclusions,  proclaiming 
his  likes  and  his  dislikes,  as  he  went  along.  And  although 
he  was  always  a  very  plain-spoken  man,  and  his  opinions 
frequently  ran  counter  to  the  popular  notions,  his  evident 
honesty  and  sincerity  took  wonderfully  with  the  people. 
There  has  been  nobody  in  our  time  like  General  Sherman. 

It  may  be  too  soon  properly  to  estimate  his  military  abili 
ties.  We  are  perhaps  too  near  to  the  war,  too  familiar  with 
the  actors  themselves,  and  with  the  local  and  temporary  tra 
dition  about  their  doings ;  we  are  perhaps  too  much  inter 
ested  in  them  to  be  able  to  be  thoroughly  impartial.  Yet  the 


128     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

contemporary  generation  possesses  certain  manifest  advan 
tages  for  coming  to  a  correct  judgment  of  the  men  and  affairs 
of  its  day  which  cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  possessed 
by  the  generations  that  come  after.  The  men  of  the  time 
cannot  easily  be  grossly  deceived  or  greatly  mistaken.  They 
have  not  gained  all  their  knowledge  from  books.  When  they 
do  read  about  the  events  through  which  they  have  passed, 
they  know  something  about  the  writers  of  the  books  and  their 
qualifications,  and  something  about  the  events  themselves 
from  sources  independent  of  the  books.  Eye-witnesses  and 
direct  testimony  count,  and  ought  to  count,  for  a  good  deal. 
Let  us  then  try  to  state  in  a  very  brief  way  what  we,  in  this 
generation,  know  and  think  of  the  great  soldier  who  has  so 
recently  left  us. 

General  Sherman  was  appointed  to  the  Military  Academy 
at  West  Point  from  the  State  of  Ohio,  in  1836,  and  graduated 
in  1840,  sixth  in  his  class.  Although  during  the  Mexican 
war  he  was  employed  in  the  expedition  to  California,  and 
therefore  missed  the  opportunities  for  distinction  in  the  field 
which  the  campaigns  of  Scott  and  Taylor  so  liberally  afforded, 
and  although  he  subsequently  left  the  service,  his  appoint 
ment  in  the  regular  army  as  Colonel  of  one  of  the  new  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  and  also  as  Brigadier-General  of  Volun 
teers  in  May,  1861,  shows  how  highly  his  abilities  were  rated 
by  his  contemporaries  and  superiors.  After  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  where  he  commanded  a  brigade,  he  was  sent  to 
Kentucky  to  serve  under  General  Robert  Anderson.  The 
latter's  health,  however,  soon  failing  him,  Sherman  assumed 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland.  General 
Sherman's  connection  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  did 
not  long  continue,  for,  superseded  at  his  own  request  by 
General  Buell,  he  was  transferred  to  General  Halleck's 
Department  of  the  Mississippi.  Here  began  his  connection 
with  the  troops  which  were  afterwards  organized  into  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee.  The  history  of  these  two  famous 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  129 

commands  is  virtually  the  history  of  the  war  in  the  Mis 
sissippi  Valley.  Grant,  Sherman  and  McPherson  are  the 
heroes  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee ;  Buell,  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

Halleck's  forces  opened  the  campaign  of  1862  with  a  bril 
liant  stroke.  The  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 
by  the  troops  under  Grant  and  the  fleet  under  Foote,  in 
February,  caused  the  immediate  fall  of  Nashville  and  the 
evacuation  by  the  enemy  of  the  greater  part  of  the  States  of 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  It  was  determined  to  push  for 
ward  on  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River  as  large  a  force  as 
could  be  collected.  Grant,  with  the  confidence  born  of  his 
recent  victory,  established  his  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  or 
Shiloh,  on  the  western  side  of  the  river,  having  his  head 
quarters  at  Savannah,  some  eight  miles  further  down  the 
river,  —  that  is,  to  the  northward,  —  and  on  the  opposite 
or  eastern  bank.  Sherman  commanded  a  division  in  this 
army.  Buell,  now  under  Halleck's  orders,  had  been  directed 
to  march  with  all  his  disposable  forces  from  Nashville  to 
Savannah,  thence  to  be  transferred  to  Pittsburg  Landing, 
from  which  point  the  whole  command  was  to  advance  south- 
westwardly  to  Corinth,  a  town  on  the  great  railroad  which, 
running  from  west  to  east,  connected  Memphis  with 
Chattanooga,  intersecting  the  railroad  from  Mobile  to  the 
Ohio  River,  and  constituted  one  of  the  most  important 
avenues  of  communication  for  the  enemy  in  that  region. 
It  was  supposed  at  the  time  that  the  Confederate  troops  had 
been  thoroughly  discouraged  by  their  recent  heavy  losses  in 
men,  material  and  territory,  and  that  we  should  have  no 
serious  difficulty  in  attaining  our  objective  point,  and  thus 
opening  the  way  for  further  operations.  Everybody  knows 
what  happened :  how  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
saw  their  opportunity  in  the  exposed  situation  of  Grant's 
army;  how  they  rapidly  and  secretly  gathered  their  forces 
together ;  how  they  were  delayed  by  bad  weather  and  fright- 


130     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

ful  roads,  but  how,  on  Sunday  morning,  the  6th  of  April, 
they  struck  the  unsuspecting  army  of  Grant  a  terrible  blow ; 
how  stubbornly  and  bravely  Grant  and  his  lieutenants  re 
sisted  and  held  out,  fighting  to  the  last,  Sherman  especially 
distinguishing  himself  not  only  for  gallantry,  but  for  readi 
ness  and  skill  in  making  his  dispositions ;  how,  nevertheless, 
they  were  pressed  back  in  disorder ;  how  at  the  close  of  the 
day  the  advance  guard  of  Buell's  army  arrived  just  in  time 
to  check  the  last  assaults  of  the  exhausted  Confederates ;  and 
how  the  battle  was  renewed  the  next  day,  and  resulted  in  a 
great  success  for  the  Union  arms. 

Grant  and  Sherman  have  always  persistently  maintained 
that  they  were  not  surprised  at  Shiloh ;  but  the  world  has 
never  been  able  to  take  their  statements  seriously.  Grant 
wrote  to  Halleck,  the  day  before  the  battle,  that  he  had 
scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  a  general  attack  being  made 
upon  him.  Sherman,  the  same  day,  wrote  from  Pittsburg 
Landing  to  Grant  at  Savannah  that  he  did  not  apprehend 
anything  like  an  attack  upon  his  position.  They  unquestion 
ably  said  what  they  thought  at  the  time.  The  battle  began 
at  half  past  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Grant  did  not 
reach  the  field  till  after  nine.  It  stands  to  reason  that 
such  tardiness  on  the  part  of  an  army  commander  to  arrive 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  susceptible  of  no  more  natural,  and 
assuredly  of  no  more  honorable  explanation  than  that  he  was 
expecting  no  battle  to  occur.  Surprised,  however,  as  was 
the  Federal  commander,  he  was  not  thrown  off  his  balance. 
Never  did  Grant  display  to  better  advantage  the  firmness 
and  steadfast  courage  which  he  possessed  in  so  unusual  a 
degree.  Sherman's  conduct,  too,  after  the  fighting  began, 
was  above  all  praise.  His  division  was  made  up  of  troops 
perfectly  new,  who  had  never  been  under  fire ;  but  he 
handled  them  with  such  skill  and  ability  that  he  made  a 
reputation  on  that  disastrous  field. 

As  a  subordinate  commander,  Sherman  had  the  rare  good 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  131 

fortune  of  serving  under  a  man  whom  he  greatly  admired 
and  in  whom  he  fully  trusted ;  and  General  Grant  returned 
the  confidence  which  his  lieutenant  reposed  in  him.  The 
perfect  understanding  between  these  two  eminent  men  was 
not  only  one  of  the  most  interesting  facts  of  the  war,  but 
it  was  productive  of  great  good  to  the  public  service.  It 
showed  in  many  ways  how  wise  it  is  for  the  superior,  when 
ever  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  to  rely  confidently  on  the  subordi 
nate  ;  to  refrain  from  undertaking  to  regulate  his  decisions 
as  to  matters  under  his  own  eye ;  not  to  attempt  to  prescribe 
the  details  of  his  action  or  to  criticise  his  dispositions  in  the 
spirit  of  a  taskmaster.  Cordial  co-operation  in  their  work 
was  the  fruit  of  this  unique  relation  between  Sherman  and 
Grant.  While  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  part  of  Sherman's 
life  was  marked  by  any  brilliant  successes  in  the  field,  his 
reputation  with  the  army,  with  Grant,  his  immediate  supe 
rior,  and  with  Halleck,  the  General-in-Chief  at  Washington, 
steadily  increased.  He  was  seen  to  be  a  careful,  energetic 
and  trustworthy  corps  commander.  But  that  was  all.  The 
army  that  reduced  Yicksburg  had  no  great  battles  to  fight 
like  those  of  Stone  River  and  Chickamauga.  The  Vicksburg 
campaign  was  won  by  superior  strategy.  Therefore  Sherman, 
when  summoned  by  Grant  to  join  him  at  Chattanooga,  in 
October,  1863,  after  the  latter  had  been  assigned  to  the 
command  of  all  the  forces  in  the  West,  brought  with  him  no 
such  reputation  as  a  brilliant  fighter  as  Lon^street  bore  when 
he  came  to  add  his  veteran  Virginians  to  th&  army  of  Bragg. 
On  the  other  hand,  Thomas,  who  had  succeeded  Rosecrans 
in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  had  just  won 
great  distinction  by  his  extremely  able  and  courageous 
conduct  on  the  bloody  field  of  Chickamauga,  where  he 
stopped  the  rout,  rallied  the  fugitives,  and  maintained  his 
position  with  entire  and  splendid  success  against  the  des 
perate  assaults  of  the  Confederates,  flushed  with  their  victory 
over  the  right  of  the  line  led  by  Rosecrans  in  person.  There 


132    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

was  no  denying  that  Thomas  had  proved  himself  not  only 
equal  to  the  situation,  but  superior  to  it.  It  would  have 
been  only  just  to  have  entrusted  to  him  the  supreme  conduct 
of  affairs  in  that  region,  and  to  have  re-enforced  him  with  all 
the  troops  that  were  available.  But  General  Grant's  great 
success  at  Vicksburg  induced  the  government  to  give  to  him 
the  chief  command  in  the  Mississippi  Valley ;  and  he  at 
once  ordered  Sherman  to  march  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  to  the  assistance  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land.  Moreover,  Grant  determined  to  give  to  Sherman  the 
principal  part  in  the  forthcoming  battle,  by  which  he  expected 
to  raise  the  siege  of  Chattanooga.  Sherman,  with  five  divi 
sions,  was  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  and  completely  turn 
his  position  ;  when  this  should  have  been  done,  Thomas  was 
to  attack  the  centre ;  Hooker,  meanwhile,  was  to  operate 
against  his  extreme  left.  Owing,  however,  to  the  unex 
pectedly  difficult  nature  of  the  ground,  Sherman  failed  to 
make  any  impression.  To  create  a  diversion  for  him,  Grant 
ordered  Thomas's  command,  consisting  of  four  divisions,  to 
carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  enemy's  position.  In 
an  incredibly  short  time  his  troops  had  executed  this  task. 
But  they  could  not  stay  in  the  works  they  had  won.  Yet 
they  had  no  orders  to  go  forward.  They  took  the  matter 
into  their  own  hands.  Without  orders,  and  to  the  amaze 
ment  of  the  commanding  general,  they  clambered  up  the 
slopes  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  after  a  brief  and  brilliant 
fight  they  stood  victorious  on  its  summit. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  in  their  accounts  of  this  great 
battle,  as  of  Shiloh,  Grant  and  Sherman  have  allowed  their 
personal  feelings  to  color,  if  not  to  distort,  the  narrative. 
Sherman  has  stated  that  the  object  of  the  attacks  made 
upon  the  flanks  of  Bragg' s  position  by  General  Hooker  and 
himself  "  was  to  disturb  him  [Bragg]  to  such  an  extent  that 
he  would  naturally  detach  from  his  centre  as  against  us,  so 
that  Thomas's  army  could  break  through  his  centre."  And 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  133 

Grant,  in  his  Memoirs,  obviously  intends  to  convey  the 
impression  that  this  was  his  plan  of  battle,  and  that  the 
battle  was  fought  and  won  as  he  had  planned  it.  Yet  the 
despatches  and  reports  prove  conclusively  that  the  movement 
which  Grant  ordered  was  intended  merely  to  relieve  Sherman 
by  distracting  the  enemy's  attention ;  and  that  it  was  limited 
to  the  capture  of  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  Ridge. 
General  Grant's  original  orders  to  both  Sherman  and  Thomas 
show  that  he  intended  a  joint  attack  to  be  made  by  their 
united  commands,  when  Sherman  should  have  carried  the 
north  end  of  the  Ridge.  Instead  of  this,  Sherman  failed, 
owing  to  unforeseen  difficulties,  to  accomplish  his  part  of  the 
programme.  Grant,  thinking  him  hard  pressed,  ordered  an 
advance  to  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  the  Ridge,  in 
order  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  him ;  this  diversion  was  all 
that  was  intended  by  this  move.  But  the  gallantry  of  the 
troops  and  the  fortune  of  war  turned  this  incidental  operation 
into  a  brilliant  success,  which  resembled  in  its  execution  and 
consequences  the  famous  assault  on  the  heights  of  Pratzen 
which  decided  the  battle  of  Austerlitz.  The  glory  of  this 
unexpected  victory  belongs  mainly  to  the  troops  themselves, 
and  specially  to  the  men  of  Sheridan's  and  Wood's  divisions, 
and  cannot  properly  be  claimed  by  either  Grant  or  his  lieu 
tenants. 

To  Sherman,  however,  as  Grant's  favorite  officer,  was 
given  the  chief  command  in  the  West,  when,  in  the  spring 
of  1864,  the  new  Lieutenant-General  was  placed  in  control  of 
all  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  In  May  of  that  year  a 
new  career  opened  for  General  Sherman,  that  of  commander 
of  a  large  army,  and  the  famous  Atlanta  campaign  began. 
At  the  same  time,  General  Grant,  accompanying  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  under  General  Meade,  crossed  the  Rapidan 
and  advanced  against  General  Lee.  The  objects  of  both 
commanders  were  similar.  They  were  laid  down  clearly  by 
Grant  himself.  On  the  4th  of  April  he  wrote  to  Sherman : 


134    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

"  You  I  propose  to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  to  break 
it  up  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as 
far  as  you  can,  inflicting  all  the  damage  you  can  against 
their  war  resources." 1  To  the  same  effect,  substantially, 
he  wrote  to  Meade  on  the  9th :  "  Lee's  army  will  be  your 
objective  point.  Wherever  Lee  goes,  there  you  will  go 
also."  2  That  Sherman  clearly  understood  his  chief's  inten 
tion  is  certain.  He  says  in  his  Memoirs  :  "  Neither  Atlanta, 
nor  Augusta,  nor  Savannah,  was  the  objective,  but  the  '  army 
of  Jos.  Johnston'  [sic],  go  where  it  might."3 

There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  soundness  of  General 
Grant's  view.  If  the  two  armies  of  Lee  and  Johnston  could 
be  destroyed,  there  would  be  an  end  of  the  war.  If  these 
armies  should  not  be  destroyed,  the  occupation  of  the  South 
ern  cities  would  avail  little.  New  York  and  Philadelphia, 
Charleston  and  Savannah,  were  held  by  the  British  in  the 
war  of  the  Revolution ;  but  so  long  as  Washington  and  Greene 
were  at  the  head  of  armies  in  New  Jersey  and  the  Carolinas 
the  rebellion  was  not  put  down.  Grant's  idea  of  the  true 
objects  to  be  accomplished  by  himself  and  Sherman  was 
unquestionably  sound  and  clearly  stated.  It  is,  therefore, 
rather  remarkable  that  neither  he  nor  Sherman  succeeded, 
in  the  campaigns  which  they  began  in  May,  1864,  in  accom 
plishing  these  objects.  At  the  close  of  that  year  the  main 
army  of  Lee  lay  in  its  lines  in  front  of  Petersburg  and 
Richmond ;  only  that  part  of  Lee's  army  which  he  had  sent 
into  the  Shenandoah  Valley  had  been  destroyed.  This  cer 
tainly  had  been  effected  by  Sheridan.  Sherman,  also,  reached, 
occupied,  demolished,  and  left  Atlanta  without  destroying  the 
army  of  Johnston  and  Hood.  That  task  he  finally  abandoned 
to  Thomas,  who  executed  it  in  the  memorable  and  decisive 
victory  of  Nashville.  Let  us  briefly  examine  Sherman's 
movements. 

Sherman  undoubtedly  started  out  with  the  intention  of 
1  59  W.  R.,  246.  2  60  W.  B.,  828.  3  2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  26. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  135 

fighting,  and,  if  possible,  overwhelming,  Johnston's  army.  He 
had  with  him  about  a  hundred  thousand  men,  under  Thomas, 
McPherson  and  Schofield,  three  very  able  commanders.  His 
opponent,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  was,  next  to  Lee,  the 
best  general  in  the  Southern  army.  His  army  was  probably 
about  sixty  thousand  strong.  It  was  well  entrenched  at  Dalton. 
We  cannot,  of  course,  follow  this  most  interesting  campaign 
in  detail.  Sherman  lost,  at  the  very  outset,  the  best  and 
perhaps  the  only  chance  he  had  during  the  whole  summer  of 
inflicting  a  decisive  defeat  upon  his  antagonist.  Had  he  fol 
lowed  Thomas's  advice,  had  he  marched  immediately,  with  the 
great  bulk  of  his  army,  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  seized 
the  railroad  in  Johnston's  rear  at  Kesaca,  instead  of  sending 
McPherson  through  the  Gap  with  a  comparatively  small  force, 
he  might  have  ended  the  campaign  with  a  sudden  and  brilliant 
victory.  But  he  missed  this  opportunity,  and  his  wary  and 
skilful  opponent  presented  him  with  no  other.  Sherman  was 
compelled  to  turn  his  adversary's  positions  and  force  him  to 
fall  back  without  ever  being  able  to  bring  him  to  bay  in  a 
situation  where  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Union  army 
would  tell.  Sometimes,  in  his  endeavor  to  find  the  weak 
places  in  the  enemy's  positions,  Sherman  lost  more  men  than 
he  need  have  lost ;  and  it  must  be  said  that  his  assaults  at 
Kenesaw  Mountain  did  not  do  credit  to  his  tactical  judgment. 
In  his  desire  to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  he  failed  to  recog 
nize  that  his  orders  could  not  be  carried  out,  and  that  his 
losses  would  not  only  be  severe,  but  fruitless.  Nevertheless, 
on  the  whole,  he  husbanded  his  army.  He  cannot  be  charged 
with  having  adopted  the  wasteful  policy  of  "  attrition,"  which 
Grant  tried  during  May  and  June,  1864,  and  which  cost  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  so  many  thousands  of  valuable  lives, 
with  such  meagre  results.  And  in  point  of  caring  for  stores, 
supplies,  ammunition,  and  subsistence,  Sherman  was  a  marvel 
lous  provider.  No  one  could  march  a  large  army  through  an 
unproductive  country  more  successfully  than  he.  But  so  long 


136     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

as  Johnston  remained  in  command  of  the  Confederate  army, 
Sherman  could  not  get  at  it.  When  Johnston  was  superseded 
by  Hood,  Sherman  had  indeed  to  repel  the  latter's  fierce  at 
tacks  upon  him,  but,  from  one  cause  or  another,  he  coidd  not 
or  did  not  force  Hood  to  a  general  battle ;  and  when  he  had,  by 
another  turning  movement,  caused  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta, 
the  Confederate  army  was  still  intact  and  still  formidable. 

General  Sherman  thus  found  himself  in  a  very  difficult 
position.  He  had,  it  is  true,  possession  of  Atlanta,  which  the 
public  undoubtedly  considered  to  have  been  the  objective 
point  of  his  campaign ;  certainly  its  capture  effected  a  great 
change  in  the  minds  of  the  Northern  people  in  respect  to 
their  expectation  of  final  success  in  the  war.  But  Sherman 
knew  that  the  capture  of  Atlanta  of  itself  signified  little.  He 
knew  perfectly  well  that  he  had  not  set  out  from  Dalton  with 
the  object  of  getting  possession  of  Atlanta,  but  with  the  ob 
ject  of  destroying  the  main  Confederate  army  in  the  West ; 
and  he  knew,  also,  that  he  had  done  practically  nothing  towards 
carrying  out  his  intention.  He  recognized,  in  fact,  that  he 
was  in  most  respects  far  less  favorably  situated  for  destroying 
that  army  than  he  had  been  on  the  1st  of  May ;  for,  difficult 
as  he  had  found  it  to  be  to  obtain  supplies  in  his  march  to 
Atlanta,  —  drawing  them,  as  he  was  obliged  to  do,  from 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga,  —  he  had  yet  successfully  accom 
plished  this  task ;  he  had  carried  his  army  as  far  south  as 
Atlanta,  and  he  had  had  a  chance  to  strike  the  Confederate 
army  in  his  front  all  the  time.  But  now  he  knew  he  must 
stop.  His  line  of  communication  was  already  dangerously 
long.  He  could  not  follow  up  Hood's  army  into  the  interior 
of  the  country,  relying  on  his  existing  arrangements,  and 
transport  with  him  all  the  stores,  equipment,  and  ammunition 
that,  in  a  serious  pursuit  of  such  a  powerful  force  as  the 
Confederate  army  was,  are  necessarily  required.  Moreover, 
he  had  by  no  means  as  large  an  army  as  that  with  which  he 
had  moved  upon  Dalton  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  137 

Nearly  one  third  of  his  men  and  many  of  his  best  officers  had 
to  be  employed  in  guarding  the  railroad,  and  in  garrisoning 
the  subsidiary  depots  of  subsistence  and  ammunition.  Dimin 
ished,  then,  as  his  active  army  was  to  two  thirds  its  original 
size,  and  arrived  as  he  was  at  the  end  of  his  line  of  supply, 
what  was  there  for  him  to  do  ? 

For  nearly  a  month  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  which  took 
place  on  the  2d  of  September,  1864,  the  situation  in  Georgia 
was  substantially  as  described  above.  But  it  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  suppose  that  General  Sherman  felt  himself 
to  be  at  the  end  of  his  resources.  He  applied  to  the  problem 
before  him  a  mind  exceptionally  active  and  ingenious,  and  full 
of  enterprise  and  industry.  He  was  constantly  devising  new 
plans  by  which  the  prestige  which  the  Federal  army  had  won 
in  capturing  Atlanta  could  be  utilized,  and  by  which,  in  some 
way,  by  combinations  with  other  commands  which  were  to 
operate  either  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  or  from  the  Atlantic 
Ocean,  the  initiative,  with  all  its  inestimable  advantages,  could 
be  maintained.  To  read  his  correspondence  at  this  period 
with  Grant  and  Halleck  is  most  interesting,  albeit  at  times 
rather  puzzling.  He  propopes  plan  after  plan ;  and  some  of 
his  suggestions  strike  the  reader  as  wild  enough.  But  they 
were  merely  suggestions ;  they  did  not  in  any  way  commit 
him  to  action.  It  is  true  that  no  man  was  ever  more  fertile 
in  expedients  than  General  Sherman  ;  but  then  no  man  was 
ever  more  particular  than  he  in  arranging  the  details  of  a 
military  operation.  No  general  ever  lived  who  realized  more 
fully  than  General  Sherman  the  importance  of  knowing  just 
where  every  pound  of  beef  and  every  ounce  of  ammunition 
was  to  come  from ;  and  it  is  quite  safe  to  say  that  he  had  not 
the  slightest  intention  of  changing  his  base  until  he  had  set 
tled  all  these  and  all  other  important  details  to  his  own  com 
plete  satisfaction.  Therefore,  when  we  find  him  speaking  of 
a  movement  to  be  made  from  Mobile,  utilizing  the  Alabama 
and  Chattahoochee  rivers  as  lines  of  supply,  or  the  capture  of 


138    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Savannah  by  troops  to  be  sent  by  Grant  from  Virginia,  and 
then  the  establishment  of  a  new  base  on  the  upper  part  of 
the  Savannah  Kiver,  we  may  admire  the  fertility  of  the  mind 
which  could  find  such  ways  of  escape  from  an  enforced  inac 
tion,  and  at  the  same  time  feel  entire  confidence  that,  before 
any  important  step  should  be  taken,  matters  would  be  ar 
ranged  with  the  utmost  care  and  precaution,  so  far,  at  any 
rate,  as  General  Sherman's  own  movements  were  concerned. 

Nothing,  however,  came  of  these  suggestions,  for  the  very 
good  reason  that,  considerably  to  Sherman's  surprise,  General 
Hood  was  the  one  to  take  the  initiative.  His  cavalry,  under 
two  able  leaders,  Forrest  and  Wheeler,  had  during  Septem 
ber  been  threatening  the  railroad  from  Atlanta  to  Chatta 
nooga,  and  also  the  railroads  running  south  from  Nashville, 
and  in  some  places  cutting  the  line  for  a  time ;  but  in  the 
last  week  of  September  Hood's  main  army  broke  camp  and 
marched  north.  The  most  famous  episode  of  this  movement 
of  Hood's  was  the  resolute  and  successful  defence  made  on 
October  5  by  General  Corse  of  our  post  at  Allatoona  Pass, 
—  one  of  the  most  memorable  occurrences  in  the  whole  war. 
But  we  cannot  go  into  details  here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that 
Hood  struck  the  railroad  in  several  places,  broke  up  the  com 
munication  for  a  time,  but  finally  drew  off  his  army,  towards 
the  end  of  October,  to  Gadsden,  in  the  northern  part  of 
Alabama,  without  a  serious  engagement.  Sherman  then  re 
established  the  railroad  service  to  Atlanta,  and,  concentrating 
the  greater  part  of  his  army  at  Gaylesville,  Alabama,  waited 
to  see  what  his  adversary,  whose  army  was  lying  not  many 
miles  to  the  southwest,  would  do  next. 

Sherman  had  been  convinced  by  this  raid  of  Hood's  that 
Atlanta  was  not  permanently  tenable,  so  long,  at  least,  as  the 
Confederate  Army  of  the  West  remained  substantially  intact, 
nor  was  it  worth  the  cost  of  holding  it.  What  was  the  good 
of  remaining  at  such  an  advanced  post  as  Atlanta,  where 
every  mile  of  the  only  railway  by  which  the  army  could  be 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  139 

supplied  offered  a  temptation  to  an  enemy's  army  substantially 
in  good  order  and  condition  ?  For,  unless  he  should  cut  loose 
from  his  base  at  Chattanooga  and  march  south,  giving  up  his 
hold  on  the  railroad,  or  else  should  retreat  to  Tennessee, 
Sherman  must  remain  at  Atlanta,  since  the  railroad  communi 
cation  could  be  extended  no  further.  A  large  Federal  Army 
stalemated  at  Atlanta,  if  we  may  use  an  expression  borrowed 
from  the  chess-board,  and  whose  long  line  of  communications 
temptingly  invited  attack,  was  certainly  a  lame  and  impotent 
conclusion  of  the  campaign  so  bravely  and  hopefully  begun 
on  the  4th  of  May.  Some  issue  must  be  found  from  this 
unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs. 

The  natural  thing  to  do,  and  the  thing  which  at  this  time 
General  Sherman  undoubtedly  wanted  to  do,  was  to  resume 
the  original  plan  ;  that  is,  to  make  the  destruction  of  the 
Confederate  Army  the  sole  object  of  the  campaign.  There  is 
abundant  evidence  that  when  Hood's  movements  against  the 
railroad  forced  Sherman  not  only  to  send  Thomas  to  Chatta 
nooga,  but  to  go  north  himself  with  the  bulk  of  the  army, 
leaving  only  one  corps  at  Atlanta,  he  greatly  desired  to  bring 
Hood  to  battle.  But  Hood  was  too  wary  to  accommodate 
him.  He  saw  perfectly  the  great  advantage  to  the  Confed 
erates  in  prolonging  the  existing  state  of  things  ;  to  his  mind 
nothing  could  well  be  more  gratifying  than  to  see  the  main 
Federal  Army  of  the  West  flying  from  point  to  point  on  the 
Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  railroad,  —  here  repairing  a  burnt 
trestle,  there  rebuilding  a  blockhouse,  here,  again,  relaying  a 
few  miles  of  railroad  track ;  and  all  this  time  suffering  occa 
sional  panics  whenever  Forrest's  cavalry  approached  danger 
ously  near  the  railroads  south  of  Nashville.  Hood  kept  well 
to  the  west  of  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  railroad ;  and  he 
knew  that  he  could,  in  case  Sherman  should  move  against 
him,  lead  him  a  chase  through  a  difficult  country,  across  con 
siderable  rivers,  and  put  him  to  great  trouble  to  obtain  his 
subsistence  and  forage.  For,  in  moving  against  Hood's  army 


140    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

with  the  intention  of  engaging  and  in  the  hope  of  destroying 
it,  Sherman  could  not  afford  to  use  the  light  equipment  which 
sufficed  for  the  unopposed  march  to  the  sea  ;  nor  would  it  do 
to  scatter  his  army  in  order  to  obtain  provisions,  as  he  then 
so  freely  did.  If  he  was  to  make  Hood's  army  his  objective, 
he  must  arrange  his  dispositions  accordingly  ;  he  must  carry 
with  him  abundance  of  artillery,  of  ammunition,  of  supplies  of 
all  sorts,  and  be  prepared  to  fight  battles,  This  Hood  calcu 
lated  Sherman  did  not  wish  to  do,  situated  as  he  then  was. 

And  in  this  calculation  Hood  was  quite  right.  The  Federal 
commander  was  indeed  prepared,  and  in  fact  anxious,  to  move 
against  Hood,  if  Hood  should  be  so  unwise  as  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  Kiver,  on  his  northward  march,  within  a  short 
distance  of  Gaylesville,  where  Sherman's  army  lay.  Not  to 
operate  against  an  army  which  should  thus  recklessly  expose 
its  communications  would  indeed  be  unpardonable.  But 
Hood  had  no  intention  of  committing  such  a  blunder  as  this. 
He  moved  westward  as  far  as  Florence,  Alabama,  some  hun 
dred  and  fifty  miles  west  of  Chattanooga,  and  there  concen 
trated  his  troops  and  supplies.  Here  he  was  011  the  1st  of 
November.  Here  he  and  Beauregard,  who  was  advising  with 
him,  had  fixed  their  base  of  operations  for  their  proposed  ad 
vance  on  Nashville.  Now,  for  Sherman  to  march  across  the 
country  from  Gaylesville  towards  Florence  with  a  large  army 
was  not  only  not  an  easy  task,  but  it  involved  the  abandon 
ment —  so  Sherman  thought — of  Atlanta,  and  an  entire 
rearrangement  of  bases  and  lines  of  supply.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  retire  the  army  to  Tennessee,  and  there  repel  an 
invasion  of  the  enemy,  seemed  like  a  confession  of  defeat,  or 
at  least  of  having  entirely  failed  to  carry  out  the  true  objects 
of  the  spring  campaign,  —  a  thing,  as  Sherman  thought,  cer 
tainly  to  be  avoided,  if  possible.  There  remained  another 
course,  —  and  it  was  one  which  fascinated  the  Federal  com 
mander  alike  by  its  originality  and  its  startling  audacity,  — 
and  that  was  to  re-enforce  Thomas  so  as  to  make  him  equal 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  141 

to  the  task  of  repelling  the  invasion,  if  one  should  be  under 
taken,  while  the  main  army,  under  Sherman  in  person,  should 
march  across  the  State  of  Georgia  to  Savannah  and  the  sea. 

Bearing  now  in  mind  the  great  attraction  which  this  pro 
ject  possessed  for  General  Sherman,  as  appears  from  his 
correspondence  with  the  Washington  authorities,  we  must 
not  be  surprised  to  find  in  Sherman's  letters  to  Grant  and 
Halleck  evidences  of  an  unwillingness  on  his  part  to  look  the 
matter  in  all  its  bearings  squarely  in  the  face,  and  of  a  strong 
desire  to  dwell  only  on  the  more  favorable  conditions  of  the 
problem,  and  especially  to  present  the  scheme  so  that  only  its 
most  attractive  features  should  be  displayed.  The  idea  of  a 
march  to  the  sea,  which  should  demonstrate  the  hollowness 
of  the  Confederacy,  which  should  amaze  and  delight  the 
world  by  its  novelty  and  its  audacity,  and  which  should  yet 
involve  no  risk  to  the  60,000  picked  veterans  who  were 
to  perform  the  feat,  took  manifest  possession  of  General 
Sherman's  mind.  But  Grant,  whose  imagination,  if  he 
ever  had  any,  was  not  excited  beyond  bounds  even  by  this 
brilliant  proposal  of  his  favorite  lieutenant,  urged,  in  a  let 
ter  dated  November  1,  upon  Sherman  that  he  had  better 
"  entirely  settle  "  Hood  before  starting  on  his  proposed  cam 
paign  ;  that,  "  with  Hood's  army  destroyed,"  he  could  go 
where  he  pleased  "  with  impunity. 'v  "  If  you  can  see  the 
chance  for  destroying  Hood's  army,  attend  to  that  first,  and 
make  your  other  move  secondary."  l 

This  was  unquestionably  sound  advice ;  the  destruction  of 
Hood's  army  would,  as  Grant  said,  make  everything  possible 
in  the  West.  The  Confederacy  had  no  other  army  but  Lee's 
east  of  the  Mississippi ;  and  if  Hood's  army  should  be  broken 
up,  the  Gulf  and  the  Southern  Atlantic  States  must  fall 
before  the  forces  of  the  Union.  But  Sherman  was  not  to  be 
dissuaded  from  his  project.  He  convinced  himself,  and  so 
represented  to  Grant  and  Halleck,  that  Thomas  was  not  only 
1  79  W.  R.,  576. 


142    CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

able  to  "  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  "  River,  but  would 
"  very  shortly  be  able  to  assume  the  offensive,"  l  —  even  talk 
ing  about  ordering  him  to  move  on  Selma,  Alabama,  before 
long.2  How  far  these  representations  were  from  giving  Grant 
a  correct  notion  of  the  actual  state  of  things  appears  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  not  until  November  30,  the  day  of  the 
battle  of  Franklin,  that  Thomas  could  be  said  to  have  had 
at  Nashville  a  force  large  enough  to  be  called  an  army.  On 
that  day,  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  of  12,000  men 
arrived  there  from  Missouri ;  and  on  the  next  day,  Schofield, 
whose  little  army  had  been  obliged  to  fall  back  from  the 
Tennessee  River  to  Franklin,  where  it  had  desperately  and 
successfully  defended  itself  against  the  determined  onslaught 
of  Hood,  made  good  his  retreat  to  the  same  place. 

General  Sherman  succeeded,  however,  in  convincing  Grant, 
who  wrote  to  him  on  November  2  :  "  With  the  force  you 
have  left  with  Thomas,  he  must  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood 
and  destroy  him.  ...  I  say,  then,  go  as  you  propose." 3 
Sherman  thus  obtained  the  assent  of  his  superior  to  his  start 
ling  project  of  leaving  to  Thomas  the  accomplishment  of  the 
task  which  had  originally  been  assigned  to  Sherman  himself, 
—  the  destruction  of  the  main  Confederate  army  in  the  West. 
Grant  at  last  yielded  to  Sherman's  persistent  representations, 
and  consented  to  assume  that  this  task,  for  which  in  the 
spring  the  whole  Federal  army  of  the  West  was  deemed  no 
more  than  adequate,  might  in  the  fall  safely  be  entrusted  to 
a  congeries  of  commands,  then  widely  separated,  soon,  to  be 
sure,  to  be  brought  together,  but  which  could  not  be  properly 
called  an  army  at  all  until  its  scattered  parts  should  be  as 
sembled.  And  this,  too,  when  there  was  no  pretence  of  any 
exigency  demanding  the  presence  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
Federal  Army  of  the  West  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  In  view 
of  such  a  decision  as  this,  it  is  impossible  not  to  say  that 
those  who  made  it  trusted  largely  in  their  good  luck.  To 
1  79  W.  K,  660.  2  16.,  740.  3  Ib.,  594, 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  143 

transport  the  greater  part  of  the  Federal  Army  of  the  West 
far  from  the  theatre  of  war,  while  the  Confederate  army 
in  that  region  was  still  a  large,  well-organized,  well-com 
manded  and  formidable  force,  was  certainly  a  most  amazing 
step  to  take.  It  turned  out  all  right,  indeed ;  but  no  one  can 
read  the  story  of  Hood's  invasion  of  Tennessee  in  November 
and  December,  1864,  without  at  times  holding  his  breath. 
It  seems  almost  as  if  the  goddess  known  as  the  Fortune  of 
War  from  time  to  time  visibly  interfered  to  hinder  and  de 
range  the  operations  of  Hood  and  his  lieutenants,  and  to 
further  the  combinations  and  movements  of  Thomas  and  his 
subordinates.  No  one  familiar  with  this  campaign  can  hon 
estly  say  that  he  thinks  that  such  luck  could  fairly  have  been 
counted  on  by  Grant  and  Sherman.  It  is  a  clear  case  where 
the  maxim  Exitus  act  a  probat  is  applicable,  if  that  maxim 
ever  is  applicable. 

For  his  great  march,  however,  Sherman,  his  mind  now 
relieved  by  Grant's  tardy  assent  from  all  anxiety  about  the 
situation  in  Tennessee,  made  his  most  careful  preparations. 
Sixty-two  thousand  of  the  best  troops  in  the  army,  well 
organized,  well  officered,  every  detail  of  equipment  most  care 
fully  attended  to,  full  of  ardor,  elation,  enterprise  and  cour 
age,  began  on  the  15th  of  November,  1864,  one  of  the  most 
unexpected  and  startling  military  movements  on  record. 
They  met  no  foe  until  they  reached  the  sea.  The  North  was 
electrified,  the  South  dismayed.  And  while  Sherman's  army 
was  besieging  Savannah,  Hood  had  made  his  invasion ;  had 
forced  back  Schofield  from  the  Tennessee  to  the  Harpeth ; 
had  furiously  assaulted  him  at  Franklin,  only  to  be  repelled 
with  unheard-of  loss ;  had  pursued  him  to  Nashville ;  had 
then  sat  down  before  that  city  as  if  on  purpose  to  give 
the  cool  and  resolute  commander  of  the  Union  forces  all  the 
time  he  needed  to  equip  and  consolidate  his  heterogeneous 
command ;  and  had,  on  December  15,  succumbed  utterly 
to  the  well-conceived  and  well-delivered  blows  of  General 


144    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Thomas.  The  battle  of  Nashville,  unlike  nearly  all  our  bat 
tles,  well-nigh  destroyed  the  beaten  army. 

Hence,  when  Savannah  surrendered,  the  country  was 
already  in  a  state  of  exultation  at  Thomas's  glorious  and 
decisive  victory;  and  men's  minds,  as  always  in  such  cases, 
welcomed  with  almost  frantic  excitement  the  novel  sight 
of  the  other  great  Western  general  now  arriving  on  the 
Atlantic  coast.  Savannah  was  presented  by  the  victor  as  a 
Christmas  present  to  President  Lincoln  ;  and,  in  view  of 
the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  West  by 
Thomas,  and  the  addition  of  this  splendid  Western  army 
under  Sherman  to  the  Union  forces  east  of  the  Alleghanies, 
it  was  evident  to  the  dullest  understanding  that  the  end  was 
rapidly  drawing  nigh.  And  in  truth  the  "  March  to  the 
Sea,"  as  Sherman  had  calculated  it  would  do,  absorbed 
public  attention  to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else.  Its 
novelty  and  audacity,  the  ease  with  which  it  had  been  con 
ducted,  the  demonstration  which  it  afforded  of  the  superior 
power  of  the  North,  filled  the  public  mind  with  exultation 
and  hope.  The  imagination  of  the  people  was  captivated. 
Sherman  became  the  hero  of  the  day. 

Yet  the  propriety  of  the  withdrawal  of  this  army  from  the 
seat  of  war  in  the  West  can  be  defended  only  by  the  event. 
To  have  imperilled  the  hold  of  the  Union  government  on  the 
States  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky ;  to  have  exposed  all  the 
posts  from  Chattanooga  to  Nashville,  to  say  nothing  of 
Louisville,  to  assault  and  capture  by  the  Confederate  army 
under  Hood ;  in  short,  to  have  left  so  much  to  chance  when 
everything  might  so  easily  have  been  made  secure,  was  to 
count  unwarrantably  upon  the  favors  of  fortune.  No  margin 
was  left  for  accidents.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  50,000 
men  would  not  have  served  Sherman's  purpose  as  well 
as  62,000  men ;  and  assuredly  12,000  good  troops  would 
have  added  greatly  to  Thomas's  scanty  resources,  and  con 
tributed  largely  to  insure  the  destruction  of  Hood's  army, 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  145 

which  alone  could  give  to  the  strategy  which  sanctioned 
the  withdrawal  of  so  many  troops  to  the  Atlantic  coast  the 
possibility  of  leading  to  useful  results.  It  is  true  that 
Thomas's  victory  practically  attained  this  end.  In  the 
march  of  his  army  through  the  Carolinas,  Sherman  had  to 
encounter  only  the  remnants  of  Hood's  defeated  and  dis 
couraged  troops  added  to  the  insignificent  garrisons  of  the 
Atlantic  cities ;  and  with  these  forces  he  was  abundantly  able 
to  cope.  But  Thomas's  success  was  really  unprecedented. 
It  could  not  fairly  have  been  anticipated.  And  it  would 
have  been  an  entirely  different  matter  for  Sherman  if  Hood's 
whole  army,  or  the  greater  part  of  it,  had  confronted  him  at 
the  marshes  and  rivers  over  which  his  toilsome  and  difficult 
route  lay. 

Sherman  used  his  advantages  with  the  greatest  skill.  His 
hold  on  his  army  was  perfect ;  there  was  nothing  that  the 
men  would  not  do  at  his  bidding.  The  labors  of  the  march 
northward  from  Savannah  were  enormous,  the  weather  was 
terrible,  but  everything  was  cheerfully  borne.  Sherman's 
masterly  manoeuvres  deceived  and  confused  his  adversaries. 
He  aimed  to  reach  a  new  base,  where  he  should  find  sup 
plies  and  re-enforcements,  at  Goldsboro',  North  Carolina; 
he  recalled  the  fate  of  Cornwallis,  who,  in  the  interior 
of  North  Carolina,  was  obliged  to  give  battle  to  Greene, 
and,  although  remaining  master  of  the  field,  was  forced  by 

his  losses  in  men  and  ammunition  to  retire  to  Wilmington. 

& 

Sherman  turned  off  at  Columbia  to  the  northeast,  though 
feigning  with  a  part  of  his  force  to  keep  on  moving  north. 
Hence  the  enemy  were  unable  to  strike  him  until  he  was 
close  upon  Goldsboro'.  At  Averysboro'  he  had  a  brisk  and 
successful  engagement ;  at  Bentonville  the  action  was  more 
severe,  but  we  held  our  own  at  the  end  of  the  day.  Once 
arrived  at  Goldsboro'  the  task  was  easy.  Here  Schofield, 
with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  joined  the  army;  and  from 
Goldsboro'  as  a  new  base  the  march  was  resumed,  until  on 


146    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

April  14,  1865,  a  flag  of  truce  was  received  from  General 
Johnston,  opening  negotiations  for  the  surrender  of  the 
Confederate  forces. 

It  would  not  be  right  to  close  a  review  of  General 
Sherman's  character  and  services  without  referring  to  his 
of  ten  -  announced  policy  of  devastation.  It  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  a  desire  to  inflict  punishment  on  the  people  of 
the  South  for  their  course  in  breaking  up  the  Union  was 
a  strong  element  in  favor  of  his  project  of  marching  across 
the  country.  Thus,  on  October  9,  1864,  he  telegraphs  to 
General  Grant :  - 

"  Until  we  can  repopulate  Georgia,  it  is  useless  to  occupy 
it ;  but  the  utter  destruction  of  its  roads,  houses,  and  people 
will  cripple  their  military  resources.  ...  I  can  make  the 
march,  and  make  Georgia  howl !  "  1 

October  17,  to  General  Schofield  :  —  "I  will  make  the 
interior  of  Georgia  feel  the  weight  of  war."  2 

October  19,  to  General  Beckwith  :  - 

"  I  propose  to  abandon  Atlanta  and  the  railroad  back  to 
Chattanooga,  and  sally  forth  to  ruin  Georgia  and  bring  up 
on  the  seashore."  3 

So,  when  he  arrived  before  Savannah,  he  wrote  to  the 
Confederate  General  Ilardee  as  follows  :  — 

"  Should  I  be  forced  to  resort  to  assault,  and  the  slower 
and  surer  process  of  starvation,  I  shall  then  feel  justified  in 
resorting  to  the  harshest  measures,  and  shall  make  little  effort 
to  restrain  my  army,  —  burning  to  avenge  a  national  wrong 
they  attach  to  Savannah  and  other  large  cities  which  have 
been  so  prominent  in  dragging  our  country  into  civil  war."  4 

To  General  Grant,  December  18  :  — 

"With  Savannah   in  our  possession  at  some  future  time, 

if  not  now,  we  can  punish  South  Carolina  as  she  deserves, 

and  as  thousands  of  people  in  Georgia  hoped  we  would  do. 

I  do  sincerely  believe  that  the  whole  United   States,  North 

1  79  W.  R.,  102.          2  Ib.>  335.          3  Ib.,  359.          4  92  W-  R.,  737. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  147 

and  South,  would  rejoice  to  have  this  army  turned  loose  on 
South  Carolina  to  devastate  that  State,  in  the  manner  we 
have  done  in  Georgia,  and  it  would  have  a  direct  and  imme 
diate  bearing  on  your  campaign  in  Virginia."  l 

To  General  Halleck,  December  24  :  — 

"  I  attach  more  importance  to  these  deep  incisions  into  the 
enemy's  country,  because  this  war  differs  from  European  wars 
in  this  particular.  We  are  not  only  fighting  hostile  armies, 
but  a  hostile  people,  and  must  make  old  and  young,  rich  and 
poor,  feel  the  hard  hand  of  war,  as  well  as  their  organized 
armies.  I  know  that  this  recent  movement  of  mine  through 
Georgia  has  had  a  wonderful  effect  in  this  respect.  .  .  . 
The  truth  is  the  whole  army  is  burning  with  an  insatiable 
desire  to  wreak  vengeance  upon  South  Carolina.  I  almost 
tremble  at  her  fate,  but  feel  that  she  deserves  all  that  seems 
in  store  for  her.  ...  I  look  upon  Columbia  as  quite  as  bad 
as  Charleston,  and  I  doubt  if  we  shall  spare  the  public  build 
ings  there,  as  we  did  at  Milledgeville."  2 

From  the  above  citations,  —  and  they  might  easily  be 
multiplied,  —  it  seems  clear  that  General  Sherman  conceived 
that  he  was  justified  in  causing  loss  and  damage  to  private  and 
public  property  as  a  punishment  for  political  conduct.  It  can 
hardly  be  pretended  that  the  devastation  spoken  of  is  that 
which  follows  naturally  and  inevitably  in  the  wake  of  an 
invading  army.  If  that  is  all  that  is  referred  to,  then  the 
language  employed  is  a  great  deal  too  strong  to  convey  the 
meaning  of  the  writer.  It  is  true  that  the  orders  issued  to 
his  army  for  its  conduct  on  the  great  march  are,  though  by 
no  means  strict,  yet  not  in  principle  objectionable.  Foraging 
was  to  be  confined  to  regular  foraging  parties  ;  soldiers  were 
not  to  enter  houses  or  commit  any  trespass.  Corps  com 
manders  only  could  destroy  mills,  houses,  and  like  property ; 
and  then  solely  in  districts  and  neighborhoods  where  the 
inhabitants  had  burnt  bridges,  obstructed  roads,  or  otherwise 
1  92  W.  R.,  743.  2  I6.,799. 


148    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

manifested  hostility.  It  may  well  be  believed,  certainly,  that 
there  was  much  greater  license  exercised  than  was  warranted 
by  the  terms  of  these  orders.  But  granting  that  this  was  so, 
it  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  unavoidable  circumstance 
that  the  army  had  to  live  off  the  country ;  and  acts  of  this 
nature -do  not  tend  to  settle  the  question  whether  devasta 
tion  for  the  sake  of  punishment  was  ordered  or  allowed  by 
General  Sherman.  It  seems  to  us  that  General  Sherman, 
in  the  passages  cited  above,  did  enunciate  in  distinct  terms 
the  principle  that  the  infliction  of  such  punishment  by  a 
general  commanding  an  army  is  within  his  rights ;  that  is, 
that  it  is  sanctioned  by  the  laws  of  modern  civilized  warfare. 
If  we  are  correct  in  attributing  this  position  to  Sherman, 
we  cannot  lose  the  opportunity  of  pointing  out  that  the 
authorities  are  against  him.  Military  operations  are  not 
carried  on  for  the  purpose  of  inflicting  punishment  for  politi 
cal  offences.  The  desolation  and  destruction  inseparable  from 
them  are  not  the  result  of  acts  done  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
ducing  suffering,  but  are  to  be  considered  as  merely  incidental 
to  the  military  movements  ;  and  the  object  of  military  move 
ments  is  to  overcome  armed  resistance.  The  amount  of  such 
suffering  cannot  be  unnecessarily  increased  without  a  violation 
of  the  humane  rules  of  modern  war.  The  true  principle  is 
stated  with  sufficient  accuracy  in  Sherman's  orders  at  the 
commencement  of  his  great  march.  If  he  transgressed  these 
rules,  as  it  would  appear  from  his  own  letters  and  despatches 
that  he  did,  he  cannot  be  defended.  Whatever  the  Georgians 
and  South  Carolinians  suffered  by  having  to  supply  provi 
sions,  forage,  fuel,  horses,  or  military  stores  of  any  kind  to 
Sherman's  invading  army,  whether  more  or  less  in  amount, 
was  a  mere  incident  of  a  state  of  war,  for  which  neither  Gen 
eral  Sherman  nor  his  army  was  to  blame.  But  if  Sherman 
purposely  destroyed,  or  connived  at  the  destruction  of,  property 
which  was  not  needed  for  the  supply  of  his  army  or  of  the 
enemy's  army,  he  violated  one  of  the  fundamental  canons  of 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  149 

modern  warfare;  and  just  so  far  as  he  directed  or  permitted 
this,  he  conducted  war  on  obsolete  and  barbarous  principles. 
As  to  the  facts,  they  are  not  perfectly  easy  to  ascertain.  In 
his  official  report,  Sherman  estimated  the  entire  damage  done 
to  the  State  of  Georgia  at  $100,000,000,  of  which  only 
$20,000,000  "  inured  to  our  advantage,"  the  remainder  being 
"  simple  waste  and  destruction." l  Still,  much  of  this  may 
have  been  inevitable.  We  have  no  space  here  to  review  the 
evidence,  and  must  content  ourselves  with  stating  the  rule  as 
we  understand  it. 

We  cannot,  in  this  connection,  avoid  remarking  that  Gen 
eral  Sherman  was  proved  by  the  event  to  have  been  entirely 
mistaken  in  thinking  that  "  to  devastate  "  the  State  of  South 
Carolina  "  would  have  a  direct  and  immediate  bearing  on  " 
Grant's  "  campaign  in  Virginia."  This  is  clearly  a  case  of 
seeking  far  afield  for  a  reason  for  a  thing  which  a  man  has 
made  up  his  mind  to  do.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  General  Lee 
remained  in  his  lines  at  Petersburg  and  Richmond  until 
the  season  was  sufficiently  advanced  for  Grant  to  commence 
operations ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  battle  of  Five  Forks 
had  been  lost  that  Lee  evacuated  his  works  and  began  his 
disastrous  retreat. 

Much  the  same  criticism  may  be  passed  upon  General 
Sherman's  statement,  above  cited,  of  the  importance  which  he 
attached  to  "  these  deep  incisions  into  the  enemy's  country," 
namely,  that  we  were  not  only  fighting  hostile  armies,  but 
a  hostile  people,  and  must  make  everybody  "  feel  the  hard 
hand  of  war."  There  is  a  sort  of  ad  captandum  semblance 
of  logic  about  this  remark  that  no  doubt  made  it  popular  at 
the  time.  But  surely  it  needs  but  a  moment's  reflection  to 
see  that  nothing  is  gained  by  adding  anything  to  the  task  of 
the  soldier,  which  is  to  defeat  and  destroy  the  hostile  force. 
To  infuriate  needlessly  a  population  already  known  to  be 
unfriendly  assuredly  cannot  make  the  soldier's  task  easier ;  on 
1  92  W.  B.,  13. 


150     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

the  contrary,  it  must  rather  multiply  his  difficulties,  and  tend 
to  render  success  less  certain,  besides  making  the  population, 
when  conquered,  more  hostile  than  ever  before.  There  is,  it 
must  be  confessed,  in  many  of  these  utterances  of  General 
Sherman's  a  good  deal  that  will  not  stand  the  test  of  careful 
examination.  They  show  that  Sherman's  mind  was  not  occu 
pied  solely  in  the  work  which  alone  it  was  his  duty  to  attend 
to,  that  is,  in  the  endeavor  to  solve  the  military  problem 
before  him  ;  in  other  words,  that  he  concerned  himself  more 
or  less  all  the  time  with  the  popular  and  political  questions 
connected  with  the  war,  —  in  this  respect  presenting  a  great 
contrast  to  Grant  and  Thomas.  Evidences  of  this  are  to  be 
found  everywhere  in  his  despatches  and  correspondence,  — 
notably  in  his  letters  to  General  Hood  and  to  the  mayor 
and  city  government  of  Atlanta,  in  September,  1864,1  and  in 
the  Memorandum  or  Basis  of  Agreement  between  him  and 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  in  April,  1865.2  At  the  same 
time,  Sherman  never  for  an  instant  pretermitted  his  active 
attention  to  the  welfare  of  his  army,  or  his  study  of  the  mili 
tary  problems  which  his  masterly  manoeuvres  were  constantly 
presenting  for  his  solution. 

In  truth,  it  is  far  from  easy  to  draw  the  portrait  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman.  Here  is  an  officer  of  high  rank,  who  began 
his  service  in  the  war  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run ;  who 
received  the  surrender  of  the  last  of  the  Confederate  gen 
erals  ;  who  was  at  the  head  of  one  of  the  finest  armies  in 
the  country,  but  who  never  commanded  in  a  great,  still  less 
a  decisive,  battle;  whose  most  famous  exploit  consisted  in 
marching  a  large  and  well-appointed  force  almost  unopposed 
through  the  enemy's  country ;  and  whose  reputation  never 
theless  stands  as  high,  at  least  with  the  Northern  public,  as 
that  of  any  of  the  generals  of  the  Union.  Such  a  sketch 
as  the  above  certainly  leaves  much  to  be  accounted  for.  Yet 
it  is  true  so  far  as  it  goes.  What  is  not  stated  in  it  con- 

1  78  W.  R.,  416,  418.  2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  356. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  151 

tains,  however,  the  solution  of  the  apparent  paradox.  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  military  abilities,  though  not  exhibited  con 
spicuously  on  the  battlefield,  were  confessedly  of  a  very  high 
order.  His  Atlanta  campaign  proves  this  by  universal 
admission.  If  we  are  surprised  at  his  leaving  to  Thomas  the 
task  of  resisting,  and,  if  possible,  destroying,  the  principal 
Confederate  army  in  the  West ;  if  we  fail,  as  we  fairly  may, 
to  see  in  what  respect  Sherman  gained  anything  in  not  fol 
lowing  Grant's  advice  to  "  entirely  settle "  Hood  before 
"  starting "  on  his  "  proposed  campaign,"  we  must  at  the 
same  time  admit  that  no  operation  in  the  war  was  more  skil 
fully  carried  out  than  that  "  proposed  campaign."  It  accom 
plished  all  that  Sherman  had  expected  or  hoped  from  it.  It 
won  not  only  the  assent,  but  the  admiration,  of  Grant  and 
Lincoln.  It  captivated  the  popular  mind.  Closing  as  it  did 
with  the  surrender  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  it  virtu 
ally  ended  the  war.  And  as  Thomas's  skill,  endurance,  cour 
age,  and  good  fortune  enabled  him  to  win  the  great  victory 
which  was  the  indispensable  condition  of  success  for  the  whole 
undertaking,  the  world  has  naturally  not  been  over-curious 
to  search  for  defects  in  arrangements  which  yielded  such 
wonderfully  complete  results. 

It  is  nevertheless  to  be  remembered  that  if  Sherman  had 
followed  up  Hood,  as  the  Washington  authorities  originally 
intended  and  desired  him  to  do,  before  marching  to  the  sea, 
the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  army  could  hardly  have 
failed  to  be  more  thorough  than  it  was.  The  Southwestern 
and  South  Atlantic  States  would  have  been  almost  absolutely 
without  defence ;  and  the  result  of  the  campaign  could  hardly 
have  been  other  than  decisive.  A  certain  amount  of  risk,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  denied,  attended  the  transfer  of 
the  greater  part  of  Sherman's  command  to  the  Atlantic  coast 
before  Hood's  army  had  been  disposed  of.  Grant  —  who  was 
easily  converted  to  any  project  of  his  favorite  lieutenant  — 
and  Sherman  have  sometimes  shown  a  disposition  to  minimize 


152    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

this  risk,  and  hence  to  consider  the  victory  of  Nashville  a 
very  ordinary  affair  ;  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  when 
Thomas's  campaign  was  being  fought  Grant  was  terribly 
anxious.  He  did  not  know  at  the  time,  nor  was  he  after 
wards  quite  willing  to  admit,  the  existence  of  the  difficulties 
under  which  Thomas  labored,  and  which  induced  the  delay 
on  Thomas's  part  which  Grant  thought  so  unnecessary  and 
so  perilous  to  the  retention  of  our  hold  on  the  States  of  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee.  But  there  were  real  and  potent  causes 
for  Grant's  anxiety;  and  of  course  the  action  of  General 
Sherman  in  carrying  off  sixty  thousand  men  to  the  seacoast 
before  the  campaign  in  the  West  had  been  brought  to  a 
successful  termination  was  the  underlying  cause  of  it  all. 
Thomas,  however,  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  He  scored  a 
magnificent  success  at  Nashville.  Sherman  at  the  same  time 
captured  Savannah.  Everything  turned  out  marvellously 
well.  Both  officers  showed  themselves  at  their  best.  The 
risk  having  passed  by,  the  North  reaped  the  full  advantage 
of  the  daring  march.  The  task  then  before  Sherman  was 
one  to  which  he  was  by  nature  wonderfully  adapted,  and 
which  he  soon  brought  to  a  triumphant  end. 


MAJOR-GENERAL 
JAMES  EWELL  BROWN  STUART, 

Commander  of  the  Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES. 

Eeprinted  by  permission  from  the  "Atlantic  Monthly"  for  March,  1886. 


GENERAL  STUART. 


AMONG  the  valuable  works  which  the  South  has  contrib 
uted  to  the  history  of  the  late  war,  the  "  Life  and  Campaigns 
of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart "  *  will  take  a  high  place.  The 
book  is  by  no  means  a  mere  biography  of  Stuart  himself ;  it 
is  a  history,  as  the  inscription  on  the  side  of  the  cover  aptly 
puts  it,  of  "  the  Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry."  We  are 
prepared,  therefore,  to  find  a  full  and  minute  account  of  all 
the  principal  and  of  many  of  the  subsidiary  operations  of  that 
force.  The  account,  indeed,  is  so  full  and  so  minute  that  it 
will  tax  the  patience  of  the  ordinary  reader  to  master  the 
descriptions  of  skirmishes  and  ambushes  which,  unimportant, 
perhaps,  in  their  bearing  on  the  great  events  of  the  war,  were 
yet  worthy  of  being  carefully  narrated  in  a  work  claiming 
to  give  a  complete  history  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  To  any  student  of  the  military  art, 
however,  these  literal  and  exact  accounts  of  the  mode  of  cav 
alry-fighting  in  our  civil  war  cannot  but  be  of  very  great  and 
permanent  interest ;  while  any  reader  who  is  willing  to  give 
the  time  required  for  following  out  the  descriptions  with  the 
aid  of  the  excellent  maps  which  accompany  the  volume  will 
find  himself  well  repaid  in  the  peculiar  attraction  always 
attendant  on  watching  the  varying  fortunes  of  a  fight. 

1  The  Life  and  Campaigns  of  Major-General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  Commander  of 
the  Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  By  H.  B.  McClellan,  A.  M., 
late  Major,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  and  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Cavalry 
Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Boston  and  New  York :  Houghton, 
Mifflin  &  Co.  Richmond,  Va. :  J.  W.  Randolph  &  English.  1885. 


156    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Major  McClellan  was  Stuart's  Chief  of  Staff,  and  lie  is,  as 
lie  should  be,  loyal  to  his  general.  But,  so  far  as  we  can 
discover,  he  is  actuated  by  an  impartial  spirit.  Neither  in 
his  treatment  of  the  Federal  narratives,  nor  in  his  accounts 
of  Confederate  operations,  do  we  find  any  evidence  of  parti 
sanship.  At  the  same  time,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the 
fact  that  he  writes  from  the  standpoint  of  Stuart  himself. 

The  function  of  cavalry  in  warfare  has  changed  very  much 
in  the  last  thirty  years.  For  hundreds  —  nay,  thousands  — 
of  years,  it  remained  substantially  the  same  ;  the  Numidian 
horse  of  Hannibal  fought  very  much  in  the  same  way  as  did 
the  cuirassiers  of  Napoleon.  But  with  the  introduction  of 
improved  firearms  a  change  has  gradually  come  about.  We 
saw  one  of  the  last  examples  of  the  old  method  in  the  famous 
charge  at  Balaklava,  thirty  odd  years  ago  ;  but  that  was  con 
demned  at  the  time  as  not  being,  strictly  speaking,  "  war." 
In  our  great  struggle,  it  seems  to  have  been  recognized  from 
the  first  that  the  role  of  the  cavalry  was  to  be  auxiliary  only. 
They  were  employed  —  often  most  unjustifiably  —  to  do  the 
picket  duty  for  the  whole  army  ;  they  were  sent  off  on  ex 
peditions  to  cut  telegraph  wires,  destroy  railroads,  capture 
depots  of  supplies,  and  generally  to  break  up  the  enemy's 
communications.  Columns  of  cavalry  always  preceded  and 
covered  the  march  of  an  army,  and  were  expected  to  ascer 
tain  the  position  and  intentions  of  the  enemy.  In  these 
operations  it  of  course  often  happened  that  severe  fighting 
had  to  be  done;  but  when  infantry  were  encountered,  the 
cavalry  usually  dismounted  and  fought  as  infantry.  In  fact, 
up  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  campaign  of  1864,  it  was  only 
when  cavalry  were  opposed  to  cavalry  that  the  hostile  squad 
rons  charged  in  the  old  style,  using  the  sabre.  Whether  this 
mode  of  fighting  would  ever  be  resorted  to  now  is  certainly 
very  questionable.  With  the  repeating  small  arms  of  to-day 
in  the  hands  of  the  troopers,  such  splendid  attacks  as  were 
made  by  both  the  Federal  and  Confederate  cavalry  at  Brandy 


GENERAL  STUART  157 

Station  (or  Fleetwood)  would,  we  apprehend,  never  be 
attempted.  It  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  book  before 
us  that  it  gives  all  the  necessary  facts  of  a  transitory  yet 
very  interesting  phase  in  the  history  of  the  employment  of 
cavalry  in  modern  warfare.  We  have  minute  narratives  of 
those  daring  raids  in  the  rear  of  our  armies,  of  which  Stuart 
made  at  least  three  which  were  successful  and  famous.  We 
have  the  details  of  the  services  performed  by  him  when  ac 
companying  a  column  of  infantry.  We  have  careful  and 
impartial,  though  naturally  not  always  correct,  descriptions 
of  those  obstinate  and  spirited  hand-to-hand  encounters  be 
tween  cavalry  and  cavalry  which  followed  immediately  on  the 
reorganization  of  the  Federal  horse  in  the  spring  of  1863, 
and  which  will  carry  down  to  posterity  the  names  of  Buford 
and  Gregg  and  Custer  and  Sheridan.  The  actions  at  Kelly's 
Ford,  Brandy  Station,  Aldie  Gap,  Middleburg,  Gettysburg, 
Yellow  Tavern,  are  all  described  at  length ;  and  though  there 
is  a  great  deal  that  might  be  written  to  fill  out,  or  to  correct, 
or  even  in  some  cases  to  reverse,  the  conclusions  of  Major 
McClellan,  the  Federal  historian  must  acknowledge  his  in- 
debtness  to  him  as  a  fair  and  honest  writer  on  his  own  side. 

In  Stuart  the  Confederacy  had  a  natural  leader  of  cavalry. 
Daring,  cool,  eminently  a  man  of  resources  in  an  emergency, 
full  of  the  spirit  of  adventure,  young,  gay,  handsome,  a  fine 
horseman,  he  carried  into  the  somewhat  prosaic  operations  of 
our  civil  war  not  a  little  of  the  chivalrous  spirit  of  former 
times.  Belonging  to  one  of  the  distinguished  families  of 
Virginia,  and  possessed  of  so  many  undoubted  qualifications 
for  his  task,  his  position  was  an  assured  one  from  the  very 
first.  He  took  an  active  part  in  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Eun, 
winning  the  high  commendation  of  Generals  Johnston  and 
Jackson.  He  commanded  the  entire  cavalry  of  the  Confed 
erate  Army  on  the  Peninsula.  It  was  here  that  he  first 
acquired  general  reputation  by  his  daring  raid  around  our 
army,  about  the  middle  of  June,  1862.  Being  the  first  per- 


158    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

formance  of  the  kind,  the  effect  it  produced  upon  the  not 
very  experienced  soldiers  of  McClellan's  army  was  considera 
ble,  and  the  expedition,  rash  and  perilous  as  it  certainly  was, 
may  fairly  be  said  to  have  been  justified  under  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case.  In  August  of  that  year  Stuart  tried  the 
same  manoeuvre  again,  getting  in  the  rear  of  the  army  of 
General  Pope,  and  capturing  some  of  that  officer's  head 
quarters  baggage.  But  though  this  was  also  a  very  daring  and 
skilfully  conducted  affair,  it  did  not  strike  either  army  as 
possessing  the  importance  of  the  former  raid.  Stuart,  how 
ever,  who  evidently  enjoyed  these  expeditions,  the  manage 
ment  of  which  was  peculiarly  suited  to  his  character  and 
talents,  undertook,  not  long  after  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
still  another,  and  perhaps  more  venturesome,  incursion.  In 
October,  1862,  when  Lee's  army  was  in  Virginia,  Stuart 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  McCoy's  Ferry,  a  short  distance  above 
William  sport ;  proceeded  rapidly  to  Chambersburg,  where  he 
obtained  supplies  of  all  kinds ;  then  taking  the  Gettysburg 
road  as  far  as  Cashtown,  he  returned  by  way  of  Emmittsburg 
to  White's  Ferry,  just  above  Conrad's  Ferry,  where  he  crossed 
the  Potomac,  eluding  with  great  skill  and  good  fortune  the 
Federal  troops,  by  whom  his  little  force  seemed  to  be  well- 
nigh  surrounded.  What  the  object  of  this  performance  was, 
beyond  exhibiting  to  the  men  of  both  armies  what  a  fine  set 
of  fellows  Stuart's  cavalry  were,  what  risks  they  were  ready 
to  take,  and  with  what  audacity  and  coolness  they  could  escape 
from  the  snares  laid  for  them  by  their  foes,  we  are  at  a  loss 
to  know.  But  the  importance  of  distributing  information  of 
this  kind  is  hardly  to  be  weighed  against  the  danger  of  losing 
such  an  auxiliary  to  an  army  as  Stuart  and  his  command. 
As  it  was,  everything  turned  out  well  enough  ;  the  Federal 
generals  were  annoyed,  and  the  Northern  public  was  irritated. 
But  suppose  that  Pleasanton  had  not  been  misled  by  false 
reports,  and  that  Stuart  and  his  raiders  had  been  taken :  any 
one  can  see  what  effect  that  news  would  have  had  upon  both 


GENERAL  STUART  159 

armies.  It  would  have  been  a  serious  blow  to  the  confidence 
reposed  by  the  South  in  their  generals,  and  it  could  not  have 
failed  greatly  to  encourage  the  North. 

General  Stuart  was  now  to  have  a  rare  opportunity  for 
distinction.  In  the  campaign  of  Chancellorsville,  as  hitherto, 
he  commanded  the  cavalry.  On  the  evening  of  the  2d  of 
May,  after  the  crushing  assault  on  the  Eleventh  Corps,  the 
great  Confederate  leader,  Stonewall  Jackson,  was  severely 
wounded,  and  his  place  was  filled  by  A.  P.  Hill,  who,  while 
exerting  himself  to  repair  the  disorder  into  which  the  troops 
had  necessarily  fallen  in  their  onward  and  successful  move 
ment,  and  to  resist  the  counter-attacks  which  Sickles,  at  the 
head  of  the  undismayed  veterans  of  the  Third  Corps,  was 
fiercely  making  to  recover  the  lost  ground,  was  wounded  him 
self.  Then  Lee  sent  for  Stuart,  and  put  him  in  command 
of  Jackson's  corps.  It  was  a  proud  moment  in  Stuart's  life, 
and  a  great  honor  for  so  young  an  officer,  for  he  was  but 
just  thirty  years  aid.  The  task  before  him  was,  fortunately, 
neither  an  ambiguous  nor  a  complicated  task.  There  was 
but  one  thing  to  do,  and  that  was  to  fight.  Of  the  battle 
which  raged  so  fiercely  on  Sunday  morning  ;  of  the  repeated, 
desperate,  persistent  assaults  which  Stuart  directed  against 
our  position  ;  of  the  energy  and  enthusiasm  which  he  inspired ; 
and  of  the  gallantry  with  which  from  time  to  time  he  led 
the  troops  himself,  we  have  not  time  to  speak.  Fierce  and 
determined  as  were  those  repeated  attacks,  however,  nothing 
but  the  gross  mismanagement  of  Hooker  can  account  for  their 
having  overcome  the  steady  and  obstinate  resistance  of  the 
troops  of  Sickles  and  Slocuin.  But  we  need  not  dwell  on  this 
ever  painful  episode  in  the  war.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Stuart 
acquitted  himself  admirably. 

His  services  were,  however,  more  needed  in  the  cavalry. 
In  the  severe  actions  which  occurred  in  the  spring  and  early 
summer  of  1863,  at  Brandy  Station,  Aldie  Gap,  Middleburg, 
and  Gettysburg,  cavalry  met  cavalry,  and,  as  has  been  before 


160     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

said,  the  fighting  was  of  the  most  approved  old  style,  horse  to 
horse,  and  sabre  to  sabre.  In  these  engagements  the  Federals 
displayed  a  confidence  and  courage  which  had  rarely  been 
observed  before,  and  which  was  the  result  of  the  thorough 
reorganization  of  our  cavalry,  for  which  the  army  was  indebted 
to  General  Hooker  probably  more  than  to  any  one  else. 

Stuart's  course  in  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg  has  been 
severely  criticised  as  well  by  Confederate  as  by  Federal 
authorities.  When  Lee  determined  on  the  invasion  of  the 
North,  he  left  a  large  force  of  cavalry  to  guard  the  passes  of 
the  Blue  Ridge.  He  took  a  very  small  force  to '  cover  the 
march  of  the  army.  The  remainder  he  entrusted  to  Stuart, 
and  practically  gave  him  carte  blanche  as  to  the  route  he 
should  take  to  compass  the  two  objects  of  ascertaining  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  communicating  his  information 
to  General  Lee.  Stuart,  instead  of  keeping  011  the  right  flank 
of  the  Confederate  columns,  between  them  and  our  army, 
chose  the  devious  and  complicated  course  of  passing  to  the 
south  of  our  corps  while  they  were  marching  north,  thus  get 
ting  between  them  and  Washington,  and  then  crossing  the 
Potomac  near  Washington  at  Rowser's  Ford.  He  expected 
to  make  a  complete  circuit  around  our  army,  as  he  had  twice 
done  before,  and  to  bring  seasonable  information  of  Hooker's 
whereabouts  and  operations  to  his  commanding  officer. 
Looked  at  from  any  point  of  view,  this  plan  was  bad.  It 
necessarily  involved  the  separation  of  the  cavalry  from  the 
rest  of  the  army  for  a  period,  the  duration  of  which  no  one 
could  guess,  and  it  exposed  it,  moreover,  to  be  cut  off  and 
captured.  The  only  recommendations  of  the  project  were  its 
adventurousness,  which  we  suspect  was  a  pretty  strong 
recommendation  in  the  eyes  of  General  Stuart,  and  the 
possibility  of  doing  some  damage  to  the  communications  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  operating  between  it  and 
Washington.  With  such  a  .small  force  as  accompanied 
Stuart,  however,  no  great  successes  in  this  direction  were 


GENERAL  STUART  161 

to  be  looked  for,  while  the  danger  of  utter  failure  from 
the  discovery  of  his  exposed  position  by  the  Federal  army 
-  which,  contrary  to  his  expectation,  did  not  rest  near 
Washington,  but  continued  to  march  north  —  daily  increased. 
Not  only  was  Stuart  thus  made  aware  of  a  concentration 
of  the  Federal  army  in  Pennsylvania,  a  fact  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  General  Lee,  but  the  very  movements  of 
the  Federal  corps  by  which  this  concentration  was  effected 
prevented  Stuart  from  sending  his  information  to  the  head 
quarters  of  his  commander.  It  must  also  be  admitted  that 
Stuart  was  far  from  showing  that  clear,  strong  sense  which 
a  man  like  Stonewall  Jackson  would  have  shown  in  a  like 
situation.  Having  early  made  a  trumpery  capture  of  a  lot 
of  wagons  and  prisoners,  he  persisted  in  carrying  them  along 
with  him,  in  spite  of  the  delay  they  were  manifestly  causing. 
He  never  seems  to  have  realized  that  so  long  as  he  was  unable 
to  communicate  with  Lee  he  was  in  a  false  position,  from 
which  he  ought  to  make  every  effort  to  escape.  As  for  the 
claim  put  forward  by  Major  McClellan,  that  Stuart  hindered 
the  movements  of  the  Federal  army,  that,  with  all  submis 
sion,  is  an  entire  mistake.  "  My  main  point,"  wrote  Meade 
to  Halleck,  "  being  to  find  and  fight  the  enemy,  I  shall  have 
to  submit  to  the  cavalry  raid  around  me  in  some  measure." l 
Stuart  reached  Gettysburg  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of 
July.  But  by  that  time  the  mischief  had  been  done.  General 
Lee,  deprived  of  his  cavalry,  had  been  concentrating  his  army 
on  Gettysburg,  in  ignorance  of  General  Meade's  movements. 
His  leading  divisions  had,  on  the  day  before,  encountered 
the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  of  the  Federal  army  near 
Gettysburg,  and  had  beaten  them  after  an  obstinate  struggle. 
The  Federal  general  had,  nevertheless,  decided  to  concentrate 
his  whole  army  here  and  await  an  attack.  On  the  2d  of 
July  Lee  followed  up  his  first  success  by  driving  the  Third 
Federal  Corps  from  an  untenable  position.  Unable  now  to 

i  43  W.  R.,  67. 


162     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

resist  the  influences  of  the  hour,  he  was  about  to  essay  the 
hazardous  task  of  assaulting  the  steady  infantry  of  the 
Northern  army,  thinned  but  not  a  whit  daunted  by  their  ill 
luck  on  the  past  two  days,  and  holding  a  strong,  well-defined 
position.  In  truth,  Lee's  only  chance,  humanly  speaking,  lay 
in  compelling  the  Federal  army  to  attack  him ;  but,  owing  to 
his  ignorance  of  our  designs  and  movements,  his  troops  struck 
their  enemy  unexpectedly,  and  having  been  thus  far  —  owing 
in  part,  at  least,  to  adventitious  circumstances  —  successful, 
Lee,  on  the  3d  of  July,  made  that  gallant,  but  rash,  assault 
on  our  left  centre,  the  utter  repulse  of  which  left  Meade  the 
victor  of  the  three  days'  fight.  Whether,  if  Stuart's  cavalry 
had  been  with  the  main  army,  Lee  would  or  could  have  so 
managed  that  Meade  would  have  been  induced  to  assault  him 
in  position,  no  one,  of  course,  can  say ;  all  we  know  is  that 
the  battle,  as  it  was  fought,  was  unpremeditated  by  General 
Lee,  —  that  it  was  not  the  kind  of  battle  which  he  had 
intended  to  deliver. 

General  Stuart's  services  in  the  Wilderness  campaign 
were  very  brief.  In  the  winter  of  1863-64  our  cavalry,  then 
under  Sheridan,  had  vastly  improved  ;  the  cavalry  of  the 
Confederates,  on  the  other  hand,  was  weak  in  numbers  and 
poorly  equipped.  Early  in  the  campaign,  Sheridan,  with 
some  12,000  horse,  moved  in  rear  of  the  army  of  Lee  and 
threatened  Richmond.  In  a  severe  action  at  Yellow  Tavern, 
Stuart  was  mortally  wounded.  He  met  his  fate  like  a  brave 
and  good  man,  as  he  was.  Major  McClellan's  narrative  here 
is  simple  and  very  touching. 

We  have  extended  this  review  to  a  greater  length  than  we 
originally  intended.  But  among  the  heroic  figures  of  the  war, 
the  gallant  leader  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  is  certainly  one 
of  the  most  attractive. 


MAJOR-GENERAL 
GEORGE  HENEY  THOMAS. 


BY 


HENRY  STONE, 

BREVET  COLONEL,  U.  S.  V. 
Read  before  the  Society  on  Tuesday  evening,  March  11,  1890. 


The  following  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  by  Colonel  Stone,  concern 
ing  the  Civil  War  :  — 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  [Annual  Oration 
delivered  at  the  Nineteenth  Reunion  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  held  at  Chicago.  September  19-20,  1888.  In  the  Report  of  that 
Reunion,  pages  71-112.]  Cincinnati,  1889. 

HOOD'S  INVASION  OF  TENNESSEE.  [In]  The  Century  Magazine,  August,  1887, 
Vol.  34,  No.  4,  pages  597-616 ;  [also  in]  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War,  .  .  .  Edited  by  Robert  Underwood  Johnson  and  Clarence  Clough  Buel. 
4  vols.,  New  York,  1887,  Vol.  4,  pages  440-464. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS.  [In]  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  October,  1891, 
Vol.  68,  No.  408,  pages  506-514. 

MEMORIAL  BIOGRAPHIES  in  the  Reports  of  the  Reunions  of  the  Society  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  1884-1894. 

See  list  of  Papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu 
setts  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


GENERAL  THOMAS. 


IT  has  been  the  fortune  of  General  Thomas  to  create  the 
conviction,  in  the  minds  of  the  best  judges  among  those  who 
knew  him  best,  that  he  was  a  soldier  of  consummate  ability. 
This  conviction  has  sometimes  been  challenged ;  chiefly,  per 
haps,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  based  on  personal  admiration 
rather  than  on  military  achievements.  His  career  affords  the 
only  test  of  his  merits.  This  Society  is  composed  mainly  of 
soldiers  ;  of  men  who  have  studied,  and  had  more  or  less 
experience  in  military  operations.  To  the  consideration  of 
judges  thus  qualified,  facts,  not  eulogy,  constitute  the  highest 
appeal.  But  even  by  such  a  tribunal,  the  exceptional  posi 
tion  of  General  Thomas  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  is 
entitled  to  its  due  weight. 

Born  in  Virginia,  in  1816,  —  when  that  State  was  still 
the  mother  of  Presidents,  —  young  Thomas  was  trained  in 
supreme  devotion  to  her  name  and  history.  Every  fibre  of  his 
being  thrilled  at  the  contemplation  of  her  achievements  in  war 
and  peace.  Within  a  short  distance  from  his  birthplace  lay 
Yorktown,  where  was  won  the  last  decisive  battle  for  American 
independence.  Soldiers  who  had  served  under  Washington 
from  Valley  Forge  to  final  victory,  poured  into  his  youthful 
ears  the  stories  of  their  hardships  and  the  greatness  of  their 
leader.  The  war  of  1812,  in  which  Virginia  suffered  much 
desolation,  had  just  ended.  Madison  was  President,  to  be 
followed  by  Monroe,  the  fourth  Virginian  of  the  five  Presi 
dents  during  the  first  thirty-six  years  of  our  national  life. 
Marshall  was  Chief-Justice,  and  was  to  hold,  unrivalled,  that 


166     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

eminent  position  till  Thomas  had  grown  to  manhood.  With 
an  interval  of  only  seven  years,  the  secretaryship  of  State 
was  filled  by  Virginians,  till  Monroe  laid  down  the  office  to 
become  President.  William  Wirt  was  Attorney-General  for 
twelve  years,  —  still  a  great  name  after  two  generations. 
It  seemed  impossible  that  the  government  could  be  carried 
on  without  one  or  more  Virginians  in  the  Cabinet ;  and 
the  counsels  of  Virginians  in  Congress  largely  prevailed. 
Robert  E.  Lee,  trained  in  the  same  school  of  doctrine, 
became  so  blindly  the  slave  of  its  traditions,  that,  in  1861,  he 
resigned  his  commission  in  the  army,  though  he  confessed, 
when  he  did  it,  that  he  recognized  "  no  necessity  for  the  state 
of  things  into  which  Virginia  had  been  drawn."  With  all 
his  alleged  "devotion  to  the  Union,  and  the  feeling  of  loyalty 
and  duty  of  an  American  citizen,"  he  could  "  not  take  part 
against  his  native  State."  Thomas,  almost  alone,  save 
Scott,  of  officers  of  high  rank  in  the  army,  and  conspicuous 
social  position,  remained  true  to  his  oath  and  his  flag.  Of 
the  ninety-seven  Virginians  whose  names  are  in  the  Army 
Register  for  January  1,  1861,  only  seven  of  the  line  of  the 
army  are  found  in  that  for  January  1,  1862.  That  Thomas 
was  one  of  the  seven,  proves  him  a  man  of  no  common  mould. 
This  fidelity,  in  one  so  born  and  reared,  should  have  aided  in 
his  advancement,  as  time  and  events  demonstrated  his  capa 
city.  But  it  worked  rather  to  his  detriment.  Unquestionably, 
Grant  and  Sherman  owed  as  much,  for  the  early  and  constant 
recognition  of  their  merits,  to  the  fact  that  they  were 
constituents  and  wards  of  representatives  like  Washburne  and 
senators  like  John  Sherman,  as  to  anything  they  did  in  the 
field.  In  political  life,  too,  the  loyalty  of  Southern  men  was 
conspicuously  rewarded.  Andrew  Johnson  became  possible 
President  only  because  he  was  a  Southerner.  But  the  fact 
that  Thomas  was  a  Virginian  excited,  at  first,  groundless 
suspicion ;  and  afterwards  delayed  appreciation.  There  was 
no  one  at  hand,  in  Washington,  when  honors  were  to  be 


GENERAL   THOMAS  167 

conferred,  to  remember  this  modest,  truthful,  untiring,  always 
successful  soldier.  Whatever  recognition  came  to  him  came 
late,  and  was  compelled  by  his  own  soldierly  devotion  and 
genius. 

He  was  fortunate  in  his  ancestral  inheritance.  Descended 
on  his  father's  side  from  Welsh  parentage,  as  the  name 
indicates,  —  from  that  people  who,  almost  alone  of  all 
Europe,  remained  unconquered  by  the  arms  or  arts  of 
Ca3sar,  —  and,  on  his  mother's,  from  those  Huguenots  of 
France  who  kept  the  faith  against  all  consequences,  it  is 
easy  to  trace,  in  his  mental  and  moral  traits,  as  well  as  in 
his  physical  appearance  and  bearing,  the  influence  of  such 
heredity.  The  mingling  of  the  somewhat  opposing  qualities 
he  drew  from  each  —  a  gentle  voice  and  manner,  quick,  high 
temper,  unconquerable  courage,  inflexible  will,  delicate  sen 
sitiveness,  a  commanding  sense  of  duty  —  was  admirably 
harmonized  into  a  well-rounded  character.  He  was  already 
quite  mature  in  years  and  intellect  when,  in  1836,  he  entered 
the  Military  Academy.  Passing  through  Washington  on  his 
way  to  West  Point,  he  called  to  thank  Mr.  Mason,  his 
Representative,  —  afterwards  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  —  for 
his  appointment.  Mr.  Mason  said  to  him :  "  No  Cadet 
from  our  district  has  ever  yet  graduated.  If  you  do  not,  I 
never  want  to  see  your  face  againC"  His  career  at  the 
Academy  was  highly  creditable.  From  twenty-sixth  in  rank 
at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  he  rose  to  be  twelfth  at 
graduation.  He  was  successively  cadet-corporal,  sergeant, 
and  lieutenant.  He  averaged  twenty-two  demerits  a  year. 
His  traits  of  character  and  appearance,  and  his  Virginia 
birth,  brought  him  the  nickname  of  George  Washington. 
Assigned,  at  graduation,  to  the  Third  Artillery  as  Second 
Lieutenant,  he  was  sent  in  November,  1840,  to  Florida,  to 
take  part  in  the  closing  scenes  of  the  Seminole  War.  In  a 
highly  successful  expedition,  resulting  in  the  capture  of 
forty-nine  Indians,  he  won  the  brevet  of  First  Lieutenant, 


168     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

November  6,  1841,    "  for  gallantry  and  good    conduct,"  • 
alone    of   all   his  contemporaries  the    recipient   of    such   an 
honor.       His   immediate    commander,    Captain    Wade,    and 
the    department    commander,  Colonel    Worth,  make    special 
mention  of  his  valuable  and  efficient  services. 

In  August,  1845,  he  was  sent  to  the  Mexican  frontier. 
He  was  at  Corpus  Christ!  and  on  the  Rio  Grande  till  the 
battle  of  Monterey,  in  which  he  took  part.  In  this  action, 
General  Henderson,  commanding  the  Texas  Volunteers,  thus 
speaks  of  him :  "I  beg  leave  to  compliment  Lieutenant 
Thomas  for  the  bold  advance  and  efficient  management  of 
the  force  under  his  charge.  When  ordered  to  retire,  he 
reloaded  his  piece,  fired  a  farewell  shot  at  the  foe,  and 
returned  under  a  shower  of  bullets."  General  Twiggs,  his 
division  commander,  mentions  him  as  "  deserving  the  highest 
praise  for  skill  and  good  conduct  under  the  heaviest  fire  of 
the  enemy."  "  For  gallantry  and  meritorious  conduct "  here 
he  won  his  second  brevet,  as  Captain,  to  date  from  September 
23,  1846.  He  was  one  of  the  few  regular  officers  left 
with  General  Taylor,  when  the  main  army,  under  Scott, 
advanced  to  the  City  of  Mexico.  In  the  battle  of  Buena 
Vista,  February  22-23,  1847,  he  bore  a  still  more  efficient 
part.  In  every  report,  his  name  is  mentioned  with  high 
praise.  Of  the  twenty-five  killed,  wounded  and  missing 
in  the  two  companies  of  regular  artillery  in  that  battle, 
eighteen  were  from  Thomas's  company.  Captain  T.  W. 
Sherman,  —  of  Sherman's  Flying  Artillery,  —  his  immediate 
commander,  speaking  of  the  tenacity  with  which  the  ad 
vanced  and  exposed  position  was  held,  says  that  he  found 
Lieutenant  Thomas  011  the  plateau,  "who  had  been  con 
stantly  engaged  during  the  forenoon  in  the  preservation 
of  that  important  position  ;  "  that  he  behaved  nobly  through 
out  the  action,  and  his  coolness  and  firmness  contributed 
not  a  little  to  the  success  of  the  day ;  and  that  he 
"more  than  sustained  the  reputation  he  has  long  enjoyed 


GENERAL   THOMAS  169 

in  his  regiment  as  an  accurate  and  scientific  artillerist." 
General  Wool  ascribes  our  success  to  the  artillery,  and 
expresses  great  admiration  of  five  officers  whom  he  names,  — 
Thomas  the  junior  among  them,  —  "  to  whose  services," 
he  says,  "  we  are  mainly  indebted  for  the  great  victory 
over  more  than  20,000  men.  Without  our  artillery,  we 
could  not  have  maintained  our  position  a  single  hour." 
General  Taylor  also  names  Thomas  as  among  those  officers 
who  "  in  every  situation  exhibited  conspicuous  skill  and 
gallantry."  Ripley,  in  his  History,  describes  the  operations 
of  the  artillery  in  great  detail,  and  says  that  at  a  critical 
moment,  when  threatened  by  an  overwhelming  foe,  Thomas 
kept  up  his  fire  on  the  advancing  enemy,  retreating  only 
by  the  recoil  of  his  pieces.1  For  this  battle,  he  was  again 
brevetted, — this  time  as  Major,  —  for  "gallant  and  merito 
rious  conduct,"  to  date  from  February  23,  1847.  Thus,  in  a 
period  of  less  than  five  and  a  half  years,  he  had  won  three 
brevets,  an  almost  unprecedented  distinction  in  the  annals  of 
the  army  up  to  that  time.  It  was  not  until  nearly  seven 
years  later,  December  24,  1853,  that  he  was  promoted  to  a 
captaincy.  The  citizens  of  his  native  county  of  Southampton, 
proud  of  his  honorable  career,  in  July,  1847,  presented  him 
a  magnificent  sword,  in  token  of  their  appreciation  of  his 
"  patience,  firmness,  fortitude  and  daring  intrepidity." 

Meantime,  he  was  employed  on  almost  every  kind  of  duty 
that  falls  to  a  subaltern :  quartermaster,  commissary,  recruit 
ing  officer,  battery  commander,  —  in  Texas,  Louisiana, 
Florida  and  Boston.  From  his  post  at  Fort  Independence, 
he  was  detailed,  April  1,  1851,  as  Instructor  of  Cavalry  and 
Artillery  at  the  Military  Academy.  He  remained  on  that 
duty  three  years.  Among  those  who  then  came  under  his 
instruction  were  many  of  the  most  distinguished  officers  in 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Slocum,  Stanley,  McCook, 
McPherson,  Crook,  Sheridan,  Hood,  Custis  Lee,  linger, 

1  1  Ripley,  418. 


170     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Howard,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  and  others.  All  of  those  named 
on  the  Union  side  served  under  him,  and  most  of  those  on  the 
rebel  side  against  him,  during  the  war.  On  the  expiration 
of  his  tour  of  duty  at  West  Point,  he  was  sent  May  1,  1854, 
to  Fort  Yuma,  in  Lower  California,  a  place  of  absolute  exile 
from  all  the  surroundings  and  comforts  of  civilization.  But 
he  made  his  exile  pleasant  and  profitable  by  the  investigation 
of  geography  and  natural  history,  studies  which  always 
fascinated  him.  The  Museums  of  the  Smithsonian  Insti 
tution  contain  many  specimens  of  unique  value  from  his 
contributions. 

Early  in  1855,  the  army  was  enlarged.  Of  one  of  the 
new  cavalry  regiments,  —  the  Second,  now  the  Fifth,  - 
Captain  Thomas,  then  junior  captain  of  artillery,  was 
appointed  Major.  The  appointment  had  been  offered  to 
Captain  Braxton  Bragg  of  the  same  regiment,  who  declined, 
as  his  resignation,  accepted  a  year  later,  had  already  been 
determined  upon.  He  is  said  to  have  recommended  Thomas. 
If  so,  he  unwittingly  made  amends  for  his  subsequent 
mischief.  These  new  cavalry  regiments  were  the  choicest 
in  the  army.  In  no  similar  case  were  such  pains  taken  in 
the  selection  of  officers.  Jefferson  Davis  was  Secretary  of 
War,  and  was  chiefly  responsible  for  the  names.  Sumner, 
already  a  veteran,  was  made  Colonel  of  the  First,  with  Joseph 
E.  Johnston,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  and  Emory  and  Sedgwick 
for  Majors.  In  the  Second,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  made 
Colonel,  Robert  E.  Lee,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  and  Hardee  and 
Thomas,  Majors.  The  most  significant  fact,  however,  was 
that  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  officers  were  of  Southern 
birth  and  residence.  From  the  Second  Cavalry,  twenty-four 
entered  the  rebel  service,  of  whom  twelve  became  general 
officers,  Sidney  Johnston  and  Lee  holding  the  highest  posi 
tions  from  the  outset.  Among  such  professional  arid  personal 
associations,  Thomas  passed  the  six  years  preceding  that 
April  day  in  1861,  which  decided  the  fate  of  the  republic. 


GENERAL   THOMAS^  171 

» 
The  greater  part  of  this  time  he  was  in  Texas,  where  every 

influence,  together  with  his  own  almost  morbid  aversion  to 
politics,  conspired  to  minimise,  the  sentiment  of  allegiance 
to  the  government,  under  the  anticipated  change  of  adminis 
tration  ;  while  the  imbecility  of  the  existing  administration 
pointed  almost  inevitably  to  approaching  dissolution. 

While  thus  stationed  in-  Texas,  Major  Thomas  sent  a 
communication  to  the  adjutant-general,  dated  July  7,  1857, 
when  the  Utah  expedition  under  Sidney  Johnston  was  fit 
ting  out.  In  it  he  detailed  the  information  he  had  gained 
while  an  artillery  officer  at  Fort  Yuma,  three  years  before, 
concerning  the  possible  navigability  of  the  Colorado  River. 
He1  gives  the  facts  he  had  learned  from  careful  questioning  of 
the  Hamok-ain,  the  Navajo,  and  the  Pay-Ute  Indians,  which 
led  him  to  think  that  the  river  was  navigable  to  within  one 
hundred  or  two  hundred  miles  of  Salt  Lake  City.  If  that 
were  so,  he  concludes,  "  it  will  be  not  only  the  most  direct, 
but  the  most  convenient  and  safest  route  to  convey  supplies 
to  the  troops  stationed  in  Utah  Territory."  This  letter  shows 
not  merely  great  interest  in  geography,  as  well  as  in  his 
own  profession,  but  it  also  gives  evidence  of  an  intelligent 
study  of  philology,  as  well  as  of  close  observation.  In.  that 
self-constituted,  but  commanding,  inner  circle  which,  in 
every  society,  sits  in  judgment  andT  forms  a  kind  of  court 
of  appeals,  Thomas  had  received  the  verdict  of  absolute 
approval,  —  so  far  as  the  army  is  concerned,  —  as  early  as 
1855.  But,  outside  the  army,  he  was  little  known.  Even  in 
so  important  a  crisis  as  April  and  May,  1861,  when  he  was 
so  rapidly  promoted,  he  was  to  the  authorities  at  Washington 
merely  a  name ;  though  in  the  army,  which  for  twenty  years 
had  witnessed  his  capacity,  fidelity  and  power,  that  name  was 
a  synonym  for  whatever  was  most  excellent  in  the  profession 
of  arms.  Unfortunately,  most  of  those  who  best  knew  him 
had  deserted  the  cause  of  their  country.  Thus,  while  the 
Johnstons,  and  Lee,  and  Bragg,  and  Hardee  —  the  most 


172     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

competent  witnesses  —  were  incapacitated  to  testify,  the  very 
fact  that  he  had  been  their  approved  confidant  and  friend 
now  counted  against  him.  He  could  not  speak  for  himself 
except  by  deeds ;  and  what  he  had  done  was  overlooked  in 
the  hurly-burly  of  the  present. 

On  the  1st  of  November,  1860,  before  the  presidential  elec 
tion,  Major  Thomas  left  Texas  on  a  long  leave  of  absence, 
granted  some  months  before.  A  railroad  accident,  from  the 
effects  of  which  he  never  fully  recovered,  compelled  him  to 
remain  in  New  York  City  through  most  of  the  following 
winter.  Those  who  knew,  or  can  remember,  the  atmosphere 
of  that  city  at  that  time,  especially  that  breathed  in  the  cor 
ridors  of  the  New  York  hotel  at  which  he  made  his  home, 
know  that  nowhere,  even  in  Virginia  or  South  Carolina,  was 
secession  more  openly  or  ardently  advocated.  Here  he  saw, 
with  inexpressible  anxiety,  the  rising  of  the  coming  storm. 
He  was  a  soldier  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term.  For  twenty 
years  he  had  had  no  thought,  or  wish,  or  capacity  but  to 
serve  his  country  in  his  chosen  profession.  As  State  after 
State  went  through  the  form  of  secession,  and  fort  after  fort 
was  abandoned  by  the  administration,  it  began  to  seem  to  him 
as  though  he  would  soon  have  no  country  to  serve.  His  regi 
ment  had  been  treacherously  surrendered  by  Twiggs  to  a  mob 
of  Texas  insurgents.  The  remnants  of  it  began  to  arrive  in 
New  York  early  in  April.  On  the  10th,  he  received  orders 
revoking  the  unexpired  portion  of  his  leave,  and  directing 
him  to  conduct  the  companies  already  landed  to  Carlisle 
Barracks,  for  reorganization.  Pie  cheerfully  obeyed  the 
order.  On  his  way  there,  the  guns  opened  against  Fort 
Sumter.  His  answer  to  the  challenge  was  immediate  and 
significant.  On  his  arrival  at  Carlisle,  he  sought  a  magis 
trate,  before  whom,  with  the  profoundest  solemnity,  he 
renewed  his  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  of 
America.  On  the  20th,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee 
left  Arlington  for  Richmond  and  entered  at  once  upon  the 


GENERAL   THOMAS  173 

service  of  Virginia,  though  his  resignation  from  the  Army  of 
the  United  States  was  not  yet  accepted.  On  the  25th, 
Major  Thomas  was  promoted  to  be  lieutenant-colonel  to  fill 
the  vacancy  made  by  Lee's  defection.  A  week  later,  on  the 
3d  of  May,  he  was  promoted  to  be  colonel,  in  place  of 
Sidney  Johnston,  who  had  forwarded  his  resignation  from 
California,  and  was  stealthily  making  his  way  overland  to 
Texas,  to  join  his  fortunes  with  that  State,  when  he  found 
that  his  own  State  of  Kentucky  remained  steadfast  in  the 
Union. 

On  the  27th  of  April,  the  Department  of  Pennsylvania 
was  created,  with  General  Robert  Patterson  as  commander. 
In  the  organization  of  troops  in  this  department,  Colonel 
Thomas,  on  the  29th  of  May,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  First  Brigade  consisting  of  part  of  his  own  regiment  and 
three  regiments  of  three  months  militia  from  Pennsylvania. 
On  the  12th  of  June,  he  led  the  advance  to  the  Potomac 
River  at  Williamsport.  On  the  2d  of  July,  he  crossed  into 
Virginia  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  where  he  encountered 
and  helped  put  to  flight  a  force  of  Virginia  troops  under 
Stonewall  Jackson  and  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  aggregating  2,600 
men.  Thus  his  first  encounter  with  the  enemy  during  the 
Rebellion  was  in  his  own  State,  and  was  entirely  successful. 
Though  but  slight  resistance  was  made,  all  the  moral  effects 
of  victory  were  with  the  Union  troops.  Colonel  Thomas's 
admirable  bearing  is  spoken  of  in  all  the  reports,  and  was 
never  forgotten  by  any  who  saw  it.  Among  the  soldiers  then 
in  the  ranks  was  Samuel  J.  Randall,  since  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States.  On  the  3d 
of  August  this  private  soldier  wrote  to  his  old  friend,  Thomas 
A.  Scott,  just  appointed  Assistant  Secretary  of  War :  "I 
notice  that  the  Government  is  now  considering  the  appoint 
ment  of  proper  persons  to  be  brigadier-generals.  In  the 
name  of  God,  let  them  be  men  fully  competent.  .  .  .  [For 
nearly  three  months]  we  have  been  under  command  of 


174     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Colonel  George  H.  Thomas.  .  .  .  He  is  thoroughly  compe 
tent  to  be  a  brigadier-general,  has  the  confidence  of  every 
man  in  his  command  for  the  reason  that  they  recognize 
and  appreciate  capacity.  .  .  .  This  appointment  would  give 
renewed  vigor  and  courage  to  this  section  of  the  army.  I 
am,  as  perhaps  you  know,  a  private  in  the  First  City  Cavalry 
of  Philadelphia,  and  I  never  saw  Colonel  Thomas  until  I 
saw  him  on  parade,  and  our  intercourse  has  only  been  such 
as  exists  between  a  colonel  and  one  of  his  soldiers  ;  hence, 
you  see  my  recommendation  comes  from  pure  motives,  and 
entirely  free  from  social  or  political  considerations.  .  .  .  You 
will  do  the  country  a  service  by  giving  my  letter  a  serious 
consideration."  l  But  it  required  more  than  the  recommen 
dation  of  a  private  soldier,  even  like  Samuel  J.  Randall,  to 
secure  such  an  appointment.  When  the  first  list  came  out, 
among  the  thirty-eight  appointed  as  Brigadier-Generals  of 
Volunteers,  to  date  from  May  17,  1861,  were  Fitz  John 
Porter,  Patterson's  Adjutant-General ;  Charles  P.  Stone,  a 
brigade  commander  ;  George  A.  McCall,  of  the  Pennsylvania 
militia ;  and  Charles  S.  Hamilton,  Colonel  of  a  Wisconsin 
regiment,  all  of  whom  were  in  that  column  ;  to  say  nothing 
of  men  like  Sigel,  and  Prentiss,  and  McClernaiid,  and 
Blenker,  elsewhere  ;  but  the  name  of  Colonel  Thomas,  who 
had  done  more  than  any  other  there,  was  lacking.  It  is 
worthy  of  mention,  also,  that  when,  after  the  disaster  at  Bidl 
Run,  General  Patterson  was  made  the  scapegoat  for  that 
catastrophe,  Thomas  unhesitatingly  took  his  part  in  the 
controversy  that  ensued. 

Early  in  August  General  Robert  Anderson  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland.  He  in 
sisted  on  the  appointment  of  Colonel  Thomas ;  and  it  was  only 
in  consequence  of  his  urgency  that,  on  the  17th  of  August, 
the  latter  was  made  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  and 
assigned  to  that  department,  with  which  he  was  identified  till 

1  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas,  37. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  175 

the  close  of  the  war.  He  stood  55th  in  the  list,  though  in 
the  old  army  he  had  ranked  every  one  of  those  who  became 
his  superiors  in  the  Volunteer  service.  On  the  6th  of 
September  he  reported  for  duty  at  Louisville,  and  from  that 
day  till  the  last  soldier  was  mustered  out,  did  not  have  or 
seek  an  hour's  intermission  from  active  duty.  The  first  work 
in  his  new  department  was  the  organization  and  instruction 
of  the  rawest  of  raw  recruits  from  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 
No  task  could  be  more  irksome  than  the  discipline  of  these 
wild  mountaineers.  Every  one  of  them  deemed  himself 
already  amply  able  to  fight,  and  each  as  good  as  any  other, 
officers  included.  It  was  proper  work  for  the  drill  sergeant, 
not  for  the  general.  But  he  gave  himself  to  it  with  a  patience, 
assiduity  and  faithfulness  which  soon  transformed  the  uncouth 
refugees  into  soldiers  unsurpassed  for  endurance,  courage  and 
energy.  He  had  hardly  reached  Louisville  before  he  found 
that  the  rebel  State  Guard,  under  the  leadership  of  Buckner, 
Breckinridge  and  others,  was  planning  an  encampment  at 
Lexington,  ostensibly  for  drill,  really  to  seize  the  arms  in  the 
arsenal  at  Frankfort  and  subvert  the  State  government. 
Their  purposes  were  similar  to  those  of  the  militia  at  Camp 
Jackson,  in  St.  Louis,  which  was  broken  up  by  General  Lyon 
in  May  previous.  Without  orders  or  advice,  General  Thomas 
silently  marched  a  regiment  to  the  Fair  Ground  the  night 
before  the  day  of  rendezvous.  Thus  without  collision,  he 
defeated  the  scheme.  Breckinridge  and  his  followers  fled 
the  next  night.  This  foresight  and  promptitude  gained  a 
moral  victory  and  unquestionably  prevented  an  effort  —  most 
likely  a  successful  effort  —  at  bloody  revolution  in  the  capital 
of  Kentucky.  It  was  all  done  so  quietly  that  nobody  then 
realized  the  importance  of  the  service  thus  rendered.  It  is 
only  now,  in  the  light  of  history  and  of  all  the  surrounding 
and  subsequent  circumstances,  that  its  value  is  seen.  Great 
reputations  have  sometimes  been  won  for  less  useful  services. 
From  the  outset,  it  had  been  the  purpose  of  the  government 


176     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

to  send  an  expedition  into  East  Tennessee,  to  help  free  that 
beleaguered  and  persecuted  region  from  rebel  oppression. 
Delay  followed  delay,  till  the  coming  of  winter  put  a  stop  to 
further  effort.  General  Thomas  had  moved  as  far  as  Somerset, 
in  southeastern  Kentucky,  —  making  only  seventy-five  miles 
in  eighteen  days,  —  when,  at  daylight  on  the  19th  of  January, 
1862,  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  about  twelve  miles  from 
Cumberland  River,  his  outposts  were  driven  in  by  the  advance 
of  nine  rebel  regiments  of  infantry,  two  battalions  of  cavalry, 
and  two  batteries  of  artillery.  It  was  a  cold,  rainy,  cheerless 
morning.  He  had  with  him  five  regiments  of  infantry,  a 
battery,  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry.  As  the  cavalry  vedettes 
were  attacked,  the  colonel  of  the  advance  regiment  of  infantry, 
after  ordering  the  long  roll  beaten,  rode  back  to  Thomas's 
headquarters,  to  ask  what  he  should  do.  When  Thomas 
reached  the  field,  soon  after,  he  found  the  two  regiments 
which  formed  the  front  line  slowly  falling  back,  their 
ammunition  nearly  exhausted.  His  presence  at  once  gave 
confidence  and  steadiness  to  the  men,  who  needed  only  a 
leader.  Two  other  regiments  soon  arrived,  which,  with  the 
battery,  restored  the  line.  For  some  hours  the  fighting 
continued  without  much  advantage  to  either  side.  About  10 

o 

o'clock,  hearing  of  the  approach  of  two  additional  regiments, 
General  Thomas  ordered  a  charge  by  the  9th  Ohio  —  a 
German  regiment  well  drilled  in  bayonet  exercise  —  on  the 
rebel  left.  About  the  same  time,  General  Zollicoffer, 
commanding  the  rebel  advance,  was  killed.  The  result  was 
instantaneous  and  overwhelming.  The  entire  Confederate 
line  was  thrown  into  confusion  and  began  a  disorderly  retreat, 
which  lasted  till  night.  The  demoralized  remnant  reached 
the  fortifications  on  the  banks  of  the  Cumberland,  from  which 
they  had  marched  the  evening  before  confident  of  the  rout 
or  capture  of  Thomas's  isolated  regiments.  The  pursuit  was 
relentless.  By  dark,  the  works  were  surrounded.  During 
the  night,  such  as  could,  escaped  across  the  river,  leaving 


GENERAL   THOMAS  177 

behind  guns  and  all  their  transportation  and  supplies.  The 
rebel  force  outnumbered  the  Union  troops  nearly  two  to  one. 
They  were  commanded  by  General  George  B.  Crittenden, 
who  had  been  especially  assigned  to  that  post  by  Jefferson 
Davis.  The  Union  loss  was  39  killed,  and  207  wounded. 
The  rebel,  192  kiUed,  309  wounded,  and  157  prisoners, 
besides  12  guns  and  much  property.  The  Confederate  force 
was  so  thoroughly  demoralized  that  it  never  came  together 
again  as  a  separate  organization.  General  Crittenden's 
career  was  ended.  General  Sidney  Johnston,  at  Bowling 
Green  one  hundred  miles  west,  when  he  heard  of  the  disaster, 
wrote  to  Richmond :  "  If  my  right  is  thus  broken,  as  stated, 
East  Tennessee  is  open  to  invasion,  or  if  the  plan  of  the 
enemy  be  a  combined  movement  upon  Nashville,  it  is  in 
jeopardy.  .  .  .  The  country  must  now  be  roused  to  make 
the  greatest  effort  they  will  be  called  on  to  make  during  the 
contest.  .  .  .  Our  people  do  not  comprehend  the  magnitude 
of  the  danger  that  threatens."  l 

To  the  authorities  at  Washington,  the  news  of  the  victory 
came  as  a  burst  of  sunshine  after  a  long  and  stormy  season. 
It  was  the  first  real  triumph  since  the  dreadful  day  at  Bull 
Run.  Stanton  had  not  been  Secretary  of  War  a  week  when 
the  glad  tidings  reached  him.  In  an  exuberant  order,  he 
returned  the  thanks  of  the  President  "  to  the  gallant  officers 
and  soldiers  who  won  that  victory,"  and  promised  that, 
when  the  official  reports  were  received,  "the  military  and 
personal  valor  displayed  in  battle  will  be  acknowledged  and 
rewarded  in  a  fitting  manner." 2  This  promise,  so  far  as 
Thomas  was  concerned,  was  never  fulfilled.  His  name  was 
not  mentioned  in  orders  then  or  afterward.  Three  regimental 
commanders,  were,  indeed,  made  brigadier-generals,  one  of 
whom  had  so  acted  that  General  Thomas  ever  after  refused 
to  hold  any  intercourse  with  him.  Even  the  commissions 
that  were  granted  did  not  bear  date  from  the  battle  for  which 
1  7W.  B.,844.  2  7W.R.,  102. 


178     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

they  were  conferred ;  while  the  organizer  and  leader,  whose 
presence  and  conduct  alone  made  victory  possible,  was  forgot 
ten  or  overlooked. 

Immediately  following  this  brilliant  victory  came  the  move 
ment  against  Fort  Donelsoii,  and  Grant's  great  triumph  there. 
The  East  Tennessee  expedition  was  recalled  and  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  marched  to  Nashville,  and  thence  to  the 
field  of  Shiloh.  In  this  last  movement  Thomas's  division 
was  in  the  rear,  and  did  not  reach  the  Tennessee  Eiver  till 
the  battle  was  over.  Later,  when  Halleck  took  the  field,  he 
so  reorganized  the  forces  that  Thomas  was  placed  in  com 
mand  of  the  right  wing,  made  up  of  his  own  division  and  the 
bulk  of  Grant's  Shiloh  army.  He  thus,  practically,  super 
seded  Grant,  who  was  made  second  in  command,  a  position 
that  gave  him  neither  power  nor  responsibility.  Undoubt 
edly,  here  began  that  misunderstanding,  or  lack  of  good 
understanding,  between  the  two  generals  which  was  never 
cleared  up,  and  which  operated  greatly  to  the  detriment  of 
the  service.  They  ought  to  have  been  the  closest  of  friends. 
If  Thomas,  rather  than  Sherman,  had  been  Grant's  chosen 
lieutenant  in  the  great  campaigns  which  followed,  it  is  im 
possible  not  to  believe  that  their  results  would  have  been  far 
more  effective.  But  Thomas  had  not  the  arts  of  the  cour 
tier  ;  and  Grant  brooded  over  the  slights  which  Halleck  had 
put  upon  him,  and  for  which  Thomas  was  made  the  vicarious 
sufferer. 

On  the  25th  of  April,  1862,  on  the  recommendation  of 
Buell  and  Halleck,  Thomas  was  made  Major-General  of  Vol 
unteers  to  fill  the  vacancy  caused  by  the  death  of  C.  F.  Smith. 
In  June,  after  the  occupancy  of  Corinth,  he  was  relieved  at 
his  own  desire  from  the  command  of  the  five  divisions 
of  the  right  wing,  and  with  his  old  division  rejoined  BuelTs 
army.  From  the  1st  of  July  to  the  1st  of  October,  that 
army  underwent  as  arduous,  and,  as  it  then  seemed  to  them, 
as  purposeless  hardships  as  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  soldiers. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  179 

Leaving  Corinth  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  occupying 
Chattanooga,  it  found  itself,  on  the  1st  of  October,  at 
Louisville,  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles  in  the  rear  of  its 
original  destination.  Here  the  command  of  the  army  was  con 
ferred  on  Thomas.1  His  answer  was :  "  General  Buell's  prep 
arations  have  been  completed  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and 
I  therefore  respectfully  ask  that  he  may  be  retained  in  com 
mand.  My  position  is  very  embarrassing,  not  being  so  well 
informed  as  I  should  be  as  the  commander  of  this  army,  on 
the  assumption  of  such  responsibility."  2  General  Buell  was 
accordingly  continued  in  command.  Under  him  was  fought, 
on  the  8th  of  October,  the  important  and  successful  battle 
of  Perryville,  in  which  the  troops  with  Thomas  were  not  en 
gaged.  On  the  30th,  Buell  was  superseded  by  Rosecrans. 
It  is  not  easy  to  see  why,  if  Thomas  was  the  fit  man  to  super 
sede  Buell  on  the  24th  of  September,  another  should  have 
been  designated  on  the  30th  of  October.  But  he  accepted 
the  choice  loyally,  not  without  a  protest,  however,  against 
having  a  junior  in  rank  placed  over  him  ; 3  a  protest  nullified 
by  the  arbitrary  antedating  of  Rosecrans's  appointment  as 
Major-General,  from  its  original  day,  August  16,  to  the 
21st  of  March.  Under  its  new  commander,  the  army  re 
turned  to  Tennessee,  the  leading  division  reaching  Nashville 
on  the  7th  of  November.  Thomas',  who  during  the  early 
summer  had  made  himself  thoroughly  familiar  with  all  the 
approaches  to  Chattanooga,  advocated  an  immediate  advance, 
at  least  to  the  Cumberland  mountains,  and  presented  a  plan 
for  the  movement,  substantially  that  which  was  followed  so 
successfully  six  months  later.4  But  it  was  received  in  silence. 
No  attempt  at  advance  was  made  till  the  end  of  December, 
when  the  enemy  were  found  concentrated  and  fortified  at 
Murfreesboro'. 

In  the  bloody  and  long  continued  battle  of  Stone's  River, 
fought  near  that  place  in  the  closing  hours  of  1862  and  the 

1  23  W.  R.,  539.  2  Ib.t  555.  3  J6.,  657.  4  30  W.  R.,  61. 


180     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

opening  days  of  1863,  Thomas  commanded  the  centre.  His 
whole  force  consisted  of  five  divisions;  but  only  two  were 
with  him  during  the  first  day's  fight,  and  a  single  additional 
brigade  joined  him  the  second  day.  Within  an  hour  after 
the  opening  of  the  battle  at  daybreak  of  December  31,  the 
whole  right  wing  of  the  Union  army  was  driven  from  the  field, 
half  of  it  in  dire  confusion.  On  the  action  of  Thomas's  two 
divisions  then  depended  the  fate  of  the  day.  As  Sheridan, 
whose  division  joined  Thomas's  right,  and  who  maintained 
his  organization  unbroken,  was  driven  back  by  overwhelming 
numbers,  —  his  ammunition  exhausted,  his  three  brigade  com 
manders  dead  on  the  field,  and  nearly  one-third  of  his  men 
killed  or  wounded,  —  Thomas  met  the  shock  with  unmoved 
firmness.  He  had  sent  forward  a  brigade  to  relieve  the  pres 
sure  upon  Sheridan ;  and,  when  this  was  also  forced  back, 
the  rest  of  his  line  was  ready  and  held  its  ground.  His 
whole  force  in  action  numbered  about  11,000  men.  His  loss 
was  2,678,  more  than  twenty-four  per  cent.  One  of  his  bri 
gades  lost  over  forty  per  cent.  Alone  of  all  the  troops  in 
line  that  morning,  except  the  division  that  joined  his  left,  he 
was  unshaken  by  any  assault ;  and  continued  to  hold  the 
ground  he  had  chosen  till  the  enemy,  three  days  later,  aban 
doned  the  field.  It  was  a  brigade  of  his,  also,  which,  on  the 
afternoon  of  January  2,  charged  across  the  river,  captured 
a  battery,  and  so  shattered  Breckinridge's  division,  which 
had  been  sent  against  Rosecrans's  left  flank,  that  Bragg  felt 
compelled  to  order  the  retreat  of  his  whole  army,  —  leaving 
the  Union  forces  in  possession  of  the  field. 

Not  merely  in  the  storm  of  the  battle  was  Thomas  firm 
and  immovable.  In  the  anxious  and  sorrowful  council 
of  war  held  by  the  commanding  general  on  the  night  of 
December  31,  amidst  the  wreck  of  the  Union  forces,  when 
the  question  was  discussed  of  maintaining  the  ground,  or 
of  retreating  to  Nashville  or  elsewhere,  his  mind  was  equally 
fixed.  During  most  of  the  discussion  he  was  fast  asleep. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  181 

When  waked  with  the  question  of  whether  he  could  cover 
the  rear  of  the  retiring  army,  his  sole  answer  was,  "  This 
army  can't  retreat,"  and  he  went  to  sleep  again. 

It  was  near  the  end  of  June  before  the  advance  from 
Murf reesboro'  began.  By  a  series  of  most  skilful  manoeuvres, 
the  enemy,  in  the  space  of  two  weeks,  was  forced  across  the 
Tennessee  River  into  Chattanooga.  Another  halt  of  six 
weeks  followed.  On  the  16th  of  August  began  the  move 
ment  which,  a  month  later,  culminated  in  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga.  In  this  battle,  by  the  universal  testimony 
of  friends  and  foes,  Thomas's  heroic  and  inspiring  leadership 
saved  the  army  from  final  destruction.  But,  what  is  of  equal 
consequence,  his  action  at  the  very  opening  of  the  contest,  by 
his  unordered  and  unexpected  assault  on  the  enemy's  right, 
prevented  the  accomplishment  of  Bragg's  cherished  purpose 
of  placing  his  own  army  between  Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga, 
and  so  cutting  off  all  communication  between  the  Union  force 
and  its  only  base  of  supplies.  This  early  collision  was  acci 
dental  and  unanticipated.  But  the  promptness  with  which 
Thomas  took  advantage  of  the  unlocked  for  collision,  and 
turned  it  to  good  account,  showed  great  generalship.  The 
same  great  generalship  marks  every  stage  of  the  encounter 
on  his  part.  General  Garfield's  telegraphic  report,  written 
at  8.40  on  the  night  of  September  20,  when  fresh  from 
the  sight  of  the  heroic  defence,  shows  us  the  final  result 
in  a  few  strong  words :  "  General  Thomas  has  fought  a 
most  terrific  battle  and  has  damaged  the  enemy  badly.  .  .  . 
Longstreet's  Virginians  have  got  their  bellies  full.  ...  I 
believe  we  can  now  crown  the  whole  battle  with  victory."  1 
And  Mr.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  also 
on  the  ground,  telegraphed  to  Washington :  "  Our  troops 
were  as  immovable  as  the  rocks  they  stood  on.  ...  Thomas 
seemed  to  have  filled  every  soldier  with  his  own  unconquerable 
firmness."2  When,  at  dark,  under  orders  from  General 
1  50  W.  R-,  145.  2  Ib.,  194-195. 


182     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Eosecrans  in  Chattanooga,  the  army  fell  back  to  Eossville, 
every  man  in  it  knew  and  felt  that  Thomas  was,  indeed,  "  the 
Rock  of  Chickamauga." 

It  has  sometimes  been  intimated  that  the  "Western  armies 
were  successful  because  they  did  not  encounter  such  troops 
as  Lee  commanded  in  Virginia.  Comparisons  of  this  kind 
are  of  little  value,  since,  in  each  army,  Eastern  and  Western 
troops  were  intermingled.  When  Longstreet's  corps,  which 
had  been  counted  the  flower  of  Lee's  army,  on  the  afternoon 
of  September  20,  —  led  by  such  division  commanders  as 
Hood  and  Kershaw,  and  others  equally  gallant,  —  after  the 
rout  and  dispersion  of  Eosecrans's  right  wing,  surged  up 
against  the  semi-circle  of  men  of  whom  Thomas  was  the 
centre,  with  ranks  thinned,  and  ammunition  reduced,  with 
few  cannon  and  no  reserves,  everything  gone  but  manhood 
and  the  ground  they  stood  on,  —  it  recoiled  from  those 
invincible  lines,  as  completely  baffled  and  broken  as  when, 
nearly  three  months  earlier,  the  remnant  of  Piekett's  men, 
mowed  down  by  the  fire  of  a  hundred  guns,  and  assaulted 
front  and  flank,  drifted  back  from  the  heights  of  Cemetery 
Eidge  and  gave  up  the  field  of  Gettysburg.  Nor,  later  still, 
did  the  same  troops  meet  any  better  success  in  their  attempt 
to  capture  Knoxville.  These  were  the  only  occasions  when 
any  of  Lee's  troops  encountered  the  armies  of  the  West. 
The  result  was  not  encouraging.  Longstreet's  loss,  killed, 
wounded  and  missing,  on  the  20th  of  September,  was  7,866 
out  of  22,882  engaged;  nearly  thirty-five  per  cent,  of  the 
number  taken  into  action. 

A  month  after  Chickamauga,  on  the  20th  of  October, 
General  Thomas  superseded  General  Eosecrans.  He  accepted 
the  command  reluctantly ;  not  through  any  false  modesty  as 
to  his  own  capacity  or  fitness,  but  because  he  believed  that 
Eosecrans  ought  to  be  permitted  to  work  out  his  plans  for 
the  supplying  of  his  army.  This,  however,  was  not  left  to 
any  option.  Both  the  War  Department  and  General  Grant 


GENERAL   THOMAS  183 

were  of  opinion  that,  at  all  events,  Rosecrans  should  be 
relieved.  On  the  30th  of  September,  the  Secretary  of  War 
had  written  to  Mr.  Dana :  "  The  merit  of  General  Thomas 
and  the  debt  of  gratitude  the  nation  owes  to  his  valor  and 
skill  are  fully  appreciated  here,  and  I  wish  you  to  tell  him 
so.  It  was  not  my  fault  that  he  was  not  in  chief  command 
months  ago."  1  He  was  thus,  for  the  first  time,  in  a  position 
to  show,  on  a  large  scale,  his  capacity  as  a  general.  But  the 
post  was  soon  made  far  from  independent.  Simultaneously 
with  his  assignment,  General  Grant  was  made  Commander 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  came  to 
Chattanooga  to  give  his  personal  oversight  to  matters  there. 
Thus,  while  Thomas  was  held  to  all  the  responsibilities  at  a 
critical  juncture,  he  was  so  directly  under  the  eye  of  his 
superior  as  to  impede,  or  repress,  proper  freedom  of  action, 
especially  in  view  of  the  known  prejudice  entertained  by 
Grant.  His  situation  was  much  like  that  of  General 
Meade,  after  Grant,  as  General-in-Chief,  took  the  field  in 
Virginia.  Before  Grant's  arrival,  Thomas,  as  the  result  of 
the  observations  of  General  W.  F.  Smith,  had  elaborated  a 
plan  for  shortening  the  wagon  haul  between  Chattanooga 
and  Bridgeport  to  only  eight  miles,  by  using  Brown's  Ferry, 
hitherto  held  by  the  enemy,  and  by  calling  up  to  Wauhatchie 
a  part  of  the  troops  sent  from  Virginia  under  General  Hooker. 
The  great  problem  at  Chattanooga  was  how  to  get  meat  and 
drink.  This  Thomas  soon  solved,  so  that,  on  the  31st  of 
October,  he  joyfully  announced  to  Halleck :  "  We  can  easily 
subsist  ourselves  now,  and  will  soon  be  in  good  condition."  2 
The  results  of  this  plan  were  equal  to  a  great  victory,  and 
success  was  gained  by  a  Union  loss  of  only  82  killed  and 
344  wounded,  the  greater  part  of  the  loss  being  met  in  a 
night  attack  made  on  Hooker,  in  Lookout  Valley,  in  which 
our  late  associate,  General  Underwood,  received  his  serious 
and  disabling  wound. 

1  52  W.  R.,  940.  2  54  W.  R.,  41. 


184     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

If  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  displayed  Thomas's  quality 
in  defensive  action,  Missionary  Ridge  showed  his  offensive 
ability  in  an  equally  high  degree.  The  opening  of  this  great 
action  was  delayed  four  days  to  enable  Sherman's  belated 
columns  to  reach  the  designated  spot.  On  the  18th  of 
November,  orders  had  been  issued  "  for  attacking  the 
enemy's  position  on  Missionary  Ridge  by  Saturday  [the 
21st]  at  daylight."  l  Thomas's  duty  was  to  "  co-operate  with 
Sherman,"  by  having  his  troops  well  concentrated  on  his  left 
flank,  "  toward  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge."  2 
The  brunt  of  the  action  was  to  be  borne  by  Sherman.  As 
he  was  still  far  in  the  rear,  the  execution  of  these  orders  was 
postponed.  On  the  night  of  the  22d,  a  deserter  from  the  enemy 
reported  Bragg  as  retreating.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
23d,  Thomas  was  ordered  "  to  ascertain  at  once  the  truth  or 
falsity"  of  his  story.3  Under  this  order,  he  advanced  with 
the  two  divisions  of  Wood  and  Sheridan,  drove  the  enemy 
from  Orchard  Knob  "  in  the  most  gallant  style,"  4  and  thus 
gained  a  commanding  position,  half  way  to  the  Ridge,  which 
enabled  him,  after  Sherman's  repulse,  on  the  25th  to  carry 
the  steep  heights  in  his  front.  lie  showed  his  usual  timeli 
ness  of  action,  by  "  having  done  on  the  23d  what,"  Grant 
says,  "was  intended  for  the  24th."5  The  truth  or  falsity 
of  the  deserter's  story  could  easily  have  been  ascertained  by 
the  reconnoissance  of  a  single  brigade,  or  less.  It  was  the 
ample  manner  in  which  the  preliminary  work  was  done 
under  his  provident  direction  which  secured  the  final  triumph. 
It  is  generally  represented  that  the  battle  was  carried  out 
exactly  as  planned  by  General  Grant.  Nothing  could  be 
more  unjust  either  to  Grant  or  Thomas  than  such  represen 
tation.  Grant's  plan  was  most  admirable  and  skilful.  He 
meant  to  turn  Bragg's  right  by  sending  Sherman's  army 
against  it,  on  the  north  end  of  the  Ridge;  and  then,  by 
rapidly  following  up  his  advantage,  gain  the  whole  Chicka- 

1  55  W.  II.,  31.          2  16.          3  Ib.,  32,  41.          4  16.,  32-33.         5  16.,  33. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  185 

manga  Valley,  at  Bragg' s  rear,  and  so  cnt  off  his  retreat. 
The  work  assigned  to  Thomas  was  to  hold  Bragg's  centre, 
along  the  summit  of  the  Ridge.  General  Thomas,  in  his 
report,  modestly  says  :  "  The  original  plan  of  operations  was 
somewhat  modified  to  meet  and  take  the  best  advantage  of 
emergencies,  which  necessitated  material  modifications  of  the 
plan.  It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  original  plan,  had  it 
been  carried  out,  could  not  possibly  have  led  to  more  success 
ful  results."  l  It  could  hardly  have  led  to  a  more  decisive 
victory ;  but  if  Sherman  and  Hooker  had  succeeded,  as  Grant 
meant  they  should,  in  gaining  Bragg's  rear,  the  results  might 
have  been  more  successful,  since  the  greater  part  of  Bragg's 
army  might  thus  have  been  captured.  Grant  never  meant, 
and  never  ordered,  an  assault  upon  Missionary  Ridge  by  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  November,  four  days  later 
than  Grant  had  planned  for,  General  Sherman  was  lying  with 
his  troops  across  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge.  His 
whole  command,  four  divisions  and  a  brigade,  numbered 
24,915  men.  With  these  at  his  call,  he  made  an  unsuccess 
ful  assault  upon  the  rebel  lines,  manned  by  18,200  men.  His 
losses  amounted  to  202  killed,  1,094  wounded,  288  missing  ; 
a  total  of  1,584.  The  rebel  loss  in  his  front  was  142  killed, 
952  wounded,  216  prisoners ;  a  total  of  1,310.  The  force 
with  which,  in  the  afternoon,  Thomas  assaulted  the  face  of 
the  Ridge,  amounted  to  24,536  men.  Opposed  to  him,  in 
their  fortified  works  on  the  summit,  and  in  the  double  line  of 
rifle-pits  at  the  foot  and  half  way  up  the  Ridge,  were  19,333 
men.  The  rebel  loss  in  this  successful  assault  was  221  killed, 
1,228  wounded,  3,920  prisoners ;  a  total  of  5,369.  The 
Union  loss  was  416  killed,  2,834  wounded,  20  missing ;  a 
total  of  3,270.  It  was  the  work  of  one  hour  and  five 
minutes  from  the  firing  of  the  signal  guns.  Sherman's  loss, 
killed  and  wounded,  was  less  than  seven  per  cent. ;  Thomas's 

1  55  W.  R.,  90,  97. 


186     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

more  than  thirteen  per  cent,  of  the  forces  engaged.  The 
rebel  loss,  killed  and  wounded,  in  Sherman's  front,  was  six 
per  cent.  ;  in  Thomas's,  eight  per  cent,  of  the  forces  engaged. 
Both  Grant  and  Sherman  represent  that  the  lines  in  front  of 
Thomas  were  weakened,  to  enable  the  rebels  to  mass  against 
Sherman.  This  assertion  is  clearly  disproved  by  the  official 
records,  which  locate  every  part  and  movement  of  the  rebel 
forces.  The  troops  that  operated  against  Sherman  were  those 
which,  the  day  and  night  before,  evacuated  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  and  those  which  had  been  in  Chickamauga  and  Chatta 
nooga  valleys.  The  forces  on  Missionary  Ridge,  in  front  of 
Thomas,  was  not  weakened  by  a  single  man  during  the  three 
days  of  preparation  and  combat,  except  as  they  were  killed, 
wounded  or  captured  by  Thomas.  In  his  movement  against 
the  north  end  of  the  Ridge,  Sherman  had  more  men  under 
his  command  than  Thomas  had  for  his  movement ;  and  to 
Sherman  was  assigned  the  task  of  making  the  successful 
assault.  The  number  of  men  he  had  to  encounter  was  less 
than  that  which  confronted  Thomas.  General  Bragg,  in  his 
report,  says  the  position  carried  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  "  was  one  which  ought  to  have  been  held  by  a  line  of 
skirmishers  against  any  assaulting  column."  l 

The  charge  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  up  the  steep 
slope  of  Missionary  Ridge  was,  indeed,  unordered  and  unex 
pected  by  the  commanding  general.  The  men  themselves 
began  it  by  an  uncontrollable  impulse.  In  that  respect  it 
was  not  the  work  of  any  general.  But  if  those  men  had 
been  trained  under  a  general  of  less  heroic  mould,  would  they 
have  undertaken,  or  executed,  an  enterprise  so  hazardous  as 
to  be  almost  impossible  ?  It  was  the  confident  spirit  with 
which  General  Thomas  had  inspired  them  which  made  the 
impulse  unconquerable  and  the  action  successful.  To  quote 
Mr.  Dana  again :  "  The  storming  of  the  Ridge  by  our 
troops  was  one  of  the  greatest  miracles  in  military  history. 

i  55  W.  R,  GG6. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  187 

.  .  .  Neither  Grant  nor  Thomas  intended  it.  ...  The 
unaccountable  spirit  of  the  troops  bore  them  bodily  up  those 
impracticable  steeps,  over  the  bristling  rifle-pits  on  the  crest, 
and  the  thirty  cannon  enfilading  every  gully.  .  .  .  The 
generals  caught  the  inspiration  of  the  men,  and  were  ready 
themselves  to  undertake  impossibilities."  l  Even  while  the 
shouts  of  victory  were  still  filling  the  air,  the  shrill  whistle 
of  the  first  steamboat,  loaded  with  supplies,  coming  up  the 
reopened  river,  told  the  story  of  future  plenty,  after  the  long 
starvation ;  and  added  another  proof,  if  one  were  needed, 
to  the  willing  minds  of  his  enthusiastic  soldiers,  that  their 
commander  could  feed  as  well  as  fight  them.  It  was  the 
final  test  alike  of  his  greatness  in  battle  and  his  providence 
in  the  care  of  them. 

When,  on  the  3d  of  March,  1864,  Grant  was  made 
Lieutenant-General,  it  was  natural  that  he  should  secure  the 
assignment  of  Sherman  as  his  successor  in  the  command  of 
the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi.  Thus  Thomas  was 
again  placed  under  command,  not  merely  of  his  junior  in 
rank,  but  of  one  who  had  served  under  him  during  the 
advance  on  Corinth.  But  he  entered  as  heartily  upon  the 
work  of  the  new  campaign  as  though  he  himself  were  com 
manding  general.  The  Confederate  Army,  now  under  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  lay  at  Dalton,x  thirty  miles  southeast  of 
Chattanooga. 

On  the  28th  of  February,  Thomas  submitted  to  General 
Grant,  then  commanding  the  Military  Division,  a  proposition 
based  on  a  reconnoissance  from  which  he  had  just  returned, 
for  a  movement  with  his  own  army  against  the  enemy,  which, 
he  believed,  would  overcome  all  opposition  as  far,  at  least,  as 
Atlanta.2  His  first  move,  in  the  plan  he  submitted,  was 
identical  with  that  afterward  unsuccessfully  attempted  by 
General  Sherman :  that  is,  to  hold  Johnston  at  Dalton 

1  55  W.  R.,  69. 

2  58  W.  R.,  489  ;  C.  W.  1  Sup.,  Thomas's  Report,  197,  201-202. 


188      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

by  a  demonstration  at  Buzzard  Roost,  and  by  a  rapid  and 
secret  movement  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  with  the  bulk  of 
his  army,  seize  Resaca,  cut  the  rebel  communications  and  then 
overthrow  the  enemy.  That  such  a  movement  would  have 
been  successful,  nobody  who  carefully  studies  the  physical 
features  of  the  country  and  the  situation  of  things  at  the 
time  can  doubt.  Folk's  corps  and  a  division  from  Mississippi 
had  not  yet  joined  Johnston,  and  would  have  been  entirely  cut 
off  from  making  the  junction.  Sherman  borrowed  this  plan, 
but  bungled  in  carrying  it  out.  Instead  of  throwing  the 
bulk  of  his  army  through  the  Gap  upon  Resaca  as  Thomas 
intended,  he  held  most  of  it  about  Buzzard  Roost,  and  along 
the  inaccessible  palisades  to  its  right  and  left.  Then  he  sent 
less  than  a  quarter  part  through  the  Gap.  This  quarter, 
under  McPherson,  finding  the  task  more  hazardous  and  of 
greater  magnitude  than  had  been  anticipated,  instead  of 
seizing  Resaca  returned  to  the  Gap,  fortified  it,  and  waited 
for  re-enforcements.  The  whole  scheme  was  thus  revealed 
to  Johnston,  who,  finding  the  road  still  open,  prudently  and 
safely  withdrew.  A  bloody  and  indecisive  battle  of  two 
days  followed,  and  Johnston  again  withdrew  without  loss  of 
men  or  material  except  such  as  were  destroyed  in  the  fight. 
Had  General  Thomas's  scheme  been  properly  carried  out, 
Johnston's  army  ought,  by  every  rule  of  warfare,  to  have 
been  entirely  cut  off  from  its  base,  and  scattered  in  disorder 
through  the  inhospitable  mountains  of  northern  Georgia  and 
the  western  Carolinas,  within  one  week  after  the  opening  of 
the  campaign.  Sherman's  obstinate  determination  to  gain 
for  his  own  old  and  smaller  army  all  the  glory  of  the  anti 
cipated  triumph,  alone  prevented  the  consummation  of  so 
decisive  a  result.  Of  the  combined  aggregate  of  100,000  men 
under  his  command,  McPherson  had  25,000  and  Schofield 
14,000;  while  Thomas  had  61,000,  —  nearly  two  thirds  of 
the  whole.  Yet  each  of  these  separate  armies  was  treated  as 
on  the  same  footing,  though  when  hard  work  was  to  be  done 


GENERAL   THOMAS  189 

the  figures  show  that  most  of  it  fell  on  Thomas.  His  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  during  the  campaign,  prudent  and  saving 
of  life  as  he  always  was,  amounted  to  thirty-two  per  cent,  of 
his  original  force  ;  while  McPherson's  was  twenty-six  per 
cent.,  and  Schofield's  less  than  sixteen. 

The  only  successful  assault  made  upon  the  enemy's  lines 
was  by  Thomas's  old  corps,  —  the  Fourteenth,  —  at  the  battle 
of  Jonesborough,  on  the  1st  of  September,  resulting  in  the 
utter  rout  of  the  rebels,  and  the  capture  of  Govan's  brigade. 
That  night  Atlanta  was  abandoned,  and  the  next  morning 
the  city  was  surrendered  to  the  Twentieth  Corps.  The  great 
campaign  ended,  as  that  of  Halleck  against  Corinth  more 
than  two  years  before  had  ended,  with  the  occupation  of  the 
abandoned  city.  But  there  was  no  diminution  of  courage  or 
enterprise  in  the  rebel  army.  During  this  campaign,  General 
Thomas's  army  participated  in  all  the  battles,  except  that  of 
the  22d  of  July,  in  which  McPherson  was  killed.  From  all 
share  in  this  it  was  withheld  by  General  Sherman,  on  the 
expressed  ground  that  "  if  any  assistance  were  rendered  by 
either  of  the  other  armies,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  would 
be  jerJous."1  All  day  long,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
under  Thomas,  lay  within  hearing  of  that  desperate  encoun 
ter,  and  in  sight  of  its  smoke,  —  close  to  the  fortifications  of 
Atlanta,  held  mainly  by  Georgia  '  militia,  —  longing  and 
wondering  for  the  word  which  should  send  them  over  the 
works,  and  through  the  beleaguered  city,  upon  the  rear  of 
the  force  so  vehemently  assailing  the  Tennessee  army  under 
Logan.  The  word  never  came.  The  enemy  withdrew  into 
the  city,  which  they  held  for  six  weeks  longer.  The  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  was  spared  the  infliction  of  that  pang, 
which,  to  General  Sherman's  fancy,  could  not  be  assuaged 
even  by  the  capture  of  the  town,  or  the  overthrow  of  the 
enemy. 

General  Thomas,  on  this  campaign,  shared  with  the  other 

1  2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  82. 


190     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

commanders  in  the  battle  of  Resaca,  the  assault  on  Kenesaw, 
and  the  engagements  of  Ezra  Church  and  Jonesborough.  At 
New  Hope  Church,  Pickett's  Mill,  Kolb's  Farm,  Marietta, 
Vining's  Station  and  Peach  Tree  Creek,  his  army  fought 
unaided.  At  Peach  Tree  Creek,  on  the  20th  of  July,  Hood 
signalized  his  assumption  of  command  by  a  most  determined 
and  persistent  attack  upon  a  part  of  Thomas's  force,  while 
in  the  act  of  crossing  the  Creek.  The  assault  was  made 
substantially  by  the  same  force  that,  two  days  later,  fell 
upon  McPherson.  It  was  even  more  signally  repulsed.  The 
attack  fell  mainly  upon  five  divisions,  — three  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps,  and  one  each  of  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth.  General 
Thomas  was  at  the  very  front  when  the  assault  began.  He 
aided  personally  in  arranging  the  lines  and  placing  the  guns. 
Hood  never  fought  with  greater  desperation,  or  was  more 
decisively  repulsed.  The  Union  loss  was  over  1,800  ;  that 
of  the  rebels  was  estimated  at  7,000.  To  this  most  spirited 
engagement,  in  which  as  many  men  were  engaged  as  in  that 
of  July  22d,  and  the  results  of  which  were  equally  impor 
tant,  General  Sherman  makes  only  the  faintest  allusion  in  his 
report.  In  his  Memoirs,  he  dismisses  it  with  about  the  same 
number  of  lines  as  he  gives  pages  to  the  latter,  —  in  which 
the  Union  loss  was  less  than  2,000,  and  the  rebel  loss 
estimated  at  10,000.  It  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at,  that, 
with  such  historians,  General  Thomas  has  failed  to  receive 
just  recognition.  The  publication  of  the  Official  Records  will 
alone  afford  means  of  learning  the  truth.  Meantime,  a 
whole  generation  has  grown  up,  whose  chief  sources  of  infor 
mation  about  the  great  events  in  which  he  bore  so  leading  a 
part  are  the  partial  and  imperfect  accounts  given  by  Grant 
and  Sherman ;  Grant,  misled  by  those  to  whom  he  entrusted 
the  collection  and  arrangement  of  the  records ;  Sherman,  by 
his  own  prejudice,  and  his  amazing  indifference  to  historic 
truthfulness. 

Soon  after  the  occupancy  of  Atlanta  by  the  Union  forces, 


GENERAL   THOMAS  191 

General  Thomas  proposed  to  General  Sherman  to  take  his 
army  and  inarch  to  the  sea.1  This  suggestion  was  declined, 
as  that  for  the  movement  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  in  the 
early  spring  had  been.  Instead,  on  the  29th  of  September, 
Thomas  was  sent  back  to  Tennessee,  with  only  two  divisions 
of  infantry,  to  oversee  the  petty  task  of  expelling  the  guerrilla 
band  of  Forrest,  who  was  playing  havoc  in  that  State.  The 
work  was  speedily  accomplished,  and  General  Thomas  pre 
pared  to  return  to  Atlanta,  where  he  had  left  his  personal 
effects,  his  headquarters  and  most  of  Ins  staff.  But  when 
Sherman  finally  determined  to  lead  the  army  to  the  sea  him 
self,  he  ordered  Thomas  to  remain  in  the  rear,  —  soon  to  be 
come  the  only  front  of  battle.  Selecting  for  his  own  use  the 
two  largest  of  Thomas's  corps,  numbering  about  30,000 
infantry,  and  all  his  mounted  cavalry,  more  than  5,000, 
Sherman  left,  to  defend  Tennessee,  his  two  weakest  corps,  — 
together  numbering  about  22,000  infantry  with  4,000  dis 
mounted  cavalry.  These  two  corps  were  of  separate  armies, 
and  had  never  operated  together,  except  that  each  had  served 
on  the  Atlanta  campaign.  How,  at  last,  with  a  noble  rem 
nant  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  under  A.  J.  Smith,  and  the  newly 
organized  and  remounted  cavalry,  under  General  Wilson,  he 
welded  them  all,  in  an  incredibly  short  time,  into  a  powerful 
and  homogeneous  army,  and  at  Nashville  destroyed  the  force 
which  Sherman  with  nearly  three  times  the  number  had 
failed  to  overthrow,  has  before  been  told.2 

This  battle  of  Nashville  was  the  last,  as  the  battle  of  Mill 
Spring  was  the  first,  of  the  great  victories  in  the  southwest. 
In  each,  General  Thomas  was  in  chief  command.  The  plan 
and  execution  of  both  were  his.  As  they  were  the  only  bat 
tles  for  which  he  alone  bore  the  sole  responsibility,  his  chief 
claim  to  generalship  must  rest  upon  them.  Without  going 

1  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas,  255. 

2  Colonel  Stone's  accounts  of  the  battles  of  Franklin  and  Nashville  will  be 
published  in  this  series  of  Papers  of  the  Military  Historical  Society.  —  EDITOR. 


192     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

into  a  detailed  analysis,  it  is  enough  to  say  that,  in  each, 
he  annihilated  his  opponent.  In  the  first,  he  was  consider 
ably  outnumbered  ;  in  the  last,  his  own  slight  superiority  in 
numbers  was  more  than  offset  by  the  strongly  fortified  position 
of  the  enemy.  In  the  first  he  changed  his  tactics,  at  the  criti 
cal  moment,  from  defensive  to  offensive,  with  striking  success ; 
in  the  last,  he  was  on  the  offensive  from  beginning  to  end. 
The  impression  that  the  enemy  did  not  fight  with  spirit 
and  determination  at  Nashville  is  not  sustained  by  the  facts. 
It  is  true,  the  loss  of  life  was  less  than  in  many  other  battles 
not  so  persistently  fought.  This  argues  the  greater  skill  on 
his  part,  in  the  planning  and  execution  of  the  work,  so  as  to 
produce  decisive  results  with  comparatively  little  bloodshed. 
The  capture  of  over  10,000  prisoners,  —  nearly  one-third  the 
enemy's  whole  force,  —  with  seventy-two  guns,  is,  I  think, 
unprecedented  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  in  an  open 
field  fight,  between  nearly  equal  numbers,  and  where  the 
enemy  had  command  of  more  than  one  line  of  retreat.  The 
captures  at  Fort  Donelson  and  Vicksburg  were  of  fortified 
places,  so  completely  invested  that  escape  was  impossible. 
Not  even  Sheridan,  in  the  Valley  or  at  Five  Forks,  won  a 
more  overwhelming  victory  than  Thomas  at  Nashville,  or 
showed  greater  energy  and  vigor  in  assault  or  pursuit ;  and 
the  preponderance  of  numbers  was  decidedly  greater  in 
Sheridan's  case. 

It  is  true,  Thomas  did  not  completely  cut  off  Hood  after 
the  battle,  as  Grant  did  Lee  after  Petersburg.  But  all  the 
circumstances  were  widely  different.  When  Grant's  pursuit 
began,  he  certainly  outnumbered  the  enemy  more  than  two  to 
one ;  and  a  large  part  of  his  force  was  already  well  advanced 
beyond  Lee's  right  flank.  He  had  choice  of  several  roads 
parallel  to  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat ;  whatever  streams 
he  had  to  cross  were  fordable,  and  it  was  warm  and  bright 
spring  weather.  Thomas,  on  the  contrary,  had  but  a  single 
line  of  pursuit,  which  the  enemy  had  already  desolated ;  he 


GENERAL   THOMAS  193 

had  at  least  two  formidable  streams  to  cross  before  reaching 

o 

the  Tennessee  Eiver.  It  was  midwinter  and  the  weather 
was  freezing  cold ;  his  pursuing  force  was  scarcely  superior 
to  that  of  the  enemy  in  numbers,  and  his  pontoniers  were 
untrained  and  soon  became  benumbed  in  the  icy  streams. 
Besides  that,  his  most  promising  plan  for  the  capture  of 
Hood's  army  came  to  nought,  through  caiises  entirely  beyond 
his  control.  He  had  sent  by  rail  immediately  after  the  bat 
tle,  through  Stevenson  and  Decatur,  a  sufficient  force  under 
General  Steedman,  his  most  energetic  division  commander, 
to  occupy  the  south  bank  of  the  Tennessee  to  confront  Hood 
as  he  should  cross,  and  compel  his  surrender.  To  the 
success  of  such  a  scheme  every  hour  was  vital ;  and  if,  by 
an  appearance  of  dilatoriness  in  immediate  pursuit,  he  could 
persuade  Hood  to  delay  a  little,  the  chances  of  Steedman's 
success  would  be  greatly  increased.  Steedman  was  detained 
at  Murfreesboro',  through  what  he  denounced  as  "  the  crim 
inal  negligence,  incompetency  and  indifference  of  a  portion 
of  the  railroad  employes,"  1  nearly  forty-eight  hours.  On  the 
27th  his  whole  force  was  across  the  river,  within  striking 
distance  of  Hood's  place  of  crossing,  but  it  was  just  too  late. 
The  main  rebel  army  was  already  over,  and  the  rear  guard 
crossed  that  night  and  made  good  its  escape.  Steedman's 
small  cavalry  force  overtook  the  trains,  and  on  the  31st  of 
December  destroyed  over  300  wagons  and  78  pontoon  boats, 
besides  capturing  many  prisoners.  But  for  the  unaccountable 
delay  at  Murfreesboro',  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
Hood  would  have  been  compelled  to  surrender  his  whole 
force,  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles  from  the  battle 
field,  ten  days  after  the  fight. 

The    head    of    Thomas's    pursuing   column    was    at   the 

Tennessee  River  on  the  morning  of  December  28,  having 

made  that  distance  in  eleven  days,  with  fighting  every  day, 

through  the  very  worst  winter  weather.     In  the  pursuit  from 

1  93  W.  R.,506. 


194    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Petersburg  to  Appomattox,  the  head  of  Grant's  army  led  by 
the  tireless  Sheridan  also  fought  every  day,  and  marched 
seventy-five  miles  in  seven  days.  The  world  is  justly  full 
of  praise  and  wonder  at  the  extraordinary  energy  shown 
in  that  relentless  pursuit.  Yet  Thomas's  pursuit  was  more 
rapid,  the  natural  obstacles  to  be  overcome  far  greater  than 
any  Grant  encountered,  and  the  resistance  offered  by  Hood 
fully  equal  to  that  made  by  Lee.  The  losses  in  each  case 
tell  that  part  of  the  story.  From  the  29th  of  March  till 
Lee's  surrender,  Grant  lost  a  little  less  than  10,000  men, 
about  nine  per  cent,  of  the  number  actually  engaged.  The 
loss  in  Thomas's  army  from  the  15th  to  the  28th  of  December 
was  about  5,000,  over  twelve  per  cent,  of  the  number  actually 
engaged.  These  facts  speak  for  themselves,  and  suggest 
their  own  moral. 

The  battle  of  Nashville  was  also  the  first  in  the  West, 
if  not  the  first  during  the  war,  in  which  cavalry  was  used 
like  infantry  in  assaulting  fortified  lines.  Under  Sherman, 
on  the  Atlanta  campaign,  the  cavalry  was  not  only  made 
insignificant,  it  was  treated  with  every  species  of  indignity ; 
still,  as  in  its  earliest  days,  it  was  a  by-word.  Numbering 
at  the  outset  over  12,000  well-mounted  men,  under  able 
and  energetic  commanders  like  Garrard  and  McCook  and 
Stoneman  and  Minty  and  La  Grange,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  discover  that  it  accomplished  anything  commensurate  with 
its  numbers  and  capability.  To  the  extent  of  his  capacity, 
Sherman  minimized  its  fighting  qualities.  In  almost  every 
enterprise  it  undertook,  it  found  itself  outnumbered  and 
was  badly  worsted.  Yet  less  than  half  these  same  men, 
re-enforced  by  Hatch's  admirable  division  from  Mississippi 
and  some  new  regiments  from  Indiana,  recruited  to  full 
ranks,  remounted,  concentrated,  encouraged  and  properly 
handled,  performed  the  arduous  duty  of  retarding  Hood's 
advance ;  then,  under  Wilson,  at  the  battle  of  Franklin 
defeated  Forrest;  at  the  battle  of  Nashville  vied  with  the 


GENERAL   THOMAS  195 

infantry  in  daring  and  success ;  and  led  the  pursuit  of 
Hood's  retreating  columns  with  unsurpassed  energy  and 
endurance.  In  the  use  to  which  he  so  successfully  put  this 
important  arm  of  the  service,  Thomas  gave  another  proof  of 
that  quickness  and  versatility  of  mind  which  is  one  of  the 
marks  of  a  great  captain. 

One  secret,  not  only  of  Thomas's  unvarying  success,  but  of 
his  wonderful  hold  upon  the  confidence  and  affection  of  his 
army,  is  the  fact  that  every  one  in  it  was,  to  him,  a  man  and 
a  soldier.  He  did  not  show  his  appreciation  of  their  good 
conduct  by  many  words  of  praise ;  but  he  showed  in  every 
way  that  he  always  expected  the  highest  results.  To  secure 
such  results,  he  devoted  himself  with  unceasing  application. 
Thus  he  was  unremitting  in  his  care  that  they  should  be  well 
supplied,  well  looked  after  and  always  brought  to  the  right 
place  at  the  right  time.  His  mind  was  always  vigorous,  alert, 
quick  to  perceive,  to  decide,  to  act.  His  personal  movements 
were  generally  very  deliberate,  —  chiefly  because  he  was  a 
constant  sufferer,  and  hasty  or  violent  exertion  produced 
acute  pain.  He  never  mounted  his  horse  without  a  wrench, 
and  it  was  almost  agony  to  ride  fast.  He  never  spoke  of  his 
sufferings,  and  -it  is  only  since  his  death  that  I  learned  of 
them.  "  I  have  educated  myself  not  to  feel,"  he  once  said, 
rather  sadly,  to  an  intimate  friend.  But,  with  all  this 
deliberativeness  of  movement,  on  a  march  or  a  campaign, 
he  saw  every  part  of  his  army  every  day.  On  the  Atlanta 
campaign  especially,  when  every  day  brought  at  least  a 
skirmish,  he  invariably  made  his  way  along  to  the  head  of  the 
column.  If,  when  he  was  at  the  rear,  the  sounds  indicated 
contact  with  the  enemy,  he  pushed  on  to  the  very  front,  where 
he  often  dismounted  and  walked  to  the  outer  skirmish  line,  to 
reconnoitre.  Only  in  this  way,  in  that  obscure  country,  could 
any  idea  be  obtained  of  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  of  his 
own  troops.  It  was  a  constant  fight  in  the  dark ;  but  his 
wood-craft  was  almost  unerring.  He  could  make  his  way 


196     CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

through,  the  thickest  forest,  and  come  out  at  the  spot  he 
aimed  for.  When  under  fire  his  movements,  whether  on  foot 
or  mounted,  were  as  deliberate  as  at  any  other  time.  If  not 
indifferent  to  danger,  he  was  never  influenced  by  a  sense  of 
it.  He  seemed  unconscious  of  fear ;  his  manner  in  the  heat 
of  battle  was  the  same  as  at  any  other  time  —  always 
imperturbable,  resolute,  self-possessed,  unhurried.  In  the 
crisis  of  an  engagement  he  was  like  the  great  surgeon,  who, 
in  a  capital  operation,  said  he  had  not  time  enough  to  be  in  a 
hurry.  He  was  never  seen  riding  up  and  down  his  lines, 
waving  his  sword,  shouting,  or  going  through  any  of  those 
ceremonies  which  constitute  the  picturesque  part  of  general 
ship.  Not  thus  did  he  command  the  absolute  confidence 
and  obedience  of  his  devoted  soldiers.  But  whenever  and 
wherever  they  saw  him,  they  knew  that  all  was  right,  and 
they  read  in  his  fixed  countenance  the  resolve  that  was  always 
the  harbinger  of  victory.  So,  also,  on  the  march  nobody  ever 
saw  him,  with  an  escort  trailing  behind  him,  dashing  past  a 
moving  column  of  troops,  throwing  up  dust  or  mud,  and 
compelling  them  to  leave  the  road  to  him.  If  anybody 
had  the  right  of  way  it  was  they,  not  he.  He  would  break 
through  the  woods,  or  flounder  across  a  swamp,  rather  than 
force  his  men  from  the  road,  and  so  wear  them  out  by 
needless  fatigue.  No  detail  escaped  him,  however  apparently 
insignificant.  "  The  fate  of  a  battle  may  depend  on  a  buckle," 
he  once  said  to  a  battery  commander  who  had  carelessly 
allowed  his  harness  to  break. 

He  sometimes  had  terrific  outbursts  of  temper.  It  was 
usually  under  complete  control,  but  when  it  did  break  out  it 
was  volcanic.  He  once  so  alarmed  a  teamster  who,  when  his 
mules  were  stalled,  was  beating  them  over  the  head  with  the 
butt  of  his  whip,  that  the  poor  fellow  took  to  the  woods  to 
escape  he  knew  not  what  fate.  Again,  when  the  servants 
and  orderlies  about  his  headquarters  were  chasing  a  stray 
goose  and  making  a  great  shouting  and  disturbance,  he 


GENERAL   THOMAS  197 

flamed  out  so  that  everybody  ran  and  hid  from  his  wrath  ; 
while  the  poor  goose,  after  a  short  circling  flight,  lighted  at 
his  feet  as  if  for  protection  and  safety.  And,  indeed,  to  all 
dumb  animals  he  was  a  friend  and  protector ;  stray  dogs  and 
homeless  cats,  no  less  than  horses,  found  with  him  a  refuge. 
It  was  exhibitions  of  meanness  or  cruelty  to  those  who  could 
not  defend  themselves,  rather  than  any  great  faults  or  crimes, 
which  chiefly  stirred  his  passion.  The  violation  of  a  flag 
of  truce  under  which  some  of  the  escort  were  robbed  of 
overcoats  and  blankets,  and  Bragg' s  failure  to  render  proper 
return,  led  him  to  such  vehemence  of  language  as  even 
treason  to  the  flag  did  not  call  forth.  But  such  outbursts 
were  very  infrequent,  only  often  enough  to  show  that  it  would 
not  do  to  trifle.  Habitually,  he  was  the  gentlest  and  kindest 
of  men ;  thoughtful  of  others,  considerate  to  all,  approachable, 
with  no  affected  dignity,  and  entirely  free  from  every  sort 
either  of  obsequiousness  or  patronage.  He  had  great  fondness 
for  light  humor  and  pleasantry,  and  liked  as  he  sat  by  the 
camp  fire  to  hear  the  droll  anecdotes  and  adventures  of  his 
soldiers.  He  was  never  idle ;  when  not  engaged  in  necessary 
active  duty,  he  liked  to  occupy  himself  with  some  mechanical 
work,  for  which  he  had  great  fondness  and  aptitude,  or  with 
the  study  of  science,  history  or  philosophy.  He  was  not 
an  omnivorous  reader,  was  rather  given  to  reflection  than 
acquisition.  Besides  the  literature  and  science  of  his  own 
profession,  with  which  he  was  thoroughly  acquainted,  he  was 
well  versed  in  constitutional  law,  or  rather,  perhaps,  in  the 
Constitution  itself,  which  he  studied  and  thought  upon  contin 
ually  with  all  diligence.  It  was  his  political  Bible,  which  he 
accepted  unquestioningly,  and  maintained  manfully. 

Born  in  a  slave  State,  and  passing  nearly  all  his  life  in 
slave-holding  communities,  he  never  liked  the  institution. 
Among  his  early  experiences  were  the  horrors  of  the  Nat 
Turner  insurrection,  which  took  place  in  his  native  county. 
His  only  personal  relation  to  slavery  was  the  purchase  of 


198     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

one  or  two  servants,  when  so  situated  that  he  could  not  do 
otherwise.  But  he  never  sold  them,  and  afterwards  gave 
them  their  freedom  at  great  trouble  and  expense  to  himself. 
His  keen  sense  of  justice  revolted  against  the  crime  of 
unrewarded  labor.  When  the  enlistment  of  colored  men  as 
soldiers  was  authorized,  he  heartily  aided  the  scheme,  and 
always  gave  the  colored  troops  their  due  share  of  work  and 
of  credit. 

He  easily  commanded  men,  rather  by  inherent  force  of 
character  than  by  arbitrary  rule,  so  that  his  troops  always 
tried  to  do  their  best  as  much  for  his  sake  as  their  own.  An 
extraordinary  illustration  of  his  power  over  men  was  given  at 
the  Reunion  of  the  Western  Armies  at  Chicago,  in  December, 
1868.  It  was  just  after  Grant's  election  to  the  Presidency, 
and  there  was  assembled  there  the  largest  collection  of  officers 
gathered  together  since  the  close  of  the  war.  At  the  great 
banquet  in  the  immense  hall  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
more  than  two  thousand  men  were  seated  at  the  tables,  and 
the  wine  flowed  freely.  By  the  time  the  speaking  began, 
the  hubbub  and  turmoil  were  indescribable  and  apparently 
uncontrollable.  Sherman  presided;  Terry  and  Schofield 
and  Slocum  and  Hurlbut  and  Logan  and  Oglesby  and 
Scliurz,  all  practised  orators,  attempted  to  speak;  with 
most,  it  was  mere  dumb  pantomime ;  with  others,  it  was 
merely  the  handing  of  manuscripts  to  the  reporters.  Thomas 
alone,  out  of  all  the  number,  secured  a  quiet  and  listening 
attention  from  beginning  to  end.  It  was  a  spontaneous  and 
almost  unconscious  tribute  to  his  commanding  bearing  and 
character. 

He  had  also  the  rare  faculty  of  concentrating  his  whole 
attention  upon  the  subject  before  him,  hence  all  business 
was  quickly  disposed  of.  Colonel  Thruston,  Judge- Advocate 
on  his  staff,  writes :  "  It  was  a  matter  of  surprise  to  me  to 
find  how  remarkably  familiar  and  accomplished  he  was  with 
all  matters  of  military  law  and  precedent.  .  .  .  During  two 


GENERAL   THOMAS  199 

years  in  the  judge-advocate's  department,  I  devoted  almost 
my  entire  time  to  fitting  myself  for  the  duties  of  my 
position,  sending  to  Europe  for  books,  and  reading  everything 
pertaining  to  military  law  and  that  branch  of  the  service. 
Yet,  in  the  consideration  of  questions  of  law,  the  General  was 
always  ready  with  useful  suggestions  and  counsel,  and  seemed 
to  have  given  more  consideration  to  these  subjects  than  any 
other  officer  of  his  army.  During  his  earlier  days  he  had 
made  a  careful  study  of  court-martial  law  and  had  prepared 
notes  of  decisions,  showing  how  painstaking  he  was  in 
making  himself  master  of  all  departments  of  his  profession." 
The  same  thing  might  be  said  of  him  in  regard  to  the 
adjutant-general's  department,  although  he  seemed  to  attach 
less  importance  to  that  than  to  some  other  branches  of  the 
service.  He  made  it  a  rule,  also,  to  finish  up  all  his  work 
to  the  minutest  detail  before  any  important  movement  was 
begun.  Wherever  his  signature  was  required,  even  if  it  were 
only  in  a  copy-book,  he  invariably  signed  his  name  himself. 
On  a  campaign,  he  required  that  all  necessary  documents  and 
papers  should  be  completed  every  day;  and  his  adjutant- 
general's  wagon  was  a  model  of  convenience  and  utility. 

All  his  personal  habits  marked  him  as  a  gentleman  of 
refinement  and  self-control.  He  was  extremely  neat  in  dress 
and  person,  and  free  from  every  kind  of  offensiveness  of 
speech  or  manner.  He  hated  vulgarity  and  loudness  and 
pretension.  While  not  a  puritan,  certainly  not  of  the  type 
Macaulay  describes,  but  a  lover  of  all  manly  sports  and 
exercises,  with  great  enjoyment  of  jollity  and  good  fellowship 
in  others,  he  was  himself  abstemious  and  moderate  in  all 
things.  He  drank  less  whiskey  than  any  officer  I  knew  in 
the  service  who  drank  any  at  all,  never  taking  it  to  while 
away  an  idle  hour  or  for  mere  companionship,  but  only  when 
tired  or  exhausted.  Yet  he  always  produced  it  when  visited, 
and  kept  a  staff  officer  who  was  an  expert  in  mixing  toddies. 
He  never  smoked  ;  his  private  life  was  as  pure  and  stainless 


200    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

as  a  saint's ;  lie  lived  always  in  the  full  light  of  day,  with  no 
secrets  to  hide  and  no  habits  of  which  to  be  ashamed.  He 
was  a  strong,  rugged,  vigorous,  complete,  well-rounded  man, 
physically,  mentally  and  morally. 

No  portrait  that  I  have  ever  seen  of  General  Thomas 
begins  to  do  justice  to  the  manly  strength  and  comeliness  of 
his  form  and  face.  In  any  assembly,  he  would  be  noticeable 
for  the  grace  and  easy  dignity  of  his  bearing,  as  well  as  for 
his  countenance,  marked  by  clear  intelligence,  and  a  winning 
smile  which  lighted  up  all  his  features.  His  brow  was  very 
heavy  and  projecting,  and  so  overshadowed  his  eyes,  —  which, 
as  General  Garfield  well  says,  "were  cold  gray  to  Ms  enemies, 
but  warm  deep  blue  to  his  friends,"  -  -  that,  in  sitting  for  a 
photograph,  their  light  and  expression  were  almost  wholly 
lost.  Such  pictures  wear  a  grim  and  almost  forbidding  look, 
entirely  at  variance  with  his  ordinary,  every-day  appearance. 
But,  at  all  times,  one  could  read  in  his  every  look  the  story 
of  resistless  strength,  which  neither  time  nor  fate  could 
overcome.  His  whole  appearance  expressed  unconquerable 
power,  as  gentle  but  ineradicable  as  one  of  the  elemental 
forces.  His  voice  was  singularly  pleasant  and  attractive, 
and  all  gladly  listened  to  its  musical  tones.  His  inherent 
dignity  forbade  undue  familiarity ;  but  with  the  members 
of  his  personal  and  military  family,  there  was  unbounded 
freedom  of  intercourse.  The  men  in  the  ranks  never 
hesitated  to  seek  him  out  if  they  wanted  anything,  and  were 
sure  to  receive  considerate  attention.  He  once  went  on  the 
bail-bond  of  one  of  his  old  soldiers,  whom  he  knew  only  as  a 
sentinel  about  his  headquarters,  when  sued  for  a  debt  for 
which  another  was  responsible,  walking  down  to  the  magis 
trate's  with  him  as  if  it  were  the  natural  thing  for  a  major- 
general  to  do. 

In  the  everlasting  search  for  an  available  candidate  for  the 
Presidency  which  marks  our  politics,  it  was  inevitable  that 
a  man  of  such  mark  and  character  should  be  one  of  the 


GENERAL   THOMAS  201 

possible  selections.  Throughout  the  Southwest,  where  the 
men  who  had  served  under  him  were  in  the  majority,  he  was 
unquestionably  the  favorite  in  1868.  In  Ohio  and  Tennessee, 
especially,  strong  organizations  were  formed  to  secure  his 
nomination,  and  they  felt  sanguine  of  success.  Silent  acqui 
escence  on  his  part  was  all  they  asked.  But  that  was 
precisely  what  they  failed  to  secure.  Not  only  did  he  refuse 
that,  but  he  enjoined,  as  a  personal  obligation  upon  his 
friends,  that  they  should  see  to  it  that  his  name  should  not 
be  brought  forward.  "  I  have  learned  the  trade  of  a  soldier," 
he  said,  "  and  I  am  too  old  to  learn  another."  A  letter  of 
his  written  in  March,  1867,  so  well  reveals  his  feelings  and 
character  that  I  quote  nearly  all  of  it :  — 

"  There  are  many  reasons  why  I  cannot  consent  to  be  a 
candidate  for  the  Presidency. 

"  First :  I  am  wholly  disqualified  for  so  high  and  responsible 
a  position,  being  but  a  mere  tyro  in  the  science  of  statesman 
ship. 

"  Second :  I  have  not  the  necessary  control  over  my  tem 
per,  nor  have  I  the  faculty  of  conforming  to  a  policy  and 
working  to  advance  it,  unless  convinced  within  myself  that 
it  is  right  and  honest. 

"  Third :  My  habits  of  life,  established  by  a  military 
training  of  over  twenty-five  years,  are  such  as  to  make  it 
repugnant  to  my  self-respect  to  have  to  induce  people  to  do 
their  duty  by  persuasive  measures.  If  there  is  anything  that 
enrages  me  more  than  another,  it  is  to  see  an  obstinate 
and  self-willed  man  oppose  what  is  right,  morally  and 
legally,  simply  because  under  the  law  he  cannot  be  compelled 
to  do  what  is  right. 

"Fourth:  I  can  never  consent,  voluntarily,  to  place  myself 
in  a  position  where  scurrilous  newspaper  men  and  political 
demagogues  can  make  free  with  my  personal  character  and 
reputation,  with  impunity. 

"  Fifth :  I  have  no  taste  whatever  for  politics.     Besides, 


202    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

restrictions  have  recently  been  thrown  around  the  President, 
by  Congress,  which  virtually  deprive  him  of  his  just  powers 
and  rights  under  the  Constitution.  I  could  never  consent  to 

o 

be  President  so  long  as  that  officer  is  deprived  of  the  exercise 
of  all  the  rights,  privileges  and  duties  guaranteed  to  him  by 
the  Constitution. 

"I  could  name  many  more  equally  valid  reasons  for  not 
wishing  the  office.  I  will  name  only  one  more,  and  that  not 
the  least ;  I  am  poor  and  cannot  afford  it.  ...  I  therefore 
sincerely  hope  that  I  may  not  be  compelled  to  decline  in  a 
more  formal  manner,  which,  if  nominated,  I  shall  certainly 
do." 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  several  such  letters  as  this,  written 
about  the  same  time,  to  influential  people  in  various  places, 
produced  the  desired  result.  There  was  no  mistaking  their 
meaning  or  sincerity.  Yet  he  underrated  his  qualifications. 
In  the  chaotic  condition  of  things  throughout  Tennessee 
and  the  other  states  under  his  command  during  the  critical 
period  of  reconstruction,  where  he  exercised  autocratic  power, 
an  infinite  number  and  variety  of  questions  came  up  for 
adjudication ;  and  his  orders  always  were  based  on  broad 
grounds  of  law  and  justice.  His  testimony  before  the 
Reconstruction  Committee  in  1866  clearly  shows  his  fairness 
and  impartiality.  One  looks  in  vain  for  any  trace  of  bitterness 
or  hostility  toward  the  people  of  the  South,  though  of  all  men 
living,  he  might  be  pardoned  for  entertaining  and  expressing 
such  feeling.  This  judicial  habit  of  mind  also  raised  him 
above  all  political  considerations  in  his  dealing  with  men 
and  events.  He  never  was  swayed  in  the  slightest  by  any 
thought  as  to  the  influence  his  action  might  have  upon  his 
own  personal  fortunes.  Indeed,  he  more  than  once,  by  his 
insistence  on  what  he  deemed  right  and  just,  stood  in  the 
way  of  his  own  advancement.  A  notable  instance  of  this 
is  his  conduct,  when  Andrew  Johnson,  in  February,  1868, 
nominated  him  to  be  Lieutenant-General  and  General  by 


GENERAL   THOMAS  203 

brevet.  Undoubtedly  Johnson's  purpose  was  to  assign  Thomas 
to  duty  according  to  his  brevet  rank,  and  so  supersede  Grant 
by  him.  To  many  men,  perhaps  to  most  men,  this  would  have 
proved  a  great  temptation,  especially  if  one  felt  as  Thomas 
did,  that  Grant  had  treated  him  unjustly.  How  it  affected 
him  is  shown  by  Ins  letter  to  the  President  of  the  Senate,  in 
which  he  says  :  — 

"  For  the  battle  of  Nashville,  I  was  appointed  a  Major- 
General  in  the  United  States  Army.  My  services  since  the 
war  do  not  merit  so  high  a  compliment;  and  it  is  too  late 
to  be  regarded  as  a  compliment,  if  conferred  for  services 
during  the  war. 

"  I  therefore  earnestly  request  that  the  Senate  will  not 
confirm  the  nomination." 

At  the  same  time  he  wrote  the  President  a  similar  letter, 
requesting  him  to  recall  the  nomination.  So  ended  this 
mischievous  attempt  to  seduce  General  Thomas  and  to 
degrade  General  Grant. 

In  the  great  work  of  giving  a  faithful  record  of  the  career 
of  the  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy,  which  General 
Cullum  has  performed  with  such  fulness  and  impartiality, 
there  are  but  two  officers  named  whose  record  of  service 
equals,  in  length,  that  of  General  Thomas,  and  these  are 
both  in  the  Engineer  Corps.  Neither  Grant,  nor  Sherman, 
nor  Sheridan  can  boast  of  such  an  amount  and  variety  of 
duty.  He  took  part  in  more  than  thirty  actions,  and  every 
one  of  them  added  to  his  skill  and  experience,  as  well  as  to 
the  confidence  with  which  his  soldiers  always  regarded  him. 
He  captured  more  grins  in  single  battles  on  the  open  field 
than  any  of  the  other  commanders  during  the  war:  40  at 
Missionary  Ridge,  50  at  Nashville,  25  on  the  pursuit  after 
that  battle.  If  he  ever  lost  a  gun,  he  made  the  account  good 
by  the  capture  of  a  corresponding  number  in  the  same 
engagement.  In  all,  he  took  in  the  open  field  183  guns, 
over  25,000  prisoners  and  over  15,000  deserters.  Nearly 


204    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

one  half  of  the  regiments  and  batteries  which  served  under 
him  veteranized  during  the  winter  of  1863-64. 

If  Sheridan  had  never  commanded  in  any  other  battles 
than  Booneville  and  Five  Forks,  —  the  first  and  the  last  of 
the  battles  of  his  own  planning,  —  and,  in  all  his  intermediate 
career,  had  fought  under  the  eye  and  direction  of  a  superior, 
he  would  still  be  recognized  as  a  great  general,  all  whose 
actions  bear  the  stamp  of  his  peculiar  military  genius.  Some 
illustration  might,  indeed,  be  lacking  to  demonstrate  the 
variety  and  extent  of  his  powers.  But  from  what  is  seen 
of  his  independent  character  in  those  two  striking  examples, 
all  his  other  qualities  may  be  naturally  inferred.  If  Sherman 
had  never  been  in  chief  command,  except  on  his  unavailing 
enterprise  against  Vicksburg  in  December,  1862,  and  his 
almost  fatal  over-confidence  at  Bentonville  in  1865,  —  the 
first  and  the  last  of  his  independent  actions,  —  we  should 
still  have  ample  testimony  to  his  failure  to  inflict  any  very 
serious  loss  upon  the  enemy,  and  to  his  unbroken  habit  of 
fighting  by  detachments  and  without  decisive  results  ;  while, 
at  the  same  time,  we  could  not  fail  to  recognize  the  wonderful 
skill  with  which  he  could  march,  supply  and  handle  an  army 
everywhere  except  upon  the  battlefield.  In  the  same  manner, 
Mill  Spring  and  Nashville  —  the  first  and  the  last  battles  of 
Thomas's  planning  and  execution  —  reveal  the  quality  of  his 
genius,  and  show  us  by  their  completeness  the  possession  of 
abilities  which  go  to  make  up  a  great  captain.  Lacking 
perhaps,  certainly  never  showing  the  audacity  which  some 
times  helped  Caesar  and  Napoleon  to  win,  almost  contrary  to 
fortune  ;  yet,  in  all  the  important  elements  requisite  for  a 
true  soldier  of  the  republic,  nothing  seems  lacking,  —  neither 
native  ability,  nor  industry,  nor  character,  nor  patience,  nor 
skill,  nor  readiness  in  emergencies,  nor  courage,  nor  self- 
reliance,  nor  unfailing  success,  nor  unswerving  fidelity  to  the 
highest  calls  of  duty.  What  Napier  says  of  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  may  as  fitly  be  said  of  Thomas :  "  He  held  his 


GENERAL   THOMAS  205 

army  in  hand,  keeping  it  with  unmitigated  labor  always  in  a 
fit  state  to  march  or  to  fight,  and  thus  prepared,  he  acted 
indifferently  as  occasion  offered,  on  the  offensive  or  defensive, 
displaying  in  both  a  complete  mastery  of  his  art." 

To  quote  Napier  again,  in  summing  up  the  attributes 
of  a  great  captain :  "  The  certain  mark  of  a  master  spirit 
in  war  is  that  most  rare  faculty  of  coming  to  prompt  and 
sure  conclusions  on  sudden  emergencies.  Without  this,  a 
commander  may  be  distinguished,  he  may  be  a  great  man, 
but  he  cannot  be  a  great  captain."  Numerous  instances 
show  that  Thomas  had  this  essential  faculty  in  a  very  high 
degree.  His  exhibition  of  it  at  Mill  Spring  has  already 
been  noticed ;  how,  at  the  critical  moment,  he  changed  from 
defensive  to  offensive,  and  so  won  a  complete  victory.  At 
Stone's  River,  while  generally  on  the  defensive,  yet  his  send 
ing  forward  a  brigade  into  the  Cedars,  to  check  the  column 
that  was  overwhelming  Sheridan  till  the  latter  could  establish 
and  maintain  a  new  and  firm  line,  saved  the  centre  from 
being  crushed,  and  so  kept  a  salient  toward  the  enemy  which 
could  not  be  carried.  At  Chickamauga,  he  brought  on  the 
battle  by  sending  forward  a  division  to  cut  off  a  brigade, 
erroneously  reported  as  detached  from  all  support ;  when  he 
found  that  he  had  confronted  a  formidable  line  of  battle, 
marching  to  turn  his  own  left,  he  instantly  brought  his  other 
divisions  into  line  and  into  action  to  meet  the  unexpected 
emergency,  and  held  his  own  throughout  the  day,  against  all 
odds,  so  that  the  enemy  utterly  failed  to  secure  the  prize 
so  ardently  coveted.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  second 
day,  when  ordered  to  retire  to  Rossville,  he  carried  out  the 
hazardous  undertaking  by  a  display  of  audacity  hardly  found 
in  any  other  of  his  actions.  Having  given  orders  how  each 
division  was  to  be  withdrawn,  he  placed  himself  at  the  head 
of  one  of  them,  and,  by  a  terrific  charge  in  column,  broke 
through  the  opposing  line,  and  then,  sweeping  around  its 
rear,  gathered  in  guns  and  hundreds  of  prisoners.  Under 


206    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

cover  of  this  most  daring  attack,  the  rest  of  the  army  was 
withdrawn,  in  comparative  ease  and  safety,  from  the  very 
presence  of  and  contact  with  the  enemy.  His  ample  pro 
vision  on  the  23d  of  November,  1863,  by  which,  unordered, 
he  carried  and  held  the  decisive  position  on  Orchard  Knob, 
and  so  made  victory  possible  and  complete,  has  been  men 
tioned.  At  Little  Kenesaw,  on  the  18th  of  June,  1864,  he 
gained,  by  a  spirited  assault,  a  commanding  point  which 
compelled  Johnston  to  fall  back  to  the  main  mountain.  His 
conduct  at  Peach  Tree  Creek  and  Jonesborough,  already  re 
ferred  to,  reveal  the  same  quality  of  an  instantaneous  grasping 
of  the  situation,  and  of  corresponding  promptness  of  action. 

Few  officers  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  received 
more  of  formal,  official  praise,  real  and  sincere,  but  bringing 
no  access  of  power  or  opportunity,  than  he.  The  legislature 
of  Ohio  thanked  him,  after  the  battle  of  Mill  Spring ;  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  thanked  him  for  Hood's  signal 
defeat  at  Nashville ;  the  State  of  Tennessee  thanked  him, 
had  his  portrait  painted,  and  presented  him  a  magnificent 
gold  medal;  the  Secretary  of  War,  sending  him  notice  on 
Christmas  Eve,  1864,  of  his  appointment  as  Major-General, 
declared  :  "  No  commander  has  more  justly  earned  promotion 
by  devoted,  disinterested  and  valuable  service  to  his  coun 
try."  l  Yet  his  military  reward,  after  it  all,  consisted  in 
dividing  up  his  army,  and  scattering  its  fractions,  under 
subordinate  commanders,  to  all  points  of  the  compass  to  reap 
independent  honors. 

General  Grant,  in  his  Memoirs,  gives  an  estimate  of 
Thomas's  character  based  on  very  imperfect  knowledge, 
though  exceedingly  just  as  far  it  goes.  He  says  :  "  Thomas's 
dispositions  were  deliberately  made,  and  always  good.  He 
could  not  be  driven  from  a  point  he  was  given  to  hold.  I 
do  not  believe,"  he  adds,  "  that  he  could  ever  have  conducted 
Sherman's  army  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  against  the 
1  94  W.  R.,  329. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  207 

defences  and  the  commander  guarding  that  line,  in  1864. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  had  been  given  him  to  hold  the 
line  which  Johnston  tried  to  hold,  neither  that  General,  nor 
Sherman,  nor  any  other  officer  could  have  done  it  better." 1 
This  is  very  high  praise,  and  goes  as  far  as  Grant's  acquaint 
ance  with  Thomas  fairly  justifies.  But  there  are  multitudes 
of  soldiers  who  believe  they  knew  Thomas  better  than  Grant 
did,  and  who  believe  that  he  would  not,  indeed,  have  con 
ducted  that  campaign  as  Sherman  did;  but  that  if  the 
conduct  of  it  had  been  in  Thomas's  hands,  the  results  would 
have  been  something  vastly  different  from  the  barren  occupa 
tion  of  an  abandoned  city,  at  the  end  of  four  months'  incessant 
fighting  which  left  the  enemy  relatively  as  strong  and  defiant 
as  at  the  beginning.  The  battle  of  Nashville  is,  after  all, 
that  011  which  the  fame  of  General  Thomas  must  ultimately 
depend.  Though  reckoned  by  Swinton  as  among  the  decisive 
battles  of  the  war,  it  has  not  thus  far  commanded  the  study 
and  attention  its  magnitude  and  importance  deserve.  Most 
of  those  who  have  thus  far  written  our  war  history  fail  of 
apprehending  its  supreme  consequence.  Defeat  at  Nashville 
involved  ruin  to  the  national  cause  more  complete  and  effect 
ual  than  at  any  other  point  in  the  whole  sphere  of  action. 
There  was  nowhere  any  available  army  to  stem  the  tide,  in 
case  of  disaster  there.  Thomas  hact  to  create  the  force  which 
annihilated  Hood.  If,  as  is  just,  the  measure  of  a  soldier's 
greatness  and  glory  is  to  be  computed  by  the  magnitude  of 
the  evils  from  which  his  victory  saves  the  nation,  as  well 
as  by  the  positive  benefits  conferred,  no  one  of  our  generals 
deserves  higher  rank  or  greater  honor. 

Popular  attention  has  been,  not  unnaturally,  concentrated 
chiefly  on  Grant  and  Sherman.  The  Titanic  blows  of 
the  one,  and  the  coruscating  brilliancy  of  the  other,  have 
alternately  astonished  and  dazzled  men's  judgments  and 
imaginations.  But  time,  which  is  said  to  set  all  things  even, 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  255. 


208     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

will  at  last  restore,  or  reveal,  the  proper  perspective.  Then 
it  will  be  seen  that,  next  to  the  surrender  at  Appomattox, 
the  one  blow  under  which  the  Rebellion  reeled  and  tottered  to 
its  fall  was  that  delivered  by  Thomas  at  Nashville.  When 
that  battle  ended,  but  a  single  army  remained  to  vex  the 
peace  of  the  Republic.  The  gigantic  Colossus  which  had 
so  long  bestrode  the  land  henceforth  had  but  one  foot  left 
to  stand  upon ;  the  other  had  been  crushed  to  pieces  at 
Nashville. 


GENERAL  THOMAS  IN  THE  RECOED. 


THOMAS   L.   LIVERMORE, 

MAJOR  AND  BREVET  COLONEL,  FIFTH  NEW  HAMPSHIRE  VOLUNTEERS  ;  COLONEL,  EIGHTEENTH 
NEW  HAMPSHIRE  VOLUNTEERS. 


Eead  before  the  Society  on  Tuesday  evening,  February  2,  1892. 


GENEEAL  THOMAS  IN  THE  EECOKD. 


THE  fame  of  General  Thomas  as  a  patriot  and  a  soldier  is 
established  beyond  question.  It  is  not  the  lightest  testimony 
to  his  power  as  a  leader  of  men  that  his  followers  and 
admirers,  not  reconciled  with  the  fortune  which  gave  Grant 
and  Sherman  more  extensive  commands  than  his,  or  restricted 
his  genius  to  the  conduct  of  campaigns  less  important  than 
theirs,  ask  the  world,  even  at  this  late  day,  to  revise  its 
judgment  of  him.  They  do  not  admit  that  his  military 
genius  was  less  eminent  in  one  direction  than  in  another,  and 
they  insist  that,  abler  than  Sherman  and  the  equal  of  Grant, 
he  would  have  done  as  well  as  the  latter  and  better  than  the 
former,  if  he  had  been  given  their  opportunities.  It  would 
be  a  thankless  and  a  profitless  task  to  examine  these  conten 
tions  in  a  critical  way,  if  they  consisted  of  nothing  more  than 
an  estimate  of  Thomas  from  the  point  of  view  of  loyal 
friends ;  but  because  they  have  extended  to  a  disparagement 
of  Grant  and  Sherman,  and  to  a  denial  of  the  received 
accounts  of  some  of  their  greatest  achievements,  these 
contentions  have  become  the  proper  subject  of  critical 
examination,  in  the  interest  of  the  truth  of  history.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  charge  that,  in  the  first  days  of  the  War 
of  the  Rebellion,  Thomas  failed  to  receive  due  recognition 
because  he  was  a  Virginian ;  that  the  reward  to  him  and  his 
officers  for  Mill  Springs,  the  first  important  Union  victory, 
was  tardy  and  inadequate ;  that,  later  in  the  war,  jealousy  or 
want  of  appreciation  in  the  authorities  retarded  the  promotion 
he  had  earned ;  and  that  he  was  repeatedly  passed  over  in  the 


212    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

assignment  of  inferior  men  to  commands  which  should  have 
been  given  to  him.  It  has  also  been  said  that  Thomas's 
reputation  has  suffered  for  want  of  biography  and  memoirs 
such  as  Grant's  and  Sherman's,  but  this  leaves  out  of  the 
account  not  only  Van  Home's  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  which,  written  at  the  request  of  Thomas  and 
from  materials  "  mainly  collected  and  supplied  by  him,"  was 
published  in  1875,1  the  year  in  which  Sherman's  memoirs 
appeared  and  ten  years  before  Grant's,  but  also  Cist's  History 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

It  is  the  attempt  of  the  present  paper  to  test  the  assertions 
above  recapitulated,  by  the  evidence  presented  in  the  Records 
of  the  armies,  published  by  the  War  Department,  which  must 
always  hereafter  be  regarded  as  the  fountain-head  of  our 
military  history  from  1861  to  1865.  It  will  be  well  to  state 
in  the  outset,  that  in  the  important  matter  of  numbers  the 
conclusions  reached  will  often,  perhaps  always,  be  found  to 
differ  from  what  is  commonly  accepted  as  the  fact.  The 
men  actually  bearing  arms  were  much  fewer  than  those 
ordinarily  counted  in  the  strength  of  the  army.  Often  the 
force  actually  on  the  battlefield  embraced  only  infantry  and 
artillery.  Not  infrequently  whole  brigades  of  infantry 
belonging  to  one  army  or  the  other  were  absent  on  detached 
duty,  and  always  a  considerable  portion  of  the  force  reported 
as  "  present  for  duty  "  consisted  of  non-combatants,  such  as 
musicians,  and  those  employed  in  the  quartermaster,  commis 
sary  and  medical  departments.  The  Confederates  classed 
their  fighting  force  by  itself  as  the  "  effectives  present,"  and 
usually  the  returns  of  this  force  excluded  the  officers  and 
included  only  the  men  bearing  muskets. 

The  writer's  admiration  for  the  military  character  and  lofty 

spirit  of  General  Thomas  has   not  been   diminished  by  his 

studies    for  this   paper,  and  he   shares  the  impatience    with 

which    those    who    followed    Thomas   in    the    field   hear  the 

1  Van  Home's  Life  of  General  Thomas  was  published  in  1882. 


GENERAL    THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  213 

suggestion  that  any  other  motive  than  patriotism  and  fealty 
of  the  highest  type  led  him  to  draw  his  sword  in  the  nation's 
cause.  In  this  he  followed  the  example  of  another  Virginian, 
his  illustrious  friend  General  Scott,  who,  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  Rebellion,  discharged  his  duty  in  supporting  the  govern 
ment  at  the  Capital,  with  a  martial  soul  a  world  removed 
from  the  possibility  of  defection. 

Coming  now  to  the  statements  which  are  to  be  considered, 
we  read  that  although  Thomas  "  encountered  and  helped  put 
to  flight  "  Jackson's  troops,  July  2,  1861,  at  Falling  Waters 
on  Virginia  soil,1  soon  afterwards  his  loyalty  was  suspected 
when  there  was  question  of  his  promotion  at  Washington, 
and  we  discover  hi  the  Record  that  it  was  not  Thomas's  but 
Abercrombie's  brigade  which  put  the  Confederates  to  flight  in 
that  action.  Thomas's  infantry  was  not  under  fire.  Thomas's 
loyalty  was  so  far  above  suspicion  that  even  before  this  action 
he  had  been  promoted  from  Major  to  Colonel  of  the  Second 
United  States  Cavalry,  and  afterwards  he  was  made 
Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers  in  advance  of  Abercrombie, 
and  was  preceded  in  this  rank  by  only  three  of  the  officers 
who  were  with  him  under  Patterson  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  —  Porter,  Stone  and  Morell.  In  November,  Thomas 
was  assigned  by  Buell  to  the  command  of  the  Union  line  in 
Kentucky,  which  extended  from  London  to  Columbia.  The 
Confederates  facing  this  line  had  pushed  a  force  under 
Zollicoifer  across  the  Cumberland  in  front  of  Mill  Springs, 
and,  December  29,  Buell  directed  Thomas  to  move  down  on 
the  left  of  this  force  and  endeavor  to  cut  it  off  from  the  river, 
while  Schoepf's  command  at  Somerset  should  attack  it  in 
front ;  and  in  communicating  the  order  he  wrote  to  Thomas 
as  follows  :  "  The  result  ought  to  be  at  least  a  severe  blow  to 
him  or  a  hasty  flight  across  the  river.  But  to  effect  the  former 
the  movement  should  be  made  rapidly  and  secretly,  and  the 
blow  should  be  vigorous  and  decided.  There  should  be  no 

1  Ante,  173. 


214    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

delay  after  you  arrive."  1  Thomas  marched  to  Logan's  Cross 
Roads  and  there  halted  January  17,  about  ten  miles  from  the 
enemy's  camp,  to  await  the  arrival  of  four  of  his  regiments 
which  were  detained  in  the  rear  by  bad  roads.  Crittenden, 
the  Confederate  commander  at  Mill  Springs,  on  the  same  day 
got  news  of  Thomas's  movement,  and  on  the  18th  sent  two 
regiments  across  the  river,  thus  raising  the  force  there  to  eight 
regiments  of  infantry,  three  battalions  of  cavalry  and  twelve 
pieces  of  artillery,2  reported  as  4,000  strong,  and,  taking  the 
resolution  to  attack  Thomas  before  he  could  join  with  Schoepf 
or  receive  his  belated  regiments,  marched  at  midnight  and 
fell  on  Thomas's  advance  at  daylight.  Thomas  had  seven 
regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  cavalry  and  two  batteries.3 
The  numbers  are  not  reported.  They  probably  were  a  little 
less  than  the  Confederates.  As  his  advance  retired  before 
the  enemy,  Thomas  ordered  up  the  rest  of  his  troops  and  a 
hot  fight  ensued,  in  which  the  enemy  were  put  to  flight  with 
a  loss  of  533  to  Thomas's  loss  of  253.4  We  search  the 
Record  in  vain  for  evidence  to  support  the  account  which, 
describes  Thomas  as  turning  a  repulse  into  a  defeat  by 
changing  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive,  and  ordering  a 
charge  when  the  enemy  were  shaken  by  the  loss  of  their 
commander.  Their  commander,  Crittenden,  did  not  fall. 
Zollicoffer  commanded  one  of  the  brigades.  When  he  was 
killed  only  two  regiments  had  been  engaged,  and  afterwards 
the  Confederates  made  a  general  advance.  They  were  put 
to  flight  by  a  charge  in  flank,  which  McCook  reported  to 
Thomas  that  he  made  upon  his  own  judgment.5  The  reports 
leave  no  doubt  that  Thomas  here  displayed  the  same  traits 
which  afterwards  distinguished  him  in  greater  battles.  He 
was  undisturbed  by  the  sudden  and  unexpected  attack  of  the 
enemy,  and  he  ordered  his  brigades  forward  and  put  them  in 
action  with  calm  and  confident  courage.  Without  doubt,  he 

i  7  W.  B.,  78.  2  j6.?  105.  8  Ib^  79.402. 

4  16.,  82, 108.  5  /&.,  94. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  215 

rode  the  field  with  that  impressive  bearing  which  so  often 
lent  courage  and  firmness  to  those  who  were  with  him  in 
time  of  trial.  It  would  seem  that  if,  instead  of  halting  on  the 
17th,  he  had  called  Schoepf  with  his  5,000  men1  down  from 
Somerset  (which  was  only  eight  miles  from  him  and  about 
twelve  miles  from  the  enemy),  and  had  moved  011  the  enemy 
that  night  with  as  great  celerity  as  they  moved  on  him  the 
next  night,  he  would  have  caught  them  with  a  force  much 
smaller  than  his  own,  and  would  have  had  a  fair  chance  of 
capturing  or  destroying  all  of  them.  The  inquiry  also  arises, 
whether  his  march  was  as  rapid  as  it  might  have  been.  His 
force  spent  seventeen  days  in  making  the  distance  of  about 
sixty-five  miles  between  Lebanon  and  Logan's  Cross  Roads, 
although  speed  was  repeatedly  urged  by  Buell.2  The  weather 
and  roads  were  very  bad;  but  between  the  14th  and  17th  of 
the  same  month,  McCleriiand  marched  a  column  of  4,000 
infantry  seventy-five  miles  in  Western  Kentucky  in  the  same 
inclement  weather.3 

Although  the  loss  of  the  enemy  in  the  battle  was  small,  the 
victory  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads  gave  great  encouragement  to 
loyalty  in  Kentucky ;  and  so  welcome  was  it  at  Washington 
that  four  of  Thomas's  colonels  commended  by  Buell 4  were 
made  brigadiers  ;  and  Thomas's  appointment  as  Major-General 
in  April,  1862,  in  advance  of  forty-two  of  the  fifty-five 
brigadiers  senior  to  him,  including  Sherman,  although  urged 
by  Halleck  for  his  immediate  purpose,5  must  have  been  made 
in  recognition  of  his  leadership  in  this  battle,  for  he  had 
fought  no  other.  Halleck  desired  his  promotion  in  order 
that  in  reorganizing  the  army  after  Shiloh  for  the  advance 
on  Corinth,  he  might  place  Thomas  in  command  of  the  right 
wing.  It  has  been  said  that  in  doing  this  he  caused  Thomas 
to  supersede  Grant,  and  that  it  was  "  a  slight  Grant  never 
forgot ;  " 6  but  the  right  wing  was  newly  created  by  this  order, 

i  7  W.  R.,  484,  485.        2  J6.,  82,  530,  549,  558.        3  16.,  68-70. 

*  16.,  77.  5  23  W.  R.,  663.  6  68  Atlantic  Monthly,  509. 


216    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

and  only  a  portion  of  Grant's  army  was  included  in  it.1 
Ilalleck  at  the  same  time  made  Grant  "  second  in  command  " 
of  the  army,  an  anomalous  position  which  proved  very 
distasteful  to  Grant.  There  is  110  evidence  that  Grant  was 
prejudiced  against  Thomas  by  these  changes.  His  choice  of 
Thomas  in  preference  to  Rosecrans  in  October,  1863,  to 
command  the  army  at  Chattanooga,  is  evidence  to  the 
contrary.2 

In  passing  it  is  to  be  said,  that  it  seems  that  it  was  not,  as 
has  been  asserted,  at  Thomas's  request  that  he  was  afterwards 
relieved  from  his  command  of  the  right  wing  of  Halleck's 
army.  In  his  letter  of  October  30,  1862,  to  Halleck,  he 
says :  "  As  soon  as  the  emergency  was  over,  I  was  relieved 
and  returned  to  the  command  of  my  old  division.  I  went  to 
my  duties  without  a  murmur,  as  I  am  neither  ambitious  nor 
have  I  any  political  aspirations."  3  The  feeling  betrayed  by 
him  in  this  letter  heightens  the  great  magnanimity  of  his 
act  of  September  30,  in  declining  to  supersede  Buell  in  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  011  the  ground  that  the 
latter  ought  to  be  allowed  to  carry  out  the  plans  which  he  had 
formed.4  Buell,  on  his  part,  on  the  same  day  announced 
Thomas  as  second  in  command.5  Perhaps  the  fact  that  he 
held  this  title  when  the  battle  of  Perryville  was  fought,  eight 
days  later,  prejudiced  him  at  Washington  when,  after  the 
battle,  Rosecrans  was  preferred  to  him  as  BuelFs  successor.0 
But  there  is  no  evidence  that  Thomas  was  at  fault  in  the 
battle,  unless  it  was  in  retaining  the  nominal  position  of 
second  in  command  without  the  opportunity  to  exercise 
authority  commensurate  with  the  title.  The  battle  occurred 
in  this  wise :  On  October  7,  Buell,  moving  with  three 
corps  to  attack  Bragg  at  Perryville,  ordered  Thomas  to 
advance  with  Critteiiden's  corps  and  put  it  in  order  of  battle 

1  11  W.  K.,  144. 

2  2  Grant's  Memoirs,  18-19,  20;  53  W.  R.,  404 ;  55  W.  R.,  11. 
8  23  W.  R.,  657.  4  16.,  555. 

6  Ib.t  500.  6  Ib.,  640. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  217 

on  the  right  of  the  army,  and  then  report  for  orders.1  Buell 
apparently  did  not  suspect  that  the  enemy  might  attack,  and 
being  ill,  and  not  intending  to  deliver  his  attack  until  the 
next  day,2  he  was  not  with  his  advance,  so  that  although 
Bragg  attacked  his  left  flank  early  in  the  day  and  gave 
vigorous  battle  for  several  hours,  Buell  did  not  learn  that  a 
battle  was  going  on  until  late  in  the  day,  and  Thomas, 
although  he  had  heard  the  cannonading,  was  led  to  believe, 
by  reports  from  Buell' s  and  the  next  corps  commander's  head 
quarters,  that  there  was  no  serious  engagement,  and  being  left 
without  instructions  from  Buell,  took  no  part  in  the  battle. 
Bragg  reported  that  he  had  14,500  infantry  and  1,500 
cavalry.3  Buell  reported  his  force  at  58,000.4  The  battle 
was  a  fierce  one  and  the  Confederates  were  repulsed  with  a 
loss  to  them  of  3,396,5  and  to  the  Union  army  of  4,241.6  Not 
one  half  of  Buell's  force  was  brought  into  action.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  in  casting  about  for  a  vigorous  and  capable 
leader  to  succeed  Buell,  the  authorities  at  Washington  at  this 
time  preferred  Rosecrans,  who  a  week  before  the  battle  of 
Perry ville  had  routed  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  inflicting  a  loss 
of  6,000,  to  a  loss  on  his  part  of  3,310.7 

Rosecrans,  moving  southward  from  Nashville  to  attack 
Bragg's  army,  encountered  it  near  Murfreesboro',  Tennessee, 
in  the  battle  of  Stone's  River,  December  31,  1862.  We  are 
told  in  one  account  of  this  battle  that  the  right  being  "  swept 
from  the  field,  the  left  threatened  with  disaster,"  Thomas 
with  two  divisions  "  maintained  his  ground,  beating  back 
every  assault,"  and  "  held  fast  the  critical  point ;  " 8  and  in 
another  account  from  the  same  loyal  pen  that  "  the  whole 
right  wing  of  the  Union  army  was  driven  from  the  field,  half 
of  it  in  dire  confusion,"  and  that  "  on  the  action  of  Thomas's 
two  divisions  then  depended  the  fate  of  the  day ; "  that  as 

1  23  W.  R.,  558,  580.  '2  22  W.  R.,  186,  187,  275,  276, 1025. 

3  Ib.,  1092.  4  J6.,  1028. 

6  Ib.,  1112.  6  16.,  1036. 

7  24  W.  R.,  78, 126, 176, 382, 383, 384.  8  68  Atlantic  Monthly,  510. 


218    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

Sheridan  was  driven  back  "  Thomas  met  the  shock  with 
unmoved  firmness.  He  had  sent  forward  a  brigade  to  relieve 
the  pressure  upon  Sheridan  ;  and,  when  this  was  also  forced 
back,  the  rest  of  his  line  was  ready  and  held  its  ground.  .  .  . 
Alone  of  all  the  troops  in  line  that  morning,  except  the 
division  that  joined  his  left,  he  was  unshaken  by  any  assault, 
and  continued  to  hold  the  ground  he  had  chosen  till  the 
enemy,  three  days  later,  abandoned  the  field." 1  By  the 
Record  it  appears  that  Rosecrans  had  39,440,  and  Bragg 
had  38,635  infantry  and  artillery  in  action  on  the  day  in 
question.2  Rosecrans  drew  up  his  army  facing  Stone's 
River,  his  right  wing  of  three  divisions  under  McCook,  his 
centre  of  two  divisions  under  Thomas,  and  his  left  of  three 
divisions  under  Crittenden.  Bragg's  army  was  drawn  up  on 
the  opposite  side  of  Stone's  River  in  line  nearly  parallel  to 
the  Union  line  but  extending  beyond  the  Union  right  flank. 
Each  commander  resolved  to  attack  with  his  left  wing. 
Early  in  the  morning  (December  31)  Rosecrans  advanced 
from  his  left,  but  before  engagement  could  take  place  Bragg 
with  his  left  attacked  Rosecrans's  right  with  great  vigor,  and 
turning  the  flank  of  Johnson's  division,  which  was  on  the 
extreme  right,  drove  it  back,  and  then  fell  on  and  forced  back 
the  other  two  divisions  (Davis's  and  Sheridan's)  of  the  right 
wing  and  Negley's  division  of  Thomas's  command ; 3  but,  a 
stout  resistance  was  made,  notably  by  Sheridan's  division, 
which  made  front  against  the  enemy  for  several  hours.4 
Thomas  had  Rousseau's  division,  4,688  strong,  in  reserve. 
Rosecrans  withdrew  his  left  as  soon  as  the  gravity  of  Bragg's 
attack  was  manifest,  and  he  says  in  his  report :  "  General 
Thomas  was  immediately  despatched  to  order  Rousseau,  then 
in  reserve,  into  the  cedar  brakes  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
Sheridan,"  5  and  that  Crittenden  was  ordered  to  send  Van 
Cleve's  division  and  Barker's  brigade,  from  the  left  wing,  in 

1  Ante,  ISO.  2  29  W.  R.,  200  et  seq.,  393,  40G,  674,  675. 

3  Ib.,  250,  40a  4  Ib.,  348,  349,  373,  407.  6  Ib.,  193. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  219 

on  the  right  of  Kousseau.1  Rousseau  deployed  in  the  posi 
tion  indicated  by  Rosecrans,  and  then  had  to  retreat ; 2  he 
re-formed  on  a  new  line  in  the  rear,  with  the  aid  of  the  re- 
enforcements  which  Rosecrans  had  sent  from  the  left  wing, 
which  formed  on  his  right.  He  says  in  his  report  that 
repeated  assaults  of  the  enemy  were  repulsed  in  this  position, 
adding :  "  During  the  last  assault  I  was  informed  that  our 
troops  were  advancing  on  the  right,  and  saw  troops,  not  of  my 
division,  led  by  General  Rosecrans,  moving  in  that  direction. 
I  informed  General  Thomas  of  the  fact,  and  asked  leave  to 
advance  my  lines.  He  directed  me  to  do  so.  We  made  a 
charge  upon  the  enemy  and  drove  him  into  the  woods.  .  .  . 
This  ended  the  fighting  of  that  day."3  The  reports  of 
Crittenden  and  his  officers  confirm  this,  and  also  show  that 
they  made  front  against  the  enemy,  which  had  driven  back 
the  right  wing,  all  the  rest  of  the  day.4  These  three  brigades 
which  Rosecrans  brought  from  the  left  wing  numbered  3,761 
men.5  These  facts  are  inconsistent  with  the  assertion  that 
Thomas's  line  remained  unmoved,  or  that  it  alone  saved  the 
right  wing,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  evidence 
in  the  Record  that  Thomas  sent  forward  a  brigade  to  relieve 
the  pressure  on  Sheridan.6 

Turning  now  to  the  reports  of  the  commanders  in  the  left 
wing,  we  find  no  evidence  that  it  was"  threatened  with  disaster 
or  that  it  left  the  fate  of  the  day  to  depend  on  Thomas.  We 
have  already  seen  that  it  spared  three  brigades  to  go  to  the 
aid  of  Thomas  and  the  right  wing.  Of  the  remainder,  the 
only  brigade  which  was  forced  back  was  Cruft's  of  Palmer's 
division,  which  had  place  in  the  original  line,  next  on  the  left 
of  Negley's  division,  and  which  after  a  long  and  hot  action 
was  flanked  by  the  enemy  because  Negley  gave  way, 
exposing  its  flank.  The  remaining  four  brigades  of  the  left 

i  29  W.  R.,  193,  377.  2  J6-,  373,  374,  378. 

8  16.,  378.  4  16.,  449,  500,  574,  583. 

*  J6.,  201.  6  Ante,  180. 


220    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

wing,  6,498  strong,1  under  Crittenden,  aided  by  Sheridan's 
men,  who  came  into  action  again  after  supplying  themselves 
with  ammunition,  held  their  position  in  the  line  with  severe 
fighting  until  night.  In  fact,  they  were  the  only  troops  who 
maintained  their  original  position.2  The  reports  give  a  great 
deal  of  evidence  of  the  bravery  and  resolution  of  Thomas,  but 
the  same  is  true  of  Rosecrans.  lie  appears  to  have  been 
fully  equal  to  meeting  the  disaster  which  had  overtaken  his 
right,  and  the  Kecord  furnishes  no  evidence  that  Thomas 
took  charge  of  the  field  or  exercised  command  over  any 
other  troops  than  those  of  his  two  divisions. 

Thomas's  next  battle  was  Chickamauga,  in  September,  1863. 
Rosecrans  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  below  Chattanooga,  and 
thereby  so  threatened  Bragg's  line  of  communication  with  the 
South  that  he  retreated  from  Chattanooga  to  the  vicinity  of 
Lafayette.  Eosecrans  took  possession  of  Chattanooga,  and 
then,  in  the  belief  that  Bragg  was  retreating  to  Rome,8  pressed 
on  to  strike  him,  sending  Crittenden's  corps  from  Chattanooga 
to  Ringgold,  and  Thomas's  and  McCook's  corps  over  the 
Cumberland  Mountains,  the  former  to  Stevens's  Gap  and  the 
latter  to  Alpine.  On  the  llth  he  became  convinced  that  Bragg 
had  been  re-enforced  by  Johnston,  and  that  at  Lafayette, 
opposite  the  Union  centre,  he  awaited  re-enforcements  from 
Virginia  to  take  the  offensive.  Rosecrans  then  ordered 
Crittenden  and  McCook  to  close  on  Thomas,  and  the  latter  to 
await  them  in  the  position  then  held  by  him  in  front  of 
Stevens's  and  Cooper's  Gaps  in  Lookout  Mountain.  This 
accomplished,  Rosecrans  moved  the  whole  line  to  his  left 
down  the  Chickamauga  River,  which  he  says  was  "with  a 
view  to  covering  the  Lafayette  road  toward  Chattanooga,  and 
facing  the  most  practicable  route  to  the  enemy's  front."  4 
This  movement  was  begun  on  the  18th  and  was  continued 
until  the  next  morning,  when  the  enemy  were  encountered 

1  20  W.  R.,  201.  2  Ib^  104j  440)  450,  400,  461,  545,  561. 

3  50  W.  R.,  52  et  seq.  4  J6.,  55. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  221 

and  the  battle  began.  We  are  told  in  one  of  the  recent 
accounts  to  which  reference  has  been  made  above,  that 
Thomas  "  by  wearisome  marches  day  and  night "  placed  his 
corps  "  in  front  of  the  enemy's  right,  urgently  striving  to  gain 
the  road  to  Chattanooga,  the  one  line  of  safety  for  the  Union 
Army;  "  and  that  here  on  September  20,  when  the  whole 
right  wing  was  swept  from  the  field,  he  "with  only  the 
remnants  of  six  divisions  and  two  brigades  "  held  his  ground 
against  eleven  divisions  of  twice  his  numbers  until  with  the 
approach  of  night,  when  his  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted, 
he  attacked  and  broke  through  the  enemy's  lines.1  The 
following  is  the  story  as  told  by  the  Eecord :  Eosecrans  had 
not  made  his  movement  to  the  left  a  moment  too  soon,  for 
Bragg  had  already  ordered  an  advance  from  his  right,  which 
there  extended  beyond  Eosecrans' s  left.  In  the  movement  to 
the  left  Thomas  passed  by  Crittenden's  corps,  thus  taking 
position  on  the  left  flank  of  the  army,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  19th,  unaware  of  Bragg's  movement,  which  had  already 
begun,  he  sent  forward  a  division  to  locate  and  capture  what 
was  reported  to  him  to  be  a  single  brigade  in  his  front.2 
Thomas's  attack  was  met  by  a  fierce  counter  attack  from 
Bragg's  advance  near  Eeed's  Bridge,3  and  the  battle  became 
so  general  that  all  the  rest  of  Eosecrans's  infantry,  except  the 
reserve  corps,  became  involved  in  the  battle.  The  result 
was  that  Bragg's  attack  failed.  In  his  report  he  says  "  the 
enemy  .  .  .  seemed  disposed  to  dispute  with  all  his  ability 
our  effort  to  gain  the  main  road  to  Chattanooga  in  his  rear."4 
There  is  no  mention  in  his  order  for  the  attack,  of  any 
purpose  of  gaining  this  road,  and  Hill,  whose  corps  was  oil 
the  right  flank  of  his  army,  in  his  report  throws  doubt  upon 
Bragg's  intimation  that  he  had  such  a  purpose.5  Although 
Thomas  felt  that  it  was  desirable  to  cover  this  road,  yet,  so 
far  as  the  Eecord  goes,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  thought  that 

1  08  Atlantic  Monthly,  510.  2  50  W.  R.,  249. 

3  &.,  and  51  W.  R.,  31.  4  51  W.  R.,  32.  5  J&.,  143, 144. 


222    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

it  would  be  of  paramount  importance  in  the  action  wliich 
impended  for  the  next  day,  in  which  Rosecrans  confidently 
expected  a  successful  result.1 

In  the  course  of  the  day's  battle  Johnson's  division  of 
McCook's  corps  and  Palmer's  division  of  Critteriden's  corps 
had  been  sent  to  Thomas  and  had  been  placed  in  his  line,  so 
that  at  the  close  of  the  day  he  had  them  under  his  command, 
with  three  of  his  own  divisions  under  Brannan,  Reynolds  and 
Baird.  The  order  of  these  divisions  from  right  to  left  was 
Brannan,  Reynolds,  Palmer,  Johnson,  Baird,2  with  the  right 
flank  on  Missionary  Ridge  and  the  left  flank  on  the  road 
leading  from  Reed's  Bridge  to  Rossville,  the  line  crossing 
the  main  Chattanooga  road  running  from  Gordon's  Mill  to 
Rossville.  Negley's  division  of  his  own  corps  had  been 
separated  from  him  early  in  the  day,  and  at  this  hour  was 
between  Thomas  and  the  troops  further  on  the  right.3  At  a 
conference  held  at  midnight  between  Rosecrans  and  his  corps 
commanders,4  it  was  settled  that  Thomas  should  maintain  the 
line  then  held  by  him,  that  McCook  should  form  on  Thomas's 
right,  and  that  Crittenden  should  be  held  in  reserve  near 
McCook.5  At  six  A.  M.  of  the  20th  Thomas  sent  a  despatch 
to  Rosecrans  saying,  "  Since  my  return  this  morning  I  have 
found  it  necessary  to  concentrate  my  lines  more.  My  left 
does  not  now  extend  to  the  road  that  branches  off  at 
McDonald's  house  to  Reed's  Bridge.  I  earnestly  request 
that  Negley's  division  be  placed  on  my  left  immediately. 
The  enemy's  skirmishers  have  been  discovered  about  three 
quarters  of  a  mile  from  our  left  picket-line,  facing  toward  the 
Rossville  road.  A  division  on  my  left  would  be  exactly  in 
their  front.  .  .  .  General  Baird  has  just  reported  to  me 
that  the  enemy  are  moving  towards  our  left."6  The  road 
mentioned  by  him  was  the  road  to  Chattanooga.  Thomas 
then  had  eleven  brigades  in  his  front  line  and  three  brigades 

1  50  W.  R.,  136.  2  Ib.,  135.  3  Ib.,  56,  320. 

4  16.,  57,  135.  5  16.,  69.  6  Ib.,  137-138. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  223 

in  reserve.  The  eleven  brigades  were  in  two  lines,  one  in  rear 
of  the  other,  so  that  the  front  line  was  equivalent  to  five  and 
a  half  brigades,  while  those  in  the  rear  equalled  eight  and  a 
half  brigades.1  If  Thomas  had  thought  it  was  vital  to  cover 
the  road  to  Chattanooga,  it  is  incredible  that  he  would  not 
have  prolonged  his  line  to  the  left  by  moving  out  some  of  his 
men  from  the  rear.  The  various  accounts  of  the  battle  seem 
to  have  assumed  that  this  was  the  only  road  to  Chattanooga 
by  the  way  of  Rossville,  but  the  map  shows  one  still  further 
to  the  left  which  was  always  open  to  the  enemy,  and  one  to 
the  right  which  led  by  the  Snodgrass  house  to  Rossville.  The 
latter  was  not  uncovered  by  our  line  at  any  time  during  the 
battle  which  ensued  on  the  20th.  Upon  receiving  Thomas's 
despatch  of  6.30  A.  M.,  Rosecrans  at  once  ordered  Negley  to 
Thomas's  left,2  and  Steedman,  of  Granger's  reserve  corps,  at 
Rossville  was  informed  of  Thomas's  report  of  the  enemy  on 
the  left  and  warned  to  be  "  on  the  lookout,"  3  Granger  himself 
having  been  told  011  the  evening  before  he  must  help  "  in  the 
fight  to-morrow  by  supporting  Thomas,"4  and  to  post  his 
corps  "on  the  eastern  slope  of  Missionary  Ridge  to  support 
Me  Cook  or  Thomas."  5 

Beatty's  brigade,  of  Negley's  division,  reached  Thomas  and 
was  posted  on  his  left  before  the  battle  opened,6  but  the  other 
two  brigades  of  Negley's  division  were  detained,  by  reason  of 
delay  in  the  movement  of  the  troops  that  were  to  take  their 
place,  and  did  not  reach  Thomas  until  some  time  after  the 
battle  had  begun.7  Bragg  had  divided  his  army  into  two 
wings,  the  right  under  Polk  and  the  left  under  Longstreet, 
and  he  ordered  Polk,  who  was  opposite  Thomas,  to  attack  at 
daydawn  and  Longstreet  to  then  take  up  the  attack  promptly.8 
The  attack  was  begun  by  Polk's  command9  between  8.30  and 

1  50  W.  R.,  277,  278,  287,  301 ,  310,  367,  369,  371,  379,  409,  417,  429, 441, 535, 
540,  714. 

2  76.,  09.  8  16.,  138.  4  52  W.  R.,  741. 
5  50  W.  R.,  69.                     6  76.,  367.                          7  16.,  58,  489. 

8  76.,  33.  9  16.,  141. 


224      CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

9  A.  M.,1  upon  the  left  flank  and  front  of  Baird's  division, 
then  in  position  on  the  left  of  Thomas's  line,  and  in  the  course 
of  an  hour  or  two  afterwards  it  extended  to  the  right  so  far 
as  to  involve  the  divisions  of  Johnson,  Palmer  and  Keynolds.2 
The  attack  on  the  front  of  these  divisions  was  everywhere 
repulsed,  but  the  attack  on  Baird's  flank  became  so  serious 
in  the  estimation  of  General  Thomas  that  he  repeatedly  sent 
to  Rosecraiis  for  re-enforcements.  The  latter  hastened  the 
remainder  of  Negley's  division  off  for  Thomas,  and  Garfield 
his  chief  of  staff  wrote  to  McCook  on  the  right  at  10.10 
A.  M.,  "  General  Thomas  is  being  heavily  pressed  on  the  left. 
The  general  commanding  directs  you  to  make  immediate 
disposition  to  withdraw  the  right  so  as  to  spare  as  much 
force  as  possible  to  re-enforce  Thomas.  The  left  must  be 
held  at  all  hazards,  even  if  the  right  is  withdrawn  wholly 
back  to  the  present  left.  Select  a  good  position  back  this 
way  and  be  ready  to  start  re-enforcements  to  Thomas  at  a 
moment's  warning," 3  following  this  at  10.30  with  an  order 
to  send  two  brigades  of  Sheridan's  division  to  support  Thomas 
with  all  possible  despatch  ; 4  but  at  10.35  he  wrote  to  Thomas, 
"  The  general  commanding  directs  me  to  say,  if  possible 
refuse  your  left,  sending  in  your  reserves  to  the  northward, 
as  he  would  prefer  having  Crittenden  and  McCook  on  your 
right."5  Thomas  replied,  "The  enemy  are  pushing  me  so 
hard  that  I  cannot  make  any  changes.  The  troops  are 
posted  behind  temporary  breastworks;  "G  and  at  11  A.  31.  he 
wrote,  "  The  enemy  penetrated  a  short  time  since  to  the  road 
,  leading  to  McDaniels's  [McDonald's]  house,  and  I  fear  they 
are  trying  to  cut  off  our  communications  with  Kossville 
through  the  hills  behind  the  centre  of  our  army.  I  think, 
therefore,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  Negley's  division 
be  ordered  to  that  point,  —  the  left  of  my  line."  7  Rosecraiis 
replied  that  Negley  was  on  the  way,  and  that  Bramian's 

1  50  W.  R.,  277.  2  J&M  441,  535-536,  714.  3  Ib.,  480. 

*  Ib.  6  Ib.,  139.  6  Ib.  7  Ib. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  225 

reserve  brigade  was  available,  and  upon  another  call  for 
re-enforcements  coming  from  Thomas  immediately  after 
wards,  he  ordered  Van  Cleve's  division  from  Crittenden's 
corps  to  his  assistance.1  It  will  be  of  advantage  at  this 
point  to  ascertain  the  numbers  of  the  contending  forces. 
Polk  attacked  with  Hill's  and  Walker's  corps.  They  state 
in  their  reports  that  these  two  corps  entered  the  battle  on 
the  19th  with  15,417  men.2  On  the  19th,  HiU's  corps  of 
8,884  men  had  lost  475.3  In  Walker's  corps,  Liddell's 
division,  reported  as  3,175  strong  on  the  18th,  lost  105  on 
that  day  and  1,393  September  19-20.4  Assuming  half  this 
loss  to  have  been  suffered  on  the  19th,  the  strength  of  the 
division  on  the  20th  was  2,374.  Gist's  division,  which  lost 
heavily  on  the  19th,  is  reported  to  have  entered  the  action  on 
the  20th  with  about  1,980.5  These  figures  would  leave  the 
force  which  attacked  on  the  20th  as  about  12,800.  When 
Folk's  attack  began  it  seems  that  Thomas  had  about  17,500 
present  equipped  for  duty.  This  number  is  arrived  at  as 
follows :  Thomas's  corps  numbered  12,458.  The  force  of 
Negley's  two  absent  brigades  is  not  given,  but  as  they 
contained  seven  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  battery,  while 
there  were  fifty-four  regiments  and  eleven  batteries  in  the 
corps,  it  seems  safe  to  assume  that  these  two  brigades  num 
bered  1,750,  and  upon  this  assumption  he  had  of  his  corps 
10,700  men  present  on  the  19th.6  Palmer  had  5,000  men. 
Assuming  Johnson's  divison  to  constitute  one-third  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  it  had  3,300  men.  The  losses  of  these  two 
divisions  on  that  day  are  not  given ;  but  assuming  that  it  was 
one  half  of  the  total  of  3,010  on  both  days,  there  were  over 
6,800  men  left  for  the  battle  of  the  20th.7  Of  aU  the  troops 
which  Thomas  had  in  rear  of  his  front  line,  it  appears  that 
only  one  brigade  and  a  portion  of  another  were  moved  to  con- 

1  50  W.  R.,  58,  59.  2  51  W.  R.,  146,  243.          3  Ib.,  198,  202. 

4  16.,  243,  251,  254.  5  Ib.,  245. 

6  50  W.  R.,  41,  170,  371,  378,  385,  717,  720.  7  16.,  174, 176,  617,  720. 


226     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

front  the  Confederates  who  were  coming  round  the  left  flank, 
and  considerable  numbers  had  no  share  in  repelling  any  part 
of  Folk's  line,1  and  it  is  not  possible  to  discover  in  the  Record 
the  evidence  of  anything  which  should  have  prevented  Thomas 
from  moving  his  reserves  to  his  left  as  Rosecrans  requested, 
or  which  justified  him  in  calling  for  aid  from  Crittenden  or 
McCook.  In  fact,  the  attack  on  the  left  was  completely 
beaten  off  without  the  aid  of  any  of  the  troops  sent  by  these 
commanders.2  Hill  says  in  his  report,  "  The  whole  corps  had 
failed  in  its  attack.  ...  A  heavy  pressure  upon  us  when  first 
disordered  by  the  repulse  might  have  been  serious."  ; 

When  Rosecraiis  had  started  all  the  re-enforcements  for 
Thomas,  there  remained  beyond  the  right  of  the  latter's 
command  Wood's  division  of  Crittenden's  corps  and  Davis's 
division  of  McCook's  corps,  in  the  front  line,  and  Laiboldt's 
brigade  of  Sheridan's  division  in  reserve.4  At  this  time 
Longstreet,  holding  back  his  right  (which  extended  in  front 
of  Thomas)  because  of  the  failure  of  Folk's  command  next 
to  him  to  make  the  expected  impression  on  the  Union  lines,5 
was  advancing  with  his  left  under  Hood  to  attack  in  the 
vicinity  of  Brotherton's,  —  the  point  where  Wood's  division 
joined  Brannan's  division,  which  was  the  extreme  right  of 
Thomas's  command.  At  this  juncture  a  most  unhappy 
mistake  occurred.  An  officer  of  Thomas's  staff,  at  about 
10.45,  informed  Rosecrans  that  Brannan's  division  was  out 
of  line,  and  that  the  right  of  Reynolds' s  division,  which  was 
next  on  the  left,  was  exposed,  while  in  fact  Brannan's  division 
was  in  its  place  but  somewhat  retired,  as  if  en  echelon. 
Rosecrans,  yet  unconscious,  and  apparently  unsuspicious,  of 
the  line  which,  under  cover  of  the  forest,  was  sweeping  down 
on  his  right,  promptly  ordered  Wood  to  "close  up  on 

1  50  W.  R.,  277,  278, 287,  301,  310,  317,  367,  3G9,  371,  379, 401,  417,  429,  441, 
448,  535,  714, 1040. 

2  16.,  278.  3  51  W.  R.,  143-144. 
4  50  W.  R.,  59,  580.                            6  51  W.  R.,  288. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  227 

Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible,  and  support  him." l  Wood 
faced  to  the  left  and  came  up  against  Brannan's  division,  but, 
ignorant  of  the  error  in  fact  which  had  caused  Rosecrans 
to  send  him  the  order,  passed  in  rear  of  Brannan  to  obey 
the  order  literally.  On  the  way  he  met  Thomas,  who  told 
him  that  Reynolds  did  not  need  support,  and  took  the  re 
sponsibility  of  ordering  him  to  the  extreme  left  wing  to 
support  Baird's  division.2  An  attempt  was  made  by  McCook 
to  close  up  the  gap  left  by  Wood  with  Davis's  division,3  but 
before  this  was  accomplished  Hood's  line  swept  through  this 
gap  so  rapidly  as  to  cut  off  and  carry  away  several  regiments 
from  the  rear  of  Wood's  column  and  a  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's 
division  as  they  were  marching  to  the  left. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  re-enforcements  for  Thomas  had 
left  in  the  line  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army  only  Davis's 
division  of  two  brigades  and  Laiboldt's  brigade  of  Sheridan's 
division,  numbering  in  all  not  over  2,600  men.4  Hood's  line 
enveloped  them  on  the  right  flank,  and  quickly  swept  them 
back.5  Sheridan  with  his  two  other  brigades  was  hastening 
towards  Thomas  when  Hood's  men,  coming  round  the  right 
flank  of  Davis,  struck  him.  He  halted  and  faced  them,  but 
was  forced  back.  He  made  repeated  stands,  until,  discovering 
that  the  enemy  had  pushed  between  him  and  the  left  wing  of 
the  army,  he  endeavored  to  join  Thomas  by  the  Dry  Creek 
Valley  Road.6  Finding  the  enemy  had  pushed  to  this  road, 
and  were  in  his  path,  he  marched  to  Thomas  by  the  way  of 
Rossville,  and  a  little  before  nightfall  joined  Thomas's  left  in 
advance  of  Rossville,  but  did  not  come  into  engagement  with 
the  enemy.7  He  had  with  him  not  over  2,500  men.8  The 
three  regiments  of  Wood's  division  which  were  carried  away 
numbered  452.9  The  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division  which 
was  carried  away  numbered  on  the  19th  1,384.10  The  sum  of 

i  50  W.  R.,  59,  635.  2  16.,  251,  035.  «  jr^  490;  500i 

4  16.,  42,  490,  500,  580.  5  16.,  500.  6  76.,  580-581. 

7  16.,  581,  584,  597.  8  16.,  581.         9  16.,  643,  656.        10  16.,  810. 


228     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

all  these  numbers  is  6,936.  This  is  probably  an  excessive 
estimate  of  the  strength  of  what  has  been  called  the  right 
wing,  which  was  swept  away.  All  the  rest  of  the  army  had 
joined,  or  were  marching  to  join,  Thomas.  Longstreet's  men, 
turning  to  the  right,  struck  the  right  flank  and  rear  of 
Brannaii's  division,  and  forced  it  to  swing  backwards,  and 
then  Wood  and  Van  Cleve  joined  Brannan,  and  they  formed 
a  new  line  facing  the  direction  of  Longstreet's  attack  in  flank, 
and  made  front  against  the  enemy.1  At  about  2  P.  M., 
Thomas,  unaware  of  the  disaster  on  the  right,  riding  towards 
his  right,  and  still  expecting  to  see  Sheridan  coming  to 
re-enforce  him,2  was  undeceived  by  the  onset  of  Longstreet's 
troops  from  the  right  in  place  of  Sheridan.  A  stubborn  bat 
tle  then  ensued  on  this  flank.  Granger,  hurrying  up  from 
Rossville,  joined  Thomas  with  three  brigades.  The  strength 
of  two  of  these  brigades  is  given  as  3,913.3  If  we  assume 
that  the  other  (McCook's)  had  half  this  number,  we  make 
Granger's  force  5,870,  and  the  conclusion  is  reached  that  the 
total  force  which  came  under  Thomas's  command,  excluding 
Sheridan's  men,  was,  all  told,  about  32,000.  Longstreet 
reports  his  force  at  22,882.4  Cheatham's  division,  which 
joined  in  the  later  attacks  of  the  right  wing,  is  reported  at 
4,778.5  Adding  Folk's  force  of  13,000,  as  above  estimated, 
we  find  the  total  force  of  Bragg's  army  to  have  been  little 
over  40,000.6  Between  3  and  4  o'clock  Garfield  brought  an 
order  from  Rosecrans  to  Thomas,  to  take  command  of  the 
forces  and  assume  a  threatening  attitude  at  Eossville.7 

1  50  W.  R.,  402.  2  J6.,  252.  3  16.,  856. 

4  51  W.  R.,  201.  s  j^  79?  82. 

6  Colonel  Dawes,  in  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  iii.  p.  070, 
using  the  returns  of  "present  for  duty,"  August  31,  in  Hood's  and  McLaws's 
divisions  (49  W.  R.,  681).  estimates   the  Confederate  force  at  Chickamauga 
at   71,551  ;    but  this  apparently  includes  Wofford's  and  Bryan's  brigades  of 
McLaws's  division,  which  were  not  present  (51  "W.  R.,  18),  and  it  also  includes 
those  lost  before  September  20  and  the  cavalry,  which  are  not  included  in  the 
above  estimate  of  40,000. 

7  50  W.  R.,  140,  253,  256. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  229 

Thomas  maintained  a  firm  attitude  until  about  5.30,  when  he 
ordered  the  retreat.  In  beginning  the  movement  to  the  rear, 
discovering  the  enemy  in  his  path,  he  cleared  them  away  by  a 
charge  of  Reynolds's  division.  The  enemy  made  attacks  on 
several  of  the  divisions  as  they  were  retiring,  but  met  with  no 
success,  and  Thomas  secured  his  new  position  at  Rossville. 
The  disorder  caused  by  Longstreet's  irruption  on  Rosecrans's 
right  might  well  have  brought  disaster  upon  the  whole 
army  if  it  had  not  consisted  of  brave  and  veteran  soldiers. 
Thomas  in  this  battle  displayed  the  greatest  quality  as  a 
fighter  on  the  defence,  and  his  admirable  poise,  coolness 
and  imperturbability  were  doubtless  worth  an  army  corps. 
Whether  his  perception  of  what  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  enemy  was  such  as  we  look  for  in  a  profound  strategist, 
or  whether  his  conservatism  was  responsible  in  any  degree  for 
the  disaster  due  to  unnecessarily  stripping  the  right  wing  to 
re-enforce  the  left,  is  a  question. 

In  his  report  Thomas  makes  no  mention  of  sending  the 
fatal  message  to  Rosecrans  which  brought  Wood's  division 
out  of  the  line,  and  makes  no  justification  of  his  appropriation 
of  this  division.  Rosecrans  says  that  Captain  Kellogg 
brought  the  word.1  Van  Home  does  not  say  who  brought  it.2 
Turchin,  in  his  history  of  the  battle,  says  that  Captain 
Kellogg  heard  it  from  Reynolds,  and  accepted  it  as  a  fact, 
and  reported  it  to  Rosecrans,3  and  the  latter  adopted  this 
theory  in  a  letter  to  the  Adjutant-General,  January  12,  1864.4 
Cist,  in  his  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  says 
that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Von  Schrader  of  Thomas's  staff, 
after  riding  the  lines,  reported  the  alleged  fact  to  Thomas, 
and  that  the  latter  sent  the  information  to  Rosecrans.5 
Much  blame  has  been  thrown  on  General  Wood  for  not 
discovering  that  the  order  to  close  up  on  Reynolds  could  not 
be  fulfilled  literally,  and  for  not  reporting  to  Rosecrans  for 

1  50  W.  R-,  59.  2  1  Van  Home,  A.  of  C.,  347.  3  Turchin,  112. 

4  50  W.  R.,  1017.  5  Cist,  206. 


230    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

instructions  when  he  discovered  this  fact.  The  inquiry  arises 
whether  General  Thomas  did  not  commit  a  graver  fault  in 
ordering  Wood's  division  still  farther  away  without  consult 
ing  Rosecrans. 

The  "  legend  "  of  a  map  entitled,  "  Tactical  Study  of  the 
Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,"  issued  by  the  War  Department 
(Sheets  5  and  6),  for  which  Captain  Kellogg  was  responsible, 
stated  that  Brannan's  division,  having  been  placed  in  reserve 
for  Thomas  on  the  night  of  the  19th,  was  moved  to  the  front 
without  his  knowledge  on  the  morning  of  the  20th.1  This 
seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  reports,2  and  Van  Home's 
history.3  The  writer  is  informed  from  the  War  Department 
that  Captain  Kellogg  based  his  statements  on  the  memory  of 
himself  and  others ;  and  General  Rosecrans  writes  that  the 
legend  is  wrong.4 

Immediately  after  this  battle,  when  Grant  was  placed 
in  command  of  the  operations  between  Virginia  and  the 
Mississippi,  he  chose  Thomas  to  command  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  as  we  have  seen.5  It  has  been  said  that  it 
would  have  been  only  just  to  have  entrusted  the  supreme 
conduct  of  affairs  in  the  region  around  Chattanooga  to 
Thomas  instead  of  Grant.  This  leads  to  a  comparison  of 
their  records  up  to  that  time.  Thomas  had  won  the  victory 
of  Mill  Springs,  and  had  commanded  the  right  wing  at  the 
siege  of  Corinth,  a  corps  at  Stone's  River  and  the  left 
wing  at  Chickamauga.  Grant's  first  battle  at  Belmont  in 
November,  1861,  was  not  glorious  because,  having  landed  to 
attack  a  force  there,  he  was  obliged  to  take  to  his  boats  again, 
but  tactically  it  was  to  his  credit,  for,  with  a  force  of  3,114 
men,  he,  with  a  loss  of  485,  broke  up  the  enemy's  camp, 
inflicted  a  loss  of  641,  and  with  raw  troops  effected  a  safe 

1  The  leg-end  of  Plate  xlvi.  of  the  Atlas  to  accompany  the  War  Records, 
published  in  1892,  since  this  paper  was  written,  does  not  contain  this  state 
ment. 

'2  50  W.  R.,  57,  401,  1040.  3  1  Van  Home,  A.  of  C.,  342. 

*  Supra,  243.  5  53  W.  R.,  404 ;  55  W.  R.,  11. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  231 

and  orderly  embarkation  in  the  face  of  a  force  made  superior 
to  his  by  re-enforcement.1  In  February,  1862,  he  started 
from  Cairo  for  Fort  Henry,  sixty  miles  up  the  Tennessee 
River.  The  Confederates  abandoning  the  fort  on  the  ap 
proach  of  the  navy,  he  marched  at  once  for  Fort  Donelson, 
eleven  miles  away.  The  navy  attacked  and  was  repulsed. 
The  enemy  made  a  sortie  which  was  repulsed,  and  Grant 
pushed  up  against  the  work.  The  commander  and  several 
thousand  men  fled  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  and  on  the  16th 
the  fort  was  surrendered  with  a  force  reported  by  Buckner 
as  9,000  men.2  Grant  in  his  Memoirs  states  that  14,623 
surrendered,  and  that  the  total  Confederate  force  opposing 
him  at  first  was  21,000.3  Buckner  reported  the  total  force 
as  not  over  12,000,4  and  Pillow  reported  it  at  13,000.5  The 
Record  does  not  state  Grant's  force,  but  he  states  it  in  his 
Memoirs  as  27,000.6 

At  Shiloh,  April  6,  1862,  with  a  force  reported  as  number 
ing  37,593  present  for  duty,7  he  was  attacked  by  Johnston 
with  a  force  reported  as  having  40,335  effectives.8  Probably 
Grant's  "  present  for  duty  "  should  be  reduced  ten  per  cent,  for 
a  comparison.  His  army  was  forced  back  for  a  mile  or  two 
to  the  Tennessee  River,  and  there  with  the  aid  of  Nelson's 
division  of  4,541  men  from  BuelTs  arjny  and  two  gunboats 
he  took  up  a  new  line,9  and  on  the  next  day,  re-enforced  by 
Wallace's  division  of  his  own  army  and  about  20,000  men 
of  Buell's  army,  he  drove  the  enemy  from  the  field,10  inflicting 
a  loss  of  10,694,  and  suffering  a  loss  of  13, 047. n 

The  Record  disproves  the  statement  so  often  made  that  the 
Union  Army  was  surprised.  It  shows  that  the  battle  was 
opened  by  the  attack  of  an  advance  party  from  one  of  the 
Union  divisions,12  and  that  each  division  was  in  line  of  battle 

I  8  W.  R-,  269,  271,  310,  325,  327,  346,  350.  2  7  W.  R.,  335. 

8  1  Grant's  Memoirs,  314-315.  4  7  W.  R.,  335.  5  Ib.,  283. 

6  1  Grant's  Memoirs,  315.         7  10  W.  R.,  112.          8  16.,  396.         9  Ib.,  324. 
10  Ib.,  108;  11  W.  R.,  148;  1  Van  Home,  A.  of  C.,  112,  115. 

II  10  W.  R.,  108,  395.  12  Ib.,  278. 


232     CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

to  receive  the  enemy's  attack.1  McPlierson  says,  "  It  was 
well  known  the  enemy  was  approaching  our  lines,  and  there 
had  been  more  or  less  skirmishing  for  three  days  preceding 
the  battle."  2  Hardee,  who  commanded  the  Confederate 
advance,  says,  "  At  early  dawn  the  enemy  attacked  the 
skirmishers  in  front  of  my  line ;  "  3  and  Bragg  says,  "  The 
enemy  did  not  give  us  time  to  discuss  the  question  of  attack, 
for  soon  after  dawn  he  commenced  a  rapid  musketry  fire  on 
our  pickets."  4  The  belief  that  there  was  a  surprise  seems  to 
rest  mainly  on  Grant's  despatch  to  Halleck  of  April  5,  "  I 
have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one) 
being  made  upon  us,  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a 
thing  take  place,"5  and  Sherman's  despatch  to  Grant  of  same 
day,  "  I  have  110  doubt  nothing  will  occur  to-day  more  than 
some  picket  firing." 6  Sherman  was  right,  for  nothing 
more  did  occur  that  day,  and  although  Grant's  prophecy  was 
wrong,  it  ought  to  have  been  right.  Corinth,  where  the 
Confederates  were,  was  only  twenty  miles  from  Pittsburg 
Landing,  where  Grant  had  landed  three  weeks  before.  At 
least  ten  days  before  it  was  evident  to  Johnston  that  Grant's 
purpose  was  to  seize  Corinth,"  and  it  would  not  have  been  a 
violent  presumption  that  Johnston  knew  of  Buell's  march  from 
Nashville  to  join  Grant,  which  began  as  early  as  March  18,8 
and  as  Johnston  had  waited  until  Buell  was  within  ten  miles 
it  was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  would  attack  at  that 
juncture,  having  refrained  during  so  long  a  time  when  Grant 
was  alone.  His  only  justification  for  leaving  his  strong 
defensive  position  was  the  attempt  to  beat  Grant  before  Buell 
could  arrive.9  The  logical  result  of  his  delay  was  the  total 
and  bitter  defeat  which  his  army  suffered.  Bragg  wrote  to 
Beauregard  the  next  day  on  the  road  to  Corinth  :  "  Our  con 
dition  is  horrible.  Troops  utterly  disorganized  and  demor- 

1  10  W.  R.,  114,  148,  203,  248,  278.  2  16.,  181.  3  16.,  568. 

4  16.,  464.  &  16.,  89.  6  11  W.  R.,  93-94.  7  Ib.,  361. 

8  16.,  42,  46.  9  10  W.  R.,  385  ;  11  W.  R.,  381,  383,  387. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  233 

alizecl.  .  .  .  Our  artillery  is  being  left  all  along  the  road  by 
its  officers ;  indeed  I  find  but  few  officers  with  their  men."  l 
44  The  men  are  exhausted,  dispirited,  and  work  with  no  zeal ; "  2 
and  Breckinridge  wrote  to  Bragg,  44  My  troops  are  worn  out 
and  I  don't  think  can  be  relied  on  after  the  first  volley."  3 

Grant's  presence  at  Savannah,  eight  miles  down  the  river, 
was  not  due  to  false  security.  Buell  had  asked  him  to  meet 
him  there  on  his  arrival,  which  took  place  on  the  evening  of 
the  5th,4  and  Grant  had  more  reason  to  fear  an  attack  on 
his  depot  at  Crump's  Landing,  four  miles  below  Pittsburg 
Landing,  than  on  the  latter  place.  At  Savannah  he  was 
below  both  places,  and  within  easy  reach  of  either  by 
steamer.5 

Halleck  refuted  the  charge  that  the  army  was  surprised 
in  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  having  made  careful 
inquiry  soon  after  the  battle.6 

When  Halleck  went  to  Washington  in  the  following  July, 
Grant  was  placed  in  command  of  the  operations  in  West 
Tennessee,  Kentucky  and  Mississippi.  He  directed  the 
campaign  in  which  the  actions  at  luka  and  Corinth  were 
fought,  and  in  December  he  began  the  series  of  operations 
for  the  capture  of  Yicksburg.  After  the  resolute  but  vain 
efforts  to  seize  a  position  from  which  to  approach  it  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  being  urged  by  Halleck  to  join 
forces  with  Banks  to  operate  against  Port  Hudson  or 
Vicksburg,7  on  the  12th  of  April  he  started  down  the  west 
side  of  the  river,  passed  Vicksburg,  and  then  crossed  the 
river,  attacked  and  routed  about  5,000  Confederates  under 
Bowen  at  Port  Gibson,  May  I.8  Then  learning  that  Banks 
was  off  in  Louisiana,9  without  delay  he  pushed  into  the 
interior,  brushed  aside  the  advance  of  the  enemy,10  pene- 

1  11  W.  R.,  308.  2  16.,  399.  3  Ib.,  400. 

4  Ib.,  91 ;  10  W.  R.,  291.  6  10  W.  R ,  175, 178,  179. 

6  Ib.,  98,  99.  7  36  W.  R.,  25.  8  Ib.,  26,  29,  34. 

»  38  W.  R.,  223,  225.  10  36  W.  R.,  36. 


234    CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

tratecl  between  the  armies  of  Pemberton  at  Vieksburg  and 
Jolmston  at  Jackson,1  and  after  defeating  the  latter  turned 
the  whole  force  on  Vicksburg,  and,  investing  that  place, 
compelled  its  surrender  with  30,000  men  July  4.2  Johnston's 
effective  force  behind  him  was  reported  June  25  at  2 8,1 54, 3  and 
the  losses  of  the  Confederates  in  action  are  set  down  in  the 
incomplete  reports  as  over  6,350.4  Their  total  force  is  thus 
shown  to  have  been  at  least  64,500.  Grant's  force  present 
for  duty,  all  told,  up  to  his  arrival  before  Vicksburg,  was  a 
little  less  than  57,000.5  The  strategy  which  accomplished 
such  results  was  of  a  kind  unheard  of  in  our  war  up  to  that 
time,  and  was  worthy  of  the  most  brilliant  commanders  in 
history.  It  would  have  been  strange  if  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  seeking  for  a  leader  to  drive  the  Confederates 
from  East  Tennessee,  should  have  preferred  Thomas,  even 
with  all  his  noble  qualities,  to  a  general  with  this  record  of 
incessant  activity,  successful  strategy  and  aggressive  tactics. 
Grant  assumed  command  October  18,  arrived  at  Chattanooga 
on  the  23d,6  and  on  November  18  issued  orders  for  the 
attack  on  Bragg' s  army,  which,  following  the  Union  army 
from  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  had  taken  position  on 
Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout  Mountain  in  the  face  of 
Chattanooga.7  Sherman  had  brought  up  a  part  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tennessee  River. 
He  was  to  attack  on  the  left,  while  Thomas  attacked  on.  the 
centre  and  on  the  right.  Grant  wrote  to  Thomas,  "The 
general  plan,  you  understand,  is  for  Sherman  ...  to  effect 
a  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  River  just  below  the  mouth  of 
Chickamauga,  .  .  .  and  to  secure  the  heights  from  the 
northern  extremity  to  about  the  railroad  tunnel  before  the 
enemy  can  concentrate  against  him.  You  will  co-operate 

1  36  W.  R.,  30.  2  Ib.,  44.  3  38  W.  R.,  978. 

4  37  W.  R.,  82,  99,  112,  328,  654. 

5  Including  the  4th  Division  of  the  16th  Corps,  37  W.  R.,  148,  154;  38  W. 
R.,  249. 

6  54  W.  R.,  706.  7  55  W.  R.,  31. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  235 

with  Sherman.  The  troops  in  Chattanooga  Valley  should 
be  well  concentrated  on  your  left  flank,  leaving  only  the 
necessary  force  to  defend  fortifications  on  the  right  and 
centre,  and  a  movable  column  of  one  division  in  readiness  to 
move  whenever  ordered.  This  division  should  show  itself  as 
threateningly  as  possible  on  the  most  practicable  line  for 
making  an  attack  up  the  valley.  Your  effort  then  will  be 
to  form  a  junction  with  Sherman,  making  your  advance 
well  toward  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and 
moving  as  near  simultaneously  with,  him  as  possible.  The 
juncture  once  formed,  and  the  Ridge  carried,  communications 
will  be  at  once  established  between  the  two  armies  by  roads 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  river.  Farther  movements  will 
then  depend  on  those  of  the  enemy." 1  Sherman  having 
started  up  the  river  for  the  crossing,  Thomas  on  the  23d, 
under  orders  from  Grant  to  ascertain  whether  Bragg  was 
retreating  as  had  been  reported,2  assaulted  Bragg's  advanced 
line  in  front  of  the  town  and  seized  and  held  Orchard  Knob ; 
and  the  next  morning  Hooker,  being  sent  by  Thomas  to  make 
a  demonstration  against  the  enemy's  left  flank  on  Lookout 
Mountain  to  divert  them  from  Sherman  while  he  was  crossing 
the  river,  carried  the  point  and  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain 
at  about  midday.3  Sherman  crossed  the  river  and  seized  the 
northern  end  of  the  Ridge  on  the  same  day.4  Grant  then 
wrote  to  him :  "  You  will  attack  the  enemy  at  the  point  most 
advantageous  from  your  position  at  early  dawn  to-morrow 
morning  (25th  instant).  General  Thomas  has  been  instructed 
to  commence  the  attack  early  to-morrow  morning.  He  will 
carry  the  enemy's  rifle-pits  in  his  immediate  front,  or  move  to 
the  left  to  your  support,  as  circumstances  may  determine 
best." 5  And  to  Thomas :  "  I  have  instructed  General 
Sherman  to  advance  as  soon  as  it  is  light  in  the  morning,  and 
your  attack,  which  will  be  simultaneous,  will  be  in  co-opera- 

1  55  W.  R.,31.  2  16.,  33,  41.  3  16.,  43,  95, 105,  106. 

4  16.,  33,  34.  6  jk}  43. 


236     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 


tion.  Your  command  will  either  carry  the  rifle-pits  and 
directly  in  front  of  them  or  move  to  the  left,  as  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  may  require."  1  Sherman  attacked  with  great 
vigor  but  could  not  get  beyond  the  railroad  tunnel.2  Grant 
reports  that  he  had  intended  to  delay  the  attack  on  the  centre 
for  Hooker's  appearance  on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  via  the 
Chattanooga  Valley,  the  Summertowii  road  and  Rossville 
according  to  orders.3  Sherman  apparently  did  not  under 
stand  the  delay,  for  at  12.45  P.  M.  he  asked,  "  Where  is 
Thomas?"4  Thomas  replied  at  1  P.  M.  from  Orchard  Knob, 
"  I  am  here  ;  my  right  [Hooker]  is  closing  in  from  Lookout 
Mountain  toward  Missionary  Ridge."  5  The  enemy  were 
then  seen  massing  re-enforcements  on  their  right  against 
Sherman,6  and  Baird's  division  was  despatched  from  Thomas 
to  re-enforce  him,  but  he  sent  word  to  Grant  that  he  did  not 
need  re-enforcement  and  Baird  formed  on  Thomas's  left.7 
Grant  says  in  his  report  that  he  then  directed  Thomas  to 
move  forward  the  centre,  "  and  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  when  carried  to  re-form  his  lines  on 
the  rifle-pits  with  a  view  to  carrying  the  top  of  the  Ridge."  ! 
Thomas's  troops  not  only  obeyed  the  order  to  carry  the  rifle- 
pits,  but  also  of  their  own  accord,  without  halting  to  re-form, 
pushed  on  and  carried  the  Ridge,  and  the  enemy  were  routed. 
It  has  been  asserted  that  Grant  did  not  intend  to  carry 
the  Ridge  by  this  attack,  that  no  order  to  that  effect  can  be 
found,  and  that  the  movement  was  intended  as  a.  mere 
diversion  in  Sherman's  favor.  The  latter  assertion  seems 
inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  Sherman  had  just  before 
declined  re-enforcements.  It  is  probable  that  Grant  gave  his 
order  to  Thomas  orally  as  they  were  together.  No  written 
copy  is  contained  in  the  Record,  but  what  seems  to  be 
conclusive  evidence  that  it  contemplated  carrying  the  Ridge 

1  55  W.  R.,  44.         2  Ib.,  574-575.  3  Ib.,  34,  96,  112,  113,  115. 

4  Ib.,  44.  6  Ib.  6  Ib.,  34,  78,  96,  750. 

?  Ib.,  508.  8  Ib.,  34. 


GENERAL    THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  237 

is  found  in  Baird's  report.  He  says  that  an  officer  of 
Thomas's  staff  brought  him  an  oral  order  to  take  the  rifle- 
pits,  and  told  him  that  "  this  was  intended  as  preparatory  to 
a  general  assault  on  the  mountain,  and  that  it  was  doubtless 
designed  by  the  major-general  commanding  that  I  should 
take  part  in  this  movement,  so  that  I  would  be  following  his 
wishes  were  I  to  push  on  to  the  summit."1  One  writer 
intimates  that  Thomas,  deserves  credit  for  the  spontaneous 
action  of  his  troops  because  his  long  command  over  them  had 
infused  them  with  the  spirit  which  actuated  them.2  The 
Record  hardly  sustains  this  proposition,  for  it  shows  that  of 
the  four  divisions  which  made  the  assault,  Sheridan's  and 
Wood's  which  were  in  the  centre  were  not  of  Thomas's  corps 
and  had  been  under  his  command  only  five  weeks. 

It  has  also  been  said  that  Grant  had  determined  to  give 
Sherman  the  principal  part  in  this  battle,  and  that  this  was 
unwarranted  in  view  of  Thomas's  greater  experience  and 
successes,  but  the  Record  does  not  confirm  this  view.  While 
it  is  clear  that  Grant  intended  to  have  Sherman  seize  the 
Ridge  as  far  as  the  tunnel  before  Thomas  should  attack  in 
the  centre,  yet  we  have  already  seen  that  Thomas's  attack 
was  intended  to  be  concurrent  with  Sherman's  when  the  latter 
had  reached  the  tunnel,  and  we  find  that  his  force  was  greater 
than  Sherman's.  The  latter  had  'the  divisions  of  M.  L. 
Smith,  Ewing  and  J.  E.  Smith  of  his  own  army  and  the 
division  of  Davis  of  Thomas's  army,  in  all  numbering  19,317 
present  for  duty.3  It  appears  that  it  was  not  originally 
intended  that  Howard's  corps  should  come  under  his  com 
mand,  but  joining  him  during  the  battle  it  brought  6,370 
present  for  duty,  thus  making  his  total  force  25,687.4 
Osterhaus's  division  of  his  army  numbering  3,734  present  for 
duty5  was  under  Thomas's  command,  and  the  total  of  his 
infantry  and  artillery  present  for  duty  was  40,963.6  Of  the 

1  55  W.  R.,  508.  2  Ante,  186.  8    55  W.  R.,  13. 

*  16.,  349.  6  16.,  13,  95.  «  16.,  12-14. 


238    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Sherman  put  into 
action  only  one  battery  and  three  regiments.  In  this  case  as 
in  others  at  least  ten  per  cent,  should  be  deducted  from  the 
"present  for  duty"  of  the  Union  armies  to  compare  them 
with  Confederate  reports  of  "  effectives  present."  It  appears 
that  three  weeks  before,  the  twenty-six  brigades  of  infantry 
and  the  artillery  which  engaged  in  the  battle  on  the 
Confederate  side,  numbered  about  33,000.*  The  force 
opposed  to  Sherman  at  the  tunnel  was  Cleburne's  division  of 
four  brigades,  numbering  5,213  effectives,2  and  six  or  seven 
brigades  from  other  divisions.3  The  force  opposed  to  Thomas's 
four  divisions  of  27,216  present  for  duty,  which  attacked  in 
the  centre,  comprised  fourteen  brigades,  numbering  about 
17,900  effectives.4  In  the  course  of  the  battle  three 5  of  these 
brigades  were  sent  to  make  part  of  the  above  mentioned 
force  opposing  Sherman. 

March  12,  1864,  Grant  was  given  the  command  of  all  the 
armies  and  Sherman  was  given  the  command  extending  from 
Arkansas  to  East  Tennessee.6  Commenting  upon  this,  one 
writer  has  said  that  Thomas  "  had  held  far  greater  responsi 
bilities  than  Sherman,  —  had  commanded  larger  armies,  had 
taken  leading  part  in  more  battles,  had  achieved  far  more 
important  results,  and  had  always  been  successful,"  7  and  that 
it  was  a  public  misfortune  that  Grant  did  not  display  towards 
Thomas  at  least  a  portion  of  the  friendship  and  confidence 
which  he  entertained  for  Sherman.  If  this  means  that  the 

1  The  artillery  of  Walker's  division,  estimated  at  315,  and  Reynolds's  brigade, 
estimated  at  968,  as  one-third  of  Bnckner's  division  ;  and  300  dedu  cted  from 
Wright's  brigade  for  absent  regiments.     55  W.  R.,  709. 

2  Ib.,  056. 

3  Wright's,  Lewis's,  Brown's,  Cumming's.  Maney's,  besides  one  not  identified, 
and  possibly  Pettus's.     Ib.,  707,  708,  739,  726,  749,  753,  735,  751,  725. 

4  Hindman's,  Walker's  and  Stewart's   divisions,  two   brigades  of  Breckin- 
ridge's  division,  estimated  at  3,774,  and  Reynolds's  brigade.     Ib.,  740,  741,  747, 
748,  739,  056. 

6  Cumming's  and  Maney's,  and  one  not  identified.     Ib.,  735,  751. 
6  59  W.  R.,  58.  7  68  Atlantic  Monthly,  511. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  239 

command  in  the  West  should  have  been  given  to  Thomas 
rather  than  to  Sherman,  a  summary  of  the  latter's  career  as 
contained  in  the  Kecord  should  be  compared  with  Thomas's 
up  to  this  date.  Sherman  commanded  a  brigade  at  Bull  Kun. 
In  April,  1862,  at  Pittsburg  Landing  he  won  the  approbation 
of  every  one  by  his  resolute  opposition  on  the  first  day  with 
his  division  of  8,800  men,  and  on  the  second  day  he  led  it  to 
victory.  On  the  28th  of  May  in  the  siege  of  Corinth  with 
his  division  re-enforced  by  two  brigades  he  fought  a  successful 
engagement  in  the  presence  of  Grant  and  Thomas.1  In 
December  he  took  four  divisions  of  32,000  men2  in  the 
expedition  down  the  Mississippi  against  Yicksburg  and  made 
the  unsuccessful  attack  on  Haynes  Bluff.3  He  says  in  his 
report  that  the  attack  was  necessary  to  a  successful  accom 
plishment  of  his  orders.4  and  that  he  attributes  the  "  failure 
to  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position."  5  A  fortnight  later 
he  commanded  one  of  the  two  corps  in  the  successful  attack 
on  Arkansas  Post,  where  with  a  loss  of  1,061  men6  a  fort, 
with  17  pieces  of  artillery  and  5,000  men,  was  captured.7 
In  the  Vicksburg  campaign  he  commanded  a  corps  of  20,0 00 8 
and  took  part  in  the  siege  and  the  battle  of  Jackson  and  the 
assaults  of  May  19  and  22 .9  If  anything  more  than  this 
record  were  necessary  to  justify  Grant  in  choosing  Sherman 
as  his  lieutenant  in  the  West,  \\i^  incessant  activity  and  his 
hearty  and  prompt  support  of  Grant  in  everything  which  had 
been  essayed  —  in  good  and  in  evil  fortune  —  would  have 
justified  Grant  in  confiding  to  him  the  charge  of  the  great 
campaign  which  was  to  begin  with  the  spring  of  1864. 

As  the  publication  of  the  War  Department  Records  has 
not  yet  reached  the  Atlanta  campaign,  it  is  not  within  the 
scope  of  this  paper  to  compare  Sherman  and  Thomas  in  that 

1  10  W.  R.,  743.  2  24  W.  R.,  603,  604.  3  15.,  605  et  seq. 

4  Ib.,  60S.  5  16.,  610.  6  16.,  719. 

7  Ib.,  708,  780,  783,  791.  8  38  W.  R.,  249. 
9  36  W.  R.,  54,  55,  751  et  seq. 


240    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

campaign,  but  certain  parts  of  the  correspondence  between 
them  and  Grant  upon  the  eve  of  the  march  to  the  sea  throw 
such  light  upon  the  question  whether  Sherman  in  taking 
away  so  large  a  force  as  he  led  to  the  coast  un justifiably 
weakened  Thomas  or  imperilled  the  national  cause  in  Ten 
nessee,  that  it  will  not  be  unprofitable  to  notice  them  here. 
One  writer  has  said  that  while  Sherman  took  away  62,000 
men  he  left  with  Thomas  only  "  25,000  men,  —  the  remnants 
of  the  two  smallest  corps,  including  all  dismounted  cavalry, 
all  sick  and  wounded." 1  Turning  to  the  correspondence, 
we  find  a  report  of  Sherman  to  Grant,  November  1,  that 
Thomas  had  40,000  to  45,000  men  and  that  two  divisions 
were  on  the  way  to  him  from  Missouri,2  and  a  despatch  from 
Sherman  to  Thomas,  November  2,  as  follows  :  "  According  to 
Wilson's  account,  you  will  have  in  ten  days  full  12, COO 
cavalry,  and  I  estimate  your  infantry  force,  independent  of 
railroad  guards,  full  40,000  men,  which  is  a  force  superior 
to  the  enemy." 3  Thomas  in  his  report  of  the  campaign 
estimates  Hood's  force  which  was  then  at  Florence,  Alabama, 
about  a  hundred  miles  south  of  Nashville,  at  52,000  to 
60,000.4  We  shall  not  be  able  to  determine  whether  it 
was  within  these  limits  until  the  Confederate  reports  are 
published,  but  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  Thomas  did  not 
underestimate  it,  in  view  of  his  knowledge  at  the  time  of 
making  his  report,  which  was  after  he  had  met  and  defeated 
this  force.5  Sherman  was  unable  to  divine  whether  Hood 
would  follow  him  as  he  marched  into  Georgia  or  would  try 

1  68  Atlantic  Monthly,  51 1-5 12. 

2  C.  W.,  1  Sup.,  Sherman's  Report,  251. 

3  Ib.,  252.     Thomas  also  states  his  effective  force,  excluding1  that  guarding 
the  railroad  and  various  posts,  as  about  29,700. 

4  Ib.,  Thomas's  Report,  369. 

5  The  War  Records  published  since  the  above  was  written  state  the  '*  present 
for  duty  "  under  Thomas's  command,  November  20,  as  71,473  ;  and  the  "  present 
for  duty  "  in   Hood's  command,  November  6,  as  35,662,  of  which  30,599  were 
effectives,  and  to  which,  apparently,  at  least  5,500  should  be  added,  for  Forrest's 
and  Roddey's  cavalry.     93  W.  R-,  52,  648,  678. 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  241 

to  invade  Tennessee.  He  wrote  to  Thomas  October  29,  "I 
will  give  you  notice  when  I  start.  All  preparations  are 
now  progressing,  but  I  want  to  know  Hood's  movements  and 
how  well  you  are  prepared  before  I  start ; " l  again  on  the 
31st,  "  You  must  unite  all  your  men  into  one  army,  and 
abandon  all  minor  points,  if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood.  He 
will  not  attack  posts,  but  march  around  them  ; "  2  and  again 
from  Kingston  about  half  way  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta 
November  10,  "  All  will  be  ready  to  start  from  here  the 
day  after  to-morrow.  Keep  me  well  advised.  I  think  you 
will  find  Hood  marching  off,  and  you  should  be  ready  to 
follow  him ; " 3  and  011  the  llth,  "  I  can  hardly  believe 
Beauregard  would  attempt  to  work  against  Nashville  from 
Corinth  as  a  base  at  this  stage  of  the  war,  but  all  information 
seems  to  point  that  way.  If  he  does,  you  will  whip  him  out 
of  his  boots.  ...  I  still  believe  public  clamor  will  force  him 
to  turn  and  follow  me."  4  On  the  next  day  Thomas  wrote, 
"  I  have  no  fears  that  Beauregard  can  do  us  any  harm  now, 
and  if  he  attempts  to  follow  you  I  will  follow  him  as  far  as 
possible.  If  he  does  not  follow  you,  I  will  then  thoroughly 
organize  my  troops,  and,  I  believe,  shall  have  men  enough 
to  ruin  him  unless  he  gets  out  of  the  way  very  rapidly." 5 
This  was  the  last  despatch  between  them.  On  that  day 
communications  were  broken,  and  Sherman's  army  marched  to 
Atlanta.  It  marched  out  of  that  place  for  the  Atlantic  coast 
on  the  15th.  After  this  correspondence  it  would  seem  that 
Sherman's  consideration  for  Thomas  was  not  open  to  ques 
tion.  That  the  force  left  with  Thomas  was  sufficient  was 
proven  by  the  event.  Whatever  risk  resulted  later  from 
Schofield's  position  at  Franklin  and  Spring  Hill  was  due  to 
Thomas's  choosing  to  have  him  at  Franklin  rather  than  at 
Nashville. 

Sherman   had  before  him  the  necessity  of  living  on  the 

1  C.  W.,  1  Sup.,  Sherman's  Eeport,  245.  2  16.,  249. 

3  16.,  264.  *  16.,  206.  6  16.,  267, 


242     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

country  in  a  march  of  three  hundred  miles.  How  easy  or 
how  difficult  this  was  to  be  could  not  be  foreseen.  It  was 
possible  that  a  full  half  of  his  army  would  have  to  scatter 
itself  over  the  country  to  search  for  food  and  forage,  and  it 
was  also  possible  that  serious  obstacles  might  be  thrown  in 
the  path  of  the  army  which  would  detain  it  and  seriously 
embarrass  it  unless  its  numbers  were  sufficient  to  sweep 
opposition  from  its  path  and  clear  the  road  of  physical 
obstacles  without  delay.  A  great  preponderance  of  numbers 
over  any  possible  opposing  force  was  necessary  for  these 
contingencies.  Again,  if  Hood  had  taken  the  course  of 
following  on  Sherman's  heels,  he  too  might  have  brought 
disaster  upon  a  force  not  greatly  stronger  than  his  own. 
On  the  other  hand,  Hood  in  attempting  to  invade  Kentucky, 
much  more  in  sitting  down  before  a  fortified  place  held  by 
Thomas,  with  his  railroad  to  the  South  broken  up  and  his 
source  of  supplies  harried  up  by  Sherman,  was  sure  to  be  at 
a  great  disadvantage  against  equal  numbers,  and  in  an  actual 
attack  on  fortifications  he  could  have  no  hope.  There  were 
reasons  for  giving  Sherman  and  Thomas  entire  confidence 
in  the  ability  of  the  latter,  with  the  force  left  him,  to  defeat 
Hood  if  he  turned  northward.  Besides  this,  Thomas  had  the 
resources  and  men  of  the  whole  North  at  his  back. 


[The  originals  of  the  following  letters  have  been  placed 
with  the  manuscript  of  this  paper  in  the  Archives  of  the 
Society  by  Colonel  Livermore.] 

War  Department,  War  Records  Office, 

WASHINGTON,  December  29,  1891. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  favor  of  the  27th  inst.,  in  regard  to  "  The  Tactical 
Study  of  the  Battlefield  of  Chickamauga,"  which  has 
recently  been  issued  by  the  War  Department.  As  that  work 
was  not  published  by  this  office,  I  am  only  familiar,  in  a 
casual  way,  with  the  text  of  the  legends  that  are  inscribed 


GENERAL   THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD  243 

on  the  several  maps ;  I  only  know  that  it  was  done  with  the 
greatest  care  by  an  officer  of  the  highest  character  and 
capacity,  from  his  training,  for  the  work,  which,  from  his 
association  with  General  Thomas  as  an  aide  during  the  battle, 
he  was  peculiarly  well  fitted  to  undertake.  I  will,  therefore, 
refer  your  letter  to  him,  and  he  will  explain  to  you  the 
authorities  upon  which  his  statements  were  based,  and  I 
remain,  Faithfully  yours, 

GEORGE  B.  DAVIS, 

Major,  U.  S.  A. 
To  T.  L.  LIVERMORE,  Esq. 

War  Department,  War  Records  Office, 

WASHINGTON,  December  30,  1891. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  seen  Colonel  Kellogg,  with 
reference  to  the  legends  on  the  Chickamauga  maps,  and  he 
tells  me  that  his  data  concerning  all  points  not  covered  by 
the  Union  and  Confederate  reports  of  the  battle  were 
derived  mainly  from  what  he  himself  saw,  as  an  aide-de 
camp  for  Major-General  Thomas,  during  the  battle,  and 
what  was  known  to  other  general  and  staff  officers,  and 
others,  who  were  participants  in  the  battle,  and  had  to  do 
with  the  movements  on  Sunday  afternoon,  along  General 
Thomas'  line. 

If  there  is  anything  further  in  tne  way  of  information  I 
can  give  you,  I  hope  you  will  command  me  freely,  and  I 
remain,  Faithfully  yours, 

GEORGE  B.  DAVIS, 
Major,  U.  S.  A. 

To  T.  L.  LIVERMORE,  Esq. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  January  13,  1892. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL,  —  Replying  to  yours  received  about 

one  week  ago  :  I  have  not  yet  had  time  to  examine  the  maps 

nor  the  legend  of  the  atlas  of  which  you  speak;  but,  from 

what  you  say,  it  must  be  in  error  and  the  reports  correct. 

Brannan's  division  was  reported  to  have  one  brigade  on 


244    CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

the  line  of  Reynolds'  right  at  the  time  the  orders  were  made 
out  and  delivered  to  the  corps  commanders  at  headquarters  in 
the  widow  Glenn's  house  on  the  night  of  the  19th. 

Beginning  very  early  after  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  General  Thomas  and  I  rode  the  full  length  of  his  line, 
beginning  on  the  left  and  passing  to  the  right.  That  matter 
was  spoken  of,  and  it  was  said  that  we  would  leave  that 
brigade  in  line  of  battle,  and  that  Brannan.  should  hold  the 
other  two  as  reserves  for  emergencies. 

I  am  sorry  that  any  such  mistake  should  have  crept  into  the 
legend. 

General  Thomas  and  I  were  at  the  right  of  Brannan' s 
brigade,  and  a  little  in  the  rear,  when,  saying  I  would  send 
him  Negley  as  soon  as  I  could,  I  left  him. 

Very  truly  yours, 

W.  S.  ROSECRANS. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVEKMORE. 

This  letter  was  written  in  reply  to  my  inquiry  as  to  the 
correctness  of  the  legend  on  War  Department  Map  of 
Chickamauga  to  the  effect  that  Brannan's  division  was  moved 
from  the  reserve  into  the  line  without  Thomas's  order  or 
knowledge.  T.  L.  L. 


THE  WAS  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW. 


BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES. 


Reprinted  by  permission  from  "  Scribner's  Magazine,"  for  June,  1891. 


THE  WAR  AS   WE   SEE   IT  NOW. 


THE  death  of  General  Sherman  removes  the  last  of  the 
conspicuously  successful  generals  of  the  Union  forces.  It  is 
true  that  there  are  still  living  in  the  North  generals  who  have 
commanded  large  armies  with  distinction,  who  have  fought 
and  won  great  battles.  But  neither  Buell  nor  Rosecrans, 
neither  Pope  nor  Banks,  remained  in  active  command  till  the 
close  of  the  war.  The  day  of  final  triumph  found  others  in 
their  places.  Hence  it  may  not  be  inappropriate  at  this  time, 
when,  arrested  by  the  death  of  the  brilliant  officer  who  has  so 
recently  left  us,  the  minds  of  those  who  have  lived  through 
the  war  naturally  turn  to  the  scenes  they  have  witnessed  and 
the  experience  they  have  passed  through,  to  glance  at  some 
of  the  more  salient  features  and  characteristics  of  our  late 
struggle. 

The  magnitude  of  the  task  which  the  North  proposed  to 
itself  —  the  conquest  of  such  a  vast  territory,  defended  by 
such  an  able,  resolute  and  gallant  people  —  was  not  fully 
seen  at  the  beginning.  Many  were  the  offers  of  troops  which 
the  Washington  Government  refused  in  the  spring  of  1861. 
The  splendid  opportunity,  which  then  existed  and  never  came 
again,  of  increasing  the  regular  army  to  a  force  exceeding 
a  hundred  thousand  men,  was  carelessly  thrown  away. 
Sherman,  who  insisted  that  at  least  two  hundred  thousand 
men  would  be  required  for  the  single  task  of  opening  the 
Mississippi  River,  was  regarded,  even  as  late  as  the  fall  of 
1861,  by  many  persons,  as  almost  insane. 

Similar    misconceptions   prevailed    among    our    Southern 


248    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

neighbors.  Their  authorities  made  no  use  of  the  opportunity 
which  existed  at  the  outset  of  the  war  of  carrying  cotton 
to  England  and  drawing  bills  against  it  for  the  financial 
needs  of  the  Confederacy.  The  orders  which  they  sent  to 
Europe  for  the  purchase  of  arms  and  ammunition  were  wholly 
inadequate  to  their  needs.  Their  preparations  for  defending 
their  borders  against  the  threatened  invasion  of  the  North 
were  exceedingly  imperfect. 

Nor  was  this  to  be  wondered  at.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  then  were  and  are  still  an  umnilitary  people,  —  like 
their  cousins  on  the  other  side  of  the  water.  They  are,  it 
is  true,  by  no  means  averse  to  fighting ;  they  are  unquestion 
ably  as  obstinate  and  resolute  fighters  as  any  people  on  earth. 
But .  that  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  being  a  military 
people.  The  "  art  military "  was  cultivated  by  but  few  of 
the  officers  of  the  regular  army ;  to  the  major  part  of  them 
and  to  the  public  at  large  it  was  nearly  unknown.  Hence, 
the  recommendations  of  sagacious  military  men,  like  Sherman, 
on  our  side,  and  J.  E.  Johnston,  on  the  other,  were  made 
to  uiireceptive  ears,  and  were  received  with  that  peculiar 
impatience  with  which,  people  of  average  abilities  and  fair 
success  in  life  hear  unwelcome  advice  011  a  subject  of  which 
they  know  nothing,  but  which  in  their  hearts  they  believe 
to  be  a  very  simple  matter. 

The  North  was  the  first  to  rise  to  the  height  of  the 
situation.  Not  only  did  the  mortifying  issue  of  the  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run  put  an  end  to  the  easy-going  confidence 
with  which  up  to  that  time  her  prosperous  communities 
had  anticipated  a  speedy  victory,  but  it  had  the  effect  also 
of  rousing  that  strong  and  determined  purpose  to  achieve 
success,  which  had  always  characterized  the  energetic,  inde 
fatigable,  resolute  workers  of  the  Eastern  and  Western 
States  from  Maine  to  Minnesota.  The  Northern  people, 
accustomed  to  the  control  of  ample  resources  and  to  the 
carrying  on  of  large  business  undertakings,  made  their 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  249 

preparations  in  the  winter  of  1861  and  1862  on  a  large  scale. 
There  was  no  stint  anywhere.  Men,  money,  ships,  guns, 
horses,  equipment  of  every  kind,  were  freely  forthcoming. 
The  spring  of  1862  saw  large  armies,  admirably  appointed, 
well-drilled  and  well-officered,  standing  on  the  borders  of 
the  Confederacy,  waiting  only  the  order  to  march;  a  well- 
equipped  navy  not  only  held  all  the  Southern  coast  in  the 
grip  of  its  blockade,  but  dominated  the  great  rivers  which 
commanded  the  communications  of  all  the  advanced  posts  of 
the  enemy  in  the  West.  And  these  vast  hosts  were  full  of 
a  genuine  and  strong  devotion  to  the  cause  of  their  country. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  line  there  was  little  at  this  time 
to  encourage  the  friends  of  the  South.  A  careless  confi 
dence,  degenerating  often  into  contempt  for  their  adversaries, 
combined  with  the  unfamiliarity  of  the  Southern  planter  with 
the  conduct  of  great  business  enterprises,  was  evidenced  in 
the  weak  army  which  J.  E.  Johnston  opposed  to  that  of 
McClellan  in  the  East,  in  the  wholly  inadequate  preparations 
of  A.  S.  Johnston  to  maintain  the  hold  of  the  Confederacy 
in  the  States  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  in  the  insufficient 
defences  of.  New  Orleans.  When  the  storm  had  passed  away, 
New  Orleans  had  fallen  ;  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were 
under  Federal  control ;  the  Mississippi  was  free  as  far  as 
Yicksburg  ;  and  it  was  Eichmond  and  not  Washington  that 
was  in  imminent  peril. 

But  the  series  of  disasters  with  which  the  year  1862 
opened  did  not  daunt  the  spirit  of  the  South ;  011  the 
contrary,  the  soldiers  and  people  of  the  Confederacy,  now 
realizing  for  the  first  time  the  desperate  nature  of  the 
contest,  strengthened  themselves  in  their  determination  never 
to  yield,  and  redoubled  their  efforts.  The  levies  of  the  North 
were  met  by  nearly  the  entire  military  strength  of  the  South. 
In  place  of  the  comforts  and  luxuries  which  were  ruthlessly 
taken  away  by  the  invasion  and  the  blockade,  was  now  to  be 
seen  the  patient  and  enduring  temper  which  can  dispense 


250    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

with  all  that  is  not  of  absolute  necessity.  The  Southern 
generals  met  the  superior  numbers  of  their  foes  with  an 
audacity  and  enterprise  which  they  had  not  hitherto  shown 
that  they  possessed.  Six  weeks  after  Fort  Donelson  had 
surrendered  with  15,000  men,  and  Kentucky  and  the  greater 
part  of  Tennessee  had  been  abandoned  to  the  Union  arms, 
the  scattered  and  demoralized  forces  of  the  Confederacy 
in  the  West  were  united  under  the  lead  of  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston.  That  able  and  daring  officer  at  once  took  the 
initiative.  Grant  at  Shiloh  was  surprised  by  one  of  the  most 
sudden,  fierce  and  determined  onslaughts  known  to  military 
history ;  and  although  he,  with  the  aid  of  a  portion  of  Buell's 
army,  held  his  own,  and  finally  succeeded  in  forcing  his 
opponent  to  retire,  the  whole  affair  showed  how  far  the  South 
was  from  being  willing  to  accept  defeat.  So  in  Virginia, 
Stonewall  Jackson,  by  his  marvellous  sagacity  and  daring 
enterprise,  entirely  disconcerted  the  plans  of  the  Washington 
Government  for  massing  an  overwhelming  force  against 
Richmond;  and,  on  Jackson's  finally  uniting  his  force  to 
that  of  Lee,  McClellan,  whose  peculiar  characteristics  were  ill 
suited  to  deal  with  such  emergencies,  was  forced  to  undertake 
a  dangerous  and  difficult  retreat  from  the  immediate  neigh 
borhood  of  Richmond  to  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  river 
James. 

The  Federal  Government,  with  a  praiseworthy  desire  to 
stop  unnecessary  expense  and  a  happy  credulity  as  to  the 
certainty  of  the  success  which  they  were  sure  must  result 
from  their  really  enormous  military  preparations  for  the 
spring  campaign,  had,  early  in  April,  1862,  actually  stopped 
recruiting,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  now  urgently 
needed  re-enforcements.  But  the  people  of  the  North  were  in 
their  comprehension  of  the  situation  far  ahead  of  their  rulers. 
The  governors  of  the  Northern  States  met  together,  and 
begged  President  Lincoln  to  call  for  300,000  men.  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  really  astounded  at  the  size  of  the  requisition 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  251 

which  he  was  desired  to  make  upon  the  patriotism  of  the 
country.  He  thought  at  first  that  half  the  number  would 
do.  But  the  governors,  Andrew,  Morgan,  Curtin,  Morton 
and  the  others,  able  men  of  affairs  and  of  large  experience, 
and  who  were  moreover  the  representatives  and  spokesmen 
of  the  business  men  of  the  North  and  West,  knew  better, 
and  300,000  it  was. 

These  illustrations  show  how  the  emergencies  of  the  war 
served  to  bring  out  the  resolute  and  unyielding  traits 
belonging  to  our  race,  —  the  unconquerable  determination 
to  meet  and  conquer  every  difficulty,  either  by  some  new 
contribution  of  force,  or  by  some  desperate  and  daring 
expedient,  or  by  patience  and  perseverance  under  existing 
circumstances.  The  war  thus  becomes  psychologically  inter 
esting  as  an  exhibition  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  on  trial,  and 
on  a  grand  theatre. 

What  we  have  just  said  about  the  governors  of  the 
Northern  States  and  President  Lincoln  leads  naturally  to 
the  characteristics  of  the  latter's  administration  during  the 
war.  It  certainly  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  a  brilliant 
administration.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  enormous 
amount  of  money  was  unnecessarily  spent,  a  great  many  men 
needlessly  sacrificed  and  a  great  deal  of  time  uselessly 
consumed.  The  resources  of  the  North  were  vast,  and  they 
were  tendered  to  the  government  with  a  patriotism  and 
liberality  that  knew  no  measure.  But  the  task  was  one 
that  would  have  taxed  the  abilities  of  the  most  experienced 
ruler,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  was  anything  but  an  experienced 
ruler.  Wisely,  economically  and  judiciously  to  collect  and 
dispose  of  the  enormous  resources  of  the  United  States 
required  a  familiarity  with  the  conduct  of  affairs  on  a  large 
scale,  utterly  beyond  anything  with  which  the  President  had 
ever  had  anything  to  do  in  the  whole  course  of  his  life. 
Abraham  Lincoln,  though  new  to  public  office,  was  probably 
the  wisest  and  most  sagacious  statesman  we  have  ever  had  in 


252     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

this  country ;  his  political  management  of  affairs  during  the 
war  illustrated  his  great  qualities  and  won  the  admiration  of 
all  men.  But  the  military  tasks  imposed  by  the  war  were 
not  only  entirely  outside  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  previous  expe 
rience,  but  even  he,  wise  and  sensible  as  he  was,  did  not  at 
first  realize  that  in  such  matters  he  had  better  consult 
experts,  and  be  guided  by  them.  His  first  appointments  in 
the  army  were  made  almost  at  random.  Major-generals, 
brigadier-generals,  colonels,  lieutenant-colonels,  without  tech 
nical  training  and  of  no  military  experience,  appeared  like 
comets  at  the  head  of  armies  and  departments,  or  invaded 
the  hitherto  sacred  quarters  of  the  officers  of  the  regular 
army,  and  many  were  the  blunders  with  which  the  fates 
avenged  these  uncalled-for  and  injudicious  vagaries  of  the 
new  President. 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  difference 
between  the  mistakes  into  which  President  Lincoln  fell  in  his 
management  of  military  affairs,  and  those  made  by  his  rival 
on  the  other  side  of  the  line.  The  Illinois  lawyer  was,  as  we 
have  just  said,  absolutely  without  any  knowledge  of  military 
matters,  and,  what  was  quite  as  important,  he  was  entirely 
unacquainted  with  the  personnel  of  the  army.  Mr.  Davis, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  been  educated  at  West  Point,  and 
had  moreover  been  Secretary  of  War.  To  him  the  officers 
of  the  army  were  as  well  known  as  are  the  members  of  the 
bar  to  a  lawyer  in  large  practice.  The  characters,  special 
acquirements,  abilities,  defects,  of  the  leading  lawyers  of  a 
great  city  are  always  more  or  less  accurately  known  to  their 
brethren,  while  a  layman  coming  from  another  city  must 
pick  up  his  information  about  them  as  best  he  can.  So 
it  was  with  the  two  Presidents.  Mr.  Lincoln's  want  of 
acquaintance  with  the  army  displayed  itself  in  sundry 
astonishing  appointments  to  high  commands.  Mr.  Davis, 
on  the  other  hand,  knew  his  men  perfectly  well.  At  the  same 
time  there  were  disadvantages,  and  those  real  ones,  which 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  253 

were  inseparable  from  the  relation  in  which  the  President  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy  stood  to  the  high  officers  in  its 
service.  There  was,  first,  the  almost  inevitable  tendency  of  a 
man  in  his  position,  who  has  been  educated  for  the  army, 
to  meddle  in  the  actual  conduct  of  military  operations,  a 
tendency  to  which  Mr.  Davis  not  infrequently  yielded,  and 
from  which  several  of  the  most  distinguished  generals  of  the 
South  suffered  from  time  to  time ;  and,  secondly,  there  was 
the  personal  relation  between  Mr.  Davis  and  the  leading 
officers,  men  of  somewhere  near  his  own  age,  and  in  regard 
to  whom  he,  naturally  enough,  entertained  the  usual  personal 
feelings  that  every  one  has  for  those  whom  one  has  always 
known.  Hence,  while  it  cost  Mr.  Lincoln  nothing  to  relieve 
any  officer  whom  he  thought  to  be  unfit  for  his  work,  or  to 
sustain  one  who  was,  as  he  thought,  doing  it  well  —  they 
being  all,  or  nearly  all,  personally  unknown  to  him  —  it  was 
an  open  secret  that  Mr.  Davis's  preferences  and  dislikes 
interfered,  in  the  opinion  of  many  good  judges,  with  his 
management  of  the  military  affairs  of  the  Confederacy. 

It  is  plain  from  what  has  just  been  said,  that  the  errors  of 
the  Northern  President  were  of  a  kind  that  experience  could 
be  expected  to  cure,  —  that  is,  if  he  were  at  bottom  a  man  of 
sense,  which  Mr.  Lincoln  certainly  was,  while  those  peculiar 
to  Mr.  Davis's  administration  were  not  likely  to  become 
ameliorated  by  lapse  of  time.  And  this  turned  out  to  be 
the  fact.  Mr.  Lincoln's  ability  to  select  men  for  high  mili 
tary  command  increased  visibly  from  year  to  year  during  the 
war ;  and  not  only  was  this  the  case,  but  his  ability  to  give 
them  an  intelligent  and  appreciative  support  and  encourage 
ment,  if  they  deserved  it  at  his  hands,  became  with  every 
year  more  and  more  apparent.  The  President  became,  in 
fact,  a  diligent  student  of  the  war.  He  found  in  time  that 
the  rules  of  war  were  only  the  rules  of  sound  sense  and 
experience  applied  to  a  subject  the  general  principles  of 
which,  although  he  knew  nothing  of  them  at  the  beginning 


254    CRITICAL   SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

of  liis  administration,  lie  found  himself  able  without  great 
difficulty  to  acquire  and  act  upon.  Hence  his  conduct  of 
affairs  became  with  each  year  more  judicious  and  capable. 
No  generals  could  ask  from  any  government  for  more  con 
siderate  and  intelligent  support  than  that  usually  accorded  by 
Mr.  Lincoln  to  General  Grant  and  General  Sherman.  On 
the  other  hand,  Mr.  Davis's  peculiarities  grew  every  year 
more  and  more  pronounced.  It  is  not  necessary  to  give  illus 
trations  at  length;  it  will  suffice  to  compare  the  steady  and 
unwavering  backing  which  General  Sherman  received  in  his 
Atlanta  campaign  with  the  treatment  of  General  Johnston 
by  the  Confederate  Government. 

At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  foolish  and  useless  to  deny 
that  in  one  respect,  and  that  a  very  important  one,  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration  of  military  affairs  cannot  be  said 
to  have  improved  with  the  progress  of  the  war.  We  refer, 
of  course,  to  the  influence  which  the  supposed  necessities  of 
politics  had  upon  appointments  to  high  command  and  assign 
ments  to  duty  in  the  field.  Not  even  the  most  devoted 
admirers  of  President  Lincoln  would  undertake  to  maintain 
that  he  always  acted  up  to  his  lights  as  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States  in  all  the 
commissions  which  he  conferred,  or  in  all  the  tasks  which  he 
laid  out  to  be  performed  by  the  soldiers  and  sailors.  For 
instance,  it  will  hardly  be  pretended  that  Mr.  Lincoln's 
military  judgment  had  not  in  the  spring  of  18G4  reached  a 
point  of  development  quite  adequate  to  the  task  of  refusing 
to  General  Butler  the  command  of  the  two  corps  destined  to 
make  the  co-operative  movement  on  Richmond.  To  suppose 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  did  not  know  better  than  this  is  to  do 
gross  injustice  to  his  mental  faculties.  Everybody  in  the 
United  States  who  knew  anything  about  military  matters, 
who  had  followed  with  the  slightest  attention  the  course  of 
war,  was  amazed  at  the  selection  of  Butler,  not  because  he 
was  not  an  able  man,  or  a  patriotic  man,  but  because  he  had 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  255 

given  no  evidence  of  capacity  for  such  a  responsible  task,  and 
because  there  were  plenty  of  men  to  be  had  who  had  shown 
talent  of  a  high  order.  Mr.  Lincoln  must  have  known,  we 
repeat,  that  to  entrust  this  important  duty  to  Butler  was  not 
a  thing  which  could  be  defended  on  purely  military  grounds ; 
more  than  this,  he  knew  as  well  as  anybody  that  it  was  not 
common  sense  to  do  it.  But  he  did  it,  nevertheless ;  and 
against  the  known  wishes  of  the  officer  who  had  just  been 
called  by  Congress  to  take  the  general  charge  and  manage 
ment  of  all  the  military  operations.  For  Grant  desired  that 
this  important  command  should  be  given  to  General  William 
F.  Smith,  whose  brilliant  operations  near  Chattanooga  had 
deservedly  won  the  highest  encomiums.  Whether  any  sup 
posed  political  necessity  could  justify  the  course  which  Mr. 
Lincoln  saw  fit  to  pursue  on  this  and  similar  occasions  is, 
to  make  the  best  of  it,  exceedingly  doubtful.  Certainly  no 
political  crisis  at  that  time  was  impending  which  could  serve 
as  such  a  justification.  Common  sense  and  the  plainest  prin 
ciples  of  duty  alike  demand  that  the  conduct  of  military 
movements  shall  be  entrusted  to  the  most  skilful  and  compe 
tent  officers  who  can  be  found.  And  although  the  American 
people,  with  their  wonted  tolerance  and  charity,  have  long 
since  forgotten  and  forgiven  these  acts  of  a  president  whose 
devotion  to  the  cause  of  his  country  was  so  conspicuous  and 
sincere,  yet  some  consideration  of  them  cannot  be  omitted  in 
making  an  estimate  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  of  our 

o 

military  affairs. 

In  looking  back  at  the  war  after  the  lapse  of  so  many 
years,  its  characteristic  features  stand  out  far  more  clearly 
than  they  did  at  the  time.  We  must  acknowledge  that  the 
lack  of  a  sound  military  direction  at  Washington  for  the  first 
three  years  protracted  the  struggle  by  expending  our  efforts 
to  a  very  considerable  extent  in  useless  or  ill-considered  plans. 
Things  certainly  went  better  when  Grant  was  called  to  take 
the  entire  control;  but  even  under  him  there  were  costly 


256     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

and  unnecessary  expeditions,  and  not  a  little  scattering  of 
forces  which  might  have  been  concentrated  to  give  additional 
strength  to  the  blows  which  he  was  preparing  to  strike.  On 
the  other  side,  also,  we  see  the  same  faults.  If  the  trans- 
Mississippi  troops  had  been  placed  under  Johnston's  orders, 
who  can  tell  how  long  that  able  soldier  might  not  have  held 
Vicksburg?  Had  Beauregard's  and  Johnston's  advice  been 
heeded  in  the  last  few  months  even,  it  is  possible  that  a 
really  formidable  army  might  have  been  collected  to  confront 
Sherman  in  the  Carolinas.  But  the  very  natural  tendency 
of  the  invader  to  attack  many  points  at  once,  and  the  equally 
natural  tendency  of  his  antagonist  to  be  prepared  for  defence 
at  all  points,  operated  to  multiply  occasions  of  conflict  and 
rendered  the  main  operations  of  the  war  less  formidable  and 
striking  than  they  might  have  been  made. 

In  the  conduct  of  their  campaigns  the  generals  in  our  war, 
on  both  sides,  showed  themselves  better  strategists  than  tacti 
cians.  The  safety  of  the  armies  was  very  rarely  compromised 
by  lack  of  due  precautions  to  keep  up  the  communications. 
The  manoeuvring  was  sometimes  very  skilful.  The  operations 
of  the  Atlanta  campaign  contain  admirable  illustrations  of 
good  strategy  on  the  part  of  both  commanders,1  and  there  are 
other  instances  in  plenty,  of  which  the  operations  of  Jackson 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  the  spring  of  18G2  are,  perhaps, 
the  most  conspicuous.  But,  mainly  owing,  we  suspect,  to  the 
absolute  lack  of  experience  before  the  war  in  seeing  large 
bodies  of  men  and  observing  their  movements,  it  certainly 
seemed  to  be  well-nigh  impossible  for  the  American  general, 
when  he  took  the  offensive,  to  get  his  battle  fought  as 
he  intended  it  should  be  fought.  Witness  General  J.  E. 
Johnston's  battle  at  Seven  Pines ; 2  General  Lee's  battles 


1  While   this   is   being1  written   the   news   arrives   thnt  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  Sherman's  great  antagonist  in  that  campaign,  has  passed  away.     Of 
the  Confederate  officers,  he  was  second  only  to  Lee. 

2  As  the  Confederates  term  the  action  of  May  31,  1862, 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  257 

at  Malvern  Hill  and  at  Gettysburg;  General  MoClellan's 
battle  at  Antietam.  These  are  instances  of  battles  under 
taken  with  preparation  —  though  this  is  not  so  true  of 
Malvern  Hill  as  of  the  others  —  and  with  a  plan  in  each  case 
deliberately  adopted,  to  carry  out  which  the  commanding 
general  used  his  best  endeavors.  Yet  the  result  was  noto 
riously  far  from  satisfying  his  just  expectations.  General 
Thomas's  battle  of  Nashville  constitutes  a  brilliant  exception 
to  these  remarks.  The  easier  tactical  task  of  repelling  an 
attack  was  often  most  ably  performed,  as,  for  instance, 
by  Lee  at  Antietam  and  Fredericksburg,  and  by  Meade 
at  Gettysburg.  Then  there  were  generals,  the  most  con 
spicuous  of  whom  were  Grant  and  Sherman,  who,  though 
brilliant  strategists,  never  paid  great  heed  to  directing  the 
details  of  the  conflicts  which  their  manoeuvres  had  rendered 
certain  to  occur.  The  battles  near  Atlanta  in  July,  1864, 
and  the  series  of  bloody  actions  in  May  and  June,  of  the 
same  year,  in  Virginia,  illustrate  this. 

The  mode  in  which  cavalry  was  employed  in  our  war  varied 
a  good  deal  with  different  commanders,  and  in  different 
stages  of  the  war.  From  the  tune  when  the  Black  Horse 
Cavalry  struck  terror  into  the  demoralized  three  months' 
volunteers  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Eun  to  the  day  when 
Sheridan's  powerful  cavalry  corps  held  Lee's  line  of  retreat 
from  Appomattox  Court  House,  both  sides  doubtless  learned 
much  regarding  the  employment  and  functions  of  mounted 
men.  But  American  generals  did  not,  it  must  be  confessed, 
take  readily  to  the  task  of  handling  properly  this  arm  of  the 
service.  Very  likely  the  fact  that  cavalry  could  no  longer  be 
expected  to  perform  on  the  field  of  battle  the  duties  which 
had  hitherto  constituted  their  chief  and  most  glorious 
function,  rendered  our  officers  doubtful  as  to  the  new  uses  to 
which  they  should  put  their  horse.  At  first,  picket  duty 
seemed  most  attractive  —  not  to  the  cavalry,  of  course,  but 
to  the  general  commanding  the  army  —  and  horses  and  men 


258    CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

were  freely  and  ruthlessly  sacrificed  in  this  way.  Then  there 
was  the  important  but  humble  task  of  guarding  trains.  But 
what  fascinated  alike  the  imagination  of  the  trooper  and  the 
ingenious  mind  of  the  American  general  was  a  raid,  designed 
to  burn  bridges  and  tear  up  railroad  tracks,  to  destroy 
supplies,  capture  trains  and  the  like.  An  operation  of  this 
kind  necessarily  involved  great  risks,  but,  bordering,  as  it  did, 
in  its  characteristic  features,  on  partisan  warfare,  it  possessed 
great  attractions  for  the  cavalry  themselves.  What  good 
was  accomplished  in  this  way  has  never  been  figured  up. 
Stuart's  raid  round  McClellan's  lines  in  June,  1862,  may 
have  served  a  useful  purpose  in  creating  a  feeling  of  insecurity 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  but  the  only  tangible  result  of 
the  repetition  of  the  performance  in  August  of  the  same  year 
was  the  capture  of  the  overcoat  of  the  Federal  commander  ; 
while,  when  for  the  third  time  the  manoeuvre  was  tried,  in 
the  Gettysburg  campaign  the  next  summer,  the  march  of  the 
Federal  army  northward  actually  prevented  the  Confederate 
cavalry  from  rejoining  their  main  army  and  reporting  the 
movement  of  the  Federals.  It  was  much  the  same  thing  in 
our  experience.  Hooker,  the  first  general  to  set  a  proper 
value  on  his  cavalry,  no  sooner  got  a  large  and  finely  mounted 
and  equipped  body  of  cavalry  together,  than  he  sent  them  off, 
a  fortnight  before  he  commenced  his  own  campaign,  to 
destroy  the  enemy's  communications  and  supplies,  and  to 
render  their  retreat,  in  the  event  of  a  Federal  success  in  the 
impending  struggle  between  the  two  armies,  more  disastrous 
than  it  otherwise  could  be.  The  result  of  this  farseeing 
move  was  to  deprive  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  of  the  infor 
mation  which  would  have  prevented  the  great  disaster  of  the 
campaign  of  Chancellor sville. 

In  the  march  on  Gettysburg,  in  the  summer  of  1863, 
General  Meade  employed  his  cavalry  with  excellent  judgment. 
The  signal  services  rendered  by  Buford  on  July  1,  and  the 
gallant  and  successful  fight  on  our  right  flank  on  July  3, 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  259 

fully  justified  his  policy  of  keeping  his  cavalry  well  in  hand, 
and  under  his  own  eye.  But  this  policy  was  entirely  reversed 
by  General  Grant.  The  campaign  of  1864  had  hardly 
opened  when  Sheridan  was  allowed  to  go  off,  on  his  own 
suggestion  and  evidently  against  Meade's  judgment,  with 
nearly  all  the  cavalry  of  the  army,  on  a  raid  toward 
Richmond,  and  it  was  not  until  Grant  had  crossed  the 
Pamunkey  that  the  cavalry  rejoined  the  main  body.  Then, 
for  a  very  few  days,  they  remained  with  the  army,  and 
rendered  excellent  service,  among  other  things  capturing  and 
holding  Cold  Harbor.  But  when,  a  fortnight  later,  the 
army  had  got  down  before  Petersburg,  Sheridan  was  on 
another  raid,  and  the  opportunity  which  really  existed  during 
the  16th  and  17th  of  June  of  taking  Petersburg  when  its 
defenders  numbered  less  than  15,000  men,  was  unknown  at 
headquarters,  simply  for  lack  of  cavalry  to  make  the  needed 
reconnoissances. 

It  will  hardly  be  questioned  that  the  conspicuous  successes 
which  Sheridan  won  in  the  Appomattox  campaign  have 
demonstrated  beyond  doubt  or  cavil  that  the  best  service  to 
which  cavalry  can  be  put  in  modern  warfare,  is  to  be  rendered 
in  conjunction  with  the  operations  of  the  main  army.  But 
that  this  service  was  rendered  in  this  campaign  by  Sheridan's 
cavalry  was  certainly  not  due  to  General  Grant.  He  had 
planned  for  Sheridan,  and  had  ordered  him  to  execute,  a  move 
ment  on  the  upper  James,  with  a  view  of  destroying  the  enemy's 
supplies  and  communications,  and  after  having  accomplished 
these  tasks,  he  was  to  join  Sherman,  in  the  Carolinas,  or  else, 
if  that  were  found  impracticable,  he  was  to  fall  back  to 
Winchester  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Fortunately  for  the 
country,  Sheridan  found  it  impossible  to  carry  out  his  orders, 
and  he  therefore  made  his  way  to  General  Grant  at  City 
Point.  Even  here,  both  Sheridan  and  Rawlins,  Grant's  chief 
of  staff,  a  thoroughly  practical  and  able  man,  were  by  no 
means  sure  at  first  that  Grant  intended  to  have  Sheridan's 


260     CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

command  included  in  the  force  which  was  destined  for  the 
campaign  which  was  then  just  about  to  open  ;  and  it  is  quite 
certain  that  Grant  inclined  even  at  this  period  to  the  opinion 
that  Sheridan  would  do  well  to  cut  loose  from  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  and  join  Sherman  in  North  Carolina. 

Other  instances  of  this  strange  inability  or  unwillingness 
of  the  American  general  to  make  use  of  cavalry  in  connection 
with  the  operations  of  the  main  army  readily  occur.  Sherman, 
as  is  well  known,  in  his  Atlanta  campaign,  did  not  rely  to 
any  great  extent  on  his  horse,  although  the  opportunities  for 
employing  cavalry  to  advantage  must  have  been  of  constant 
occurrence  from  the  time  he  left  Dalton.  And  in  his  march 
across  the  country  to  Savannah,  he  took  with  him  only  two 
brigades,  in  all  about  5,000  men. 

At  the  close  of  the  war,  however,  this  arm  of  the  service 
had  gained  due  recognition.  Not  only  was  the  country 
ringing  with  the  achievements  which  Sheridan,  at  the  head  of 
his  10,000  horse,  had  obtained  in  the  Appomattox  campaign 
in  co-operation  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  Wilson, 
at  the  head  of  a  similar  force,  fresh  and  admirably  mounted 
and  equipped,  was  overrunning  the  now  almost  deserted 
States  of  Alabama  and  Georgia,  destroying  and  defeating 
everything  that  came  in  his  way.  In  this  case  there  was,  it 
is  true,  no  army  for  the  cavalry  commander  to  co-operate 
with.  But  this  movement  of  Wilson's  was  no  ordinary  raid, 
for  he  was  practically  sure  of  meeting  no  opposition  which 
his  force  was  not  quite  adequate  to  overcome ;  it  was  rather 
the  march  of  an  invading  column. 

The  views  above  given  as  to  the  employment  of  cavalry  on 
raids  differ,  we  presume,  from  those  entertained  during  the 
war  by  most  of  the  leading  generals  on  both  sides.  Yet  there 
is  nothing,  we  submit  with  confidence,  in  which  the  effect  of 
the  lapse  of  time  is  more  discernible  than  in  changing  our 
views  of  cavalry  raids.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  to  us  now, 
that  General  Lee  should  have  sent  Stuart,  with  less  than 


THE  WAR  AS   WE  SEE  IT  NOW  261 

2,000  cavalry,  in  October,  1862,  just  after  the  battle  of 
Antietam,  to  ride  through  the  towns  and  counties  of  central 
Pennsylvania,  picking  up  horses,  clothing,  boots  and  shoes,  a 
few  prisoners,  and  what  not,  and  running  the  most  imminent 
risk  of  being  captured  with  his  whole  command.  What 
possible  good  could  Stuart  do  to  the  Confederacy  with  his 
petty  booty,  which  could  be  compared  for  a  moment  with  the 
exultation  with  which  the  news  of  his  capture  would  have 
been  received  at  the  North,  and  the  injury  which  it  would 
have  been  to  General  Lee's  army  to  have  lost  its  great 
cavalry  leader  ?  So  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign — when  Lee 
actually  gave  Stuart  carte  blanche  to  do  as  he  liked  —  whether 
to  keep  between  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  to  attempt  to  make  the  circuit  of 
the  latter  army.  What  Lee  and  Stuart  had  in  their  minds 
as  conceivably — by  any  effort  of  the  imagination — of  more 
importance  than  the  ascertainment  by  the  Confederate  cavalry 
from  day  to  day  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal  Army  and 
the  conveyance  of  this  information  promptly  to  General  Lee's 
headquarters  —  it  is  certainly  not  easy  to  conjecture.  At 
that  stage  in  the  war,  it  was  out  of  the  question  that  the 
Federal  Army  should  be  "  rattled  "  by  any  such  game  as  this. 
Both  officers  and  men  were  altogether  too  well  seasoned  to 
war  to  care  very  much  where  Stuarf;' s  4,000  or  5,000  men 
might  be.  The  trains  were  well  guarded ;  all  Stuart  suc 
ceeded  in  bagging  were  125  wagons  and  400  or  500 
prisoners ;  but,  as  this  was  all  he  had  to  show  in  justification 
of  his  course,  he  brought  them  all  in,  notwithstanding  the 
continual  delays  caused  by  such  impedimenta.  General 
Halleck  was  probably  the  only  Federal  officer  at  all  worried 
by  this  eccentric  movement  of  Stuart's,  and  he  kept  telegraph 
ing  Meade,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
to  take  measures  to  capture  Stuart's  column,  which  might, 
so  Halleck  thought,  do  unknown  damage  somewhere.  But 
Meade,  intent  on  the  great  task  before  him,  was  not  to  be 


262     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

diverted  by  any  side-show  like  this.  "  My  main  point,"  he 
coolly  and  dryly  wrote  to  Halleck,  "  being  to  find  out  and 
fight  the  enemy,  I  shall  have  to  submit  to  the  cavalry  raid 
around  me  in  some  measure."  1 

The  truth  is,  that,  considering  the  great  difficulties  which, 
during  the  period  of  our  war,  attended  the  raising  of  a  well- 
drilled,  well-equipped  and  well-mounted  body  of  horse,  it  was 
not  good  policy  for  any  commander,  and  especially  for  any 
Confederate  commander,  to  take  needless  risks  with  his 
cavalry,  or  to  subject  it  to  unnecessary  hardship  and  loss. 
While  it  is  perfectly  true  that  occasions  where  a  body  of  horse 
could  be  utilized  in  actual  combat  were  infrequent,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  cavalry  had  other  and  often  much  more 
important  functions  to  perform  than  taking  part  in  a  pitched 
battle,  and  that  for  the  due  performance  of  these  duties  the 
utmost  efficiency  of  both  horses  and  men  was  required.  Take 
as  an  illustration  the  work  of  Sheridan's  command  in  the  last 
campaign.  Here  was  a  corps  of  cavalry,  admirably  com 
manded  and  sufficiently  large  to  take  care  of  itself  for  a 
moderate  time.  Preceding  and  covering  the  inarch  of  the 
infantry,  ascertaining  the  right  roads,  seizing  the  important 
points  in  advance  of  the  arrival  of  the  main  columns  and 
holding  them  until  support  arrived,  it  rendered  the  task  of 
the  infantry  and  artillery,  which  constituted  the  main  army, 
immeasurably  easier  and  much  surer  of  successful  accomplish 
ment.  Finally,  in  actually  getting  ahead  of  the  flying  foe 
and  barring  his  retreat,  Sheridan's  horse  showed  to  perfection 
what  cavalry  can  do  in  modern  war.  But  in  order  that 
cavalry  can  render  such  service  as  this,  their  strength  and 
efficiency  must  be  carefully  preserved  until  the  decisive 
moment  arrives.  And  the  decisive  moment  is  the  moment 
when  the  great  collision  between  the  two  armies  takes  place. 
For  in  spite  of  all  the  railroad  ties  that  were  torn  up,  and  of 
all  the  barns  that  were  burned,  General  Lee  did  not  leave 

1  43  W.  B.,  67. 


THE   WAR  AS   WE  SEE  IT  NOW  263 

Petersburg  and  Richmond  until  the  result  of  the  battle  of 
Five  Forks  rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  remain  in  his 
lines  ;  and  the  battle  of  Five  Forks  was  won  by  infantry  and 
cavalry  acting  together. 

Whatever  doubts  may  have  existed  in  the  minds  of 
American  generals  in  regard  to  the  proper  modes  of  employ 
ing  cavalry,  there  was  never  any  question  of  a  similar  nature 
as  to  the  proper  function  of  artillery.  Differences  of  opinion 
there  certainly  were  as  to  the  organization  of  this  arm ; 
attention  has  recently  been  called  to  them  in  an  able  paper 
by  the  late  General  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of 
Massachusetts  about  a  year  before  he  died,  and  printed  for 
the  first  time  in  the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institu 
tion  for  March,  1891.  His  conclusion  is  unquestionably 
sound;  it  is  "that  with  proper  organization  and  administration 
our  artillery  in  the  Civil  War,  good  as  it  was,  might  have 
been  made  more  serviceable  and  produced  greater  results  ; " 
but  he  admits,  and  in  fact  claims,  that  the  efficiency  of  this 
arm  of  the  service  in  the  late  war  was  most  marked.  This 
was,  by  the  way,  as  true  of  our  adversaries  as  of  ourselves. 
The  American  soldier  seems,  in  fact,  to  take  naturally  to 
artillery.  From  the  beginning,  the  guns  were  well  served. 
In  process  of  time,  the  chiefs  of  artillery,  as  well  of  the 
various  corps  as  of  the  armies  themselves,  came  to  be  famous 
men.  It  was  a  pity  that  the  full  rank  to  which  the  Federal 
officers  performing  these  duties  were  fairly  entitled  was  never 
accorded  to  them  by  their  government.  But  the  matter 
being  a  somewhat  complicated  one,  Congress  could  never  be 
got  to  pay  proper  attention  to  the  organization  of  the  artillery. 

Infantry,  of  course,  constitutes  the  main  body  of  all  modern 
armies,  and  by  the  quality  of  its  infantry  an  army  must  be 
judged.  The  capacity  of  Americans  to  make  excellent 
soldiers  was  proved  in  the  war  beyond  a  question.  That 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  men,  most  of  them  entirely 


264     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

unacquainted  with  the  elements,  even,  of  discipline  and 
drill,  were  transformed  in  so  brief  a  period  into  officers  and 
soldiers  was  certainly  one  of  the  wonders  of  our  time.  But 
the  material  was,  in  the  main,  of  the  best;  the  desire  to 
master  the  new  trade  well-nigh  universal  and  very  strong; 
and  there  were  from  the  beginning  many  opportunities  for 
practising  what  had  been  learned.  The  armies  of  1862  were 
far  and  away  superior  to  the  levies  of  1861.  The  armies  of 
1863  were  decidedly  superior  to  those  of  1862.  But  in  1863 
it  is  probable  that  the  highest  point  of  efficiency  was  reached 
in  both  the  Federal  and  Confederate  armies  in  the  East,  and 
certainly  in  the  Western  army  of  the  Confederacy.  From 
the  autumn  of  1863  these  three  great  armies  began  to  become 
less  serviceable.  Let  us  see  why. 

Take,  first,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  army,  when  it 
fought  at  Gettysburg,  in  July,  1863,  contained,  it  is  true, 
some  poor  troops,  but  it  contained  few  or  no  green  regiments, 
and  no  raw  recruits  whatever.  The  officers  and  men  were 
veterans,  the  greater  part  of  whom  had  had  two  years'  service 
in  the  field.  They  had  known  victory  and  defeat ;  they 
could  march  and  they  could  fight ;  they  had  had  all  sorts  of 
experiences,  and  were  not  to  be  astonished  nor  greatly 
troubled  by  anything  that  could  happen  to  them.  Had  a 
proper  policy  been  pursued  in  regard  to  the  inevitable 
losses,  had  the  old  regiments  been  kept  up  assiduously  to  the 
maximum  strength,  or  to  anything  like  the  maximum 
strength,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  not  only  have  been 
stronger  at  Gettysburg,  but  it  would  have  gained  in  every 
way  during  the  winter  which  ensued.  It  would  have  been 
superior  in  point  of  efficiency  when  it  entered  on  the  campaign 
of  1864  to  the  army  which  fought  at  Gettysburg,  for  the 
prestige  of  that  great  victory  would  have  been  the  heritage  of 
all  its  regiments,  and  would  have  inspired  the  new  recruits  as 
well  as  the  old  soldiers.  But  this  great  advantage  was  thrown 
away  by  the  people  of  the  North,  or  at  least  by  the  greater 


THE  WAR  AS   WE  SEE  IT  NOW  265 

part  of  the  Northern  States.  Instead  of  building  up  the  old 
regiments,  new  ones  were  raised.  Instead  of  utilizing  the 
army's  capital,  if  we  may  so  call  it,  of  long  service,  thorough 
acquaintance  with  the  duties  of  officers  and  soldiers,  memories 
of  labors,  dangers  and  sufferings  shared  in  common,  of  dark 
and  bloody  days  of  defeat  manfully  and  patiently  borne,  of 
glorious  scenes  of  victory  rewarding  steadfast  valor  and 
unremitting  energy,  —  the  greater  part  of  the  North  blindly 
and  recklessly  threw  it  away.  Veteran  regiments,  whose 
names  and  numbers  had  become  deservedly  famous,  whose 
very  traditions  would  forever  have  secured  their  efficiency, 
were  allowed  to  waste  away  until  they  scarcely  equalled  a 
couple  of  full  companies,  and  their  places  were  taken  by 
troops  who  had  never  smelt  powder  nor  seen  the  face  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  difficult  to  speak  with  patience  of  this  wretched 
business.  It  is  pleasanter  to  turn  to  those  few  States  which, 
like  Wisconsin  and  Illinois,  kept  up  to  their  full  strength  the 
regiments  which  had  first  gone  out,  and  with  whose  names 
were  associated  the  honor  due  from  the  State  to  the  steadfast 
performance  of  duty  and  to  gallant  deeds  of  arms.  But  it  is 
plain  that  no  army  re-enforced  in  numbers  as  was  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  could  be  ex 
pected  to  improve  in  efficiency,  —  on  the  contrary,  it  is  but  too 
evident  that  it  must  sensibly  decline.  The  army  with  which 
Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan  on  May  3,  1864,  was  no  doubt 
larger  by  some  20,000  or  30,000  men  than  that  which 
began  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  ;  but  among  the  old  regi 
ments  was  much  worthless  material  —  men  whose  enlist 
ments  had  been  induced  by  the  extravagant  bounties  then 
paid  by  the  States  and  cities  of  the  East  to  get  their  quotas 
filled  —  and  then  there  were  plenty  of  absolutely  new 
regiments,  which  had  not  been  organized  six  months.  On 
the  other  side  of  the  river  the  army  of  Lee  was  weaker  than 
it  was  at  Gettysburg,  for  the  very  decisive  reason  that  it  had 
not  been  able  to  make  up  its  losses  in  that  terrible  fight. 


266     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

It  had  seen  its  best  clays.  And  the  same  remark  applies  to 
the  main  Confederate  army  in  the  West.  The  sanguinary 
struggle  of  Chickamauga  had  cost  the  Confederates  dear  ; 
and,  followed,  as  it  was,  by  the  recall  of  Long-street's  corps 
to  Virginia,  and  also  by  the  rout  of  Missionary  Ridge,  it  was 
not  possible  for  J.  E.  Johnston,  who  replaced  the  unfortunate 
Bragg,  to  take  the  field  with  a  force  anything  like  as  efficient 
as  that  which  so  fiercely  attacked  Rosecrans  in  September, 
1863. 

The  national  instinct  on  this  subject  is  perfectly  correct. 
It  was  at  Gettysburg  and  Chickamauga  that  our  American 
armies  were  at  their  best  and  did  their  best.  Never  were 
they  —  either  before  or  after  those  memorable  engagements 
—  so  strong,  so  well  officered,  so  fierce,  so  determined  to  win, 
so  resolved  not  to  yield.  They  were  then,  we  repeat,  at  their 
best  —  containing  none  but  seasoned  troops,  under  veteran 
officers,  inured  to  war,  both  armies  confident  of  victory,  and 
pretty  nearly,  taking  all  things  together,  equally  matched. 
And  no  one  can  read  the  story  of  those  great  battles  without 
being  proud  of  his  country  and  his  race,  for  never  was  there 
more  resolute  and  obstinate  and  gallant  fighting  done,  nor 
ever  were  severe  losses  more  unshrinkingly  borne.  Nor  can 
it  be  truly  said  of  either  of  these  battles  that  the  beaten 
army  did  not  fight  as  hard  and  as  long  as  its  more  successful 
antagonist.  There  is  glory  enough  for  all.  Hence  it  is  fitting 
that  both  fields  —  Gettysburg  and  Chickamauga  —  should  be 
dedicated  to  the  perpetual  remembrance  of  the  great  battles 
so  worthily  fought  there. 

It  may  have  been  noticed  that  the  Federal  Army  of  the 
West  was  not  included  in  the  foregoing  estimate.  We  are 
disposed  to  think  that,  unlike  the  armies  of  Johnston,  Lee  and 
Grant,  the  army  commanded  by  Sherman  entered  upon  the 
campaign  of  1864  in  better  condition  in  every  respect  than  it 
ever  was  in  before.  It  had  had  ample  time  to  repair  the 
losses  of  Chickamauga ;  it  had  not  been  weakened,  as  had  its 


THE  WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  267 

antagonist,  by  the  withdrawal  of  a  part  of  its  force  for 
service  elsewhere ;  its  losses  at  Missionary  Ridge  had  not 
been  large,  and  its  success  there  had  been  of  the  most  strik 
ing  and  brilliant  kind.  It  was  composed  in  the  main  of 
Western  regiments  that  had  enlisted  in  1861,  and  had,  to  a 
great  extent,  at  least,  been  kept  up  to  a  fair  average  of 
strength  by  the  wiser  and  more  military  policy  which  the 
Western  States  generally  adopted  in  the  matter  of  recruiting 
their  contingents,  of  which  we  have  spoken  above.  Hence 
General  Sherman's  army  reaped  the  full  benefit  of  all  the 
most  favorable  military  conditions  that  can  affect  the  effi 
ciency  of  an  army.  Its  unity  had  been  strictly  preserved  ; 
it  had  not  been  depleted  by  losses  or  by  detachments ;  it  had 
not  been  "  watered  "  by  the  addition  of  raw  troops.  It  was 
under  a  commander  who  was  the  idol  of  his  men,  whose  great 
abilities  were  universally  and  cheerfully  acknowledged,  and 
who  possessed  the  entire  confidence  of  the  General-in-Chief 
and  the  Government  at  Washington.  And  these  favorable 
conditions  continued  to  the  close  of  the  war.  In  Sherman's 
progress  toward  Atlanta,  although  it  was  marked  at  times  by 
severe  fighting,  the  losses  were  never  excessive,  considering 
the  size  of  the  army.  While  Grant,  by  his  reckless  and 
wasteful  attacks,  was  throwing  away  his  veterans  ten  thou 
sand  at  a  time,  and  in  fact  actually  changing  the  very  structure 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  his  lieutenant  in  the  West 
marched  into  Atlanta  with  practically  the  same  army  with 
which  he  had  set  out  from  Dalton.  There  had  been  suffered, 
it  is  true,  some  losses  that  might  have  been  avoided,  but 
neither  these  nor  the  unavoidable  casualties  of  the  campaign 
materially  affected  the  identity  or  the  strength  of  the  com 
mand.  The  army  which  entered  Atlanta  was  the  army  of 
Chickamauga  and  Missionary  Ridge,  of  Peach  Tree  Creek 
and  Decatur.  Its  career  had  been  one  of  almost  uniform 
success.  The  veteran  troops  had  had  their  confidence  in 
their  leader  and  in  themselves  largely  augmented  by  their 


268     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE  COMMANDERS 

experience  in  this  campaign.  They  felt  themselves  strong 
enough  for  anything.  They  were  ready  for  new  tasks. 
They  were  full  of  enterprise  and  hope.  And  not  only  the 
admirably  conducted  march  of  Sherman  to  Savannah,  and  his 
still  more  brilliant  march  from  Savannah  to  Goldsboro",  but 
the  resolute  and  steady  resistance  which  Thomas  was  at  the 
same  time  making  to  Hood's  invasion  of  Tennessee,  crowned 
as  it  was  by  the  decisive  victory  of  Nashville,  show,  perhaps 
better  than  any  other  events  in  the  war,  what  an  American 
army,  well  kept  up  in  strength,  and  boldly  but  judiciously 
managed,  can  accomplish. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  paper  we  spoke  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  task  which  the  North  proposed  to  itself.  It  was  not 
without  apparent  reason  that  the  world  doubted  and  smiled 
in  derision  at  the  presumption  of  the  Northern  Government  in 
thinking  that  it  could  succeed  in  such  a  gigantic  undertaking. 
Was  it  possible  that  a  nation  with  such  an  insignificant  navy 
could  establish  an  effective  blockade  over  three  thousand 
miles  of  sea-coast  ?  Did  the  Northern  generals  suppose  that 
armies,  large  enough  to  overcome  the  fierce  and  universal 
resistance  which  was  to  be  expected,  could  live  on  the  country 
they  were  invading  ?  And  if  not,  did  not  the  great  distances 
to  be  traversed  render  the  problem  of  transportation  and 
subsistence  well-nigh  an  insurmountable  one?  Some  suc 
cesses,  no  doubt,  the  great  superiority  of  the  North  in  men 
and  material  might  enable  it  to  win ;  very  possibly  the 
boundary  might  be  pushed  back  a  certain  distance.  But  for 
the  Northern  forces  to  overrun  the  South,  or  to  follow  up  the 
Southern  armies  into  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  there  to 
maintain  themselves  in  the  midst  of  an  unfriendly  popula 
tion  and  on  a  soil  in  great  part  destitute  of  the  means  of 
subsistence,  as  a  great  portion  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
unquestionably  was,  seemed  to  many  disinterested  and  clear 
headed  men  of  those  days  well-nigh  impracticable.  It  is  true 
that  neither  Lord  Palmerston  nor  the  Emperor  Napoleon  the 


THE   WAR  AS  WE  SEE  IT  NOW  269 

Third  inclined  to  the  side  of  the  North;  nevertheless  we 
believe  that  it  was  not  by  any  means  wholly  due  to  their 
unwillingness  to  see  us  succeed  that  they  predicted  our  failure. 
We  believe  that  they  judged  the  probabilities  of  the  case 
by  the  light  of  experience  ;  and,  judging  by  the  light  of 
experience,  it  was  not  likely  that  the  North  would  succeed  if 
the  South  should  resolutely  persist  in  endeavoring  to  main 
tain  her  independence  by  force  of  arms.  Lord  Palmerston 
and  the  Emperor  of  the  French  were  probably  as  well 
qualified  to  have  an  opinion  on  this  subject  as  any  two  men 
in  Europe;  the  one  had  been  Secretary  at  War  from  1809  to 
1815,  in  the  time  of  the  first  Napoleon  ;  the  other,  although 
not  a  soldier  himself,  had  been  a  diligent  and  intelligent 
student  of  the  campaigns  of  his  great  uncle.  Both  these 
experts  predicted  the  failure  of  the  North.  And  it  may 
safely  be  admitted  that  if  the  conditions  of  warfare  had  been 
the  same  in  1861  as  they  were  in  1815,  or,  in  our  judgment, 
as  late  as  1850,  their  prediction  would  in  all  probability  have 
been  fulfilled. 

But  the  conditions  were  not  the  same.  Steam  and 
electricity  had  in  the  intervening  time  asserted  their  power, 
and  had  rendered  possible  for  a  McClellan  or  a  Grant  what 
had  been  impossible  for  a  Napoleon.  It  was  found  that  the 
capacity  of  the  territory,  through  wliich  it  was  proposed  to 
move  an  army,  for  the  task  of  supporting  that  army  might 
generally  be  disregarded.  It  was  found  perfectly  feasible  to 
maintain  a  large  force  for  any  length  of  time  in  regions  where 
no  subsistence  of  any  sort  or  kind  was  furnished  by  the  soil. 
It  was  found  that  water-transportation  of  men  and  supplies 
was  as  certain  and  uniform,  as  much  to  be  relied  upon,  as 
transportation  by  land ;  that  the  winds  and  waves  of  the  ocean 
and  the  strength  and  direction  of  the  flow  of  rivers  could 
equally  be  ignored  when  it  was  proposed  to  transport  troops, 
or  subsistence,  or  ammunition,  to  a  given  spot.  It  was  found 
that  a  blockade  maintained  by  steam  vessels,  though  not 


270     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

absolutely  perfect,  was  a  far  more  certain  and  constant  cheek 
on  foreign  intercourse  than  could  be  effected  by  any  employ 
ment  of  sailing  vessels.  By  the  telegraph  all  available 
resources  could  be  utilized  without  the  loss  of  a  moment,  and 
all  information  instantaneously  communicated  to  or  from 
headquarters  to  or  from  any  part  of  the  theatre  of  war.  In 
other  words,  machinery  had  in  the  progress  of  time  become 
one  of  the  great  factors  in  military  operations,  and  its  intro 
duction  worked  as  marked  a  revolution  in  the  practice  of 
commanders  on  land  and  sea,  as  its  adoption  for  purposes  of 
manufacture  or  of  intercommunication  had  worked  in  the 
world  of  business  and  ordinary  life.  And,  what  was  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  North,  the  advantages  of  this  great 
change  in  matters  of  warfare  were  absolutely  at  the  call  of 
the  stronger  and  more  wealthy  of  the  two  combatants. 

There  had  been  but  little  in  the  way  of  example  to  follow. 
Steam-vessels  had,  it  is  true,  supplied  in  great  part  the  allied 
armies  in  the  Crimea,  There  had  also  been  a  short  rail 
road  constructed  for  the  accommodation  of  the  English  from 
Balaklava  to  the  front,  but  it  had  taken  a  great  while  to  build, 
and  it  was  not  very  serviceable  after  it  was  built.  The  French 
and  Austrian  s  had  also  used  their  railroads  in  the  short 
Italian  war  of  1859.  But  there  was  really  not  much  to  serve 
as  a  precedent. 

The  task  of  developing  the  possibilities  of  the  use  of 
steam  and  electricity  in  warfare  was,  therefore,  first  tried 
on  a  large  scale  in  the  war  of  secession.  Naturally  and 
inevitably  it  fell  to  the  North  to  deal  with  the  subject  with 
the  greater  thoroughness  and  ingenuity  of  application.  For 
the  North  could  overcome  the  great  natural  difficulties  pre 
sented  by  the  geographical  conditions  under  which  the  war 
was  to  be  carried  into  the  Confederacy  only  by  utilizing  to 
the  full  the  vast  resources  it  possessed  through  the  powerful 
agency  of  steam,  and  the  incalculable  assistance  afforded  by 
the  electric  telegraph.  And  it  will  probably  be  conceded 


THE   WAR  AS   WE  SEE  IT  NOW  271 

without  demur,  that  no  people  ever  lived  more  capable  of 
making  ingenious  and  useful  applications  of  steam  and 
electricity  to  war  or  to  anything  else,  than  the  people  of  the 
Northern  States. 

The  first  thing  to  do  was  to  enlarge  the  navy  so  as  to 
compass  a  blockade  of  the  Southern  coast,  and  the  next  thing 
was  to  build  a  navy  for  use  on  the  great  rivers  which  run 
through  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  That  both  tasks  were 
successfully  accomplished  in  a  very  brief  period  reflects  the 
greatest  credit  on  the  officers  of  the  navy.  We  have  not  time 
here,  nor  is  this  the  place,  to  give  the  details ;  but  in  a  couple 
of  months  or  thereabouts  the  blockade  had  become  reasonably 
effective  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ; 
and,  partly  by  purchasing  river  steamers  and  refitting  them, 
and  partly  by  building  new  and  armor-plated  vessels,  the 
Federal  Government,  early  in  18G2,  had  procured  a  fleet  on 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  which  laid  those  great 
avenues  into  the  interior  of  the  South  open  to  the  Northern 
invaders.  The  first  fruit  of  the  employment  of  this  naval 
force  in  conjunction  with  the  army  was  the  capture  of  Fort 
Donelson  in  February,  1862,  with  its  entire  garrison,  entailing 
the  evacuation,  by  the  Confederate  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  of 
the  greater  part  of  the  States  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 

The  task  of  providing  subsistence^and  forage  for  the  armies 
of  both  the  North  and  South  during  the  long  months  of 
winter  and  spring,  when  the  roads  were  well-nigh  impassable 
and  the  surrounding  country  afforded  next  to  nothing  which 
could  be  of  service,  was  immensely  simplified  by  railroads. 
It  might  be  thought  at  first  sight  that  the  advantage  of  this 
arrangement  lay  with  the  army  which  was  on  the  defensive, 
as  their  opponents  would  naturally  be  obliged  to  cut  loose 
from  their  railroad  communications  in  any  forward  movement. 
But  it  should  be  considered  that  the  all-important  thing  for 
the  North,  whose  resources  so  immeasurably  exceeded  those 
of  the  South,  was  to  maintain  as  large  an  army  as  it  could 


272     CRITICAL  SKETCHES   OF  THE   COMMANDERS 

get  together  at  a  point  from  which,  as  soon  as  the  season 
opened,  operations  could  be  successfully  commenced ;  and 
that  railroads  and  steamboats  made  it  always  possible  for  the 
North  to  accomplish  this.  Thus,  during  the  winter  of  18G4 
and  1865,  somewhere  near  130,000  men  were  comfortably 
quartered  and  supplied  in  the  Federal  lines  from  Bermuda 
Hundred  to  Petersburg,  in  a  country  where  absolutely  nothing 
was  furnished  from  the  soil  or  by  the  inhabitants ;  and  when 
the  time  came,  Grant  was  able  to  open  the  campaign  with  an 
overwhelming  superiority  of  force.  If  the  railroads  now  in 
operation  in  Russia  had  existed  in  Napoleon's  day,  it  may 
well  be  believed  that  he  would  have  supplied  his  immense 
army  with  subsistence  and  forage  during  the  winter  of  1812 
and  1813,  and  would  have  made  a  success  of  his  invasion. 
And,  it  may  equally  well  be  believed,  that,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  railroads  in  France,  the  Prussians  could  never  have 
maintained  during  the  winter  of  1870  and  1871  the  enormous 
army  which  surrounded  and  finally  reduced  Paris. 

We  must  bring  these  remarks  to  a  close.  The  war  is  now 
receiving  at  the  hands  of  the  American  people  its  due  measure 
of  attention.  Much  of  this  is  naturally  devoted  to  the  accu 
mulation  and  arrangement  of  evidence,  and  to  the  elucidation 
of  disputed  questions  of  fact.  Much  of  it  is  given  to  the 
study  of  the  characters  and  actions  of  the  prominent  leaders, 
and  to  forming  correct  estimates  of  their  respective  shares  in 
bringing  about  the  great  events  of  the  time.  Our  principal 
object  in  writing  the  foregoing  pages  has  been  to  draw  a  few 
of  the  military  inferences  and  conclusions  which,  it  seems  to 
us,  the  narrative  of  the  admitted  facts  warrants.  This  task 
of  criticism  has  an  importance  of  its  own.  For  it  is  only  by 
clearly  perceiving  and  frankly  recognizing  the  lessons  taught 
by  our  own  experience  that  we  can  hope  to  apprehend 
correctly  the  military  problems  of  the  future. 


INDEX. 


ABBOT,  H  L.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
associated  with  Humphreys,  77  ; 
his  tribute  to  Humphreys,  ib. 

Abercrombie,  J.  J.,  Col.,  7th  U.  S.  In 
fantry,  Confederates  at  Falling1  Wa 
ters,  Va.,  July  2,  1861,  repulsed  by, 
213 ;  Thomas  commissioned  Brig.- 
Gen.  in  advance  of,  213. 

Alabama,  Wilson's  1804  raid  in,  200. 

Alabama  River,  in  Sherman's  plans, 
autumn  of  1804,  137. 

Alden,  B.  11.,  Capt.  U.  S.  A.,  class 
mate  of  Gen.  Hurnphre}'s  at  West 
Point,  75. 

Aldie  Gap,  Va.,  action  at,  157,  150. 

Alexander,  Emperor  of  Russia,  offered 
Samuel  Humphreys  an  appointment, 
75. 

Alexandria,  Va.,  its  capture  advised  in 
1801,  by  Lee,  5. 

Allatoona  Pass,  the  U.  S.  post  at,  de 
fended  Oct.  5,  1864,  by  Gen.  Corse, 
138. 

Alpine,  Ga.,  McCook's  corps  sent  to, 
Sept.,  1803,  in  pursuit  of  Bragg, 
220. 

Alvord,  B.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
a  graduate  of  West  Point,  75. 

Amelia  Court  House,  Va.,  the  only 
roads  left  for  escape  of  Lee,  April 
2,  1805,  those  to,  91 ;  pursuit  of  Lee 
by  Humphreys  to,  ib. ;  Lee's  loss  of 
a  day  there,  ib. 

Anacostia,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Anderson,  li.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Hancock's  first  service  at  Washing 
ton  with,  1801,  55  ;  assigned  to  com 
mand  of  Department  of  the  Cum 
berland,  Aug.  15, 1801,  174  ;  Thomas 
made  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at  his 
instance,  and  assigned  to  his  Dept., 
Sept.,  ib. ;  his  command  in  Ken 
tucky,  128 ;  W.  T.  Sherman's  ser 
vice  under,  ib. ;  by  order  of  Oct.  0, 
1801,  relieved  of  command  of  Dept. 
of  Cum.  superseded  Oct.  8,  by  Sher 
man,  128. 

Anderson,  R.  II.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 


by    accident     anticipated     Grant's 
movement  to  Spottsylvania,  36. 

Andrew,  J.  A.,  Governor  of  Massachu 
setts,  concerned  in  recommendation 
of  a  call  for  300,000  men,  251. 

Anglo-Saxon  race  on  trial  in  the  Civil 
War,  251. 

Annapolis,  Md.,  Ninth  Corps  at,  spring 
of  1804,  10. 

Antietam,  McClellan's  overestimate  of 
the  Confederate  strength  at,  101, 
118  ;  McClellan's  statements  of,  crit 
icised,  117-118  ;  enthusiasm  excited 
by  McClellan  in  campaign  of,  122  ; 
158 ;  the  battle  not  a  masterpiece 
of  art,  120 ;  Burnside's  failure  at, 
121  ;  Hancock  given  command  of 
1st  division,  2d  Corps,  at,  57-58 ; 
Humphreys  hurried  to,  80 ;  time  of 
his  arrival,  ib. ;  McClellan's  mis- 
statement  concerning  Humphreys, 
80-81 ;  battle  not  fought  as  intended  >- 
by  McClellan,  257 ;  the  easier  task 
of  repelling  an  assault  illustrated 
by,  ib. ;  Union  loss  at,  34 ;  Stuart's 
raid  in  Penna.,  after,  261. 

Appomattox  Campaign,  April  2-9, 
1805,  the  demonstration  of  best  uses 
of  cavalry  in,  259  ;  renown  of  Sher 
idan's  achievements  in,  200. 

Appomattox  Court  House,  Va.,  Lee's 
line  of  retreat  from,  held  by  Sheri 
dan,  257 ;  Sheridan  and  Ord  across 
Lee's  path  at,  94 ;  reached  by  Hum 
phreys  April  7, 93  ;  surrender  of  Lee 
at,  April  9, 1805,  67. 

Appomattox  River,  10,  12,  14 ;  project 
to  extend  Union  left  to,  June,  1864, 
90  ;  in  the  attempt  to  escape  of  Lee's 
army,  92  ;  the  Union  army  divided 
by,  93  ;  time  lost  in  communicating 
across,  ib. 

Appomattox  Station,  Va. ,  but  for 
Humphreys  Lee  might  have  reached, 
April  8,  93  ;  and  obtained  supplies 
at,  94  ;  his  supply  line  cut  and  sup 
ply  trains  captured  by  Custer  at, 
April  8,  ib. 


274 


INDEX 


Arkansas,  within  Department  of  the 
Mississippi,  1864,  238. 

Arkansas  Post,  Ark.,  captured  by 
Sherman,  Jan.  11,  1863,  239. 

Arlington,  Va.,  left  by  Lee,  April  20, 
1861,  to  enter  service  of  Virginia, 
172  ;  its  capture  in  1861  advised  by 
Lee,  5. 

Armistead,  L.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
at  Molino  del  Key,  51  ;  mentioned. 
55. 

Army,  Confederate,  no  disparity  be 
tween  that  of  the  East  and  that  of 
the  West,  182. 

Army  of  Northern  Va.  :  strongest  of 
the  Confederacy,  34;  Stuart's  free 
dom  to  separate  from,  June-July, 
1863,  261  ;  its  strength  diminished, 
May  3,  1864,  265  ;  unable  to  make 
up  for  losses  at  Gettysburg,  ib. ;  at 
its  best  at  Gettysburg1,  266  ;  Grant's 
error  as  to  its  power  of  resistance, 

37  ;   elated  by  Grant's  failure,  18(54, 

38  ;   at  Cold  Harbor,  3D ;   at  Peters 
burg,  June  18,  1864,  17  ;  its  advan 
tage  in  fighting  on  interior  lines,  4 1 ; 
its  death  in  the  last  ditch,  44  ;   cap 
tured,  67  ;  history  of  the  cavalry  of, 
reviewed  in  McClellan's  Stuart.  155- 
162. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland  :  Anderson 
assigned.  Aug.  15,  1861,  to  the  com 
mand  of,  174 ;  W.  T.  Sherman  as 
signed  to  service  in,  Au«'.  28,  1861, 
128;  Thomas  assigned  to  service  in, 
Sept.  6,  1861,174;  Anderson  relieved 
of  command,  Oct.  6,  186 1, 128  ;  W.  T. 
Sherman  given  the  command,  Oct.  8, 
ib. ;  Buell  appointed  to  command, 
Nov.  15,  1861,  ib. ;  its  victory  under 
Thomas,  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads, 
Jan.  19,  18(52,  176-177 ;  advance  on 
Nashville,  178 ;  did  not  participate 
at  Shiloh,  ib. ;  reorganized  by  Hal- 
leek  after  Shiloh,  215 ;  command 
of  right  wing  given  to  Thomas,  ib. ; 
the  command  resigned  by  Thomas, 
216;  after  Corinth,  its  destination 
Chattanooga,  179  ;  at  Louisville, 
Oct.  1,  1862,  ib.  ;  the  command  given 
to  Thomas,  and  declined  by  him.  ib.  ; 
Buell  continued  in  command,  ib. ;  at 
battle  of  Perryville,  ib.  ;  Rosecrans 
given  command,  Oct.  30,  18(52,  170  ; 
at  Nashville,  Nov.  7,  ib. ;  at  battle 
of  Stone's  Kiver,  179-180  ;  in  Chick- 
amauga  campaign,  181  ;  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  Sept.  19-20,  1863, 
1S1-J82,  220-230;  inspired  by 
Thomas,  181 ;  at  its  best  at  Chicka 


mauga,  266  ;  Cist's  History  of,  cited 
as  to  the  fatal  message  at  Chicka 
mauga,  229;  retired  to  Kossville, 
after  battle,  182  ;  Thomas  appointed, 
Oct.  16,  1863,  to  command  of,  131, 
230  ;  he  assumed  command  of,  Oct. 
20,  1863,  182  ;  strength  of,  at  be 
ginning  of  Atlanta  campaign,  188  ; 
in  all  the  battles  but  that  of  July 
22,  before  Atlanta,  189  ;  most  of  the 
hard  work  given  to,  ib. ;  its  losses, 
ib.  ;  its  interests  made  subservient 
to  Army  of  the  Tennessee  by  Sher 
man,  188,  189;  Missionary  Ridge, 
captured  by,  Nov.  25,  1863,  33 ; 
the  capture  made  without  orders, 
132,  133,  184,185,  18(5,  187;  spon 
taneous  and  heroic  character  of  the 
charge,  186,  187  ;  compared  to  the 
assault  on  Pratzen,  133  ;  the  glory 
due  to  the  troops  themselves,  ib.  ; 
inspired  by  Thomas,  if  not  ordered 
by  him  to  charge,  186 ;  two  of  the 
divisions  under  Thomas'  command 
but  five  weeks,  237;  Buell,  Rose 
crans  and  Thomas  its  heroes,  129; 
also  called  for  a  period  Army  of  the 
Ohio. 

Army  of  the  James :  W.  F.  Smith  de 
sired  by  Grant  to  command,  18(54, 
255  ;  the  command  given  to  Butler, 
ib. ;  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  May  4, 
11;"  bottled  up  "  by  Beauregard, 
12  ;  under  Ord,  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
April  8,  1865,  94. 

Army  of  the  Ohio :  Thomas  refused 
to  supersede  Buell  in  command  of, 
21(5.  See  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  :  Barnard,  Chief 
Engineer  of,  1862,  102 ;  U.  S.  gun 
boats  provided  for  protection  of, 
in  transportation  to  the  Peninsula, 
103;  Humphreys'  service  in,  during 
Peninsular  campaign,  79 ;  retreat  to 
the  James,  18(52,  57;  113;  its  need 
of  re-enforcements,  July,  18(52,  250  ; 
McClellan  superseded  by  Burnside 
in  command  of,  121  ;  insecurity  in, 
caused  by  Stuart's  raids,  258  ;  im 
proved  by  Hooker,  121  ;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  83 ;  deprived  of  aid  of 
cavalry  in  Chancellorsville  campaign, 
258 ;  Meade  given  command  of,  86, 
261;  Humphreys,  Chief -of-Staff  of, 
8(5-89  ;  attack  on  its  centre  on  Cem 
etery  Ridge,  July  3,  18(53,  49-51  ; 
veterans  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 
264  ;  at  its  best  at  Gettysburg,  266  ; 
Stuart's  failure  to  damage,  in  ad- 


INDEX 


275 


vance  to  Gettysburg,  160-161;  be 
lieved,  by  Grant,  1863,  never  to  have 
been  thoroughly  well  fought,  34 ; 
Grant  with,  1864,  10;  difficulties 
involved  in  the  double  command,  of 
Grant  and  Meade,  87-88;  crossed 
the  Rapidan,  May  3,  beginning  1864 
campaign,  133 ;  its  wonderful  right 
ing  in  the  Wilderness,  40  ;  transfer 
to  the  James,  June,  1864,  42  ;  its 
strength,  40 ;  Beauregard's  plan  to 
defeat,  13  ;  before  Petersburg,  Juii3 
15,  16;  failure  there,  16,  17  ;  Hum 
phreys  given  command  of  2d  Corps, 
89 ;  Grant  inclined  to  deprive  it  of 
the  aid  of  Sheridan,  1865,  260 ;  the 
achievements  of  Sheridan  in  March 
and  April,  1865,  in  co-operation  with, 
ib. ;  scheme  to  cut  Lee's  railway 
communications  delayed,  90  ;  chief 
sufferer  from  Grant's  system,  37 ; 
its  losses  under  Grant's  system  of 
attrition,  135  ;  its  waste  under  Grant, 
267  ;  disheartened  by  its  losses,  38  ; 
familiar  with  Lee's  vitality,  39  ;  its 
failures,  1864-1865,  not  charged  to 
Grant  by  Badeau,  35 ;  the  affec 
tion  of,  for  McClellan,  122,  123  ;  be 
lieved  by  McClellan  capable  of  obe 
dience  only  to  him  after  Pope  cam 
paign,  100,  116  ;  Hancock  its  most 
conspicuous  brigade  leader,  57 ;  its 
losses  in  battle,  34 ;  well-fed  and 
clothed,  53  ;  development  of  cavalry 
in,  160,  162,  257-258  ;  development 
of  infantry  in,  264-266 ;  the  disad 
vantage  resulting  to,  by  disbanding 
veteran  regiments,  265  ;  larger  but 
less  efficient  May  3,  1864,  ib. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Confederate  : 
at  its  best  at  Chickamauga,  266 ; 
routed  at,  ib.  ;  depleted  thereafter, 
ib. ;  Johnston  superseded  Bragg  in 
command  of,  134,  135,  266  ;  its  de 
struction  Sherman's  sole  object,  133- 
134  ;  strength  of,  at  Dalton,  135  ;  its 
position  at  Resaca,  ib. ;  under  com 
mand  .  of  Hood,  136 ;  repulsed  at 
Allatoona  Pass,  1 38  ;  in  position  at 
Gadsden,  Ala.,  ib.  ;  not  destroyed 
by  Sherman,  134,  140-141  ;  position 
at  Florence,  140  ;  defeated  at  Frank 
lin,  Nov.  30,  1864,  142,  143  ;  de 
feated  at  Nashville,  Dec.  15,  143- 
144  ;  nearly  destroyed  by  Thomas, 
144  ;  Sherman  confronted  by  rem 
nants  of,  145. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Union  :  at  its 
best  at  Chickamauga,  266  ;  ordered 
to  Chattanooga,  132  ;  Hooker's  dem 


onstrations  during  the  crossing  of  the 
Tennessee  by,  235  ;  brought  up  to 
Missionary  Ridge  by  Sherman,  234  ; 
its  losses  not  large  in  that  battle, 
267  ;  Sherman's  connection  with, 
128 ;  his  partiality  for,  188 ;  the  priv 
ilege  of  taking  Atlanta  reserved  for, 
189;  its  good  condition,  spring  of 
1864,  266-267 ;  its  troops  veterans, 
267-268;  its  self -confidence,  268; 
enthusiasm  caused  by  successes,  ib.  ; 
a  model  army,  ib.  ;  its  composition, 
267  ;  its  unity  preserved,  ib. ;  Sher 
man  idolized  by,  ib.  ;  its  battle 
record,  ib. ;  Grant,  Sherman,  and 
McPherson  its  most  distinguished 
heroes,  129. 

Artillery,  U.  S.  Army,  3d  regt., 
Thomas'  connection  with.  1840-1855, 
167-169. 

Artillery,  the  development  of  the  ser 
vice,  during  the  civil  war,  263 ; 
might  have  been  better,  ib. ;  natural 
aptitude  of  American  soldier  for, 
ib. ;  distinction  attained  by  officers 
of  the  corps  of,  ib. ;  officers  never 
accorded  the  rank  to  which  they 
were  entitled,  ib.  ;•  indifference  of 
Congress  to  the  service,  ib. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  the  capture  of,  not  Sher 
man's  object,  134,  136  ;  his  neglect 
of  details  in  battles  near,  July,  1864, 
257  ;  the  privilege  of  capture  of,  re 
served  for  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
189;  not  captured  July  22,  1864, 
189 ;  abandoned  by  Confederates 
Sept.  1,  1864,  189;  occupied  by 
Sherman,  Sept.  2,  1864,  136,  137, 
189  ;  190  ;  the  political  character  of 
his  letters  to  mayor  of,  150  ;  rail 
road''  to  Chattanooga  threatened, 
Sept.,  1864,  138 ;  cut  by  Hood,  Oct., 
ib. ;  repaired  by  Sherman,  ib.,  139 ; 
Thomas  sent  to  Tennessee  from, 
Sept.  29,  1864,  191 ;  its  little  value 
while  Hood  was  unconquered,  136, 
137,  138,  139  ;  its  abandonment  con 
templated,  140,  146  ;  Sherman's 
army  began  its  march  to  the  sea 
from,  Nov.  15,  1864,  241. 

Atlanta  Campaign,  begun  May,  1864, 
133 ;  Sherman's  abilities  displayed 
in,  151  ;  239  ;  Lincoln's  support  of 
Sherman  in,  254  ;  the  skilful  strategy 
of,  256 ;  Sherman  did  not  rely  on 
cavalry  in,  260  ;  the  value  its  service 
might  have  been  in,  ib. ;  the  integ 
rity  of  organization  of  Sherman's 
army  preserved  from  Dalton  to,  267  ; 
Thomas  thought  by  Grant  to  have 


276 


INDEX 


been  less  competent  than  Sherman 
for  command  of,  200-207. 

Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  U.  S.,  a  reason 
ably  effective  blockade  maintained 
during  civil  war  011,  271. 

Augusta.  Ga.,  the  capture  of,  not  Sher 
man's  object,  134  ;  its  abandonment 
advocated  18(55,  by  Beauregard,  18  ; 
evacuated,  19. 

Austerlitz,  compared  to  Chattanooga, 
183. 

Averysboro',  N.  C.,  engagement  at, 
March  10,  1805,  145 ;  Johnston's 
feeble  blow  at,  19. 

Bache,  H.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  A.,  Humphreys 
with,  in  building  lighthouses,  70. 

Badeau,  A.,  his  comment  on  value  of 
success  at  Fort  Donelson,  25 ;  cited 
as  to  Grant's  reverse  at  Holly 
Springs,  80  ;  opinion  of  Lee's  army, 
34 ;  his  overestimates  of  Grant,  30, 
35,  30,  37,  42  ;  an  injustice  to  Grant, 
ib-  ;  poor  opinion  of  Lee  as  a  soldier, 
35,  30,  42. 

Bailey,  J.  B.,  Professor,  U.  S.  Military 
Academy,  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
75. 

Baird,  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com 
mand  1st  division,  14th  Corps,  left 
wing,  battle  of  Chickamauga,  his 
position  Sept.  19,  222  ;  attacked  by 
Polk,  Sept.  20,  224  ;  Wood  ordered 
by  Thomas  to  the  support  of,  227  ; 
in  command  of  3d  division,  14th 
Corps,  at  Missionary  Ridg'e,  his  divi 
sion  sent  to  re-enforce  Sherman,  but 
was  not  required,  230  ;  he  took  po 
sition  on  Thomas'  left,  ib.  ;  evidence 
in  his  report  that  Grant  wished  the 
Ridge  to  be  assaulted,  237. 

Balaklava,  railroad  built  by  the  Eng 
lish  from,  during  Crimean  War,  270 ; 
the  cavalry  charge  at,  40,  150. 

Baltimore,  Mel.,  saved  by  McClellan, 
118. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
called  to  oppose  Jackson  in  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  107-108;  Grant  urged 
to  join.  23-5 ;  in  Louisiana,  May,  1803, 
ib. ;  did  not  remain  in  active  com 
mand  till  close  of  the  war,  247. 

Barlow,  F.  C. ,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
as  Col.,  Olst  N.  Y.  V.,  1st  brigade, 
1st  division,  2d  Corps,  1802,  59  ;  High 
Bridge  over  Appomattox,  saved  from 
destruction  by,  April  7,  1805,  92  ; 
his  division  in  pursuit  of  Lee  di 
rected  towards  Farmville,  93. 

Barnard,  J.  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 


a  graduate  of  West  Point,  75,  70 ; 
Chief  Engineer,  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  1801-1802,  102;  his  letter  to 
McClellan  of  March  20,  18(52,  con 
cerning  naval  co-operation,  102-103, 
104. 

Barnes,  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  a 
graduate  of  West  Point,  75. 

Batchelder,  E.  N.,  Brig.-Gen.,  Quarter 
master-General,  U.  S.  A.,  his  service 
as  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  with  Hancock,  53 ; 
on  Hancock's  staff,  57. 

Baton  Rouge,  La.,  Gen.  Williams  at, 
August,  18(52,  28. 

Beatty.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com 
mand  of  1st  brigade,  2d  division,  14th 
Corps,  his  brigade  joined  Thomas 
before  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Sept. 
20,  223. 

Beauregard,  G.  T.,  General,  C.  S.  A., 
Roman's  Life  of,  reviewed,  8-20  ; 
his  capture  of  Fort  Sumter,  4,  5  ;  hig 
project  against  Washington,  July, 
1801,  5-0  ;  in  Sept.,  17  ;  in  command 
at  Manassas,  1801,  5  ;  urged  the 
junction  of  Johnston's  forces  with 
his  own,  5,  0,  7  ;  battle  of  Bull  Run, 

1801,  4,  5-7 ;  his  claim  of  victory  at 
Bull  Run,  incorrect,   20  ;  pursuit  of 
McDowell   not    entertained    by,    7  ; 
urged  increase  of  army,  ib.  ;  sent  to 
the    West,  ib. ;  his   plans   for   cam 
paign,  7-8  ;  did  all  he  could,  8  ;   his 
plan  to  surprise  Grant  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,    121) ;  in   command,  April 
7,  battle  of  Shiloh,  4,  8,  20 ;  defeated, 
20 ;   Bragg's   report   to,  of  horrible 
condition  of  army,  April  7,  232-233  ; 
Corinth  evacuated  by,  May  80, 1802, 
8;  in  command  at  Charleston,  Sept., 

1802,  ib. ',  his  defence  of  Fort  Sumter, 
1801,  4  ;  in  18d3,  8  ;  aided  by  Hun 
ter's   faulty  plan,    9 ;    employed   in 
defence    of   Richmond  April,  1804, 
10,  11  ;  his  advice  disregarded,  11  ; 
given   leisure   by    Butler  to  collect 
forces,    11  ;  Butler  bottled    up    by, 
11-12  ;  his  plan  of  campaign,  May 
18,  12-13  ;  disregarded,  13,  13  note  ; 
its  probable  effect,  13-14  ;   defence 
of    Petersburg,  1804,  4 ;  his   memo 
randum  of  June  9,  14  ;  his  strength, 
June   15,   15  ;  his  skilful  tactics  at 
Petersburg,   10  ;   Grant's  movement 
on  Petersburg  foreseen  by,  14  ;  his 
weakened     forces,    ib.  :     called    on 
Brag'g  for  re-enforcements,  ib. ;  his 
calls  for  re-enforcements  disregard 
ed,  10  ;  the  evacuation  of  Petersburg 
his   alternative,    17  ;  re-enforced  by 


INDEX 


277 


Lee,  June  18,  ib.  ;  his  good  disposi 
tions  of  forces  at  Petersburg1,  ib. ; 
at  Petersburg-,  July  30,  18  ;  his  ad 
vice  not  heeded,  1864-1865,  256; 
given  command  in  the  West,  1864, 
18  ;  in  co-operation  with  Hood,  at 
Florence,  Ala.,  Nov.,  1864,  140  ;  his 
plans  conjectured  to  be  directed  to 
wards  Nashville,  Nov.,  1864,  241 ; 
Sherman  believed  he  would  be  forced 
to  follow  to  Georgia,  ib. ;  Thomas 
without  fear  of  harm  from,  241  ; 
with  Johnston  in  spring1  of  1865, 
operating"  against  Sherman,  18 ; 
superseded  by  Johnston,  19  ;  battle 
of  Greensboro',  4;  interview  with 
Davis  and  Cabinet,  at  Greensboro', 
19 ;  his  plan  to  continue  the  war, 
18  ;  disregarded,  19 ;  his  merits  as  a 
commander,  4,  6  ;  not  of  high  rank 
as  a  soldier,  26  ;  his  characteristics, 
6  ;  distrusted  by  Davis,  ib.,  16. 

Beckwith,  A.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Sherman's  letter  of  Oct.  19, 1864,  to, 
146. 

Belmont,  Mo.,  Grant's  engagement  at, 
Nov.  11,  1861,  24;  purposeless,  ib. ; 
29  ;  not  glorious,  230 ;  the  reasons 
why,  ib.  ;  the  importance  of  results 
of,  ib. ;  a  tactical  success,  ib. ;  Union 
losses,  34. 

Benjamin,  J.  P.,  Sec'y  of  State,  C.  S. 
A.,  at  Greensboro'  conference,  19. 

Bentonville,  N.  C.,  Sherman's  engage 
ment  March  20-21,  1865,  at,  145  ; 
his  over-confidence,  204  ;  Johnston's 
blow  feeble  at,  19. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  Va.,  Butler  landed 
at,  May  4,  1864,  11  ;  position  of 
Union  troops  at,  ib. ;  Union  forces 
bottled  up,  12  ;  18th  Corps  taken  to 
Cold  Harbor  from,  13  ;  sent  back  to, 
14  ;  Johnston's  division  before,  ib.  ; 
supposed  to  be  in  Grant's  scheme 
against  Petersburg,  14  ;  number  of 
men  transported  by  railroad,  1864— 
1865,  from,  272. 

Berry,  H.  G.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
succeeded  by  Humphreys  in  com 
mand  of  2d  division,  3d  Corps,  Feb. 
5,  1863,  84. 

Bevel's,  or  Bevill's,  Bridge, over  Appo- 
mattox  River,  one  of  the  two  roads  of 
escape  left  for  Lee,  April  2,  1865, 
91. 

Bingham,  H.  H.,  Major,  U.  S.  V., 
Judge  Advocate,  on  Hancock's  staff, 
57. 

Blackburn's  Ford,  Bull  Run,  in  Mc 
Dowell's  plan,  July,  1861,  7. 


Black  Horse  Cavalry,  Payne's,  Con 
federate,  its  effect  at  Bull  Run, 
257. 

Bledsoe,  A.  T.,  Assist.  Sec'y  of  War, 
C.  S.  A.,  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
75. 

Blenker,  L.  M.,  appointed  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  May  17,  1861,  174. 

Blockade,  the  incredulity  of  foreign 
powers  as  to  its  maintenance  by  the 
U.  S.,  268 ;  a  navy  created  for  the 
purpose,  271 ;  made  reasonably  ef 
fective,  ib. 

Blue  Ridge,  Va.,  Lee's  provision  to 
guard  passes  of,  in  advance  to  Gettys 
burg,  160. 

Boydton  Road,  Va.,  expedition  of  Oct., 
1864,  to,  66,  87. 

Booneville,  Mo.,  battle  of,  July  1, 1862, 
the  first  planned  by  Sheridan,  204. 

Boston,  Mass.,  Fort  Independence, 
Thomas  stationed  at,  1850,  168. 

Bowen,  J.  S.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  de 
feated  by  Grant,  May  1,  1863,  at 
Port  Gibson,  233. 

Bowling  Green,  Ky.,  A.  S.  Johnston 
at,  Jan.,  1862,  177. 

Bragg,  B.,  Gen.  C.  S.  A.,  declined  ap 
pointment  of  Major  in  2d  U.  S.  Cav 
alry,  1855,  170;  joined  the  Confed 
erate  army,  171 ;  in  command  of  2d 
Army  Corps  at  Shiloh,  statement  as 
to  Union  attack,  April  6,  1862,  232  ; 
his  report  of  horrible  state  of  the 
army  after  Shiloh,  ib. ;  Buell's  move 
ment  to  attack  him  at  Perry ville, 
216 ;  repulsed  by  Buell's  left  wing, 
Oct.  8,  1862,  217  ;  his  strength  at 
Perry  ville,  217 ;  his  loss,  ib. ;  Rose- 
crans'  ^movement,  Dec.,  1862,  to  at 
tack,  ib. ;  battle  of  Stone's  River, 
Dec.  31, 1862-Jan.  3,  1863,  217-220; 
his  strength,  218;  his  position,  ib. ; 
his  plan  to  attack  Union  right,  ib.  ; 
gravity  of  his  attack,  ib. ;  defeated, 
179-180,  219 ;  his  retreat  from,  180 ; 
forced  into  Chattanooga,  181 ;  re-en 
forced  by  Longstreet,  131 ;  his  re 
treat,  Sept.,  1863,  from  Chattanooga 
to  Lafayette,  220 ;  believed  by  Rose- 
crans  to  be  retreating  to  Rome,  ib.  ; 
pursuit  of,  ib.  ;  believed  to  have 
been  re-enforced  by  Johnston,  220 ; 
and  to  be  waiting,  Sept.  11,  for  re-en 
forcements  from  Va.,  ib. ;  encoun 
tered,  Sept.  19,  in  position  on  Chicka- 
mauga  River,  ib. ;  his  intention  to 
block  road  to  Chattanooga  ques 
tioned,  221-222,  223 ;  his  attack  on 
Thomas,  221 ;  the  attack  failed,  ib. ; 


278 


INDEX 


his  dispositions  for  battle  of  Sept. 
20,  228  ;  his  right  wing-  under  Polk, 
ib.  ;  his  left  wing  under  Longstreet, 
ib. ;  the  battle  of  Sept.  20,  224-229  ; 
strength  of  right  wing,  225 ;  his 
loss  Sept.  19,  ib. ;  the  irruption  of 
his  forces  on  Thomas'  right,  227 ; 
damage  done  by,  ib. ;  Longstreet's 
attack  on  Thomas,  228  ;  defeated, 
181-182  ;  strength  of  his  left  wing, 
228;  total  of  his  force,  ib. ;  his  loss, 
182 ;  his  position  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  taken  after  Chickamauga, 
234  ;  Grant's  plans  against,  83  ;  plan 
of  attack  issued  Nov.  18,  234  ;  bat 
tle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  Nov.  25, 
184-187,  234-238  ;  objects  of  attacks 
of  Hooker  and  Sherman  on  his  flanks, 
132,  184;  reported,  Nov.  22,  as  re 
treating,  184 ;  Thomas  ordered  to 
ascertain  if  he  was  retreating,  Nov. 
23,  235  ;  his  advanced  line  seized 
by  Thomas,  ib. ;  his  forces  driven 
from  Orchard  Knob,  Nov.  23,  184  ; 
his  left  on  Lookout  Mountain  turned 
by  Hooker,  38 ;  his  position  on  the 
Ridge  captured  by  assault  of  Thom 
as'  forces,  Nov.  25,  33,  132,  184, 
185,  186,  187 ;  plan  to  cut  off  his 
retreat  in  Chickamauga  Valley,  185  ; 
his  loss  on  Missionary  Ridge,  ib. ;  his 
statement  concerning  the  strength  of 
his  position,  186 ;  his  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  depleted  after  Missionary 
Ridge,  260  ;  superseded  by  Johnston 
in  command,  ib. ;  his  command  in 
Virginia,  April,  1864,  10;  Beaure- 
gartl's  prognostications  of  Grant's 
plans,  June  9,  1864,  addressed  to, 
14  ;  not  an  obstinate  antagonist,  34  ; 
fighting  him,  not  like  fighting  Lee, 
ib.  ;  always  defeated,  34. 

Brandy  Station,  or  Fleetwood,  cavalry 
attacks  at,  156-157,  159. 

Brannan,  J.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  of  3d  division,  14th 
Corps,  left  wing,  at  battle  of  Chick 
amauga,  his  position,  Sept.  19,  222; 
at  Thomas'  disposition,  Sept.  20, 
224-225;  the  fatal  message  as  to 
rectification  of  his  line,  226 ;  his  di 
vision  in  its  proper  place,  ib. ;  the 
unfortunate  effect  of  the  message, 
227-230  ;  that  his  division  moved  to 
the  front  was  known  to  Thomas, 
230,  230  note,  244. 

Breckinridge,  J.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
his  conspiracy  to  capture  Kentucky 
state  arms,  frustrated  by  Thomas, 
175  ;  his  report  of  demoralization  of 


his    troops    after  Shiloh,    April    8, 

1862,  233 ;  his  division  shattered  by 
Thomas  at  Stone's  River,    180 ;    at 
battle    of    Missionary    Ridge,    238 
note   4 ;    as   Sec'y   of   War    at   the 
Greensboro'    council     on     the     lost 
cause,  19. 

Bridgeport,    Ala.,    short    route    from 

Chattanooga  attained,  183. 
Bristoe  Station,  Va.,  battle  at,  Oct.  14, 

1863,  87. 

Brock  Road  Junction,  Va.,  attempt  of 
A.  P.  Hill  to  seize,  May  5, 1864,  62. 

Brooke,  J.  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  a 
Col.  in  command  of  4th  brigade, 
1st  division,  2d  Corps,  1863,59;  in 
veteran  corps,  organized  by  Hancock, 
1864-1865,  66. 

Brotherton's  Farm,  Union  right  wing 
near,  Sept.  20,  1863,  226. 

Brown,  J.  C.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  of 
Stevenson's  division,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  238  note  3. 

Brown's  Ferry  on  Tenn.  River,  Con 
federates  dislodged  from,  by  Thom 
as,  Oct.  27,  1863,  183  ;  Union  loss 
at,  ib. 

Brownson,  E.  B.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  on 
Hancock's  staff,  57. 

Bryan,  G.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade,  of  Longstreet's  division,  not 
present  at  Chickamauga,  228  note. 

Buckner,  S.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
his  scheme  to  capture  the  state 
arms  of  Kentucky,  frustrated  by 
Thomas,  175  ;  Fort  Donelson  sur 
rendered  by,  Feb.  1(5,  18(52,  25,  231 ; 
the  number  of  men  surrendered,  ib.  ; 
in  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  238 
note  1. 

Buell,  D.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land,  Nov.  15,  1861,  128;  his  line 
under  Thomas  in  Kentucky,  Nov., 
1862,  213  ;  Thomas  ordered,  Dec.  29, 
to  Mill  Springs,  213  ;  his  promotions 
after  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  215  ;  or 
dered  to  join  Grant  on  the  Tennessee, 
26,  128  ;  his  march  begun  March  18, 
232  ;  his  coming  presumably  known 
to  Johnston,  ib.  ;  within  ten  miles 
of  Grant,  April  5,  ib.  ;  Confederate 
plan  to  attack,  before  his  arrival,  8, 
26  ;  his  participation  in  the  battle, 
April  7,  27,  130,  231,  250 ;  his  share 
in  the  victory,  44  ;  his  recommen 
dation  of  Thomas  to  rank  of  Maj.- 
Gen.,  178 ;  Thomas  rejoined  him 
June,  1862,  ib. ;  Chattanooga  his  ob 
jective,  Sept.,  1862,179;  at  Louisville, 


INDEX 


279 


Oct.  1,  ib. ;  superseded  by  Thomas, 
ib. ;  Thomas  having-  declined,  he 
remained  in  command,  ib.  ;  Thomas 
appointed  second  in  command  by, 
210  ;  the  battle  of  Perry ville,  Oct. 
8,  1862,  179  ;  his  orders  to  Thomas 
as  to  Perryville,  210-217  ;  being  ill 
took  no  part  in  battle,  217 ;  his 
strength  then,  ib. ;  superseded  by 
Rosecrans,  Oct.  30,  179,  210  ;  as  aii 
organizer,  compared  with  McClellan, 
1'2'2  ;  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  129 ;  not  in  ac 
tive  command  after  Oct.,  1802,  247. 

Buena  Vista,  battle,  Feb.  22-23,  1847, 
Thomas'  distinguished  service  at, 
108-169. 

Buford,  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.S.  V.,his  dis 
tinguished  cavalry  service,  157  ;  his 
signal  services,  July  1  and  3,  1803, 
Gettysburg  campaign,  258-259. 

Bull  Run,  Va.,  battle  of  1801,  4,  5-7, 
177 ;  Union  loss  at,  34  ;  awakening 
to  gravity  of  the  war  at  the  North 
after,  248  ;  Sherman  in  command  of 
brigade  at,  128,  239 ;  Stuart  at,  157  ; 
effect  of  Confederate  Black  Horse 
Cavalry  at,  257 ;  Patterson  made  the 
scapegoat  of  disaster  at,  174  ;  fight 
ing  at  Fort  Donelson  compared  with, 
25. 

Bull  Run,  second  battle,  1802,  100; 
McClellan  resented  the  attribution 
of  defeat  to  him,  119. 

Bureau  of  Topographical  Engineers, 
Humphreys  attached  to,  70. 

Burkesville,  Va.,  road  of  escape  to 
Lee  barred  there,  April  4,  1865,  91. 

Burnside,  A.  E.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
given  command  of  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  Nov.  10,  1802,  121;  not 
suited  to  the  position,  ib. ;  his  fail 
ure  at  Antietam,  ib.  ;  his  mine  at 
Petersburg,  63  ;  Humphreys  recom 
mended  for  promotion  by,  82. 

Butler,  B.  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
expedition  into  Virginia,  in  com 
mand  of  Army  of  the  James,  1864, 
10 ;  landed  at  Bermuda  Hundred, 
May  4,  11,  38;  "bottled  up,"  12, 
39 ;  Beauregard's  plan  against,  in 
event  of  capture  of  Petersburg  by, 
12;  Grant's  orders  to.  indefinite,  38, 
39  ;  his  position  and  continuance  in 
the  army  due  to  political  influence, 
254-255 ;  not  an.  able  or  patriotic 
man,  254. 

Buzzard  Roost,  Ga.,  in  Thomas'  pro 
ject  against  Johnston,  1804,  188 ;  in 
Sherman's  operations,  ib. 


Caesar,  Grant  in  comparison  with,  36 ; 
Humphreys  in  contrast  to,  82  ; 
Thomas  lacked  his  audacity,  204; 
the  Welsh  not  conquered  by,  167. 

Cairo,  Ills.,  Grant  left,  Feb.  2,  1802, 
for  Fort  Henry,  231. 

Caldwell,  J.  C.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  of  1st  brigade,  2d  Corps, 
at  Fredericksburg,  1802,  59. 

California,  Sherman  served  in,  during 
Mexican  War,  128;  Thomas  sta 
tioned  at  Fort  Yuma,  1854-1855,  in, 
170. 

Camp  Jackson,  St.  Louis,  broken  up 
by  Lyon,  May,  1801,  175. 

Carlisle  Barracks,  Pa.,  Thomas  ordered 
to,  April  10,  1801,  172 ;  his  renewal 
of  oath  of  allegiance  at,  ib. 

Carroll,  S.  S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  veteran  corps  organized  by  Han 
cock,  1804-1865,  66. 

Cashtown,  Pa.,  visited  by  Stuart  in 
raid  of  Oct.,  1862,  158. 

Cass,  G.  W.,  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
75. 

Cavalry,  its  function  in  warfare,  156 ; 
development  of,  during  the  rebellion, 
ib.,  157, 159, 257-258 ;  raids  of,  futile, 
258,  260-202  ;  improved  by  Hooker, 
160,  260-202  ;  unfortunately  em 
ployed  by  Hooker  in  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  258 ;  good  use  of,  made  by 
Meade  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  ib. ; 
Buford's  services  with,  July  1  and 
3,  1803,  258-259 ;  mistaken  use  of, 
by  Grant,  1864,  259  ;  Sherman's  in 
difference  to,  260 ;  treated  with  in 
dignity  during  Atlanta  campaign, 
194;  its  fighting  qualities  mini 
mized  by  Sherman,  ib.  ;  employed 
by  Thomas  against  fortified  lines  at 
Nashville,  ib. ;  its  strength,  ib. ;  its 
energetic  commanders,  ib. ;  its  ser 
vices  in  retarding  Hood's  advance, 
ib. ;  Forrest  defeated  at  Franklin 
by,  ib. ;  Thomas'  use  of,  195;  or 
ganized  and  commanded  by  Wilson 
in  Thomas'  1864  campaign,  191 ; 
his  raid  Alabama  and  Georgia,  1864, 
with,  ib. ;  Lee's  mistaken  use  of, 
260-201;  Lee  not  conquered  until 
there  was  a  proper  co-operation  of 
infantry  and,  202-203 ;  improved 
under  Sheridan,  102  ;  its  strength, 
1864,  ib. ;  the  success  of  Sheridan  in 
Appomattox  campaign  a  demonstra 
tion  of  the  best  use  of,  259,  202 ; 
his  force  displayed  the  perfection  of 
the  use  of,  202  ;  its  recognition  at 
close  of  the  war,  200. 


280 


INDEX 


Cavalry,  U.  S.  Army,  1st  regi.,  1855, 
Sumner,  Colonel  of,  J.  E.  Johnston, 
Lt.  Col.,  Emory  and  Sedgwick,  Ma 
jors,  170  :  2d  regi,.,  1855,  A.  S. 
Johnston,  Colonel,  R.  E.  Lee,  Lieut.  - 
Col.,  Hardee  and  Thomas,  Majors, 
170 ;  twenty -four  of  its  officers  en 
tered  rebel  service,  ib. 

Cemetery  Ridge,  Gettysburg-,  pictured 
in  battle  of  July  3,  49-51  ;  Hancock 
wounded  at,  50 ;  Humphreys'  posi 
tion  at,  84  ;  Pickett  repulsed  at,  182. 

Chambers!)  urg,  Pa.,  visited  by  Stuart 
in  his  Oct.,  1802,  raid,  158. 

Champion  Hill,  Miss.,  battle  of  May 
16,  1863,  mentioned,  18. 

Chancellor  House,  Hancock's  position 
at,  59  ;  Humphreys'  affair  at,  83. 

Chancellorsville,  Va.,  battle  of  May 
2-4,  1863,  Hancock's  service  at, 
May  3,  59  ;  Hooker's  gross  misman 
agement  at,  159 ;  his  mistaken  em 
ployment  of  cavalry  in  the  cam 
paign,  258  ;  Humphreys'  services  at, 
82,  83;  Union  loss  at,  34;  A.  P. 
Hill  and  Jackson  wounded  at,  158  ; 
Stuart  given  command  of  Jackson's 
corps  at,  ib. 

Chapin's  Farm,  near  Richmond,  63. 

Charles  City  Cross  Roads,  Va.,  in 
Grant's  movement  on  Petersburg, 
14. 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  defended  by  Beaure- 
gard,  1861,  4  ;  in  1862,  8  ;  Hunter  in 
command  before,  9 ;  might  have 
been  taken,  1863,  9  ;  Union  opera 
tions  discontinued,  1864,  9-10; 
troops  called  to  Richmond  from, 
May,  1864,  11  ;  its  abandonment 
advocated,  1865,  by  Beauregard,  18  ; 
his  advice  not  entertained,  19;  de 
layed  evacuation  of,  ib. ;  evacuated, 
1865, 9, 19  ;  Sherman  thought  Colum 
bia  "  as  bad  as,"  147  ;  in  Beaure- 
gard's  opinion,  only  a  military  posi 
tion,  5  ;  its  possession  of  little  value 
to  the  British,  134. 

Chattahoochee  River,  in  Sherman's 
plans,  autumn  of  1864, 137. 

Chattanooga,  Tenii.,  Buell's  destina 
tion,  not  reached  Oct.  1,  1802,  179  ; 
Thomas'  plan  of  advance  to,  ignored, 
ib. ;  Rosecrans'  advance  on,  from 
Murfreesboro'  begun  June  24,  1863, 
181  ;  the  Confederates  forced  into, 
ib.  ;  Bragg's  communications  at, 
threatened  Sept.  8,  220  ;  his  retreat 
from,  Sept.  8,  ib.  ;  occupied  by  Rose 
crans,  Sept.  9,  ib.  ;  pursuit  of  Bragg 
from,  ib. ;  Rosecrans'  movement  to 


ChickamaugaRiver  from,t7>.;  Bragg's 
intention  to  block  road  to,  Sept.  19- 
20,  questioned,  221-223  ;  the  roads 
to,  223  ;  Bragg's  position  overlook 
ing,  taken  after  Chickamauga,  234  ; 
the  criticism  of  choice  of  Grant  for 
supreme  command  at,  instead  of 
Thomas,  discussed,  230 ;  Thomas 
chosen  by  Grant  for  command  at, 
216  ;  the  problem  of  supplying  army 
at,  solved  by  Thomas,  183  ;  the  ser 
vices  of  W.  F.  Smith  at,  183,  255  ; 
Grant  arrived  at,  Oct.  23,  1863,  234  ; 
his  operations  at,  32-34  ;  his  plan  to 
concentrate  his  troops  in  valley,  on 
Thomas'  left  flank,  235  ;  his  orders 
for  attack  on  Bragg  at,  Nov.  18,  ib.  ; 
battle  of,  Nov.  23-26,  1863,  131-133, 
183-187  ;  see  Missionary  Ridge  ;  a 
base  of  supplies  for  Sherman,  136 ; 
railroad  to  Atlanta  cut  and  repaired, 
138,  139 ;  distance  from  Florence, 
Ala.,  140 ;  exposed  by  Sherman  to 
capture  by  Hood,  144 ;  Thomas 
thought  by  Grant  less  competent 
than  Sherman  for  command  of  move 
ment  to  Atlanta  from,  206-207; 
129,  146,  241. 

Cheatham,  B.  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
strength  of  his  division  at  Chicka 
mauga,  228. 

Cheimbusco,  Hancock  brevetted  for 
gallantry  at,  51. 

Chesapeake  Bay,  in  McClellan's  plan 
of  campaign,  101. 

Chesapeake,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  built 
by  I).  Humphreys,  74. 

Chester,  \V.  H.,  Capt,,  U.  S.  V.,  mor 
tally  wounded  at  Gettysburg,  85. 

Chicago,  Ills.,  Reunion  of  Western 
Armies,  Dec..  1868,  at,  198. 

Chickahominy  River,  Va.,  12,  57,  61, 
114  ;  concerned  in  failure  of  McClel 
lan's  campaign,  11(5,  117;  Grant's 
movement  on,  June,  1864,  14. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of,  Sept.  19-20, 
1863,  131,  181-182,  220-230  ;  move 
ment  to,  begun  Sept.  18,  220-221  ; 
the  movement  timely.  221  ;  the  left 
wing,  commanded  by  Thomas  at, 
221,230;  the  battle  brought  on  by 
an  attack  not  ordered  by  Thomas, 
181,  205,  221  ;  met  by  a  counter 
attack  near  Reed's  Bridge,  221  ; 
Bragg's  intention  to  block  road  to 
Chattanooga  questioned,  221-222  ; 
position  of  Union  forces,  Sept.  19, 
222 ;  the  enemy  repulsed,  221  ;  the 
plan  of  battle  of  Sept.  20,  adopted 
in  council,  night  of  Sept.  19,  222 ; 


INDEX 


281 


dispositions  changed  by  Thomas' 
wish  early  Sept.  20,  222  ;  Thomas  re- 
enforced,  223  ;  attack  Sept.  20,  begun 
by  Polk  on  Thomas'  extreme  left, 
224  ;  extended  to  his  entire  line,  ib.  ; 
attack  everywhere  repulsed,  ib. ;  at 
tack  most  serious  on  Baird,  ib.  ;  re-en 
forcements  called  for,  and  sent,  224- 
220 ;  Confederates  penetrated  the 
line  prior  to  11  A.  M.,  ib. ;  strength 
of  Union  left  wing  Sept.  20,  225  ; 
strength  of  Confederate  force  op 
posed  to,  225 ;  mistaken  message 
carried  to  Rosecrans  by  one  of 
Thomas'  aides,  226 ;  misfortune 
caused  thereby,  in  removal  of 
Wood's  division  from  Union  line, 
227-280  ;  the  irruption  of  enemy  in 
gap  left  by  Wood's  movement,  227  ; 
the  Union  forces  swept  away  by 
Hood,  ib.,  228  ;  Sheridan  moving  to 
left  wing  struck  and  forced  back, 
227 ;  Thomas'  right  assaulted  by 
Long-street,  about  2  p.  M.,  228  ;  this 
assault  resisted  until  5.80  P.  M.,  228- 
225) ;  the  greatest  qualities  displayed 
in  this  defence  by  Thomas,  1S4,  229 ; 
his  retreat  to  Rossville,  ib.  ;  the 
attacks  on  Thomas  in  retreat  un 
availing,  ib. ;  his  great  services  at, 
ib. ;  his  faculty  for  meeting  emer 
gencies,  instanced  at,  205  ;  cost  of 
the  battle  to  the  Confederates,  266  ; 
both  armies  of  the  West  at  their  best 
at,  ib. ;  honors  due  to  memory  of,  ib. ; 
Tactical  Study  of  the  Battlefield  of, 
its  legend  incorrect,  280,  280  note  1, 
248-244;  position  taken  by  Bragg 
on  Missionary  Ridge  after,  234 ; 
Sherman  opposed  Nov.  25  by  forces 
which  had  been  at,  186  ;  the  Union 
army  the  same  at  Atlanta  as  at, 
267. 

Chickamauga  River,  Rosecrans'  move 
ment,  Sept.  18,  1868,  to,  220 ;  Bragg 
encountered  on,  Sept.  19,  ib.  ;  the 
Union  movement  timely,  221  ;  in 
Grant's  plans,  Nov.  18,  for  Sher 
man's  advance,  284. 

Chickamauga  Valley,  plan  to  cut 
Bragg's  retreat  in,  185. 

Chickasaw  Bayou,  Sherman's  action 
at,  Dec.  28,  1862,  29. 

Chocorua,  U.  S.  gunboat,  108. 

Church,  A.  E.,  Prof,  of  Mathematics, 
U.  S.  Mil.  A  cad.,  a  graduate  of  West 
Point,  75. 

Cist,  II.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  referred  to,  112;  his  version  of 


story  of  fatal  message  at  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  229. 

City  Point,  on  James  River,  Butler's 
expedition,  1864,  to,  10 ;  Gordon's 
unsuccessful  attempt  at,  1865,  90  ; 
Sheridan  at,  March  27,  259. 

Clarke,  F.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Hancock  with,  in  the  West,  51. 

Clay,  Henry,  jr.,  classmate  of  Gen. 
Humphreys  at  West  Point,  75. 

Cleburne,  P.  R.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
opposed  to  Sherman,  battle  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  his  strength,  288; 
compared  with  Humphreys,  95. 

Coast  Survey  Office,  Humphreys  in 
charge  of,  1844-1849,  77. 

Cold  Harbor,  Va.,  battle  of,  May  31- 
June  12,  1864,  13,  40, 42,  87 ;  failure 
of  charge  at,  62 ;  Grant's  movement 
from  June,  12, 13, 14 ;  Grant  blocked 
at,  39. 

Colorado  River,  Thomas'  report  on, 
1857,  171. 

Columbia,  Ky.,  Union  line  extended 
from  London  to,  Nov.,  1862,  213. 

Columbia,  S.  C.,  Sherman's  strategy  in 
movement  to,  145 ;  regarded  by 
Sherman  "as  bad  as  Charleston," 
147;  its  abandonment  advocated, 
1865,  by  Beauregard,  18 ;  evacuated, 
19. 

Columbus,  Ky.,  Polk  in  command  at, 
Nov.,  1861,  24;  Belmont  attacked 
instead  of,  ib. 

Confederate  Govt.,  failure  to  compre 
hend,  1861,  the  magnitude  of  the 
war,  247  ;  its  shortsighted  financial 
policy,  248 ;  did  not  employ  cotton 
to  advantage  in  England,  1861,  ib. ; 
its  inadequate  provision  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  ib. ;  inadequate  prepa 
rations  for  war,  249 ;  not  daunted 
by  disasters  of  1862,  ib. ;  its  treat 
ment  of  J.  E.  Johnston,  254. 

Congress  of  the  U.  S.,  see  United  States 
Congress. 

Congress,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  built  by 
D.  Humphreys,  74  ;  destroyed  by 
the  Merrimac,  1862,  102. 

Conrad's  Ferry,  Potomac  River,  7, 158. 

Constitution,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  built 
by  D.  Humphreys,  74. 

Contreras,  Hancock  brevetted  for  gal 
lantry  at,  51. 

Cooper's  Gap,  Lookout  Mountain, 
Thomas  in  position  at,  220. 

Corinth,  Miss.,  twenty  miles  from  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  Confederates  in  posi 
tion  at,  April,  1862,  232 ;  the  pur 
pose  of  Grant  to  seize,  known  to 


282 


INDEX 


Johnston,  ib. ;  horrible  state  of  rebel 
army  in  retreat  from  Shiloh  to,  April 
8,  ib.;  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
reorganized  April,  1862,  for  the  ad 
vance  on,  215  ;  threatened  by  Grant, 
April,  1802,  26  ;  Sherman  under  com 
mand  of  Thomas  in  advance  on,  187  ; 
Thomas  in  command  of  right  wing 
at  siege  of,  230 ;  Sherman's  success 
ful  engagement  at,  May  28,  239 ; 
evacuated  by  Beauregard,  May  30, 
1862,  8;  an  abandoned  city  when 
occupied  by  Halleck,  189  ;  battles  of 
Oct.  3-4, 1862,  233  ;  Grant's  conduct 
of  battle  criticized,  27 ;  Rosecrans' 
share  in  it,  ib. ;  the  enemy  routed  by 
Rosecrans  at,  Oct.  3-4,  1862,  217; 
Union  loss  at,  34  ;  129,  179. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  Lieut.-Gen.,  British 
Army,  battle  of  Guilford  C.  H.,  1781, 
18  ;  Sherman's  position  in  North 
Carolina  compared  to  that  of,  145. 

Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers, 
U.  S.  A.,  organized,  1838,  76  ;  Hum 
phreys  a  1st  lieut.  of,  1838,  ib. 

Corpus  Christi,  Texas,  Thomas  sta 
tioned  at,  Aug.,  1845,  168. 

Corse,  J.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
defence  of  U.  S.  post  at  Allatoona 
Pass,  Oct.  5,  18(54,  138. 

Cotton  not  employed  by  the  Confeder 
acy  to  advantage  in  England,  1861, 
248. 

Couch,  D.  N.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  suc 
ceeded  by  Hancock  in  command  of 
2d  Corps,  59-60 ;  assigned  to  Dept. 
of  Susquehanna,  60. 

Crimean  War,  steam-vessels  and  rail 
roads  employed  in,  270. 

Crittenden,  G.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
in  command  before  Mill  Springs, 
Jan.,  1862,  brought  re-enforcements 
across  the  Cumberland,  Jan.  18,  214 ; 
attacked  Thomas,  at  Logan's  Cross 
Roads,  Jan.  19,  176,  214 ;  his 
strength,  ib.  ;  totally  defeated,  176- 
177,  214  ;  termination  of  his  military 
career,  176. 

Crittenden,  T.  L.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  2d  Corps  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  ordered  to  position  at  Perry- 
ville,  Oct.  7,  1862,  216  ;  in  command 
of  three  divisions  and  of  left  wing 
at  Stone's  River,  Dec.  31,  1862-Jan. 
3,  1863,  218 ;  ordered  to  send  re-en 
forcements  to  right  wing,  Dec.  31, 

218  ;  made  front  against  the  enemy, 

219  ;  no  evidence  that  he  was  threat 
ened  with  disaster,  ib.  ;  part  of  his 
command    forced   back,    ib. ;    Sher 


idan's  aid  to  left  wing,  219 ;  four  of 
his  brigades  alone  of  all  the  army 
retained  their  original  position,  ib. ; 
sent  to  Riuggold,  Sept.,  1863,  220 ; 
ordered  to  new  position,  Sept.  11, 
ib. ;  at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  221 ; 
a  division  of  his  corps  sent  to  Thom 
as,  222 ;  his  position  in  reserve  for 
Sept.  20,  ib, ;  Thomas  directed  to 
employ  his  forces,  224  ;  Van  Cleve's 
division  ordered  to  support  Thomas, 
225  ;  propriety  of  Thomas'  call  for 
aid  from,  questioned,  226 ;  Wood's 
division  of  his  command,  ib. 

Crook,  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
under  Thomas'  instruction  at  West 
Point,  169 ;  his  cavalry  division  co 
operated  with  Humphreys,  April  7, 
1865,  93. 

Cruft,  C.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com 
mand  of  1st  brigade,  2<l  division, 
left  wing  at  Stone's  River,  forced 
back,  219. 

Crump's  Landing,  four  miles  from 
Pittsburg  Landing,  Grant's  fears  of 
an  attack  at,  April  5,  1862  233. 

Cullum,  G.  W.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
a  graduate  of  West  Point,  1833,  75 ; 
his  Biographical  Register,  ib.,  76, 
203. 

Cumberland,  Army  or  Department  of, 
see  Army  or  Department  of  the 
Cumberland. 

Cumberland  Mountains,  Thomas  and 
McCook  sent  across,  Sept.,  1863,  in 
pursuit  of  Brag'g,  220. 

Cumberland  River,  Confederates  cross, 
to  Mill  Springs,  Jan.  2,  1862,  213; 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  twelve  miles 
from,  175. 

Cumberland,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  de 
stroyed  by  the  Merrimac,  1862, 
102. 

Gumming,  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  of 
Stevenson's  division,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  238  notes  3,  5. 

Currituck,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Cm-tin,  A.  G.,  Governor  of  Pennsylva 
nia,  concurred  in  recommending  call 
for  300,000  men,  251. 

Curtis,  S.  R.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  class 
mate  of  Gen.  Humphreys  at  West 
Point,  75. 

Custer,  G.  A.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen. ,TJ.  S.  V., 
cat  Lee's  last  supply  line  and  cap 
tured  supply  trains,  April  8,  1865, 
94 ;  his  distinguished  cavalry  ser 
vice,  157. 

Cutting,  F.  B.,  his  advice  to  McClel- 
lan,  April,  1862,  111. 


INDEX 


283 


Dahlgren,  J.  A.,  Rear  Admiral, 
U.  S.  N.,  resisted  at  Charleston,  4. 

Dalton,  Ga.,  13(3;  Johnston's  position 
at,  1864,  135,  187;  distance  from 
Chattanooga,  ib.  ;  evacuated  by 
Johnston,  188 ;  the  integrity  of  or 
ganization  of  Sherman's  army  pre 
served  from,  to  Atlanta,  267  ;  the 
value  cavalry  might  have  been  to 
Sherman  after  leaving,  260. 

Dana,  C.  A.,  Assist.  Sec'y  of  War, 
1804-1866,  his  report  of  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  Sept.  20,  1863,  181; 
Stanton's  message  of  approbation  to 
Thomas,  through,  183  ;  his  report  of 
capture  of  Missionary  Ridge  cited, 
186-187. 

Davis,  G.  B.,  Major  U.  S.  A.,  in  charge 
of  publication  of  War  Records,  his 
letters  to  Col.  Livermore,  concerning 
the  "  Tactical  Study  of  the  Battle 
field  of  Chickamauga,"  243-244. 

Davis,  J.,  President,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
knowledge  of  military  affairs,  252- 
254  ;  superior  to  Lincoln's,  ib. ;  ed 
ucated  at  West  Point,  1824-1828, 
252 ;  U.  S.  Secretary  of  War,  1853- 
1857,  ib. ;  his  appointments,  1855, 
to  cavalry  regiments,  170  ;  his  rela 
tions  with  Humphreys,  78;  his  ac 
quaintance  with  the  personnel  of  the 
U.  S.  Army,  ib.  ;  did  not  approve 
of  scheme  to  capture  Alexandria 
and  Arlington,  1861,  5,  6 ;  pursuit 
of  Union  forces  after  Bull  Run,  not 
entertained  by,  7 ;  Petersburg  de 
nuded  of  troops,  April,  1864,  by,  10  ; 
called  troops  to  Richmond,  May  4, 
1864,  11;  his  order  to  delay  evac 
uation  of  Charleston,  19;  inter 
view  at  Greensboro',  N.  C.,  with 
Johnston,  ib. ;  unwillingness  to  give 
up  the  cause  as  lost,  19-20 ;  con 
sented  to  Johnston's  surrender.  20; 
his  administration  censured,  ib. ;  his 
interference  in  the  conduct  of  mili 
tary  affairs,  253  ;  influenced  by  per 
sonal  feelings  for  or  against  Confed 
erate  officers,  ib. ;  his  conduct  did 
not  improve,  ib.,  254 ;  his  relations 
with  Beauregard,  3. 

Davis,  J.  C.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  1st  division,  14th  Corps, 
in  right  wing  at  Stone's  River,  forced 
back  by  enemy,  Dec.  31,  218  ;  his 
position  at  Chickamauga,  Sept.  20, 
226 ;  his  attempt  to  close  gap  in 
Union  line,  227 ;  in  command  of  2d 
division,  14th  Corps,  under  Thomas 
at  Chattanooga,  237. 


Dawes,  E.  C.,  Col.  U.  S.  V.,  his  es 
timate  of  Confederate  strength  at 
Chickamauga  cited,  228  note  ;  the 
estimate  criticized,  ib. 

Daylight,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Dearing,  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
cavalry  at  Petersburg,  June,  1864, 
14. 

Decatur,  Tenn.,  193 ;  the  Union  army 
at  Atlanta  the  same  as  at,  267. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  John 
Dickinson  and  Charles  Humphreys 
opposed,  74. 

Deep  Bottom,  Va.,  Hancock's  expedi 
tion  to,  July,  1864,  63 ;  the  objects 
of  it,  ib. 

Delaware  Bay,  Humphreys  employed 
in  building  lighthouses  on,  76. 

Department  (Military)  of  Pennsylva 
nia  created,  April  27,  1861,  173 ; 
Patterson  placed  in  command,  ib. ; 
Thomas'  services  in,  173-174. 

Department  of  the  Cumberland,  com 
mand  given  Aug.  15,  1861,  to  An 
derson,  128,  1 74 ;  Sherman  assigned 
to,  128 ;  Thomas  assigned  to,  ib. ; 
Sherman  in  command  of,  Oct.  8, 
1861,  128  ;  succeeded  by  Buell,  ib. 

Department  of  the  Mississippi,  Halleck 
in  command  of,  March  11,  1862,  26, 
129  ;  Sherman  under  command  of 
Halleck  in,  128. 

Department  of  the  Susquehanna,  Couch 
assigned  to,  60. 

De  Trobriand,  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  division  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  April 
7,  93. 

Devens,  C.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  cited 
as  to  comforts  of  Army  of  Potomac, 
53. 

Dickinson,  John,  voted  against  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  74. 

Dinwiddie,  Court  House,  engagement 
of  March  31,  1865,  90. 

Division  of  the  Mississippi,  see  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

Donelson,  Fort,  see  Fort  Donelson. 

Drewry's  or  Drury's  Bluff,  the  James 
River  open  to,  May  12,  1862,  116  ; 
Union  position  at,  May,  1864,  11  ; 
Hoke's  division  sent  to  Petersburg 
from,  June  15,  14. 

Dry  Creek  Valley  Road,  followed  by 
Sheridan,  Sept.  20,  after  repulse  by 
Hood,  227. 

Dupont,  H.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  a 
graduate  of  West  Point,  75. 

Dupont,  S.  F.,  Rear  Admiral,  U.  S.  N., 
unsuccessful  attack  on  Fort  Sumter. 
April  7,  1863,  8. 


284 


INDEX 


Early,  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1861), 
defeated  by  Hancock  at  Williams- 
burg-,  5(5. 

Edward's  Ferry,  Potomac  River,  7. 

Eighteenth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  at  battle 
of  Cold  Harbor,  13  ;  sent  back  to 
Bermuda  Hundred,  14  ;  sent  against 
Petersburg,  ib.  ;  outer  works  carried 
by,  ib.  ;  before  Petersburg,  July, 
1804,  (53. 

Electric  telegraph,  its  value  in  time  of 
war,  269—270 ;  the  capabilities  of 
the  people  of  the  Northern  States  in 
the  utilization  of,  271. 

Eleventh  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  crushing  as 
sault  on,  at  Chancellorsville,  159 ; 
beaten,  July  1,  at  Gettysburg,  161. 

Emmittsburg,  Md.,  visited  by  Stuart 
in  Oct.,  1862,  raid,  158. 

Emory,  W.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
classmate  of  Gen.  Humphreys  at 
West  Point,  75 ;  Major,  1st  U.  S. 
Cavalry,  1855,  170. 

England,  the  Confederate  Govt.  short 
sighted  as  to  use  of  cotton  in,  248  ; 
its  people  not  military,  ib. 

Ewell,  R.  S.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
corps  captured  by  Sheridan,  April 
6,  1865,  92. 

Ewing,  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  4th  division,  15th  Corps, 
under  Sherman  at  Chattanooga,  287. 

Ezra  Church,  Ga.,  Thomas  in  battle  of, 
July  28,  1864,  190. 

Fairfax  Court  House,  Va.,  McDowell 
left  position  at,  July  16,  1861,  7. 

Fair  Oaks,  battle  of  May  31-June  1, 
1862,  Union  loss  at,  34  ;  not  fought 
as  intended  by  Johnston,  256  ;  Han 
cock  not  engaged,  57. 

Falling  Waters,  Va.,  engagement  July 
2,  1861,  Thomas'  participation  in, 
173  ;  Thomas  not  under  fire  at,  213  ; 
Confederates  repulsed  by  Abercrom- 
bie  at,  ib. 

Farmville,  Va.,  Lee's  hope  to  escape 
at,  92;  Longstreet  at,  April  6,  ib.  ; 

[/  Barlow  sent  to,  April  7,  93  ;  part  of 
the  Union  army  in  position  south  of, 

ib. 

Farmville  Heights,  Lee  compelled  by 
Humphreys  to  lose  time  at,  94. 

Farragut,  D*  G.,  Rear  Admiral,  U.  S.  N., 
Vicksburg  batteries  passed  by,  27— 
28. 

Fifth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  overwhelmed  at 
Games'  Mill,  124;  under  Porter, 
composed  of  Pennsylvania  troops, 
80 ;  Humphreys  in  command  of  3d 


division,  ib. ;  at  Petersburg,  June 
17,  1864,  15,  63 ;  its  unimproved 
opportunity  at,  16  ;  commanded  by 
Meade,  84  ;  3d  division  broken  up, 
ib.  ;  movement  on  Weldon  Railroad, 
90  ;  with  Sheridan  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
91,  92,  94. 

First  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  beaten,  July  1, 
at  Gettysburg,  161. 

Five  Forks,  Va.,  battle  of  April  1, 1865, 
the  victory  at,  no  greater  than 
Thomas'  at  Nashville,  192  ;  planned 
by  Sheridan,  204  ;  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  not  abandoned  by  Lee 
until  after,  149,  263. 

Flat  Creek,  Va.,  91. 

Fleetwood  or  Brandy  Station,  cavalry 
attack  at,  156-157,  159. 

Florence,  Ala.,  Hood's  movement  to, 
140;  in  position  at,  Nov.  1,  1864, 
ib.,  240. 

Florida,  Seminole  War,  51,  76,  167; 
Thomas  stationed  in,  168. 

Floyd,  J.  13.,  Brig.-Gen..  C.  S.  A.,  his 
share  in  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson, 
25. 

Foote,  A.  H.,  Commodore,  U.  S.  N. 
(1862),  his  co-operation  with  Grant 
in  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  129. 

Forrest,  N.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
operations  in  Sept.,  1864,  138 ;  in 
Oct.,  139  ;  Thomas  sent  to  Tennessee 
to  expel,  Sept.  29,  191  ;  defeated  at 
battle  of  Franklin,  194  ;  Humphreys 
not  surpassed  by,  95. 

Forsyth,  J.  W.,  Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  V.,  Chief  - 
of -Staff,  in  episode  at  Deep  Bottom, 
July  28,  1864,  64. 

Fort  Donelson,  on  Cumberland  River, 
Grant's  advance  from  Fort  Henry 
on,  Feb.  12,  1862. 231 ;  his  strength, 
250  ;  attack  of  U.  S.  fleet  repulsed, 
231  ;  sortie  of  Confederates  repulsed, 
ib.  ;  the  commander  and  part  of 
force  escaped  Feb.  15,  ib. ;  surren 
dered  by  Buckner,  Feb.  16,  7,  25, 
129,  177,  231,  250;  number  of  men 
surrendered,  ib.  ;  250  ;  in  its  capture 
the  new  fleet  of  U.  S.  gunboats  em 
ployed,  271  ;  the  evacuation  of  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  by  Confeder 
ates  the  result  of  its  capture,  ib.  ; 
fighting  at,  compared  with  Bull 
Run,  25  ;  an  overrated  victory,  ib.  ; 
compared  with  battle  of  Nashville, 
192. 

Fort  Henry,  Tenn.  River,  sixty  miles 
from  Cairo,  281 ;  Grant  started  for, 
Feb.,  1862,  ib.  ;  abandoned  by  Con- 


INDEX 


285 


federates  on  approach  of  U.  S.  fleet, 
7,  25,  129,  231. 

Fort  Independence,  Boston,  Mass., 
Thomas  stationed  at,  168. 

Fort  Johnson,  S.  C.,  9. 

Fort  Monroe,  Va.,  101 ;  transportation 
of  U.  S.  troops  to,  protected,  103  ; 
McClellan's  confidence  in,  as  a  base, 
105. 

Fort  Stedman,  Ya.,  Gordon's  attempt 
on,  March,  1805,  90;  repulsed  by 
Parke,  ib. 

Fort  Sumter,  S.  C;,  captured  1861,  by 
Beauregard,  3,  4,  5  ;  defence  of,  by 
Beauregard,  1861,  4;  in  1863,  8; 
might  have  been  taken,  1863,  9 ; 
not  taken  until  1865,  ib.  ;  55. 

Fort  Yuma,  Lower  California,  Thomas 
stationed  at,  1854,  170,  171. 

Fourth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  in  engagement 
of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  190. 

Fourteenth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  in  engage 
ment  of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July 
20,  1864,  190 ;  successful  assault  at 
Jonesboro',  189. 

Fox,  G.  V.,  Assist.  Sec'y  of  the  Navy, 
103. 

France,  the  use  of  railroads  to  the 
Prussians  in,  1870-1871,  272. 

Frankfort,  Ky.,  conspiracy  of  rebels  to 
seize  the  state  arms  at,  frustrated  by 
Thomas,  175. 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  Schofield's  with 
drawal  to,  142 ;  his  position  at,  the 
cause  of  risk  to  Thomas,  241  ;  battle 
of,  Nov.  30,  1864,  Thomas'  strength 
at,  142  ;  Hood  repulsed  at,  142, 143  ; 
Forrest  defeated  at,  by  Hatch  under 
Wilson,  194. 

Frederick,  Md.,  80. 

Frederick  the  Great,  Grant  in  compari 
son  with,  36. 

Fredericksburg,  Va.,  battle  of  Dec.  13, 
1862,  Humphreys'  charge  at,  82,  83, 
84  ;  Hancock  at,  54,  59  ;  Union  loss 
at,  34 ;  an  illustration  of  the  easier 
task  of  repelling  an  assault,  257 ; 
mentioned,  59,  122. 

Freeborn,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Gadsden,  Ala.,  Hood's  position  at,  Oct., 
1864,  138. 

Games'  Mill,  Va.,  battle  of  June  27, 
1862,  Hancock's  service  at,  57  ;  5th 
Corps  overwhelmed  at,  124. 

Gat-field,  J.  A.,  Brig. -Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Rosecrans'  Chief-of-Staff,  orders  to 
McCook  and  Sheridan,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  communicated  by,  224  ;  or 
ders  to  Thomas,  16.,  228  ;  his  report, 


Sept.  20,  1863,  of  Thomas  at  Chick- 
amauga,  181  ;  his  description  of 
Thomas,  200. 

Garnett,  R.  S.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
Beauregard's  plans,  1861,  6. 

Garrard,  I.,  Col.,  7th  Ohio  Vol.  cavalry, 
with  Thomas,  1864,  194. 

Gates,  T.  B.,  Col.,  80th  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  forces  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  July 
3,  1863,  50. 

Gaylesville,  Ala.,  Sherman's  army  con 
centrated  at,  138;  danger  to  Hood 
in  an  advance  on,  140. 

Georgia,  Sherman's  march  projected, 
140-141 ;  executed,  143-144 ;  his  pro 
jects  of  devastation  in,  146-150;  his 
right  to  subsistence  in,  147-148  ;  his 
estimate  of  damage  inflicted  by  him 
in,  149  ;  Wilson's  1864  raid  in,  260. 

Getty,  G.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  sup 
ported  by  Hancock,  May  5, 1864, 62 ; 
in  the  Wilderness  Battle  of  the  Left, 
May  6,  ib. 

Gettysburg,  Pa.,  visited  in  his  raid  of 
Oct.,  1862,  by  Stuart,  158  ;  battle  of, 
July  1-3,  1863  ;  Buferd's  service  at, 
July  3,  258-259;  Union  left  wing 
commanded  by  Hancock,  52  ;  54  ; 
battle  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  July  3, 
1863,  49-51 ;  Hancock  wounded,  50, 
61 ;  his  use  of  infantry  at,  53 ;  his 
services  at,  60-61 ;  Humphreys'  ser 
vices  at,  82,  83-86;  his  march  to, 
84 ;  his  position  at,  ib.  ;  his  manoeu 
vres  and  gallantry  at,  85 ;  a  great 
battle,  86 ;  Pickett's  charge,  182  ;  the 
battle  not  fought  as  intended  by 
Lee,  162 ;  257 ;  his  rash  assault,  162 ; 
Stuart's  service  at,  157,  159;  Union 
loss  at,  34  ;  condition  of  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at,  264 ;  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  unable  to  make  up  for  losses 
at,  265 ;  both  armies  at  their  best 
at,  266. 

Gettysburg  Campaign,  futility  of  Stu-» 
art's  raid  during,  160-162,  258,  261- 
262 ;  excellent  use  of  cavalry  made 
by  Meade  during,  ib. ;  Lee's  plans 
in,  160. 

Gibbon,  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at 
Cemetery  Ridge,  July  13,  1863,  50, 
60 ;  his  services  in  ending  the  war, 
67. 

Gillmore,  Q.  A.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
superseded  Hunter  in  command  of 
Dept.  of  the  South,  June  12,  1863, 
9;  resisted  at  Charleston,  1863,  4; 
foiled  by  Beauregard,  ib. ;  employed 
in  Virginia.  18(54,  10. 

Gist,  S.  It.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  strength 


286 


INDEX 


of  his  division  at  Chickamauga,  April 
20,  225. 

Glenn,  Mrs.,  Rosecrans'  headquarters 
at  her  house,  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
244. 

Gloucester,  Va.,  McClellan's  plans  for 
reduction  of,  101,  103,  110. 

Goldsborough,  L.  M.,  Rear  Admiral, 
U.  S.  N.,  in  command  of  U.  S.  fleet 
in  Hampton  Roads,  1802,  103,  104; 
responsible  for  the  neutralization  of 
the  Merrimac,  103  ;  his  provision  of 
gunboats  to  McClellan,  ib. ;  unable 
to  provide  vessels  to  attack  York- 
town,  ib.,  104,  105. 

Goldsborough,  N.  C.,  its  abandonment 
advocated,  18(55,  by  Beauregard,  18  ; 
Sherman's  brilliant  march  from  Sa 
vannah  to,  19,  268 ;  his  new  base  at, 
145 ;  re-enforced  by  Schofield  at, 
ib. 

Goode's  Bridge,  over  Appomattox 
River,  Va.,  one  of  the  roads  of  es 
cape  left  for  Lee  April  2,  1805,  91. 

Gordon,  C.  G.,  Maj.-Gen.,  British  army, 
at  Khartoum,  115. 

Gordon,  J.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
attempt  on  Fort  Steclman,  March  25, 
1805,  DO ;  repulsed  by  Parke,  ib. ; 
his  unsuccessful  engagement  April  0, 
1865,  at  Sailor's  Creek,  92 ;  crossed 
the  Appomattox  at  High  Bridge,  ib.  ; 
compared  with  Humphreys,  95. 

Gordon's  Mill,  Ga.,  Thomas'  position, 
Sept.  19,  1863,  on  road  to  Rossville 
from,  222. 

Gordonsville,  Va.,  59. 

Govan,  I).  C.,  Brig-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade  captured  at  Jonesboro',  189. 

Government  of  the  Confederacy,  see 
Confederate  Government. 

Government  of  the  U.  S.,  see  U.  S. 
Government. 

Governor's  Island,  N.  Y.,  Hancock's 
death  at,  Feb.  9,  1886,  66. 

Gracie,  A.,  jr.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade  at  Petersburg,  15. 

Granger,  G.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  in  reserve, 
223 ;  ordered  to  support  Thomas 
Sept.  20,  ib.  ;  his  position  on  Mission 
ary  Ridge,  ib. ;  hurried  from  Ross 
ville  to  join  Thomas  in  repelling 
Longstreet,  228  ;  strength  of  force 
brought  to  aid  Thomas,  ib. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  General,  U.  S.  A.,  the 
early  recognition  of  his  merits  due 
to  the  partiality  of  Washburne,  166 ; 
discussion  of  his  military  ability,  23- 
46;  his  affair  at  Belmont,  Nov.  7, 


1861,  24  ;  his  losses,  34  ;  the  battle 
wanting  in  glory,  24,  230 ;  the  rea 
sons  why,  ib. ;  the  important  results 
of,  ib.  ;  started  Feb.  2,  18(52,  from 
Cairo  for  Fort  Henry,  231  ;  B'ort 
Henry  abandoned,  25,  129,  231  ; 
Fort  Donelson  invested,  Feb.  12,  ib. ; 
attack  by  U.  S.  fleet  repulsed,  ib. ; 
sortie  of  enemy  repulsed,  ib. ;  the 
fort  surrendered,  Feb.  16, 25, 129, 178, 
231  ;  the  number  of  men  captured, 
231 ;  the  strength  of,  ib. ;  an  over 
rated  victory,  25;  important  results 
of,  271  ;  under  a  cloud,  March  4-15, 
1862,27;  censured  by  Halleck,  ib. ; 
his  position,  March  10,  1862,  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  well  chosen,  26,  129; 
his  headquarters  at  Savannah,  ib. ; 
Buell  ordered  to  join  him,  2(5 ;  John 
ston  knew  that  Buell  was  on  the  way 
to  join,  232  ;  and  that  the  capture  of 
Corinth  was  the  purpose  of,  ib. ;  plan 
of  Confederates  to  attack  before 
Buell's  arrival,  8,  2(5,  129  ;  the  bat 
tle  delayed  until  Buell  was  within 
ten  miles  of,  232  ;  his  strength,  April 
5,  231  ;  the  Confederate  strength, 
ib. ;  at  Savannah  when  the  battle 
began,  20 ;  cause  of  his  absence  from 
Pittsburg  Landing,  April  6,  233  ;  con 
ference  with  Buell,  April  5,  ib. ;  his 
apprehensions  of  attack  at  Crump's 
Landing,  ib.  ;  attacked  by  Johnston, 
April  6,  4,  2(5,  130,  231,  250 ;  the  at 
tack  a  surprise,  4,  26,  130,  250 ;  his 
statement  that  the  army  was  not  sur 
prised  distrusted,  2(5,  130,  132 ;  the 
charg'e  of  surprise  refuted  by  Hal 
leck,  233 ;  the  charge  disproved  by 
the  Record,  231-233 ;  his  despatch 
to  Halleck  of  April  5, 1862, 130,  232  ; 
and  Sherman's  despatch  to,  contain 
the  data  for  proposition  that  the 
Union  army  was  surprised  April  (5, 
ib.  ;  his  stubborn  resistance,  130 ; 
forced  back  to  Tennessee  River,  26, 
231;  defeated,  April  6,  44;  re-en 
forced,  he  defeated  Beauregard, 
April  7,  230,  250 ;  his  success,  April 
7,  caused  by  Beauregard's  short 
comings,  26,  27  ;  his  losses,  34,  231 ; 
Confederate  losses,  230  ;  made  sec 
ond  in  command  to  Halleck,  April 
30,  27,  216;  command  of  apart  of 
the  Army  of  Tennessee  given  to 
Thomas,  178  ;  his  position  anoma 
lous  and  distastefiil,  216  ;  Halleck's 
slights  brooded  over,  1 78  ;  his  po 
sition  improved  by  Halleck's  pro 
motion,  27  ;  his  command  July-Oct., 


INDEX 


287 


1802,  233;  his  object  to  open  the 
Mississippi,  27  ;  the  battle  of  luka 
fought,  Sept.  19-20,  1862,  27,  28, 

233  ;  his  loss  at,  34  ;  not  to  his  credit, 
27 ;  the  battle  of  Corinth,  Oct.  3-4, 
1862,  27,  233 ;  his  conduct  of,  criti 
cized,  27  ;  his  1802  campaign  against 
Vicksburg  unsuccessful,  233  ;  his  re 
verse  at  Holly  Springs,  Dec.  20,  1862, 
29-30  ;  his  Vicksburg  campaign,  No 
vember,  1862-July,  1863, 27-32, 233 ; 
his  plans  affected  by  report  of  pro 
ject  to  give  command  to  McClernand, 
28,   29,   30;   capture   of   Vicksburg 
suggested,  28  ;  his  overland  scheme, 
28-29 ;  his  plans  criticized,  28 ;  no 
hope   of   subsistence  from   country, 
29 ;    his    plans    indefinite,   31 ;    his 
strength,  234  ;  his  advance  on,  233  ; 
urged  by  Halleck  to  join  Banks,  ib. ; 
passed  Vicksburg  April  12, 1863,  ib.  ; 
captured   Port  Gibson,  May  1,  ib. ; 
Johnston   defeated   by,  May  14,  at 
Jackson,   234 ;    Pemberton    surren 
dered   Vicksburg    to,   July    4,    ib. ; 
number   of    men    surrendered,    ib. ; 
strength   of   Confederates,   ib. ;    his 
success  at  Vicksburg  aided  by  his 
opponent's  incapacity,  32  ;  the  great 
success  of  the  war,  ib. ;  his  superior 
strategy,  131 ;  unheard  of  theretofore 
in  the  civil  war,  234 ;  worthy  of  the 
great   commanders   of   history,  ib. ; 
given  command  of  Military  Division 
of  the  Mississippi,  Oct.  16,  1863,  183, 
230,  234 ;  his  promotion  the  reward 
for  Vicksburg,  132  ;  comment  on  his 
appointment  instead  of  Thomas,  234 ; 
assumed  command,  Oct.  18,  ib. ;  ar 
rived  at  Chattanooga,  Oct.  23,  183, 
234 ;  his  operations  at  Chattanooga, 
Oct.   23-Nov.    25,    32-34,   131-133, 
184-187,  234-238 ;   would  not  wait 
for  attack  by  Bragg,  32-33 ;  issued 
orders  for  attack,  Nov.  18,  ib.,  184, 

234  ;  the  execution  of  his  order  de 
layed,  184,  185  ;  his  plan  of  attack, 
234-236 ;    his   plan   admirable    and 
skillful,  184  ;  his  orders  to  Thomas, 
234-235  ;  his  orders  to  Sherman,  235  ; 
his  purpose  to  give  Sherman  the  duty 
of  main  attack,  184,  185 ;  the  asser 
tion  that  he  intended  to  give  Sher 
man   the    chief    part   in   the    battle 
questioned,   236 ;   his  intention  that 
Thomas  and  Sherman  should  co-oper 
ate,    235—236 ;    Thomas    ordered    to 
carry  rifle-pits  at  foot  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  236 ;  his  dispositions  at  the 
Ridge,  185 ;  the  assault  on  the  Ridge 


not  intended  by  him,  33,  185,  187, 
236 ;  the  assertion  that  he  did  not  in 
tend  to  carry  the  Ridge  by  Thomas' 
attack  questioned,  236  ;  evidence  that 
Thomas  was  expected  to  carry  the 
Ridge,  237  ;  the  troops  engaged  in 
assault,  not  of  Thomas'  corps,  and 
but  five  weeks  under  his  command, 
ib.  ;  the  statement  that  the  battle  of 
Chattanooga  was  fought  according 
to  plan,  distrusted,  133, 184-185  ;  sus 
tained,  236-237  ;  the  battle  displayed 
no  remarkable  trait  in  him,  33  ;  his 
opponent  not  obstinate,  34;  his  losses, 
ib. ;  made  General  in-Chief ,  March 
3,  1864,  10,  187,  238 ;  his  plans,  10 ; 
Beauregard's  plan  for  defeat  of,  12 ; 
Butler  "bottled  up"  at  Bermuda 
Hundred,  ib. ;  desired  W.  F.  Smith 
for  command  of  Army  of  the  James, 
1864,  255;  his  orders  of  April  9, 
1864,  to  Meade  to  make  Lee's  army 
his  objective,  134  ;  the  correctness 
of  his  policy,  ib.  ;  his  advance  with 
Army  of  the  Potomac  into  Virginia, 
133  ;  his  strength,  40  ;  attacked  by 
Lee  in  the  Wilderness,  35  ;  his  flank 
movement  to  Spottsylvania  antici 
pated  by  chance,  36  ;  his  position  at 
Spottsylvania,  May,  1864,  12;  his 
mistaken  attack  on  the  Salient,  37  ; 
stalemated  on  the  North  Anna,  39  ; 
blocked  at  Cold  Harbor,  ib. ;  battle 
of  Cold  Harbor,  13,  14  ;  his  mistake 
at  Cold  Harbor,  42  ;  his  plan  against 
Petersburg,  13 ;  his  able  transfer  to 
the  James,  13,  42,  43  ;  deceived  Lee, 
14,  16,  17 ;  indefiniteness  of  his 
orders  as  to  Petersburg,  38,  39,  43, 
88  ;  his  chances  at  Petersburg,  43- 
44  f  his  scheme  to  draw  Lee's  army 
from  Petersburg,  63-65,  his  failure 
to  make  an  impression  on  Lee,  in 

1864,  37,  38,  40,  41 ;  the  character 
of  the   campaign,   61-62 ;  paid   no 
heed  to  James  River  route,  39 ;  his 
determination    to    defeat    Lee    on 
northern  route,  ib.  ;  his  plans  not  de 
fined,    ib. ;   did  not  compel   Lee  to 
leave  his  entrenchments,  40 ;  inscru 
table  as  to  his  intentions  for  Sheri 
dan,  March,  1865,  260  ;  sent  Sheri 
dan.  March  29,  1865,  to  Dinwiddie 
C.  H.,  90;    at  Farmville,  April   7, 

1865,  94  ;  his  first  letter  to  Lee,  de 
livered  from  Humphreys'  front,  ib.  ; 
the  conditions  for  capture  of  Hood 
at  Nashville  unlike  those  for  capture 
of  Lee,  192  ;  his  attitude  to  Army  of 
the  Potomac  and  Meade  criticized, 


288 


INDEX 


87-88  ;  the  difficulties  involved  in  a 
double  command,  ib. ;  his  consider 
ate  treatment  of  Meade,  88 ;  his 
gradual  assumption  of  control,  89  ; 
his  system  of  attrition  criticized, 
135  ;  his  waste  of  his  army  in  1804, 
267  ;  his  losses  in  five  weeks,  40  ;  his 
losses  in  first  ten  weeks,  1804,  38  ; 
the  improvement  in  conduct  of  mili 
tary  affairs,  1804-1805,  under,  255  ; 
his  management  criticized,  255-250  ; 
a  hero  in  no  great  military  operation, 

44  ;  not  possessed  of  true  military  in 
stinct,  30 ;  causes  of  his  success,  45  ; 
disregard  of  difficulties,  24,  31 ;  pref 
erence  for  a  difficult  plan,  ib.  ;  his 
custom  to  divide  his  forces,  27,  28,  38 ; 
his  neglect  of  details  in  battles,  257  ; 
his  experiments  at  Vicksburg,  31  ; 
a  brilliant  strategist,  257  ;  his  pref 
erence  for  hard  blows  to  maneuver 
ing,  34-35,  39,  40,  135  ;  would  not 
employ  strategy,  37  ;  his  discovery 
of  the  error,  35  ;   compelled  to  ma 
noeuvre,  38  ;  his  mistaken  use  of  cav 
alry,  259  ;  Sheridan's  successful  use 
of  cavalry  in  1805,  not  due  to,  ib.  ; 
his   plans   for  Sheridan  not  practi 
cable,  ib. ;  a  great  man,  44,  45 ;  an 
unselfish  patriot,   27,  45  ;  his  great 
services,  23 ;    admiration   due    him, 

45  ;  his  restless  disposition,  24  ;  never 
absent  from  post  of  danger,  20  ;  his 
courage,  31  ;  his  tenacity  of  purpose, 
24  ;   his  staying  power,  37  ;   a   hero 
of   Army    of    the    Tennessee,    129 ; 
loyalty  of   his  brother  officers  and 
soldiers,  44 ;    Lincoln's  support   of, 
254  ;   possessed  of  the  confidence  of 
the  nation,  42,  43  ;  Badeau's  over 
estimates  an  injustice  to,  35,  30,  37, 
42  ;  his  failures  attributed  by  Badeau 
to  his  lieutenants,  35  ;  his  position 
in  comparison  with  g'reat  generals  of 
history,  3(5,41,  4(5 ;  his  successes  due 
to  incapacicy  of  opponents  like  some 
of  Napoleon's,  32  ;  Humphreys  com 
pared  with,  95  ;  his  underestimate  of 
Lee,  34,  37  ;  his  tacit  acknowledg 
ment  of  Lee's  superiority,    43  ;  his 
relations  with  Sherman  :    the  com 
mand    of    the    Department    of    the 
Mississippi  given  to  Sherman,  133  ; 
the   choice   of   Sherman   instead   of 
Thomas,  238  ;  the  question  discussed, 
239 ;    Sherman   fought   at   Corinth, 
May    28,    1802,  in  the  presence   of, 
239  ;  his  confidence  in  Sherman,  131  ; 
Sherman's    unvarying     support    of 
Grant,  239 ;  the  favorite  officer  of, 


133 ;  his  partiality  for,  151 ;  hia 
orders  to  Sherman  of  April  4,  1804, 
to  make  Johnston's  army  his  objec 
tive,  133-134  ;  his  anxieties  because 
of  Hood,  152 ;  the  destruction  of 
Hood,  Sherman's  first  duty,  141 ; 
Sherman's  disregard  of  orders  to 
destroy  Hood,  151  ;  Sherman's  propo 
sitions  to,  Sept.,  1804, 137,  138,  141 ; 
his  unwillingness  to  accede  to  the 
u  March  through  Georgia "  plan, 
141  ;  permission  for  march  given, 
Nov.  2,  18(54, 142,  143  ;  the  strength 
ening  of  Thomas'  army  a  condition 
of  his  consent,  142  ;  data  as  to  the 
forces  taken  to  Georgia  and  left 
with  Thomas,  240 ;  his  admiration 
of  Sherman's  march,  151  ;  Sher 
man's  proposition  to  devastate  Geor 
gia,  in  letter  of  Oct.  9, 18(54,  to,  140  ; 
as  to  South  Carolina,  in  letter  of 
Dec.  18,  14(5 ;  his  campaign  in  Vir 
ginia  not  affected  by  Sherman's  de 
vastation  of  South  Carolina,  149 ; 
Sherman's  purpose  to  join  him  in  Va., 
18(55,  18 ;  Sherman  compared  to, 
1 50 ;  his  relations  with  Thomas  : 
claims  made  to  the  disparagement 
of,  examined,  211-244;  resented 
Halleck's  giving1  command  of  right 
wing  of  army  to  Thomas,  178;  cause 
of  his  misunderstanding  with  Thom 
as,  ib.  ;  Thomas  made  the  victim  of 
his  grudge  against  Halleck,  ib. ;  that 
the  giving  of  command  of  right  wing 
to  Thomas  was  thought  a  slight  by, 
questioned,  215-21(5  ;  that  Thomas 
was  made  to  suffer  in  consequence, 
doubted,  ib. ;  his  prejudice  against 
Thomas,'  183  ;  evidence  of  an  absence 
of  prejudice,  21(5 ;  Thomas  held  to  all 
the  responsibilities  at  Chattanooga 
by,  183  ;  appointed  to  command  of 
Mississippi  Department  instead  of 
Thomas,  230 ;  Ids  opinion  that  liose- 
crans  should  be  relieved,  182-183 ; 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  given  by  him  to 
Thomas,  230 ;  his  statement  that 
the  rebel  lines  in  Thomas'  front 
were  weakened  Nov.  25,  disproved, 
ISO  ;  Sherman  preferred  before 
Thomas  to  succeed  him  in  com 
mand  of  Mississippi  Dept.,  187  ; 
advantage  which  he  would  have 
gained  had  he  taken  Thomas  in 
stead  of  Sherman  into  favor,  178  ; 
Thomas'  plan  of  Feb.  28,  for  a  move 
ment  to  Atlanta  submitted  to,  187  ; 
Thomas'  refusal  of  promotion  offered 


INDEX 


289 


by  Johnson  to  degrade,  202-203; 
his  estimate  of  Thomas  criticized, 
206  ;  his  praise  of  Thomas  insuffi 
cient,  151-152,  207 ;  Thomas'  repu 
tation  obscured  by,  207  ;  comparison 
of  his  services  with  Thomas',  192, 
203  ;  the  losses  of  Thomas  compared 
with  those  of,  192  ;  his  capture  of 
Lee,  contrasted  with  Thomas'  fail 
ure  to  cut  off  Hood's  retreat  after 
NashvilJe,  192-194. 

Greene,  N.,  Maj.-Gen.,  battle  of  Guil- 
ford  C.  H.,  1781,  18,  134,  145. 

Greensborough,  N.  C.,  conference  of 
Confederate  government  and  mili 
tary  commanders  at,  19  ;  Confeder 
ate  army  surrendered  at,  4,  20. 

Gregg,  D.'M.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  opinion  of  Hancock  as  a  cavalry 
commander,  53-54 ;  movement  of 
his  cavalry,  Feb.,  1865,  90 ;  his  dis 
tinguished  cavalry  service,  157. 

Grenada,  Miss.,  suitable  as  a  de*pot  in 
an  advance  on  Vicksburg,  28. 

Gulf  of  Mexico,  a  reasonably  effec 
tive  blockade  maintained  by  the 
U.  S.  during  civil  war,  in,  271 ;  con 
sidered  in  Sherman's  plans,  Sept., 
1SG4,  137. 

Guilford  Court  House.  N.  C.,  battle  of 
March  15,  1781,  18. 

Hall,  N.  J.,  Col.,  U.  S  V.,  in  command 
of  3d  brigade,  2d  division  2d  Corps, 
at  Cemetery  Ridge,  July  3,  1863, 
51. 

Halleck,  H.  W.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  command  of  Department  of  the 
Mississippi,  March  11-Julyll,  1862, 
128 ;  Sherman  transferred  to  his 
command,  ib. ;  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson  captured  by  his  forces  un 
der  Grant,  129 ;  accused  Grant  of 
disobedience,  27 ;  Buell  ordered  to 
Pittsburg  Landing  by,  129 ;  Grant's 
despatch  of  April  5,  1862,  to,  130, 
232 ;  refuted  charge  that  the  army 
was  surprised  at  Shiloh,  233  ;  the 
reorganization  of  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  by,  178,  215  ;  recommended 
Thomas  for  rank  of  Maj.-Gen.,  215  ; 
Thomas  given  command  of  right 
wing  of  his  army  by,  178,  215  ;  Grant 
made  second  in  command,  216  ; 
Thomas  made  by  Grant  to  suffer  for 
faults  of,  178  ;  Grant's  resentment 
questioned,  215 ;  Corinth  occupied 
by,  May  30,  1862,  8  ;  an  abandoned 
city  when  captured,  189 ;  Thomas 
relieved  of  command  of  right  wing, 


by,  216 ;  appointed,  July  11,  1862, 
General-in-Chief,  27,  233  ;  Grant 
urged  by,  to  join  Banks,  ib. ;  in 
formed  by  Thomas  of  success  at 
Brown's  Ferry,  183 ;  his  orders  dis 
regarded  by  McClellan,  120  ;  Hum 
phreys  reprimanded  by,  80  ;  repri 
mand  resented  and  answered,  80-81 ; 
no  reparation  made,  81 ;  his  alarm 
because  of  Stuart's  raid,  June-July, 

1863,  261 ;    his   orders   to   capture 
Stuart  not  obeyed,  ib.  ;  Meade's  let 
ter  to,  concerning  the  raid,  161,  261- 
262 ;    his  respect  for  Sherman  in 
creased,  131 ;  Sherman's  correspon 
dence  with,  Sept.,  1864,   137 ;  Sher 
man's  proposition  to   punish  South 
Carolina    announced    to,    Dec.    24, 

1864,  147. 

Hamilton,  C.  S.,  appointed  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  May  17,  1861,  174. 

Hampton  Roads,  Goldsborough  in 
command  of  U.  S.  fleet  in,  1862, 102, 
103. 

Hancock,  W.  S.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1840-1844, 
51  ;  in  war  with  Mexico,  51 ;  his 
Western  service,  ib. ;  in  Seminole 
War,  ib.  ;  in  border  wars  in  Kansas, 
ib. ;  in  Utah  expedition,  ib. ;  cap 
tain,  1861,  stationed  at  Los  Angeles, 
California,  51,  66 ;  transferred  at  his 
own  request  from  California  to  ser 
vice  in  the  East,  1861,  55  ;  appointed 
Sept.  23,  Brig.-Gen.  of  Volunteers, 
ib. ;  his  regard  for  Volunteers,  56- 
57  ;  McClellan's  epithet  for,  56  ; 
Volunteer  officers  on  his  staff,  57  ; 
his  service  at  Williamsburg,  53,  56  ; 
not  engaged  at  Fair  Oaks,  57 ;  his 
service  at  Gaines'  Mill,  ib.  ;  repulse 
of  enemy  in  retreat  to  the  James,  ib. ; 
promoted  at  Antietam  to  command 
division,  58  ;  his  ready  assumption 
of  duty,  ib. ;  at  Fredericksburg,  in 
assault  on  Marye's  Heights,  Dec.  13, 
1862,  59;  at  Chancellorsville,  May 
3,  1863,  ib.;  succeeded  Couch  to 
command  of  2d  Corps,  June  11,  1863, 
52,  59—60 ;  responsibilities  commit 
ted  to,  by  Meade  at  Gettysburg,  60  ; 
his  appearance  at  Cemetery  Ridge, 
July  13,  1863,  50 ;  wounded,  50,  61  ; 
effect  of  his  wound,  61,  63,  66  ;  cli 
max  of  his  military  career,  60  ;  his 
services  at  Gettysburg,  ib. ;  char 
acter  of  1864  campaign  unsuited  to 
display  of  his  abilities,  61 ;  his  services 
in  the  Wilderness,  62  ;  the  unsuc 
cessful  charge  at  Cold  Harbor,  ib. ; 


290 


INDEX 


the  capture  of  the  Salient,  ib.,  63; 
crossed  James  River,  June  14,  18G4, 
14  ;  before  Petersburg1,  June  15,  ib.  ; 
not  advised  of  Grant's  purpose  to 
capture  Petersburg1,  43,  88  ;  his  ser 
vices  at  Petersburg  terminated  by 
outbreak  of  wound,  63  ;  his  expedi 
tion  to  Deep  Bottom,  July,  1864,  63- 
64 ;  an  incident  in  the  expedition, 
64  ;  his  vigilance,  65  ;  the  disaster 
at  Ream's  Station,  66 ;  its  effect  on 
him,  ib. ;  the  expedition  to  Boydton 
Road,  his  last  service  in  the  field, 
66  ;  relinquished  his  command,  Nov. 
26,  1864,  66,  89 ;  succeeded  in  com 
mand  of  2d  Corps  by  Humphreys, 
89 ;  charg'ed  with  creation  of  a  corps 
of  veterans,  Nov.  27,  1864-Feb.  27, 
1865,  ib. ;  his  high  character,  51; 
his  training,  52  ;  as  a  commander 
of  infantry,  53  ;  his  military  quali 
fications,  53-55  ;  his  tactical  skill, 
59 ;  his  influence  over  his  men,  ib. ; 
his  consideration  for  meritorious 
services,  67  j  his  encouragement  of 
young  officers,  ib. ;  his  faithfulness 
in  execution  of  his  trusts,  66  ;  his 
credit  with  A.  P.  Hill,  67  ;  Badeau's 
opinion,  of,  35 ;  did  not  surpass 
Humphreys  in  courage  and  profes 
sional  skill,  95 ;  his  death,  Feb.  9, 
1886,  66. 

Hannibal,  his  cavalry  system  like  Na 
poleon's,  156. 

Hardee,  W.  J.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Major,  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry,  1855,  170 ; 
joined  the  Confederate  army,  171  ; 
in  command  of  Confederate  advance 
at  Shiloh,  his  statement  that  hostil 
ities  began  by  Union  attack,  April 
6,  232  ;  Sherman's  threat  to,  in 
demanding  surrender  of  Savannah, 
146  ;  his  delay  in  evacuating  Charles 
ton,  19. 

Harney,  W.  S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
51. 

Harper's  Ferry,  Va.,  Jackson's  move 
ment  to  Antietam  from,  124  ;  Mc- 
Clellan's  position  near,  after  Antie 
tam,  120. 

Harpeth  River,  Tenn.,  Schofield's  re 
treat  to,  Nov.,  1864,  143. 

Harrison's  Landing,  Va.,  112;  McClel- 
lan  forced  to,  by  Lee  and  Jackson, 
250;  McClellan's  letter  to  Lincoln 
from,  114. 

Barker,  C.  G.,  Col.  65th  Ohio  Infantry, 
in  command  of  3d  brigade,  1st  divi 
sion,  left  wing,  at  Stone's  River,  or 
dered  to  re-enforce  right  wing,  218. 


Harrow,  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
at  Cemetery  Ridge,  July  3,  1863, 
51. 

Hatch,    E.,    Brig.-Gen.,   U.  S.   A.,    in 

command  of  5th  division,  his  services 

in  retarding  Hood's  advance,  and  at 

battle  of  Franklin,  194. 

Hatcher's   Run,   Va.,  battle   at,   Feb. 

5-7,  1865,  90. 
Haverford,  Pa.,  the  home  of  General 

Humphreys'  family,  74. 
Hay,  J.,  and  J.  G.  Nicolay,  Humphreys 
given  credit  by,  for  service  at  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  80. 

Hays,  A.,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  V.,  at  Cem 
etery  Ridge,  July  3,  1863,  50,  60. 
Haynes  Bluff",  Miss.,  Sherman's  unsuc 
cessful  attack  on,  239. 
Henderson,  A.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen., U.S.A., 
Thomas  at  Monterey,  complimented 
by,  168. 

Henry,  Fort,  see  Fort  Henry. 
Hicksford,  Va.,    Lee's   de"pot  of  sup 
plies,    1865,     90  ;     communications 
with,  cut,  ib. 

High  Bridge  across  Appomattox, 
crossed  by  Gordon,  April  6,  1865, 
in  attempt  to  escape,  92  ;  saved  from 
destruction  by  Barlow,  April  7,  ib.  ; 
crossed  by  Lee's  pursuers,  ib. 
Hill,  A.  P.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  Jackson's  corps  May 
2,  1863,  at  Chancellorsville,  159 ; 
wounded  there,  ib. ;  repulsed  by 
Getty  and  Hancock,  May  5,  1864,  in 
the  Wilderness,  62  ;  in  the  battle  of 
May  6,  ib. 

Hill,  D.  H.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  de 
feated  at  Williamsburg  by  Hancock, 
56  ;  on  right  flank  of  Bragg's  army 
Sept.  18,  at  Chickamauga,  221  ;  his 
strength  and  loss  at  Chickamauga, 
Sept.  19,  225  ;  under  Polk  in  attack 
on  Thomas,  May  20,  ib. ;  his  state 
ment  that  the  attack  failed  cited, 
226. 

Hindman,  T.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
at  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  238 
note  4. 

Hoke,  R.  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
division  sent  from  Petersburg  to 
Cold  Harbor,  June,  1864,  13  ;  sent 
back,  June  15,  14. 

Holly  Springs,  Miss.,  Grant's  commu 
nications  cut  at,  29,  30. 
Hood,  J.  B.,  General,  C.  S.  A.,  cadet 
at  West  Point,  1849-1853,  under 
Thomas'  instruction,  169;  at  bat 
tle  of  Chickamauga,  182  ;  under 
command  of  Long-street  Sept.  20, 


INDEX 


291 


220;  his  advance  to  attack  Union 
rig-lit  wing-,  ib. ;  availed  of  the  gap 
in  Union  line,  attacked  rear  of 
Wood's  column,  227  ;  Union  forces 
carried  away  by,  ib. ;  Sheridan  at 
tacked  and  forced  back  by,  ib. ; 
Col.  Dawes'  estimate  of  his  strength 
cited  and  criticized,  228  note  ;  re 
pulsed  by  Thomas  at  Peach  Tree 
Creek,  190;  his  attack  on  McPhe,-- 
son,  ib. ;  his  army  unconquered,  At 
lanta  of  little  value  to  Sherman, 
138 ;  superseded  Johnston  in  com 
mand  of  Confederate  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  June  18,  1804,  130  ; 
would  not  be  drawn  into  a  general 
battle  by  Sherman,  130  ;  Sherman 
could  not  follow  him,  ib. ,  140;  his 
own  problems,  140 ;  his  movement, 
Oct.,  1804,  138 ;  the  attack  at  Alla- 
toona  Pass,  ib. ;  retired  to  Gadsden, 
Ala.,  ib. ;  evaded  battle  with  Sher 
man,  ib.j  139  ;  Sherman's  failure  to 
destroy  him,  134,  140-141 ;  his  de 
struction  a  requisite  with  Grant,  141 ; 
Sherman's  plan  to  commit  his  de 
struction  to  Thomas,  141-142  ;  under 
Beauregard's  command,  18  ;  his 
strength,  Nov.,  1804,  240, 240  note  5  ; 
his  movement  to  Florence,  140,  240  ; 
his  conference  with  Beauregard,  ib. ; 
Sherman  unable  to  conjecture  if  he 
would  be  followed  to  Georgia  by, 
ib. ;  information  of,  desired  by  Sher 
man  before  starting  on  his  march, 
241 ;  possible  consequences  had  he 
been  followed  by,  242  ;  his  problem 
in  an  invasion  of  Kentucky,  ib.  ;  his 
possible  chances  on  the  withdrawal 
of  Sherman  into  Georgia,  144 ;  his 
advance  into  Tenn.  retarded  by 
Hatch,  194 ;  his  defeat  at  Franklin, 
Nov.  30,  1804,  142,  143 ;  his  defeat 
at  Nashville,  Dec.  15,  143-144,  191- 
195  ;  242  ;  his  fighting  spirited,  192  ; 
annihilated  by  Thomas,  207  ;  his  re 
sistance  to  Thomas  as  great  as  Lee's 
to  Grant,  194  ;  not  cut  off  in  retreat 
by  Thomas,  192-193  ;  pursuit  of, 
impeded,  193 ;  Steedman  prevented 
from  intercepting,  ib. ;  his  escape, 
ib.,  195 ;  the  conditions  for  his  cap 
ture  unlike  those  for  capture  of  Lee, 
192-193  ;  Thomas'  resistance  to,  and 
victory  over,  an  evidence  of  the 
merit  of  an  American  army,  208  ; 
the  destruction  of  his  army  involved 
the  fall  of  the  Gulf  States,  141 ;  con 
sequences  conjectured,  if  Sherman 
had  continued  his  opponent,  151 ;  the 


political  character  of  Sherman's  let 
ters  to,  150. 

Hooker,  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Army  of  the  Potomac  improved  by, 
122  ;  the  first  Union  general  to  value 
cavalry,  258 ;  his  improvement  of 
the  cavalry,  100,  258  ;  his  uses  of 
cavalry  in  Chancellorsville  campaign 
a  misfortune,  258  ;  his  plan  at  Chan 
cellorsville  disapproved  by  Hum 
phreys,  84 ;  his  gross  mismanage 
ment  at  Chancellorsville,  159 ;  his 
position  in  advance  to  Gettysburg 
not  reported  to  Lee  by  Stuart,  100  ; 
his  affair  in  Lookout  Valley,  1803, 
183 ;  at  battle  of  Chattanooga,  132  ; 
his  demonstration  to  divert  enemy 
while  Sherman  crossed  the  Tennes 
see,  Nov.  24,  235  ;  Bragg's  left  on 
Lookout  Mountain,  turned  by,  33, 
235 ;  his  loss,  33  ;  his  movement 
Nov.  25,  230  ;  intended  by  Grant  to 
cut  off  Bragg's  retreat,  185. 

Howard,  0.  O.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1850-1854, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  170  ; 
commander  of  llth  Corps,  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  joined  Sherman 
during  battle  of  Chattanooga,  237. 

Huguenots,  Gen.  Thomas'  mother  of  a 
family  of,  107  ;  their  loyalty  to  their 
faith,  ib. 

Humphreys,  A.  A.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
his  ancestors  and  family,  74—75 ; 
born,  1810,  75  ;  died,  1883,  ib. ;  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1827-1831,  ib. ; 
his  classmates,  ib.  ;  his  service  after 
graduation,  70 ;  in  Seminole  War, 
ib.  ;  resigned  army  commission,  1830, 
ib. ;  employed  in  building  light 
houses,  ib.  ;  entered  Corps  of  Topog. 
Engineers,  1838,  ib. ;  service  in  Bu 
reau,  ib. ,  77  ;  bridge  built  by,  70- 

77  ;  in  Coast  Survey  office,  77 ;  at 
tained   rank  of   Captain,  1848,  ib. ; 
survey  of  Mississippi  Delta,  ib. ;  loss 
of  health  and  visit  to  Europe,  ib.  ; 
survey  of  railroad  route  to  the  Pacific, 
ib.  ;  member  of  Lighthouse  Board, 

78  ;  member  of   commission  to  ex 
amine  West  Point  Academy,  ib. ;  his 
relations  with  Jeff.  Davis,   ib. ;  his 
loyalty,   ib. ;  assigned  to  duty  with 
McClellan,  18(51,  79  ;  his  rapid  pro 
motion  to  rank  of  Brig.-Gen.  of  Vol 
unteers,  79  ;  Chief  Topog.  Engineers, 
Peninsular  Campaign,   ib.  ;  selected 
position   on   Malvern   Hill,   ib.,  80  ; 
mentioned  in  McClellan's  report,  79 , 
given  command  of  3d  division,  5th 


292 


INDEX 


Corps,  Sept,  12,  1802,  80  ;  his  march 
to  Antietam,  80,  81  ;  censured  by 
Halleck,  ib. ;  censure  resented  by 
him,  ib.  ;  demand  for  court  of  in 
quiry,  81  ;  McClellan's  misstatement 
of  his  time  of  arrival,  ib.  ;  his  service 
at  Antietam,  ib. ;  his  services  at 
Fredericksburg,  82,  83  ;  his  charge, 
82  ;  his  assault  of  Marye's  Heights, 
82  ;  the  most  conspicuous  figure  of 
that  day,  ib.  ;  recommended  for  pro 
motion  by  Burnside,  ib.  ;  his  services 
at  Chancellorsville,  82,  83  ;  his  affair 
at  Chancellor  House,  ib. ;  disap 
proved  of  Hooker's  conduct  of  battle, 
84 ;  his  division  in  5th  Corps  broken 
up,  ib. ;  given  command  of  2d  di 
vision,  3d  Corps,  ib. ;  his  march  to 
Gettysburg,  84  ;  his  position  there, 
ib.  ;  not  consulted  as  to  positions, 
ib.  ;  his  statement  of  severity  of  fire, 
ib.  ;  his  manoeuvres,  85  ;  his  bravery 
and  equanimity  in  the  battle,  ib.  ;  his 
care  of  Col.  Chester,  ib.  ;  his  mishap, 
ib.  ;  appointed  Chief  -  of  -  Staff  to 
Meade,  80  ;  his  services  in  that  posi 
tion,  86-89  ;  his  book  Virginia  Cam 
paign  of  1864-1 805,  cited  as  to  the 
Wilderness,  87  ;  as  to  pursuit  of  Lee 
to  Appomattox,  94 ;  relations  be 
tween  Meade  and,  88  ;  the  model 
Chief -of -Staff,  81);  given  the  com 
mand  of  2d  Corps,  Nov.  20,  1804, 
89  ;  his  letter  of  acceptance,  ib. ;  his 
former  relations  to  the  Corps,  ib.  ; 
project  against  Lee's  supply-line 
communicated  to  Wilson  by,  90; 
executed,  Feb.  0,  1805,  by,  ib. ;  his 
position  in  Weldon  Railroad  affair, 
ib.  ;  with  Wright,  succeeded  in  affair 
on  Quaker  Road,  ib. ;  in  engagement 
on  White  Oak  Road,  March  31,  91  ; 
the  Crow  House  redoubt  carried  by, 
April  2,  ib. ;  gained  possession  of 
the  Southside  Railroad  at  Suther 
land's  Station,  ib. ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
ib.  ;  his  running  fight,  April  0,  92  ; 
battle  of  Sailor's  Creek,  ib.  ;  on  the 
heels  of  Lee  at  High  Bridge,  April 
7,  ib.  ;  Union  army  divided  by  the 
Appomattox,  93  ;  his  engagement  of 
April  7,  ib.  ;  received  assistance  from 
Crook  only,  ib.  ;  his  hope  to  capture 
Lee,  April  7,  ib. ;  the  importance  of 
his  movement  to  prevent  Lee's  es 
cape,  ib.,  94 ;  Grant's  letter  to  Lee 
demanding  surrender,  delivered 
from,  ib.  ;  his  pursuit  April  8,  ib.  ; 
the  hero  of  the  infantry  in  the  pur 
suit  of  Lee,  95 ;  07 ;  his  position 


among  commanders,  95  ;  his  extra 
ordinary  abilities,  ib.,  90 ;  his  ser 
vices  subsequent  to  the  war  as  Chief 
Engineer  of  the  Army,  ib. ;  his  per 
sonal  appearance,  81  ;  his  character, 
ib.,  83  ;  his  gallantry,  82,  83,  85,  8(5 ; 
his  patriotism,  83  ;  a  master  of  logis 
tics,  53  ;  his  qualities  as  a  fighter, 
83. 

Humphreys,  Charles,  member  of  Con 
tinental  Congress,  74. 

Humphreys,  Clement,  74. 

Humphreys,  Daniel,  the  General's 
great-great  grandfather,  a  Welsh 
Quaker,  74. 

Humphreys,  Joshua,  the  General's 
grandfather,  first  naval  constructor 
of  the  U.  S.,  74. 

Humphreys,  Samuel,  the  General's 
father,  Chief  Constructor,  U.  S. 
Navy,  74-75  ;  declined  to  expatriate 
himself,  75. 

Hunt,  H.  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  his  paper  on  the  artillery  ser 
vice  cited,  203  ;  accompanied  Hum 
phreys  in  selecting  position  on  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  79, 

Hunter,  D.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  command,  Jan.  21-June  3,  1803  ; 
before  Charleston,  9 ;  his  plans 
thought  to  be  faulty  by  Beauregard, 
ib. 

Hurlbut,  S.  A.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at 
Army  Reunion,  Chicago,  1808,  198. 

Illinois,  maintained  its  regimental 
organizations  through  the  war,  205. 

Independence,  Fort,  see  Fort  Inde 
pendence. 

Indiana  Volunteers,  with  Hatch,  1804, 
194. 

Infantry,  the  development  of,  during 
the  Civil  War,  2(53-208;  the  im 
provement  of  efficiency  of,  204 ; 
highest  degree  reached  in  1803,  ib.  ; 
the  advantage  which  would  have 
been  gained  by  mixing  green  troops 
with  veterans,  204-205  ;  the  advan 
tage  of  preservation  of  veteran  regi 
ment  organizations,  2(55. 

Island  Belle,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Island  No.  10,  Mississippi  River  opened 
to,  April  1,  1802,  7. 

Italy,  war  with  Austria,  1859,  rail 
roads  used  during,  270. 

luka,  battle  at,  Sept.  19,  1802,  233; 
Grant's  conduct  of,  criticized,  27, 28 ; 
Union  losses,  34. 

Ivanoff,    T.,   Russian   Consul-General 


INDEX 


293 


at     Philadelphia,     offered     Samuel 
Humphreys  appointment  in  Russia, 

75. 

Jackson,  Camp,  St.  Louis,  broken  up 
by  Lyon,  175. 

Jackson,  Miss.,  Johnston  defeated  by 
Grant  at,  May  14, 1863,  and  city  cap 
tured,  234  ;  Sherman's  participation 
in  the  siege  and  battle  of,  239. 

Jackson,  T.  J.,  "  Stonewall,"  Lieut.- 
Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  repulsed  by  Aber- 
crombie  at  Falling  Waters,  July  2, 

1861,  173,  213;  his  campaign  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  1862,  108,  116, 
117  ;  his  strategy  in  the  campaign, 

1862,  256.;    disconcerted    plans    of 
U.  S.  Govt.,  250;  with  Lee  caused 
McClellan's   retreat    to   the   James, 
ib. ;  at  Antietam,  124  ;  wounded  at 
Chancellorsville,   159 ;    after  A.   P. 
Hill  was  wounded,  the  command  of 
Corps  given  to  Stuart,  ib. ;  his  mili 
tary   instinct,  30 ;    would   not   have 
yielded  Vicksburg  readily,  32  ;  com 
pared  with  McClellan,  123  ;  Stuart 
commended  at  Bull  Run  by,   157 ; 
would  not  have  made  Stuart's  mis 
take  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  161. 

James,  Army  of,  see  Army  of  the 
James. 

James  Island,  Charleston  Harbor,  might 
have  been  taken,  1863,  9. 

James  River,  Va.,  closed  by  rebel  ram 
Merrimac,  105,  115  ;  McClellan's  as 
sumption  that  the  navy  could  open, 
105,  106, 110 ;  opened  by  destruction 
of  the  Merrimac,  May  11,  1862,  116; 
his  reason  for  not  taking  it  as  a  line 
of  advance,  116-117;  his  best  line, 
ib. ;  his  movement  to,  June,  1862,  57  ; 
forced  to,  by  Lee  and  Jackson,  250  ; 
its  value  as  a  route  to  Richmond, 
pointed  out  by  McClellan,  39 ;  But 
ler  not  instructed  definitely  to  make 
his  base  on,  38  ;  passage  of,  by  Army 
of  Potomac,  1864,  13,  42,  43  ;  crossed 
by  the  2d  Corps,  June  14,  14 ;  Han 
cock's  expeditions  to,  1864,  63  ; 
Grant's  plans  for  employment  of 
Sheridan  on,  1865,  259  ;  City  Point 
on,  10;  11,  13,87. 

Jerusalem  Plank  Road,  open  to  Peters 
burg  for  the  5th  Corps,  June  16-17 
1864,  16,  17. 

Jetersville,  Va.,  Sheridan  pursued  Lee 
on  the  road  to,  April  2,  1865,  91  ;  and 
was  joined  there  by  2d  and  6th  Corps, 
ib. 

Johnson,   A.,  President,   chosen   Vice- 


President  because  he  was  a  South 
erner,  166 ;  Thomas  nominated  by,- 
for  rank  of  Lieutenant-Geiieral  and 
General,  Feb.,  1808, 202-203  ;  Thorn- 
as'  letter  to,  declining  the  rank,  203  ; 
his  purpose  to  degrade  Grant,  ib. 

Johnson,  Fort,  see  Fort  Johnson. 

Johnson,  R.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  20th  Corps, 
his  position  on  extreme  of  right 
wing  at  Stone's  River,  218  ;  his  flank 
turned,  ib.  ;  sent  to  left  wing,  Sept. 
19,  battle  of  Chickamauga,  222 ; 
his  position  in  line  of  battle,! b. ;  es 
timate  of  his  strength,  Sept.  20,  225. 

Johnston,  A.  S.,  General,  C.  S.  A.,  Col. 
2d  U.  S.  Cavalry,  1855, 170  ;  in  com 
mand  of  Utah  expedition,  1857,  171 ; 
resigned  his  U.  S.  army  commission, 
173 ;  joined  the  Confederate  army, 
ib.  ;  Thomas  promoted  to  fill  his 
place,  ib. ;  his  inadequate  prepara 
tions  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 
249 ;  the  Western  Confederate  forces 
united  under  his  command,  March, 
1802,  250;  the  effect  of  Union  vic 
tory  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads  on, 
177  ;  his  evacuation  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee,  271  ;  his  strong  position 
at  Corinth,  232  ;  the  initiative  taken 
by,  against  Grant,  ib. ;  joined  by 
Beauregard,  7  ;  their  scheme  to  at 
tack  Grant  at  Pittsburg  Landing, 
7-8,  20  ;  presumably  knew  Grant's 
intention  to  seize  Corinth,  232  ;  and 
that  Buell  was  coming  to  join  Grant, 
ib. ;  his  purpose  to  beat  Grant  before 
Buell's  arrival,  8,  20,  129,  232  ;  de 
layed  too  long,  232  ;  his  strength, 
231 ;  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  or 
Shiloh,  4, 8  ;  Grant  attacked  by,  April 
6,  1802, 4,  20,  130,  231,  250  ;  the  at 
tack  a  surprise,  4,  20,  130,  132,  250  ; 
the  charge  of  surprise  refuted,  231— 
233  ;  defeated  Grant  April  0,  20,  44, 
231 ;  killed,  26 ;  his  army  totally 
defeated,  April  7,  26-27,  130,  231  ; 
would  not  have  retreated,  April  7, 
20  ;  his  strength,  231 ;  a  truly  great 
soldier,  25,  26. 

Johnston,  J.  E.,  General,  C.  S.  A., 
Lieut.-Col.  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  1855, 

170  ;   joined  the  Confederate  army, 

171  ;  in  command  Shenandoah  Val 
ley,  June  13-July  18,  1861,  5  ;  plan 
for  union  of  his  army  with  Beaure- 
gard's,  5,  6  ;  ordered   to   Manassas, 
July  17,   7;    battle   of    Bull   Run, 
July  21,  1801,  4  ;  saved  the  day,  20 ; 
did  not   contemplate   pursuit   after 


294 


INDEX 


Bull  Run,  7 ;  urged  increase  of 
army,  ib.  ;  advised  invasion  of  Mary 
land,  ib. ;  the  battle  at  Seven  Pines 
not  fought  according  to  orders  of, 
25(5 ;  defeated  by  Grant  at  Jackson, 
May  14,  1803,  234;  his  strength, 
July  25,  32,  234:  conjecture  as  to 
his  success  if  he  had  been  in  com 
mand  at  Vicksburg,  25(5 ;  Bragg 
believed  by  Rosecrans  Sept.  11,  to 
have  been  re-enforced  by,  220 ;  su 
perseding  Bragg  he  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
Dec.  27,  1863,  260;  the  army  de 
pleted  when  he  took  command,  ib. ; 
Sherman's  opponent,  1864,  135 ;  his 
strength,  1804,  135;  his  position  at 
Dalton,  Ga.,  135,  187;  Sherman's 
error  in  not  striking  the  rear  of  his 
army  at  Resaca,  135 ;  the  battle  of 
Resaca,  May  14-15,  1804,  ib.,  188; 
his  evasion  of  Sherman,  thereafter, 
130  ;  repulsed  by  Thomas  at  Little 
Kenesaw,  200 ;  not  re-enforced  by 
Folk's  corps  prior  to  May  10,  1864, 
188  ;  his  army  to  be  Sherman's  ob 
jective  under  orders  of  April  4,  1864, 
133-134  ;  his  army  should  have  been 
destroyed  by  Thomas'  scheme,  prop 
erly  executed,  188  ;  his  army  not  de 
stroyed,  134 ;  superseded  by  Hood, 
June  18,  1804,  13(5 ;  two  of  his  bri 
gades  at  Cold  Harbor,  14  ;  his  divi 
sion  before  Bermuda  Hundred  June, 
1864,  ib.  ;  brought  to  Petersburg,  15  ; 
operations  in  the  Carolinas,  1865, 17  ; 
Beauregard  and  Hood  superseded 
by,  March,  1865,  19;  distrusted  by 
Sherman,  ib. ;  his  ineffective  engage 
ments  at  Bentonville  and  Averys- 
boro',  ib.  ;  interview  with  Davis  at 
Greensboro',  ib. ;  negotiations,  April 
13,  1865,  opened  with  Sherman,  140, 
150 ;  surrender  at  Greensboro',  4,  20, 
150,  151 ;  Beauregard  distrusted  by, 
6 ;  Stuart  at  Bull  Run,  commended 
by,  157  ;  next  to  Lee,  the  best  Con 
federate  commander,  135  ;  his  saga 
cious  advice  not  heeded  by  the  Con 
federate  Govt.,  248,  250  ;*  his  weak 
army,  1861,  249;  his  treatment  by 
his  Govt.,  254 ;  his  death,  1891,  250, 
note  1  ;  207. 

Jonesborough,  Ga.,  battle  of  Sept.  1, 
1864,  189  ;  Thomas  engaged  in,  190  ; 
his  faculty  in  emergencies  instanced 
at,  206. 

Kansas,  Hancock's  service  during  bor 
der  troubles  in,  51. 


Kautz,  A.  V.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at 
Deep  Bottom  Bridge,  July  28.  1864, 
(54. 

Kellogg,  S.  C.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  an  aide 
on  Thomas'  staff,  at  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga,  243 ;  bearer  of  message 
from  Thomas  to  Rosecrans  which  led 
to  disaster  at  Chickamauga,  229 ; 
responsible  for  legend  on  War  Dept. 
map,  230,  243. 

Kelly's  Ford,  Va.,  action  at,  157,  159. 

Kelly,  P.,  Col.,  88th  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
2d  brigade,  1st  division,  2d  Corps, 
59. 

Kemper,  J.  L.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
in  attack  July  3,  1863,  on  Cemetery 
Ridge,  49. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  Ga.,  battle  of  June 
10-July  2,  1864,  not  to  Sherman's 
credit,  135  ;  Thomas  in  battle  of,  190, 
20(5.  See  Little  Kenesaw. 

Kentucky,  loyal  to  the  Union,  173 ; 
under  Anderson's  command,  1861, 
128  ;  evacuated  by  Confederates, 
1862,  7,  129 ;  evacuation  caused  by 
their  loss  of  Fort  Donelson,  271  ; 
Thomas  frustrated  rebel  conspiracy 
to  seize  state  arms,  175  ;  inadequate 
provision  made  by  Confederates  for 
defence  in,  249  ;  under  Union  con 
trol  in  1862,  ib.,  250  ;  Union  line  in, 
Nov.,  1862,  extended  from  London 
to  Columbia,  213;  Confederate  ad 
vance  to  Mill  Springs,  213  ;  encour 
agement  to  loyalty  given  by  victory 
at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  215  ;  opera 
tions  under  Grant's  command  July- 
Get.,  1862,  233 ;  the  control  of  the 
U.  S.  in,  imperilled  by  Sherman, 
1804,  144. 

Kershaw,  J.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  at 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  182  ;  his 
division  at  Petersburg  June  18, 1804, 
17. 

Khartoum,  in  the  Soudan,  115. 

Kingston,  Ga.,  Sherman's  letter  to 
Thomas,  Nov.  10,  1804,  from,  241. 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  Confederates  unsuc 
cessful  at,  182. 

Kolb's  Farm,  Ga.,  Thomas  in  engage 
ment  at,  190. 

Lafayette,  Ga.,  Bragg  retreated  to, 
Sept.,  1803,  from  Chattanooga,  220. 

La  Grange,  O.  H.,  Col.  1st  Wisconsin 
cavalry,  commander  of  2d  brigade, 
1st  division,  cavalry  corps,  with 
Thomas,  1804,  194. 

Laiboldt,  B.,  Col.  U.  S.  V.,  in  command 
of  2d  brigade,  3d  division,  20th  Corps, 


INDEX 


295 


his  position  in  rig-lit  wing1,  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  Sept.  20,  227. 

Lebanon,  Ky.,  distance  from  Logan's 
Cross  Roads,  215;  Thomas  17  days 
marching-  from,  ib. 

Lee,  Fitzhug-h,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
attack  on  Sheridan  at  Dinwiddie 
C.  H.,  March  31,  90. 

Lee,  G.  W.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1850-1854,  un 
der  Thomas'  instruction,  169. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  General,  C.  S.  A.,  a  cadet 
at  West  Point,  1825  - 1829,  76  ; 
Lieut.-CoL,  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry,  1855, 
170  ;  his  devotion  to  Virginia,  though 
deprecating  secession,  166,  171 ;  en 
tered  the  service  of  Virginia,  April 
20,  1861,  before  his  resignation  from 
U.  S.  army  had  been  accepted,  172— 
173  ;  his  place  filled  by  promotion 
of  Thomas,  173  ;  his  defensive  pol 
icy,  1861,  5;  recommended  union 
of  armies  under  Beauregard  and 
Johnston,  5  ;  advised  capture  of  Ar 
lington  and  Alexandria,  5  ;  Beaure- 
gard's  scheme  against  Washington, 
not  approved  by,  5,  6  ;  overwhelmed 
5th  Corps  at  Gaines'  Mill,  124  ;  with 
co-operation  of  Jackson  forced  Mc- 
Clellan  to  the  James,  250  ;  Malvern 
Hill  not  fought  as  he  intended,  256- 
257;  his  invasion  of  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania,  1862,  117,  118,  119, 
120  ;  MeClellan's  delayed  attack  on, 
at  Antietam,  124 ;  battle  of  Antie- 
tam,  117,  118,  119,  120;  battle  of 
South  Mountain,  118,  119  ;  not  ut 
terly  defeated  by  McClellan,  120; 
torpid  pursuit  of,  after  Antietam, 
82,  120 ;  gave  Stuart  command  of 
Jackson's  corps  at  Chancellorsville, 

159  ;  his  Gettysburg  campaign,  59, 

160  ;  Stuart  of  no  service  to   him, 
160—161 ;    his  ignorance   of   where 
abouts  of  Union   army,   1(50,    161 ; 
his  sole  chance  in  battle  of  Gettys 
burg,  162 ;  failure  of   his  plans  at, 
ib.  ;  battle  not  fought  as  intended 
by,  256  -  257 ;  pursuit  of,   8(5  ;   un 
able  to  make  up  for  losses  at  Get 
tysburg,   265 ;    believed    by    Grant 
1863,  never  to  have  been  ably  fought, 
34 ;  his  army  made  Meade's  objec 
tive   by   orders   of    April    9,    18(54, 
134  ;  in  Beauregard's  plan  of  May 
18,  12,  13;  his  army  May  3,  1864, 
weaker  than  on  July  1,  18(53,   265  ; 
his   strength    at    the    beginning    of 
18(54   campaign,   40 ;    battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  35 ;  he  should  have  been 


made  to  give  battle  beyond  the  Wil 
derness,  87 ;  Grant  by  chance  out 
generaled  by,  at  Spottsylvania,  36  ; 
his  position,  May,  1864,  at  Spottsyl 
vania,  12 ;  his  veterans  beaten  at 
the  Salient,  May  12,  1864,  62-63; 
his  stalemate  to  Grant  on  the  North 
Anna,  39  ;  Grant  blocked  at  Cold 
Harbor,  ib.  ;  battle  of  Cold  Harbor, 
13, 14  ;  would  not  leave  his  entrench 
ments,  40  ;  ignorant  of  Grant's  move 
ment  to  the  James,  13,  14,  16,  17, 
42,  43 ;  sent  troops  to  Petersburg, 
15,  17 ;  his  army  supposed  to  be 
there,  16 ;  himself  at  Petersburg, 
17 ;  feint  to  draw  his  army  from 
Petersburg  July,  1864,  63,  64  ;  the 
position  of  his  army  at  close  of  1864, 
134 ;  the  Confederacy  had  but  his 
army  and  Hood's  east  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  141 ;  Grant  became  his  an 
tagonist,  1865,  89 ;  his  Shenandoah 
Army  destroyed  by  Sheridan,  134  ; 
Grant's  plan  to  cut  his  communica 
tions,  43  ;  execution  of  plan  delayed, 
90  ;  his  supply-line  to  Hicksf  ord  cut, 
ib.  ;  his  attempt  on  City  Point,  Union 
base  of  supplies,  ib. ;  foiled,  ib. ;  his 

rition  at  Petersburg  not  altered 
Sherman's  operations,  149 ;  with 
drew  from  Petersburg  April  2,  91  ; 
his  only  roads  of  escape,  ib. ;  pursuit 
of  by  Humphreys  and  Sheridan  April 
6-7,  91-94;  a  day  lost  by  him  at 
Amelia  C.  H.,  April  4,  91 ;  his  road 
barred  at  Burkesville,  April  4,  ib. ; 
his  attempt  to  evade,  91-92  ;  his  hope 
to  reach  Farmville  or  Rice's  Station, 
92  ;  his  army  divided,  April  6,  ib.  ; 
he  might  have  been  captured  April 
7,  93  ;  Humphreys  prevented  him 
from  reaching  Lynchburg,  93  ;  com 
pelled  by  Humphreys  to  lose  time, 
April  8,  94  ;  abandoned  his  position 
with  his  starving  army,  ib.  ;  his  line 
of  retreat  from  Appomattox  held  by 
Sheridan,  257 ;  Grant's  demand  of 
surrender,  .  94 ;  his  reply,  ib. ;  his 
surrender,  19,  67,  94  ;  conquered  by 
starvation,  44 ;  the  proposition  that 
his  army  was  more  formidable  than 
Western  armies  discussed,  182;  re 
sistance  offered  by  Hood  to  Thomas 
as  great  as  that  to  Grant  by,  194  ; 
conditions  of  capture  for  Hood  after 
Nashville  unlike  those  for  capture 
of,  192 ;  would  have  been  a  difficult 
opponent  at  Vicksburg,  32  ;  his  ad 
vantage  of  interior  lines,  41  ;  his  su 
periority,  compared  with  Grant,  ib., 


296 


INDEX 


44  ;  his  campaigns  models  for  study, 
44  ;  Badeau's  poor  opinion  of,  85,  80, 
42  ;  his  distrust  of  Beaureg'ard,  6 ; 
Humphreys'  abilities  in  supreme 
command  like  Lee's,  questioned,  95  ; 
Long-street's  corps  the  flower  of 
army  of,  182  ;  his  mistaken  use  of 
cavalry,  200-201  ;  the  gravity 
Stuart's  loss  would  have  been  to, 
201;  freedom  given  to  Stuart  in 
Gettysburg1  campaign  by,  ib. ;  his 
purpose  in  these  raids  not  explained, 
ib. 

Lewis,  J.  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C,  S.  A.,  of 
Breckinridge's  division  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  28S  note  8. 

Lexington,  Ky.,  projected  encampment 
of  rebels  at,  1801,  175. 

Liddell,  St.  J.  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
strength  of  his  division.  Walker's 
corps,  Sept.  18,  1808,  and  losses  at 
Chickamauga,  Sept.  19-20,  225. 

Lincoln,  the  President,  his  orders  for 
defence  of  Washington  warranted, 
107,  10!) ;  disregarded  by  McClellan, 
107,  108,  10!);  his  relations  with 
McClellan,  128, 124  ;  McClellan's  de 
lay  in  announcing-  his  disposition  of 
army  to,  108  ;  McClellan's  conten 
tion  as  to  deprivation  of  McDowell's 
co-operation,  107-118;  McClellan's 
wrong  construction  of  the  promises 
of,  1 10  ;  his  advice  to  McClellan  of 
April  10,  111  ;  McClellan's  letter  of 
May  21,  to,  ib. ;  permission  granted 
to  McClellan  to  write  on  ' '  present 
state  of  military  affairs,"  114  ;  Mc 
Clellan's  letter  of  advice  to,  July  7, 
111;  its  presumption,  114-115;  ad 
vised  by  McClellan  on  slavery  ques 
tion.  114-115  ;  McClellan's  contempt 
for  the  cabinet  of,  99,  100  ;  McClel 
lan's  contempt  for,  111  ;  Burnside's 
recommendation  of  Humphreys  for 
promotion  to.  82  ;  Savannah  pre 
sented  as  a  Christmas  gift  to,  144  ; 
his  admiration  of  Sherman's  Georgia 
campaign,  151  ;  his  call  for  800,000 
men,  1802,  250-251  ;  his  administra 
tion  discussed,  251-25(5 ;  not  bril 
liant,  251  ;  unnecessarily  extrava 
gant,  ib.  ;  he  was  not  an  experienced 
ruler,  ib.  ;  the  most  wise  and  saga 
cious  statesman  known  in  the  U.  S., 
ib. ;  incompetent  for  direction  of 
military  affairs,  252  ;  his  manage 
ment  of  military  affairs  and  Davis', 
compared,  252-254  ;  his  poor  early 
appointments  to  the  army,  252  ;  his 
judgment  improved,  258  ;  his  sup 


port  of  Grant  and  Sherman,  254 ; 
submitted  to  political  influence,  254- 
255  ;  illustrated  by  support  of  But 
ler,  ib. ;  Life  of,  by  Hay  and  Nicolay 
cited,  SO. 

Little  Kenesaw,  Ga.,  Thomas'  assault 
at,  June  18,  1804,  200. 

Livermore,  T.  L.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  on 
Hancock's  staff,  57  ;  lettei-s  of  Davis 
and  Rosecrans  to,  concerning  the  in 
correct  leg*end  on  War  Dept.  map, 
248-244. 

Logan,  J.  A.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
the  affair  before  Atlanta,  July  22, 
1804,  189  ;  at  Army  Reunion,  Chi 
cago,  1808,  198. 

Logan  Cross  Roads,  near  Mill  Spring, 
Ky.,  battle  of  Jan.  19,  1802,  Con 
federates  in  position  before  Mill 
Springs,  Dec.  2,  1801,  218;  Thomas 
ordered  to,  Dec.  29,  ib. ;  arrived  at 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  Jan.  17,  1802, 
from  Somerset,  214;  Confederates 
re-enforced  Jan.  18,  ib.  ;  Thomas 
attacked  by  Crittendeu,  June  19, 
170,  214  ;  his  advance  fell  back,  ib.  ; 
no  evidence  in  Record  to  indicate 
a  repulse.  214  ;  Confederates  routed 
by  a  charge  at  10  A.  M.,  170  ;  the 
flank  charge  made  by  McCook,  21-1  ; 
Zollicoffer  killed,  170,  214  ;  a  relent 
less  pursuit  to  Cumberland  River, 
170  ;  captures,  177  ;  the  Confeder 
ate  force  never  reorganized,  ib. ;  the 
termination  of  Crittenden's  military 
career,  ib.  ;  the  Confederate  strength, 

214  ;   the  Union  strength,  170,   214  ; 
the  losses  on  each  side,  177,  214  ;  the 
effect  on  A.  S.  Johnston,  177  ;  an  en 
couragement  of  loyalty  in  Kentucky, 

215  ;  the  effect  at  Washington,  ib., 
215 ;  the    first   Union   victory   since 
Bull  Run,  177;  Thomas'  first  West 
ern  victory,  191,  204,  205  ;  his  charac 
teristic  traits  displayed  at,  191,  204, 
205  ;  his  services  slighted  by  Govt., 
1 77  ;  thanked  by  Ohio,  200  ;   no  evi 
dence  in  Record  that  Thomas  changed 
from  defensive  to  offensive,  214  ;  his 
policy  of  delaying  engagement  from 
Jan.  17  to  Jan.  19,  questioned,  215  ; 
the  slowness  of  his  march  questioned, 
ib. ;  his  colonels  promoted,  177,  215  ; 
his  own  promotion  to  rank  of  Major- 
General    dependent    on    reputation 
made  at,  215,  280 ;  called  also  Battle 
of  Mill  Springs,  191,  204,  205,  200, 
211. 

London,  Ky.,  Union  line  extended, 
Nov.,  1802,  to  Columbia  from,  218. 


INDEX 


297 


Long-street,  J.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  at 
Molino  del  Key,  51  ;  in  command  of 
Bragg's  left  wing  at  Chickamanga, 
Sept.  20,  223  ;  his  orders  to  attack, 
ib. ;  his  assault  on  Thomas,  abont 
2  p.  M.,  228,  229 ;  his  strength,  228 ; 
defeated  by  Thomas  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  Sept.  20,  1803,  181,  182 ;  his 
loss,  182  ;  his  corps  the  flower  of 
Lee's  army,  ib.  ;  recalled  to  Virginia 
after  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
206  ;  in  Wilderness,  battle  of  May 
0,  1804,  02  ;  his  attempt  to  escape 
abandoned,  1805,  92  ;  did  not  surpass 
Humphreys,  95  ;  his  brilliant  reputa 
tion  as  a  fighter,  131. 

Lookout  Mountain,  Tenn.,  Thomas'  po 
sition  at  Gaps  in,  220 ;  Bragg's  posi 
tion  on,  after  Chickamanga,  234 ; 
carried  by  Hooker,  Nov.  24, 33,  235  ; 
his  movement  to  Mission  Ridge  from, 
Nov.  25,  230  ;  Sherman,  opposed  by 
forces  from,  180. 

Los  Angeles,  California,  Hancock 
stationed  at  prior  to  1801,  55,  06. 

Louisiana,  Thomas  stationed  in,  1808, 
108  ;  Banks  in,  spring  of  1863,  233. 

Louisville,  Ky.,  Thomas  on  duty  at, 
Sept.  6,  18(51,  175  ;  exposed  by  Sher 
man  to  capture  by  Hood,  144. 

Lynchburg,  Va.,  Miles  and  De  Tro- 
briand  sent  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  to 
wards,  93 ;  the  Confederates  en 
trenched  on  road  to,  April  7,  ib. ; 
Lee  prevented  by  Humphreys  from 
reaching,  ib.,  94. 

Lyon,  N.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  rebel 
Camp  Jackson  broken  up  by,  May, 
1801,  175. 

Macaulay,  T.  B.,  cited,  54,  199. 

McCall,  G.  A.,  appointed  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  May  17,  1801,  174. 

McClellan,  Carswell,  Col.,  U.  S.  V., 
Humphreys'  claim  as  to  selection  of 
Union  position  on  Malvern  Hill 
proved  by,  80  ;  his  account  of  Hum 
phreys'  charge  at  Fredericksburg, 
83. 

McClellan,  G.  B.,  Maj.-Gon.,  U.  S.  A., 
his  "  Own  Story  ':  reviewed,  99-124  ; 
the  origin  of  the  book,  99  ;  his  ego 
tism  displayed  in,  ib. ;  its  merits  of 
style,  ib.j  100 ;  entirely  subjective, 
ib. ;  the  errors  of  his  Report  per 
petuated  in  it,  101  ;  the  opposition 
to  his  Peninsular  plan,  ib. ;  his  dis 
regard  of  orders  for  the  defence  of 
Washington,  107,  108  ;  his  assump 
tion  as  to  the  forces  at  his  dispo 


sition,  108,  110;  his  announcement, 
April  1,  1802,  of  his  disposition  of 
the  army,  108 ;  ignorant  of  the 
topography  of  Yorktown,  102  ;  his 
contention  with  respect  to  the  co 
operation  of  the  navy  at  Yorktown, 
101-100  ;  Barnard's  report  concern 
ing  the  navy,  March  20,  1802,  102- 
103 ;  his  unwarranted  dependence 
on  the  navy,  101-100,  110  ;  his  erro 
neous  estimates  of  the  Confederate 
strength,  101  ;  value  of  James  River 
as  a  route  to  Richmond,  39;  his 
neglect  of  that  route  discussed,  110- 
117  ;  his  army  in  Chickahominy 
swamps,  116—117;  Humphreys  with, 
in  Peninsular  campaign,  79 ;  his 
contention,  as  to  deprivation  of  Mc 
Dowell's  co-operation,  107-113,  110- 
117  ;  his  complaints,  111  ;  McDowell 
was  not  expected  to  participate  in 
operations  before  Richmond,  110  ; 
his  resentment  of  McDowell's  inde 
pendent  command,  113;  forced  to 
the  James  by  Lee  and  Jackson,  250  ; 
no  mention  of  Humphreys'  service 
at  Malvern  Hill  in  his  report,  79  ; 
opposed  by  a  weak  army  under 
Johnston,  249  ;  his  assumption  that 
after  Pope's  failure  he  only  could 
have  commanded  the  army,  100, 116  ; 
the  battle  of  Antietam  discussed, 
117-118  ;  120  ;  his  delay  in  attack, 
117,  124 ;  the  battle  not  fought  as 
intended  by,  257  ;  his  uncorrected 
misstatement  of  Humphreys  at  An 
tietam,  80-81  ;  his  battle  of  South 
Mountain  glorified,  118—119  ;  his  po 
sition  Sept.-Oct.,  1862,  120;  his 
delays,  120, 121  ;  stopped  to  refit  and 
reorganize,  ib.  ;  futility  of  Stuart's 
raid  round  his  army,  258  ;  his  rela 
tions  with  the  Government,  123-124  ; 
the  Government  not  responsible  for 
his  failures,  124  ;  his  contempt  for 
the  Government,  99,  111,  112;  his 
inability  to  adapt  himself  to  the  civil 
authorities,  109-110,  120,  121;  dis 
regarded  orders,  120,  121 ;  removed 
from  command,  ib. ;  reasons  for  re 
moval,  ib. ;  superseded  by  Burnside, 
ib. ;  his  self-confidence  expressed  in 
letter  to  Lincoln,  May  21,  111  ;  his 
offer  to  advise  Lincoln,  June  20,  1 14  ; 
his  letter  of  advice  to  Lincoln  of 
July  7,  111;  its  presumption,  114- 
115  ;  his  letter  to  Stanton,  June  28, 
112;  his  genius  for  organization, 

122  ;  affection  of  the  army  for,  ib., 

123  ;  his   power  of   exciting  enthu- 


298 


INDEX 


siasm  in  the  army,  122  ;  his  weari 
ness  of  command,  112  ;  his  debt  to 
his  country  paid,  ib.,  113  ;  a  man 
of  emotional  nature,  and  of  religious 
feeling's,  100  ;  divinely  appointed  to 
save  the  Union,  99,  100,  112,  118, 
119  twice  saved  the  Union,  118, 
11!)  his  inconsistency  of  statement, 
IK)  his  unhealthy  mind,  120  ;  his 
wilfulness,  1.15,  120;  his  letters  to 
his  wife  cited,  100,  111,  112,  118, 
119,  120;  his  epithet  for  Hancock, 
56. 

Meridian,  H.  B.,  Maj.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
Life  and  Campaigns  of  Stuart  re 
viewed,  155-1(52;  Chief-of-Staff  to 
Stuart,  15(i;  his  conclusions  as  to 
battles,  not  final,  1 57 ;  his  defence 
of  Stuart's  movement  in  Gettys 
burg1  campaign,  101  ;  his  account  of 
Stuart's  death,  1(52. 

McClernand,  J.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
appointed  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  May 
17,  18(5 i,  174  ;  his  march  in  Western 
Kentucky,  215  ;  project  to  give  him 
command  of  Mississippi  expedition, 
28  ;  Grant's  purpose  to  keep  control, 
28,  29,  SO. 

McCook,  A.  M.  D.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1847-1852, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  1(59  ;  in 
command  of  14th  Army  Corps,  Dec. 
14,  18(52,  Jan.  12,  18(53,  in  command 
of  three  divisions  and  right  wing, 
battle  of  Stone's  River,  218;  attacked, 
ib. ;  not  saved  by  Thomas.  219  ;  in 
command  of  20th  Corps,  Jan.-Oct., 
1863  ;  sent  in  pursuit  of  Bragg  over 
Cumberland  Mountains,  220 ;  his 
position  at  Stevens'  and  Cooper's 
Gaps,  Lookout  Mountain,  ib.  ;  his 
position  Sept.  19,  at  Chickamauga, 
222 ;  a  division  of  his  corps  sent  to 
left  wing,  Sept.  19,  battle  of  Chicka 
mauga,  ib. ;  Granger  ordered  to  sup 
port,  223  ;  his  position,  Sept.  20,  ib. ; 
ordered  to  re-enforce  Thomas,  224  ; 
Thomas  directed  to  employ  him  on 
his  right,  ib. ;  his  strength,  225  ;  re- 
enforcements  sent  to  Thomas  not 
required,  220 ;  the  propriety  of 
Thomas'  call  for  aid  from,  Sept.  20, 
questioned,  ib. ;  his  attempt  to  close 
the  gap  made  by  withdrawal  of 
Wood's  division,  227. 

McCook,  D.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com 
mand  of  2d  brigade,  2d  division, 
Granger's  Reserve  Corps,  estimate 
of  his  strength,  Sept.  20,  Chicka 
mauga,  228. 


McCook,  E.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  in  com- 
mand  of  1st  division,  Cavalry  Corps, 
with  Thomas,  1864,  194. 

McCook,  R.  L.,  Col.,  9th  Ohio  Infantry, 
in  command  of  3d  brigade,  1st  di 
vision.  Army  of  the  Ohio,  his  charge 
at  Logan's  Cross  Roads  put  Con 
federates  to  flight,  214. 

McCoy's  Ferry  on  Potomac.  Stuart 
crossed  river  at,  Oct.,  18(52,  158. 

McDonald's  House,  Chickamauga  Val 
ley,  Thomas'  position  near  road  to, 
Sept.  20,  222 ;  Confederates  pene 
trated  to  road  leading  to,  224. 

McDowell,  I.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
position  June-July,  1861,  5;  Beau- 
regard's  plan  to  exterminate,  July, 
6  ;  in  Sept.,  7  ;  began  march  to  Bull 
Run,  July  16,  7  ;  his  plan  of  attack 
not  executed,  ib.  ;  McClellan's  con 
tention  as  to  the  deprivation  of  his 
co-operation,  107-113;  retained  for 
defence  of  Washington,  107,  110; 
his  independent  command  resented 
by  McClellan,  113  ;  his  expedition  to 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  116-117; 
to  his  withdrawal  McClellan  attrib 
uted  the  failure  of  his  campaign, 
ib. ;  McClellan  did  not  expect  him 
to  participate  in  operations  before 
Richmond.  116. 

McKeen,  H.  B.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  59. 

McLaws,  L.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  Col. 
Dawes'  estimate  of  his  strength  at 
Chickamauga,  Aug.  31,  1863,  cited, 
228  note. 

McPherson,  J.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1847-1852, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  169;  as 
Lieut.-Col.  U.  S.  A.,  Chief  Engineer 
on  Grant's  staff,  at  battle  of  Shiloh, 
statement  that  the  advance  of  enemy 
was  known,  April  6,  1862,  232  ;  un 
der  Sherman's  command,  18(54,  135 ; 
his  strength  at  beginning  of  1864 
Atlanta  campaign,  188 ;  his  losses, 
189;  his  movement  through  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  May  7-13;  attacked  by 
Hood's  forces,  July  22,  190 ;  killed 
in  battle  of  July  22,  before  Atlanta, 
1 89 ;  a  hero  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  129 ;  Humphreys  not 
surpassed  by,  95. 

Madison,  J.,  President,  165. 

Malvern  Hill,  Va.,  position  of  Union 
army  selected  by  Humphreys,  79-80  ; 
the  battle  not  foug'ht  as  intended  by 
Lee,  257. 

Manassas  Gap,  Va.,  action  at,  July  23, 
1863,  87. 


INDEX 


299 


Manassas  Junction,  Beauregard  in  com 
mand  at,  1861,  5;  Johnston  ordered 
to,  July  17,  7 ;  battle  of  1862,  100, 
119. 

Maney,  F.,  Maj.  C.  S.  A.,  of  Walker's 
division  at  Missionary  Ridge,  238 
notes  3,  5. 

March  to  the  Sea,  Sherman's  success 
ful  work,  141-144;  its  utility  dis 
cussed,  151 ;  the  plan  suggested  ty 
Thomas,  191. 

Marietta,  Ga.,  Thomas  in  engagement 
of,  July  3-4,  1864,  190. 

Marshall,  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  a 
graduate  of  West  Point,  75. 

Marshall,  J.,  Chief  Justice,  a  Virginian, 
165. 

Marye's  Heights,  Fredericksburg,  Han 
cock's  movement  against,  Dec.  13, 
18(52,  59 ;  Humphreys'  assault,  82. 

Maryland,  Beauregard's  plan  to  rouse, 
6;  invasion  of,  urged,  1861,  7;  in 
vaded  by  Lee,  1862,  118,  119;  Stu 
art's  Oct.,  1862,  raid  in,  lf;8  ;  Mc- 
Clellan's  belief  that  the  State  was 
saved  by  him,  100,  119. 

Mason,  J.  Y.,  Member  of  Congress, 
Thomas'  interview  with,  1836,  167; 
cadets  from  his  district  unsuccessful 
at  West  Point,  ib. 

Meade,  G.  G.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1831-1835,  76  ; 
given  command  of  Army  of  Poto 
mac,  June  28,  1863,  86;  his  indif 
ference  to  Stuart's  raid,  June-July, 
1863,  161,  261  ;  his  letter  to  Halleck 
declining  to  capture  Stuart,  261-262  ; 
responsibilities  at  Gettysburg  en 
trusted  to  Hancock  by,  60 ;  Lee  ig 
norant  of  movements  of,  161  ;  his 
victory  at  Gettysburg  possibly  de 
pendent  on  Stuart's  absence  from 
Lee,  162  ;  Humphreys  his  Chief -of - 
Staff,  July  8,  1863-Nov.  25,  1864, 
86 ;  Grant  with  in  Virginia,  1864, 
133  ;  orders  for  campaign  of  April 
9,  1 34 ;  his  difficulties  in  command, 
under  Grant,  87-89;  relations  be 
tween  Grant  and,  obscure,  88  ;  his 
order  to  attack  Petersburg  June  18, 
not  fully  carried  out,  17 ;  ignorant 
that  Grant  intended  to  take  Peters 
burg,  43, 88  ;  his  relations  with  Hum 
phreys,  88,  89 ;  made  Humphreys 
commander  of  2d  Corps,  ib. ;  ap 
pointed  Webb  Chief -of -Staff ,  ib. ;  his 
irascibility,  ib. ;  Humphreys'  sugges 
tions  to,  April  7,  1865,  93 ;  his  gen 
eralship  at  Gettysburg,  86  ;  his  ex 
cellent  employment  of  cavalry  iu 


advance  to  Gettysburg,  258 ;  Grant's 
use  of  cavalry,  1864,  not  approved 
by,  259 ;  a  master  of  logistics,  53 ; 
blamed  by  Badeau,  35,  37  ;  compared 
with  Humphreys,  95. 

Meagher,  T.  F.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
at  Fredericksburg,  1862,  59. 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  129. 

Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway,  best 
route  to  Vicksburg,  28,  29. 

Merrimac,  Confederate  ram  "  Vir 
ginia,"  her  service,  1862,  102  ;  her 
neutralization  promised,  102-103; 
engagement  with  Monitor,  March  9, 
1862,  104-105;  mentioned,  109,  110; 
destroyed  by  the  Confederates,  May 

11,  1862,  115. 

Mexico,  war  of  U.  S.  and,  Hancock's 
service  in,  51 ;  Sherman  served  in 
California  during,  128  ;  Thomas'  ser 
vice  in,  168-169. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  see  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Micanopy,  Florida,  battle  Seminole 
War,  Humphreys  engaged  in,  76. 

Middleburg,  Va.,  actions  at,  June  17- 
19,  1863,  157,  159. 

Miles,  N.  A.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  59; 
in  engagement  on  White  Oak  Road, 
March  31,  91 ;  at  Sutherland's  Sta 
tion,  April  2,  ib.  ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
April  6-7,  92. 

Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
comprising  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  of  the  Cumberland  and  of  the 
Tennessee,  command  of,  given  to 
Grant,  Oct.  16,  1863,  183,  230 ;  com 
mand  of  given  to  Sherman,  March 

12,  1864,  133,  187,  238. 
Milledgeville,    Ga.,    public    buildings 

spared  by  Sherman,  147. 

Mill  Springs,  Ky.,  battle  of,  Jan.  19, 
1862,  191,  204,  205,  206,  211,  230. 
See  Logan's  Cross  Roads. 

Mine  Run,  Va.,  abortive  movement  to, 
Nov.  26-Dec.  4,  1863,  87. 

Minnesota,  U.  S.  S.,  102. 

Minty,  R.  H.  G.,  Col.  4fh  Mich.  Cav 
alry,  in  command  of  2d  brigade,  2d 
division,  Cavalry  Corps,  with  Thom 
as,  1864,  194. 

Missionary  Ridge,  Chattanooga,  Tenn., 
battle  of  Nov.  23-25,  1863,  32-34, 
132-133,  184-187,  234-238 ;  Bragg's 
position  on,  33,  234;  the  character 
of  defences,  186 ;  a  small  force  suf 
ficient  to  hold  the  Ridge,  186; 
Thomas'  position  on,  Sept.  19,  222  ; 
Sherman's  position  on,  Nov.  24,  235  ; 
Grant's  plan  of  attack  on,  issued 
Nov.  18,  1863,  184;  234;  orders  to 


300 


INDEX 


Sherman,  235 ;   orders   to   Thomas, 

184,  234,  235;   report   that   Bragg 
was  retreating  from,  184  ;   Thomas 
carried  Orchard  Knob,  Nov.  23,  /&., 
235 ;  Thomas  instructed  to  capture 
rifle-pits  and  Ridge,  Nov.  25,  230 ; 
his  troops  exceeded  orders  and  cap 
tured  the  Ridge,  33,  132,  133,  184, 

185,  180, 187,  230  ;  the  Union  charge 
a  miracle  of  military  history,   180 ; 
Grant's  purposes  as  to  assault  dis 
cussed,  z6.,  237  ;  the  time  of  duration 
of  battle,  185  ;  the  Union  strength, 
il>.  ;  Sherman's  strength,  237  ;  Thom 
as'   strength,    ib. ;   the    Confederate 
strength,    185,   238;   the    losses   on 
both   sides,   185-180;   the   losses  of 
the  Union  army  not  large  at,  2(57  ; 
guns  captured  at,  by  Thomas,  203  ; 
Bragg's  army  depleted  at,  and  after, 
2(50 ;    the    Union   army    at    Atlanta 
the  same  as  at,  ib. 

Mississippi,  Military  Division  or  De 
partment  of,  see  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi. 

Mississippi,  operations  in,  under  Grant's 
command,  July-Oct.,  1802,  233. 

Mississippi  Central  Railway,  a  route  to 
Vicksburg,  28. 

Mississippi  River,  Humphreys'  survey, 
1850—1851,  and  report,  77 ;  a  fleet 
of  gunboats  created  by  the  U.  S.  to 
operate  in,  271  ;  (Sherman's  estimate 
of  force  necessary  to  open,  1801, 
247  ;  open,  April  1,  1802,  to  Island 
No.  10,  7 ;  Grant's  purpose  to  open, 
27  ;  opened  to  Vicksburg,  1802,  249 ; 
Grant's  failure  to  take  Vicksburg 
from  east  side  of,  233 ;  projected 
appointment  of  McClernand  to  com 
mand  on,  28  ;  Davis'  project  to  con 
tinue  the  war  beyond,  1805,  20. 

Mississippi  Valley,  history  of  the  war 
in,  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  and  of  the  Tennessee, 
129. 

Mississippi  U.  S.  Volunteers,  under 
Hatch,  1804,  194. 

Missouri,  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  trans 
ferred  to  Nashville  from,  142;  two 
divisions  from,  added  to  Thomas' 
army,  Nov.,  1804,  240. 

Mitchell,  W.  G.,  Bvt.  Brig. -Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  on  Hancock's  staff,  57. 

Mitchell's  Ford,  Bull  Run,  in  McDow 
ell's  plan,  1801,  7. 

Mobile,  Ala.,  129  ;  movement  to  pro 
posed  by  Sherman,  Sept.,  1804,  137. 

Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway,  a  route  to 
Vicksburg,  28. 


Molino  del  Rey,  Hancock.  Armistead, 
Loiigstreet,  and  Pickett,  in  battle 
of,  51. 

Monitor,  U.  S.  gunboat,  engagement 
with  the  Merrimac,  March  9,  1802, 
105. 

Moiiocacy,  Md.,  80. 

Monroe,  Fort,  see  Fort  Monroe. 

Monroe,  J.,  President,  105,  100. 

Monterey,  battle  of,  Thomas'  good  ser 
vice  at,  108. 

Morell,  G.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1831-1835, 
commissioned  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Aug.  9,  1801,  in  advance  of  Thomas, 
213. 

Morgan,  C.  H.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  in  veteran  corps  organized 
by  Hancock,  1804-1805,  00. 

Morgan,  E.  D.,  Governor  of  New  York, 
concurred  in  recommending  a  call 
for  300,000  men,  1802,  251. 

Morris  Island,  Charleston  harbor,  Hun 
ter's  plans  against,  faulty,  1803,  9. 

Morton,  ().  P.,  Governor  of  Indiana, 
concurred  in  recommending  call  for 
300,000  men,  1802,  251. 

Mott,  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
called  to  Petersburg  July  28,  1804, 
04. 

Murfreesborough,  Tenn.,  Confederates 
concentrated  at,  Dec.,  1802,  179 ; 
the  battle  of  Stone's  River,  Dec.  31, 
1802-Jan. 3, 1803, 179-181, 217-220 ; 
the  advance  from,  towards  Chatta 
nooga,  begun  June  24,  18(52,  181  ; 
Steedman  in  expedition  to  intercept 
Hood  detained  at,  Dec.  20-22,  1804, 
193. 

Napier,  Sir  W.  F.  P.,  his  account  of 
Wellington  cited,  204-205. 

Napoleon  I.,  his  cavalry  system  like 
Hannibal's,  150 ;  the  effect  of  the 
use  of  railroads  in  his  Russian  cam 
paign  conjectured,  272 ;  Grant  in 
comparison  with,  30,  41,  40;  Thom 
as  did  not  show  the  audacity  of,  204  ; 
209. 

Napoleon  III.,  his  sympathies  not  with 
the  North,  208-209  ;  his  prediction 
of  failure,  ib. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  a  Union  movement 
on,  apprehended  by  A.  S.  Johnston, 
Jan.,  1802,  177;  the  fall  of,  Feb. 
23,  1802,  caused  by  the  capture  of 
Fort  Donelson,  129 ;  Army  of  the 
Cumberland's  advance  to,  178 ;  Bu- 
ell's  forces  at,  ordered  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  129 ;  his  march  begun, 


INDEX 


301 


March  18,  232  ;  returning-  from  Per- 
ryville,  arrived  at,  Nov.  1802,  179  ; 
a  base  of  supplies  for  Sherman,  1864, 
136 ;  railroads  running  south  from, 
threatened,  Sept.,  1804, 138  ;  distance 
of  Florence,  Ala.,  from,  240;  de 
fence  of,  assigned  to  Thomas,  134 ; 
exposed  by  withdrawal  of  Sherman, 
to  capture  by  Hood,  144  ;  Thomas 
chose  to  have  Schofield  at  Franklin 
rather  than  at,  241  ;  Hood's  pursuit 
of  Thomas  to,  143  ;  besieged  by 
Hood,  ib. ;  the  battle  of,  191-195  ; 
fought  according  to  plan,  257  ;  the 
plan  solely  Thomas',  191,  204  ;  his 
strength  at,  Nov.  30,  1804,  142; 
enemy  strongly  f o?-tified  before,  192  ; 
Thomas'  change  from  defensive  to 
offensive,  ib.  ;  the  cavalry  employed 
in  assault  of  fortified  lines  at,  194 ; 
Hood  annihilated,  143-144 ;  192, 208 ; 
Thomas'  captures,  192,  203 ;  com 
pared  with  other  victories,  192  ;  con 
ditions  unfavorable  for  capture  of 
Hood,  192-193;  the  pursuit  after, 
193  ;  Thomas  thanked  by  Congress 
after,  206;  honored  by  Tennessee, 
ib.  ;  promoted  to  rank  of  Major- 
General  U.  S.  A.  for  this  victory, 
ib. ;  his  fame  dependent  on,  207  ;  in 
cluded  by  Swinton  among  the  twelve 
decisive  battles,  ib.  ;  a  defeat  would 
have  ruined  the  national  cause,  ib.  ; 
the  result  caused  the  Confederacy 
to  totter,  208 ;  disposition  to  con 
sider  the  victory  an  ordinary  affair, 
152. 

Navy  Department  of  the  U.  S.,  Mc- 
Clellan's  contention,  with,  101,  106  ; 
only  promised  to  neutralize  the  Mer- 
rimac,  102-106. 

Negley,  J.  S.,  Brig.- Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  at  Stone's 
River,  forced  back  Dec.  31,  218, 
219  ;  in  battle  of  Chickamauga,  222- 
225  ;  his  division  asked  for  at  6  A.  M. 
Sept.  20,  by  Thomas,  222  ;  sent  at 
6.30  A.  M.,  223,  244 ;  one  of  his  bri 
gades  reached  Thomas  before  bat 
tle,  the  others  detained,  ib. ;  called 
for  again  by  Thomas  at  11  A.  M., 
224  ;  his  strength,  225. 

Neill,  T.  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  6th  Corps, 
before  Petersburg,  June  16, 1864, 15. 

Nelson,  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  4th  division  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  Grant  re-enforced  at  bat 
tle  of  Shiloh,  by,  231  ;  his  strength 
April  7,  1862,  ib. 


Neuse  River,  N.  C.,  troops  called  from, 
to  Richmond,  May,  1864,  11. 

Newbern,  N.  C.,  Confederate  plan 
against,  1864,  10. 

New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  battle  of  May 
25-June  5,  1864,  Thomas  engaged 
in,  190. 

New  Jersey,  Washington  unconquered 
in,  rendered  the  possession  of  New 
York  of  little  value  to  the  British, 
134. 

New  Orleans,  La.,  Confederate  de 
fences  insufficient  at,  249  ;  under 
Union  control,  1862,  ib. 

New  Store,  Va.,  but  for  Humphreys, 
Lee  might  have  reached,  April  7, 
93. 

New  York  City,  its  possession  of  little 
value  to  the  British,  134;  Thomas 
at,  winter  of  1860-1861,  172  ;  the  ad 
vocacy  of  secession  at  his  hotel,  ib. ; 
ordered  to  Carlisle  Barracks,  from, 
April,  1861,  ib. 

Nicolay.  J.  G.,  see  Hay,  J. 

Ninth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  reorganized, 
1864,  10;  before  Petersburg,  June 
16,  1864,  15,  in  July,  63. 

North  Anna  River,  Va.,  Grant  stale 
mated  by  Lee  on,  39  ;  87. 

North   Carolina,   command   of    coast, 

1864,  striven   for   by  Confederates, 
10-11  ;    Confederate    forces    called 
from,  11 ;  Sherman's  march  through, 
145 ;   his   position  in,  compared   to 
that  of  Cornwallis,  145. 

Northern  States  of  the  U.  S.  See 
United  States,  Northern  States. 

Norton,  W.  A.,  Professor,  a  cadet  at 
West  Point,  1827-1831,  75. 

Nugent,  R.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
a  Col.  in  1st  division,  2d  Corps,  1861- 
1862,  59. 

Numbers  or  strength  of  forces,  ques 
tions  involved  in  treating,  212. 

Octoroon,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103.    • 
Official  Records,  the  fountain-head  of 
military  history  of  the  U.  S.,  1861- 

1865,  212  ;  appealed  to,  for  rectifica 
tion  of  history,  190  ;  examined  with 
respect    to    the    claims    made    for 
Thomas  to   the    disparagement    of 
Grant  and  Sherman,  212  et  seq. ;  its 
evidence  that  the  Union  Army  was 
not   surprised  at    Shiloh,   231-233; 
239. 

Oglesby,  R.  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
at  Army  Reunion,  Chicago,  1868, 
198. 

Ohio,    Sherman    appointed    to    West 


302 


INDEX 


Point  from,  1830,  128;  Thomas 
thanked  by,  after  Mill  Spring,  206  ; 
organizations  formed  in,  to  secure 
nomination  to  Presidency  for  Thom 
as,  201. 

Ohio  Volunteers,  9th  regt.  (German) 
its  charge  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads, 
176. 

Ohio  River,  129. 

Ohio,  Army  of,  see  Army  of  the  Ohio. 

Old  Point  Comfort,  appearance  of  the 
Merrimac  off,  104. 

Oloklikaha,  battle,  Seminole  War, 
March  31,  1836,  Humphreys  at,  76. 

Orange  and  Fredericksburg  Plank 
Road,  action  of  May  5,  1864,  on,  62. 

Orchard  Knob,  Missionary  Ridge,  cap 
tured  by  Thomas,  Nov.  23,  1865, 
184,  235  ;  Union  position  on  Nov.  25, 
236 ;  Thomas'  faculty  of  meeting 
emergencies  instanced  at,  206. 

Ord,  E.  O.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
across  Lee's  path,  April  7,  94;  at 
Farmville,  April  7,  ib.  ;  his  services 
in  ending  the  war,  67. 

Osterhaus,  P.  J.,  Erig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  of  1st  division,  15th 
Corps,  with  Thomas  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  237. 

Pacific  Railway,  Humphreys'  survey, 
and  report  on  a  route  for,  77-78. 

Palmer,  J.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  of  2d  division,  14th 
Corps,  at  Stone's  River,  219  ;  trans 
ferred  to  left  wing  Sept.  18,  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  222  ;  his  position 
in  line  of  battle,  ib. ;  his  strength 
Sept.  20,  225. 

Palmerston,  his  sympathies  not  with  the 
North,  268-269 ;  his  experience  in 
affairs  of  state,  209 ;  predicted  fail 
ure  to  the  North,  ib. 

Pamunkey  River,  Va.,  one  of  McClel- 
lan's  routes  of  communication,  116. 

Paris,  France,  the  Prussian  army  sup 
plied  by  railroad  during  siege  of, 
272. 

Park,  Roswell,  Professor,  a  cadet  at 
West  Point,  1827-1831,  75. 

Parke,  J.  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
his  repiilse  of  Gordon,  March,  18(55, 
at  Fort  Stedman,  90  ;  his  services  in 
ending  the  war,  67. 

Parker,  I.  B.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  on  Han 
cock's  staff,  57. 

Patterson,  It.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
given  command  of  Department  of 
Pennsylvania,  April  27,  1861,  173  ; 
his  position  in  Va.,  5  ;  Thomas  as 
signed  to  command  of  a  brigade 


under  him,  173  ;  his  advance  into 
Virginia,  ib. ;  engagement  at  Falling 
Waters,  ib. ;  Beauregard's  plan  to 
destroy  him,  6  ;  made  the  scapegoat 
of  Bull  Run  disaster,  174  ;  supported 
by  Thomas  in  the  ensuing  contro 
versy,  ib. ;  213. 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  Ga.,  Thomas  in 
engagement  of,  July  20,  1864,  190  ; 
Hood  repulsed  at,  ib. ;  LTnion  loss, 
ib.  ;  slig'ht  allusion  to,  in  Sherman's 
report,  ib.  ;  Thomas'  faculty  in  emer 
gencies  instanced  at,  206  ;  the  Union 
army  the  same  at  Atlanta  as  at,  267. 

Peeble's  Farm,  Va.,  battle  of  Sept.  30, 
1864,  mentioned,  87. 

Pemberton,  J.  C.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
in  command  at  Vicksburg,  sitpposed 
by  Sherman  to  be  held  by  Grant, 
Dec.,  1862,  29  ;  Grant's  plan  to  turn 
left  wing  of,  at  Vicksburg,  31  ;  his 
strength,  32 ;  surrendered  to  Grant, 
July  4,  1863,  234 ;  number  of  men 
surrendered,  ib.  ;  fighting  him  not  to 
be  compared  to  fighting  Lee,  34. 

Peninsular  Campaign,  1862,  govern 
mental  opposition  to  plan,  101  ;  cause 
of  its  failure,  116-117  ;  Humphreys' 
services  during,  79. 

Pennsylvania,  believed  by  McClellan 
to  have  been  saved  by  him,  100,  118, 
119;  Stuart's  futile  raid  in,  Oct., 

1862,  158,    261 ;    invaded  by   Lee, 

1863,  59 ;  Stuart's  raid  in,  1863,  261 ; 
the  Confederates  suffered  the  greater 
disadvantage   from,    ib. ;   concentra 
tion    of  Union   army  in,   known   to 
Stuart  but  not  to  Lee,  161. 

Pennsylvania,  Military  Department  of, 
see  Department  of  Pennsylvania. 

Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  1st  City 
(Philadelphia)  Cavalry,  with  Patter 
son,  July,  18(51,  174;  three  months 
militia  in  Thomas'  brigade,  1861, 
173  ;  5th  Corps  formed  of,  1862,  80 ; 
their  march  to,  and  good  conduct  at 
Antietam,  80-81 ;  by  expiration  of 
term  of  service  1st  division,  5th 
Corps  broken  up,  84. 

Penobscot,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Perryville,  Ky.,  battle  of  Oct.  8,  1862, 
179  ;  Thomas  second  in  command  to 
Buell  at,  216 ;  he  was  not  engaged, 
179  ;  ignorant  that  a  battle  was  being 
fought,  217  ;  prejudice  against  him 
surmised,  because  of  his  inactivity  at, 
216;  Buell's  orders  to  Thomas,  for 
battle,  216-217 ;  Buell,  being  ill, 
took  no  part,  217. 

Petersburg,  Va.,  McClellan's  neglected 


INDEX 


303 


chance  in  1862,  to  seize,  110;  its  im 
portance  in  the  defence  of  Rich 
mond,  43  ;  defended  by  Beauregard, 
18t>4,  4 ;  his  apprehensions  for, 
April,  1864,  10 ;  the  surrender  of 
contemplated  in  his  plan  of  May  18, 
12  ;  estimate  of  Confederate  forces 
at  June  15,  15 ;  Grant's  plans  against, 
13,  14  ;  Union  forces  before,  15-16 ; 
outer  works  carried,  June  15,  14  ; 
Grant's  orders  indefinite  as  to  cap 
ture  of,  38,  39, 43 ;  the  cause  of  fail 
ure  to  take,  June  16,  17,  1864,  88 ; 
unimproved  chance  for  5th  Corps  to 
enter,  16;  Lee's  army  sent  to,  17; 
unsuccessfully  assaulted,  ib.  ;  might 
have  been  taken  June  18,  ib.  ;  mine 
exploded,  July  30,  18,  63  ;  Hancock 
prevented  from  continuing-  at  siege 
of,  63 ;  the  feint  to  draw  Lee's 
troops  from,  63-65 ;  Grant's  siege 
of,  43 ;  87 ;  the  number  of  men 
transported  to,  winter  of  1864-1865, 
272 ;  Lee's  army  before,  close  of  1864, 
134 ;  his  position  at,  not  changed 
by  Sherman's  operations,  149 ;  not 
abandoned  by  Lee  until  after  Five 
Forks,  263 ;  Lee  withdrew  from, 
April  2,  91,  149  ;  occupied  by  Union 
forces,  67  ;  conditions  for  capture  of 
Lee  after,  different  from  those  at 
Nashville,  192. 

Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railway, 
in  possession  of  Union  forces,  May, 
1864,  11. 

PettigreAV,  J.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
prisoners  from  his  division  taken  at 
Gettysburg,  60. 

Pettus,  E.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  of 
Stevenson's  division,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  238  note  3. 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,  its  possession  of 
little  value  to  the  British,  134  ;  1st 
City  Cavalry  of,  Avith  Patterson,  1861, 
173. 

Pickett,  G.  E.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C,  S.  A.,  at 
Molino  del  Rey,  51 ;  at  Gettysburg, 
182  ;  his  attack,  July  3,  1863,  on 
Cemetery  Ridge,  49  ;  prisoners  taken 
from  at  Gettysburg1,  60  ;  his  attack 
on  Sheridan,  at  Dinwiddie  C.  H., 
March  31,  90. 

Pickett's  Mills,  Ga.,  Thomas  in  en 
gagements  at,  190. 

Pillow,  G.  J.  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  at 
Fort  Donelson,  25 ;  his  statement  of 
total  strength  there,  231. 

Piper's  House,  Antietam,  58. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  Tenn.,  occupied  by 
Grant  March  10,  1862,  129,  232; 


Grant's  position   well   chosen,    26 ; 
battle  of,  see  Shiloh. 
Pleasanton,  A.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen,  U.  S.  A., 
failed  to  capture  Stuart,  raid  of  Oct. 

1862,  158. 

Plymouth,  N.  C.,  troops  called  to  Rich 
mond  from,  May,  1864,  11. 

Polk,  L.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com 
mand  at  Columbus,  1861,  24 ;  in 
command  of  Bragg's  right  wing  at 
Chickamauga,  223 ;  his  attack  on 
Union  left,  began  battle  of  Sept.  20, 
ib.;  his  strength,  225,  228;  he  at 
tacked  Thomas  with  Hill's  and 
Walker's  corps,  225 ;  his  failure  in 
attack,  224,  225,  226 ;  did  not  join 
Johnston  prior  to  May  11,  1864,  188. 

Pope,  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  Stuart's 
Aug.,  1862,  raid  in  rear  of  his  army, 
158;  McClellan  believed  the  army 
would  obey  only  him  after  defeat 
of,  117;  his  defeat  attributed  to 
McClellan,  119;  losses  in  his  Vir 
ginia  Campaign,  34;  did  not  con 
tinue  in  active  command  till  end  of 
war,  247. 

Porter,  F.  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  ap 
pointed  in  advance  of  Thomas,  Brig.- 
Gen.,  May  17, 1861, 174,  213 ;  Patter 
son's  Adjutant  -  General,  ib. ;  at 
Games'  Mill,  57 ;  his  5th  Corps,  of 
Pennsylvania  troops,  80 ;  succeeded 
by  Meade,  84. 

Port  Gibson,  Miss.,  Confederates  under 
Bowen  defeated  May  1,  1863,  by 
Grant  at,  233. 

Port  Hudson,  La.,  Grant  urged  to  join 
Banks  to  operate  against,  spring  of 

1863,  233. 

Potomac,  Army  of,  see  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Potomac  River,  crossed  by  Patterson, 
July  2,  1861,  at  Williamsport,  173  ; 
U.  S.  fleet  of  gunboats  in,  1862, 103  ; 
question  of  garrisons  for  forts  on, 
107 ;  Stuart  in  his  Oct.,  1862,  raid 
crossed  at  McCoy's  Ferry,  158  ;  on 
his  return  at  White's  Ferry,  ib. ; 
crossed  by  Stuart  at  Rowser's  Ford, 
Gettysburg  Campaign,  160. 

Potter,  R.  B.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  assault,  June  17,  at  Petersburg, 
15. 

Pratzen,  Heights  of  capture  of,  com 
pared  to  the  capture  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  133. 

Prentiss,  B.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
appointed  May  17,  1861,  174. 

Presidency,  nomination  for,  declined 
by  Thomas,  1867,  201-202. 


304 


INDEX 


President,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  built  by 
1).  Humphreys,  74. 

Price,  S.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  Mis 
souri,  1801,  24;  Grant's  affair  at 
Belmoiit  to  prevent  re-enforcing1,  ib. ; 
his  escape  at  luka,  27. 

Prime,  W.  C.,  editor  of  "  Own  Story," 
his  sketch  of  McClellan  cited,  99; 
102. 

Prussian  army,  the  value  of  railroads 
for  supplying-,  during-  siege  of  Paris, 
winter  of  1870-1871,  272. 

Railroads,  their  use  in  time  of  war, 
270  ;  their  value  to  the  U.  S.  during1 
civil  war,  271-272. 

Randall,  F.  V.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  13th 
regt.  Vermont  Volunteers  at  Cem 
etery  Ridge,  July  3,  1803,  50. 

Randall,  S.  J.,  recommended  the  pro 
motion  of  Thomas  as  Brig.-Gen., 
173-174  ;  a  private  in  1st  Phil  a. 
cavalry,  174. 

Rapidan  River  Va.,  10,  87;  crossed 
by  Grant,  May  3,  1804,  00,  133,  205. 

Rappahannock,  River,  Va.,  40,  84,  87. 

Rawlins,  J.  A.,  Brig-.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Grant's  Chief-of -Staff,  250. 

Reams'  Station,  Va.,  on  Weldon  rail 
road,  disastrous  affair  of  August 
25,  1804,  at,  00. 

Reconstruction  Committee  of  Con 
gress,  Thomas'  testimony  before, 
1800,  202. 

Recruiting-  stopped,  April,  1802,  by 
U.  S.  Govt.,  250 ;  the  call  for  300,000 
men,  250-251. 

Reed's  Bridg-e,  Chickamaug-a  River, 
battle  of  Chickamauga  began  at, 
221  ;  Thomas'  position  on  road  to 
Rossville  from,  Sept.  19,  222. 

Resaca,  Ga.,  Sherman's  lost  chance  to 
strike  enemy  at,  135,  188 ;  Thomas 
in  battle  of,  190. 

Revolution,  War  of,  the  possession  of 
cities  of  little  value  to  the  British, 
Washington  unconquered,  134. 

Reynolds,  A.  W.,  Brig-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
estimate  of  his  brigade  in  battle  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  238  note  1 . 

Reynolds,  J.  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
in  command  of  4th  division,  14th 
Corps,  left  wing1,  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  his  position  Sept.  19,  222  ; 
fatal  message  carried  to  Rosecrans, 
that  the  right  of  his  division  was 
exposed,  220 ;  said  to  have  been 
communicated  to  Capt.  Kellogg  by, 
229  ;  one  of  Brannan's  brigades  on 
line  of  his  right,  244  ;  Wood  ordered 


to  his  support  Sept.  20,  227  ;  Wood 
told  by  Thomas  that  his  support  was 
not  needed  by,  ib. 

Rice's  Station,  Va.,  an  alternative  in 
Lee's  plan  of  escape,  92  ;  Longstreet 
abandoned  it,  as  a  chance  of  escape, 
April  2,  ib. 

Richardson,  I.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
mortally  wounded  at  Antietam,  58. 

Richmond,  Va.,  plans  of  U.  S.  Govt. 
against,  disconcerted,  180)2,  by  Stone 
wall  Jackson,  250  ;  McDowell  not  ex 
pected  to  participate  in  May  opera 
tions  before,  110;  the  James  River, 
McClellan's  best  route  to.  110;  Mc 
Clellan  forced  to  the  James  from, 
ib.  ;  Butler  in  movement  on,  1804, 
254 ;  value  of  Petersburg-  to,  43 ; 
Beaureg-ard  called  to  defence  of, 
April,  18(54,  10;  his  plans  involved 
surrender  of,  12  ;  Union  advance  on, 
May,  1804,  11  ;  Grant's  plans  not 
known  at,  1804,  10 ;  troops  called 
to  defence  of,  May,  1804,  1 1  ;  opera 
tions  against  from  the  south  blocked, 
12;  threatened  by  Sheridan  May, 
1804,  102  ;  hope  of  capture  by  cav 
alry,  July,  1805,  03,  Lee's  army  be 
fore,  close  of  1804,  134  ;  Lee's  dispo 
sitions  before,  not  chang-ed  by  Sher 
man's  operations,  149  ;  not  abandoned 
by  Lee  until  after  Five  Forks,  203  ; 
evacuated,  19,  07  ;  its  evacuation 
anticipated  by  Beauregard,  4,  18  ; 
only  a  military  position  to  him,  5, 
12,  18. 

Richmond,  Confederate  Government 
at,  see  Confederate  Government. 

Ridg-ely,  S.  C.,  a  cadet  at  West  Point, 
1827-1831,  75. 

Ring-gold,  Ga.,  Crittenden's  corps  sent 
to,  in  pursuit  of  Bragg,  Sept.,  1803, 
220. 

Rio  Grande,  Thomas  stationed  on, 
1845,  108. 

Ripley,  R.  S.,  Brig-.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
History  cited  as  to  Thomas'  services 
at  Buena  Vista,  109. 

"  Rock  of  Chickamauga,"  name  earned 
by  Thomas,  182. 

Roman,  A.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  book  on 
Beauregard  reviewed,  3-20;  his 
criticism  of  Davis  and  Lee,  5  ;  cited 
as  to  operations  at  Charleston,  1803, 
9 ;  estimate  of  effectives  at  Peters 
burg,  15  ;  his  account  of  mine  explo 
sion  valuable,  18 ;  his  book  impor 
tant,  20. 

Rome,  Ga.,  Bragg  believed  to  be  re 
treating  to,  Sept.,  1803,  220. 


INDEX 


305 


Rosecrans,  W.  S.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Confederates  routed  at  Corinth  by, 
Oct.  o-4, 1802,  217  ;  his  loss,  ib. ;  his 
share  of  credit  for  battle  of  Corinth, 
27  ;  Buell  superseded  in  command 
of  Army  of  Cumberland  by,  Oct.  30, 

1802,  170,    210  ;      promoted     over 
Thomas,  ib.  ;  this  appointment  given 
for  his  success  at  Corinth,  217  ;   his 
movement   from  Nashville,    ag'ainsi 
Bragg,  Dec.  20,  1802,  ib. ;  Bragg's 
army    encountered    near    Murfrees- 
boro',   ib. ;  battle  of   Stone's  River, 
near  Murfreesboro',  Tenn.,  Dec.  31, 
1802-Jan.    3,    1803,    179-180,   217- 
220  ;  his  position,  218  ;  his  strength 
at,    ib. ;    Confederate   position,   ib. ; 
the  Confederate  strength,  ib.  ;  plan 
of  each  commander  to  attack  with 
his   left   wing1,   ib. ;    Bragg''s  attack 
on  the  right  wing,   ib.  ;  Union   at 
tack     abandoned,    that     the    right 
might  be  sustained,  ib. ;  Davis  and 
Sheridan  took  brunt  of  attack  and 
were  forced  back,  ib. ;  the  flank  of 
division    turned   on   extreme    right, 
ib.  ;  forces  sent  to  support  of  right 
wing  by,  218,  219  ;  troops  led  by,  in 
last  assault  on  right  wing,  ib.  ;  enemy 
driven  into  woods  by  Rousseau,  ib.  ; 
his  left  wing  not  in  peril,  21!) ;   only 
part  of  the  forces  of  the  left  wing 
maintained   their   original    position, 
220;  the   battle   saved  by  Thomas, 
179-180;   Bragg   retreated,  Jan.  3, 
180 ;  the  Tennessee,  below  Chatta 
nooga,  crossed  by,  220;  Bragg's  line 
of    communications   threatened    by, 
ib.  ;   Chattanooga  occupied  by,  ib.  ; 
Bragg  pursued  by,   ib. ;  Union  line 
moved  to  Chickamauga  River,  Sept. 
18,    1803,   ib.  ;   his   headquarters  at 
Widow     Glenn's     house,     244,    the 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  Sept.  19-20, 

1803,  181-182,    221-230 ;    Thomas 
placed  on  left  flank  of,  221 ;  attack 
on  Bragg  near  Reed's  Bridge,  ib.  ; 
Bragg  failed  in  his  counter  attack, 
221 ;    Confederate    dispositions    for 
Sept.  20,  222  ;  Union  plan  for  battle 
settled  in  council,  night  of  Sept.  19, 
ib. ;    his   dispositions   for   Sept.    20, 
ib. ;  the  Union  line  inspected  morn 
ing  of  Sept.  20,  by  Thomas  and,  244 ; 
dispositions  changed  by  Thomas'  re- 
qiiest,    222 ;    Thomas'  lines   further 
concentrated  morning  of   Sept.    20, 
ib.;   the  Union   strength,  225,  228; 
the  Confederate    strength,  ib. ;   the 
battle  of  20th  begun  by  Confederate 


attack,  under  Polk,  on  left  flank  of, 
221,  223-224  ;  extended  by  degrees 
over  four  of  the  Union  divisions, 
224 ;  enemy  repulsed  everywhere 
prior  to  10  A.  M.,  ib.  ;  attack  on  ex 
treme  left  most  serious,  ib. ;  the  line 
penetrated  by  enemy  between  10.30 
and  11  A.  M.,  ib. ;  the  left  re-enforced, 
224-225;  the  attack  on  Union  left 
repulsed  without  the  aid  of  re-en 
forcements  sent  by,  220;  the  error 
in  movement  of  Wood's  division, 
220-227,  229-230,  243-244;  ques 
tion  of  the  fatal  message  discussed, 
ib. ;  his  letter  to  Col.  Livermore, 
Jan.  13,  1892,  concerning  the  posi 
tion  of  Brannan's  division,  244  ;  con 
sequences  of  the  error,  the  enemy 
under  Hood  entered  the  gap  left  by 
withdrawal  of  Wood,  227 ;  captures 
made  by  Hood  from  Wood's  rear, 
ib.  ;  no  mention  by  Thomas  in  his 
report,  of  the  message,  229  ;  Thomas' 
action  in  ordering  Wood  to  his  left 
without  reference  to,  criticised,  230  ; 
the  number  of  Union  right  wing 
swept  away  by  Hood,  227  —  228  ; 
Longstreet's  attack  on  the  Union 
right,  220,  Thomas  attacked  about 
2  p.  M.  by  Longstreet,  228 ;  enemy 
repulsed,  229 ;  the  forces  remaining 
on  Union  right  after  sending  re-en 
forcements  to  the  left,  220  ;  Thomas 
ordered  to  position  at  Rossville,  be 
tween  3  and  4  p.  M.,  228  ;  retreated 
to  Rossville  about  5.30  p.  M.,  229  ; 
new  position  at  Rossville,  ib. ;  roads 
from  Chickamauga  to  Chattanooga, 
222  ;  question  as  to  defence  of  main 
road  to  Chattanooga,  221  —  223  ; 
Union  right  wing  routed  and  dis 
persed,  Sept.  20,  182  ;  saved  by 
Thomas,  131,  182 ;  position  at  Chat 
tanooga,  32 ;  his  preparations  for 
operations,  33  ;  superseded  by 
Thomas  in  command  of  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  Oct.  19,  1803,  131, 
182 ;  a  hero  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  129,  his  skillful  ma- 
noauvres  Aug.  10-Sept.  18,  1803,  in 
Chickamauga  campaign,  181  ;  his 
bravery  and  resolution  in  that  battle, 
220  ;  did  not  remain  in  active  com 
mand  until  the  end  of  the  war,  247. 
Rossville,  Ga.,  Thomas'  position,  Sept. 
19,  on  road  to,  222 ;  not  the  only 
road  to  Chattanooga,  223  ;  Thomas 
suspected  attempt  of  enemy  to  cut 
his  communications  with,  Sept.  20, 
224;  Sheridan  joined  Thomas  at 


306 


INDEX 


nightfall  Sept  20,  227  ;  movement  of 
Granger  from,  Sept.  20,  to  support 
Thomas  in  attack  from  Longstreet, 
228 ;  Thomas  retreated  to,  about 
5.30  P.  M.,  229  ;  he  secured  his  new 
position  at,  without  much  loss,  ib.  ; 
Rosecrans  after  Chickamauga  retired 
to,  182  ;  Thomas'  faculty  for  meet 
ing  emergencies  instanced  in  move 
ment  to,  205-206. 

Round  Top,  Gettysburg,  Humphreys' 
position  on,  84. 

Rousseau,  L.  H.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  under  Thom 
as  at  Stone's  River,  his  strength,  218  ; 
in  reserve,  ib.,  ordered  to  right  wing, 
ib.  ;  repulsed,  219  ;  re-formed  on  new 
line,  ib.  ;  enemy  repulsed  and  driven 
into  the  woods  by,  ib. 

Rowser's  Ford,  Potomac  River,  crossed 
by  Stuart,  in  advance  to  Gettysburg, 
160. 

Ruger,  T.  H.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1850-1854, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  169. 

Russia,  conjecture  as  to  the  result  of 
Napoleon's  campaign  in,  aided  by 
railroads,  272. 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Camp  Jackson,  broken 
up  by  Gen.  Lyon,  175. 

Sailor's  Creek,  Va.,  engagement  at 
April  6,  1865,  92  ;  Gordon's  losses 
at,  ib. 

Salient,  the  attack  on,  not  well  con 
ceived,  37  ;  Hancock's  services  in  the 
capture  of,  May  12,  1864,  02-63. 

Salt  Lake  City,  Thomas'  report  on  the 
Colorado  River  as  a  route  of  com 
munication  with,  171. 

Savannah,  Ga.,  its  possession  of  little 
value  to  the  British,  1781, 134 ;  the 
possession  of,  not  Sherman's  ob 
ject,  134  ;  Sherman's  march  to,  pro 
jected,  137,  138,  141  ;  besieged  by 
Sherman,  143 ;  his  threat  to  Hardee 
at,  146  ;  a  Christmas  gift  to  Lincoln, 
144 ;  gravity  of  its  loss  to  the  Con 
federacy,  19  ;  effect  of  surrender  of, 
144 ;  Sherman's  admirably  con 
ducted  march  to,  268  ;  his  still  more 
brilliant  march  from,  ib.  ;  Sherman's 
march  northward  from,  begun  Feb. 
1,  1865,  18,  145  ;  his  small  cavalry 
force  in  march  to,  260. 

Savannah  River,  138. 

Savannah,  Tenn.,  eight  miles  from 
Pittsburg  Landing,  233  ;  conference 
with  Buell  evening  of  April  5,  cause 
of  Grant's  absence  from  Pittsburg 


Landing  morning  of  April  6,  233  ; 
Grant's  headquarters  at,  129. 

Schoepf,  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  his 
command  ordered  Dec.  29,  1861,  to 
attack  Confederates  at  Mill  Springs, 
Ky.,  213  ;  Crittenden's  plan  to  at 
tack  Thomas  before  he  could  be 
joined  by,  214 ;  Thomas'  delay  in 
waiting  for,  questioned,  215. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
under  Sherman's  command,  1864, 
135  ;  his  strength  at  beginning  of 
Atlanta  campaign,  188 ;  his  losses, 
189  ;  his  retreat  to  Franklin,  Nov., 
1864,  142,  143  ;  the  risk  to  Thomas 
by  his  position  at  Franklin  and 
Spring  Hill,  241  ;  Sherman's  letter 
to,  Oct.  17,  1864,  146;  re-enforced 
Sherman  at  Goldsboro',  N.  C.,  145 ; 
at  Army  Reunion,  Chicago,  1868, 
198. 

Schraeder,  A.  von,  Lieut.-Col.,  Assist. 
Inspector  General,  14th  army  Corps, 
said  to  have  reported  to  Thomas  that 
Reynold's  right  was  exposed,  Sept. 
20,  Chickamauga,  229. 

Schurz,  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  at 
Army  Reunion,  Chicago,  1868,  198. 

Scott,  T.  A.,  Assist.  Sec'y  of  War,  1861- 
1862,  Thomas  recommended  for  ap 
pointment  as  Brig  -Gen.,  to,  173- 

Scott,  Winfield,  Lieut.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Hancock  with,  in  Mexico,  51  ;  168  ; 
a  Virginian  loyal  to  the  Union,  166, 
213  ;  Beauregard's  plan  to  extermi 
nate,  6. 

Second  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  command  of 
1st  division,  given  to  Hancock  at 
Antietam,  57-58 ;  Hancock  suc 
ceeded  Couch  in  command  of,  June 
24,  1863,  52,  59-60  ;  his  care  of,  53  ; 
in  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  May 
5,  6,  1864,  62  ;  capture  of  the  Sa 
lient,  May  12,  62-63 ;  crossed  the 
James  June  14,  1864,  14  ;  two  divi 
sions  before  Petersburg,  June  15, 15  ; 
the  third  division,  also,  June  16,  15, 
16  ;  disaster  of  Reams'  Station,  Aug. 
25, 1864,  66  ;  Humphreys  given  com 
mand  of,  Nov.  26,  1864,  89  ;  his  for 
mer  relations  with,  89-90  ;  its  last 
commander,  73  ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
April  2-8,  91-94;  its  losses,  40; 
Walker's  history  of,  94. 

Sedgwick,  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Major,  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  1855,  170. 

Selma,  Ala.,  project  of  a  movement  by 
Thomas  to,  142. 

Seminary  Ridge,  Gettysburg,  advance 


INDEX 


307 


of  Confederates  from,  July  3,  49, 
50. 

Seminole  War,  Florida,  Hancock  served 
in,  51  ;  Humphreys'  service  in,  76 ; 
Thomas'  service  in,  167. 

Seven  Days  Battles,  June  25- July  1, 
1862,  Union  losses  in,  34. 

Seven  Pines,  or  Fair  Oaks,  battle  of 
May  31-June  1,  1862,  not  fought  as 
intended  by  Johnston,  256 ;  Han 
cock  not  engaged,  57  ;  Union  loss 
at,  34. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  Va.,  Johnston  in 
command  in,  1861,  5  ;  Jackson's  ex 
pedition  to,  1862,  108  ;  his  strategy 
in,  256  ;  Banks  sent  to  protect,  107, 
108  ;  McDowell's  expedition  to,  116- 
117  ;  cavalry  fighting  of  old  style, 
campaign  of  1864,  156 ;  destruction 
by  Sheridan  of  Lee's  army  in,  134  ; 
Sheridan's  victory  in,  no  greater  than 
Thomas'  at  Nashville,  192  ;  Grant's 
1865  plans  for  employment  of  Sheri 
dan  in,  259. 

Sheridan,  P.  H.,  General,  U.  S.  A.,  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1848-1853, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  169  ;  the 
battle  at  Boonville,  Mo.,  July  1, 

1862,  the  first  planned  by  him,  204  ; 
at  battle  of  Stone's  River,  180,  218  ; 
his  resistance  of  enemy,  ib. ;  forced 
back,  Dec.  31,  ib. ;  Rousseau  sent  to 
his  right  and  rear,  ib. ;  re-enforced 
by  Thomas,  180,   205;  no   evidence 
that  Thomas  sent  a  brigade  to  relief 
of,  219  ;  his  aid  to  left  wing,  220  ; 
his    manoeuvres    at  Stone's    River, 
likened   to   Humphreys'  at  Gettys 
burg,  85  ;  at  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
ordered  to  send  two  brigades  to  sup 
port  Thomas,  Sept.  20,  224  ;  in  mov 
ing   towards   Thomas,  attacked   by 
Hood's  force,  227,  forced  back,  ib. ; 
did  not  join  Thomas  until  nightfall, 
at  Rossville,  ib. ;  Thomas  attacked 
by   Longstreet   when  he    expected, 
228  ;  his  strength  in  going  to  Thomas' 
aid,  ib. ;  in  command  of  2d  division, 
4th  Corps,  his   forces  with  Wood's 
captured   Orchard   Knob,   Nov.   23, 

1863,  184 ;   participated   in  the  as 
sault   by   which    Missionary   Ridge 
was  captured,  237  ;  the  share  of  his 
division  in  the   victory   at  Chatta 
nooga,  133  ;  the  1864  Va.  campaign 
gave  opportunities  for  display  of  his 
abilities,    61  ;    incident   of  his  vigi 
lance,  64-65  ;  U.  S.  cavalry  improved 
by,  winter  of  1863-1864,  162  ;  the 
strength  of  his  force,  1864,  ib. ;  Con 


federate  Shenandoah  army  destroyed 
by,  134  ;  his  mistaken  expeditions, 
1864,  259  ;  his  uncertainty  as  to  em 
ployment  in  Appomattox  Campaign, 
ib. ;  his  expedition  to  Dinwiddie, 
C.  H.,  90;  Five  Forks,  the  last 
battle  planned  by  him,  204 ;  Hum 
phreys'  efforts  not  surpassed  by,  in 
pursuit  of  Lee,  91,  95  ;  across  Lee's 
path,  April  7, 94 ;  in  pursuit  of,  April 
8,  ib. ;  his  position,  April  8,  ib. ;  Lee's 
line  of  retreat  from  Appomattox, 
held  by,  257 ;  his  great  achieve 
ments  in  the  Appomattox  cam 
paign,  66,  260  ;  the  utility  of  his  ser 
vice,  262  ;  a  demonstration  of  best 
use  of  cavalry,  259,  262  ;  his  victo 
ries  in  the  Shenandoah  and  at  Five 
Forks  compared  with  Thomas'  at 
Nashville,  192  ;  compared  with  Mc- 
Clellan,  122  ;  the  hero  of  the  cavalry, 
95. 

Sherman,  John,  U.  S.  Senator,  early 
recognition  of  the  merits  of  Gen. 
Sherman,  due  to,  166. 

Sherman,  T.  W.,  Bvt.  Maj.  -  Gen., 
U.  S.  A.,  Thomas  with,  at  Buena 
Vista,  168. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  General,  U.  S.  A.,  a 
cadet  at  West  Point,  1836-1840, 128 ; 
his  service  in  California  during  Mexi 
can  war,  ib.;  left  the  army,  1853, 
ib. ;  commissioned  Colonel  in  regular 
army,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Re 
bellion,  ib. ;  Brigadier-General  of 
Volunteers,  May  17,  1861,  ib. ;  the 
early  recognition  of  his  merits  due 
to  his  brother  John,  166 ;  com 
manded  a  brigade  at  Bull  Run,  ib.  ; 
150,  239 ;  transferred  to  Kentucky 
Aug.  28, 1861,  ib.  ;  in  command  of 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Oct.  8, 
ib. ;  voluntarily  resigned  the  com 
mand,  ib. ;  superseded  by  Buell, 
Nov.  9,  ib. ;  transferred  to  Depart 
ment  of  Mississippi,  ib. ;  Thomas 
promoted  to  rank  of  Major-Gen,  in 
advance  of  him,  215  ;  his  estimate  of 
force  necessary  for  opening  the  Mis 
sissippi,  1861,  247 ;  his  sagacious 
advice  not  heeded,  248  ;  in  command 
of  a  division  at  battle  of  Shiloh,  129  ; 
surprised  at  Shiloh,  4,  8,  26,  27,  130, 
250  ;  his  claim  that  he  was  not  sur 
prised  at  Shiloh  doubted,  26,  130, 
132  ;  his  statement  sustained,  231- 
233;  his  despatch  to  Grant,  April 
5,  1862,  considered  as  evidence  that 
the  Union  army  was  surprised  at 
Shiloh,  April  6,  232  ;  his  prediction 


308 


INDEX 


of  nothing1  but  picket-firing1  April  5, 
justified,  ib.  ;  some  of  his  troops  not 
demoralized  April  0,  26  ;  his  services 
at  Shiloh,  239  ;  his  distinction  won 
there,  129;  his  conduct  above  praise, 
130  ;  his  successful  engagement  at 
Corinth,  May  28,  1802,  239  ;  his  un 
successful  expedition  against  Vicks- 
burg,  Dec.,  18(12,  ib.;  his  unsuc 
cessful  operations  at  Chickasaw 
Bayou,  Dec.  28-29,  1802,  29;  his 
share  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  1803, 
239  ;  Arkansas  Post  captured  by 
Jan.  11,  1803,  ib.  ;  summoned  by 
Grant  to  Chattanooga,  Oct.  1803, 
131,  132  ;  the  attack  postponed  from 
Nov.  21  to  25,  because  of  his  delay, 
184 ;  part  of  Army  of  the  Tenn. 
brought  up  by,  234 ;  the  main  at 
tack  assigned  to  him,  184,  185 ;  that 
Grant  intended  him  to  take  the  chief 
part  in  battle  questioned,  230  ;  his 
failure  to  make  an  impression,  132, 
133  ;  held  in  check  at  railway  tun 
nel,  33,  184.  185  ;  re-enforcements 
sent  to,  not  required,  230  ;  Thomas' 
attack  on  rifle-pits  intended  as  a  di 
version  in  favor  of,  132,  133  ;  the  as 
sertion  not  sustained,  23(5 ;  his  state 
ment  that  Bragg  massed  his  troops 
against  him,  disproved,  180  ;  his  loss, 
33,  185-180 ;  his  strength  greater 
than  Thomas',  180 ;  his  strength 
smaller  than  Thomas',  237  ;  strength 
of  force  opposed  to  him,  185,  180, 
238  ;  the  loss  of  rebels  in  his  front, 
185  ;  intended  by  Grant  to  cut  off 
Bragg's  retreat,  ib. ,"  his  account  of 
battle  colored  by  personal  feelings, 
132  ;  as  Grant's  favorite  officer  ap 
pointed  to  the  command  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
March  12,  1804, 133,  187,  238  ;  extent 
of  his  command,  238  ;  the  claims  of 
a  class  of  Thomas'  admirers  made 
to  the  disparagement  of,  examined, 
211-244;  the  claims  stated,  211- 
212  ;  Thomas'  junior  in  rank  and 
command,  1 87  ;  the  variety  of  his 
services  not  so  large  as  Thomas', 
203  ;  his  services  and  Thomas'  com 
pared.  239  ft  seq.  ;  Thomas'  reputa 
tion  lessened  by  the  prejudice  and 
indifference  to  historic  truthfulness 
of,  190;  Thomas'  glory  obscured  by, 
207  ;  the  opinion  that  Thomas  would 
have  conducted  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign  better  than.  207  ;  Thomas  be 
lieved  by  Grant  not  so  competent  to 
conduct  the  campaign  as,  200 ;  the 


proposition  that  the  command  should 
have  been  given  to  Thomas  instead 
of  to,  discussed,  239 ;  his  strength 
at  beginning  of  1804  campaign,  135  ; 
ordered  to  make  Johnston's  army  his 
object,  not  the  capture  of  cities,  134  ; 
evaded  by  Johnston,  130  ;  he  adopted 
Thomas'  plans  in  Atlanta  campaign 
but  bungled  in  executing  them,  187- 
188  ;  his  lost  chance  to  defeat  John 
ston  at  Resaca,  135  ;  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain  battle  not  to  his  credit,  ib.  ; 
slight  allusion  in  his  report  to  affair 
at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  190  ;  the  privi 
lege  of  capture  of  Atlanta,  July  22, 
reserved  for  his  own  army,  189;  the 
city  not  captured  then,  ib.  ;  his  diffi 
cult  position  after  capture  of  Atlanta, 
130,  137 ;  his  possession  of  Atlanta 
of  little  value,  Hood  unconquered, 

138  ;  his  army  stalemated,  139  ;   his 
plans  after  Sept.  2,  1804,  137-138; 
his  army  concentrated  at  Gaylesville, 
Ala.,  138  ;  surprised  by  Hood's  Octo 
ber  raid,  ib.;  his  communications  with 
Chattanooga  cut,  ib. ;  re-established, 
ib.  ;  his   experiment  to  draw    Hood 
into  battle  unsuccessful.   130,139; 
his  difficulties  in  a  pursuit  of  Hood, 
139-140  ;   his  wish  to  destroy  Hood, 

139  ;  Thomas  sent  to  Chattanooga, 
ib. ;  Johnston's  and   Hood's    armies 
not  destroyed  by,  134,  135, 130, 139; 
the  destruction  of  Hood  assigned  to 
Thomas  by,  134,  140,  141,  142,  191; 
project  against  Savannah,   138;   his 
project  of  the  "  March  through  Geor 
gia,"    141  ;    suggested   by    Thomas, 
191  ;  unwilling-ness  of    Grant  to  ac 
cede  to  the  plan,  141  ;  obtained  per 
mission  for  his  march   from  Grant, 
Nov.  2,  142  ;  Thomas  given  the  two 
weakest  corps  of,  191  ;  the  paucity 
of  forces  assigned  to  Thomas,  144- 
145,  151  ;  the  number  of  forces  as 
signed  to  Thomas  for  operations  in 
Tenn.,  240,  240  note  5  ;  the  strength 
of   Hood's   force,   ib. ;    assured    by 
Thomas  that   he  would   have    men 
enough,   241  ;  Thomas'   force    suffi 
cient,  ib. ;  his  instructions  to  Thom 
as,  ib.  ;  his  expectations  from  him, 
142;    his    confidence    in,    241,   242; 
his  dependence    on,   justified,    145 ; 
ignorant  of  his  difficulties,  152 ;  the 
army  destroyed  at  Nashville  which 
had  not  been  overthrown  by,  191 ; 
the  misfortunes  imperilled  by  Sher 
man's  withdrawal  of  a  part  of  his 
army  into  Georgia,  144  ;  the  proposi- 


INDEX 


309 


tion  that  the  national  cause  was  im 
perilled  by  his  Georgia  campaign  of 
1804,  discussed,  240  et  seq. ;  the 
strength  of  his  army,  143  ;  its  size 
criticized,  144,  14") ;  unable  to  form 
a  conjecture  of  Hpod's  plans,  240- 
241 ;  his  problem  had  he  been  followed 
by  Hood,  242 ;  the  march  begun, 
Nov.  15,  1864,  143,  241 ;  the  neces 
sities  and  difficulties  of  his  march, 
241-242 ;  his  plan  of  living  on  the 
invaded  country  justified,  147-148 ; 
the  fortunate  results  of  the  march, 
143  ;  admirably  conducted,  208  ;  Sa- 
vaimah  besieged,  143 ;  his  threat  to 
Hardee,  140 ;  Savannah  captured 
Dec.  21,  144,  152  ;  s,  Christmas  gift 
to  Lincoln,  144 ;  compared  with 
Cornwallis,  145 ;  the  hero  of  the 
day,  144 ;  the  exultation  over  the 
success  of,  ib.  ;  left  Savannah,  Feb. 
1,  1805,  18,  145  ;  his  march  through 
the  Carolinas,  4,  9,  19,  208  ;  opposed 
by  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  18 ; 
would  have  been  confronted  by  a 
formidable  army  had  the  advice  of 
Beauregard  and  Johnston  been 
taken,  25(5 ;  his  advantage  in  hav 
ing  only  the  remnant  of  Hood's 
army  to  contend  with,  145  ;  his 
movement  to  Columbia,  ib. ;  his  en 
gagement  at  Averysboro',  ib. ;  at 
Bentonville,  ib,  ;  his  over-confidence 
there,  204  ;  re-enforced  by  Schofield 
at  Goldsboro',  145  ;  plan  for  Sheri 
dan  to  join  him  in  the  Carolinas,  259, 
200;  negotiations  for  surrender  of 
Johnston  begun,  April  14,  140,  150 ; 
Johnston's  surrender  April  20,  20, 
151 ;  his  characteristics  of  boldness 
in  action  and  speech,  127  ;  a  bril 
liant  strategist,  19,  257  ;  his  skillful 
strategy  in  Atlanta  campaign,  250  ; 
his  fertility  in  expedients,  137,  138  ; 
his  masterly  manoeuvres,  145 ;  the 
skill  with  which  he  used  his  advan 
tages,  ib.  ;  a  marvellous  provider  for 
his  army,  135,  137  ;  his  conservation 
of  his  army,  135  ;  his  army  in  better 
condition  than  ever  before,  at  be 
ginning  of  1804  campaign,  266; 
fighting  under,  severe,  but  losses 
not  large,  Atlanta  campaign,  207  ; 
his  campaigns  in  Georgia  and  the 
Carolinas  displayed  the  possibilities 
oi  an  American  army,  2(58 ;  honor 
paid  him,  127  ;  a  hero  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  129 ;  idolized  bv 
his  men,  2(57  ;  possessed  the  confi 
dence  of  Grant,  ib. ;  his  harmonious 


relations  with  Grant,  130-131 ;  his  in 
cessant  activity  and  prompt  support 
of  Grant,  239  ;  compared  with  Hum 
phreys,  95 ;  Lincoln's  support  of, 
254 ;  the  last  of  the  conspicuously 
successful  Union  generals,  247  ;  his 
right  to  his  great  reputation  ques 
tioned,  150-151 ;  evidences  of  his 
great  generalship,  204 ;  the  advan 
tage  g'ained  by  his  march  questioned, 
151  ;  his  unnecessary  destruction  of 
property  criticized,  147-150 ;  his 
policy  of  devastation  discussed,  140- 
149 ;  his  despatches  to  Grant,  Beck- 
with,  Halleck  and  Schofield,  prom 
ising  to  punish  Georgia  and  South 
Carolina,  140-147  ;  his  want  of  suc 
cess  in  independent  actions,  204  ;  his 
assumption  of  political  responsibili 
ties,  150 ;  his  neglect  of  details  in 
battles  of  July,  1804,  near  at  Atlanta, 
257 ;  the  fighting  qualities  of  the 
cavalry  minimized  by,  192  ;  his  in 
difference  to  the  use  of  cavalry,  2(50 ; 
contrasted  with  Grant  and  Thomas, 
150  ;  advantage  to  Grant  had  Thom 
as  been  taken  into  favor  instead  of, 
178 ;  at  Army  Reunion,  Chicago, 
1868,  198. 

Shiloh,  battle  of  April  6-7,  1862,  4,  8, 
18, 26-27, 129-130, 231-233 ;  Confed 
erate  strength,  231  ;  Union  strength, 
ib. ;  the  Confederate  plan,  7-8,  20, 
129,  232  ;  the  Confederates  surprised 
by  Union  attack,  232;  the  Union 
army  surprised,  4, 8,  20, 27, 130,  250 ; 
the  statements  of  Grant  and  Sher 
man  that  they  were  not  surprised, 
distrusted,  20,  130,  132 ;  the  charge 
of  a  surprise  refuted  by  Halleck, 
233 ;  evidence  in  Record  that  the 
Union  Army  was  not  surprised,  231— 
233  ;  Grant  repulsed  April  0,  by  A. 
S.  Johnston,  20,  130,  231  ;  Johnston 
killed,  20  ;  Beauregard  in  command 
April  7,  26  ;  Grant,  re-enforced,  de 
feated  Beauregard,  April  7,  27,  130, 
231,  250 ;  Confederate  loss,  231 ; 
Union  loss,  34,  231 ;  discussion  of 
Grant's  ability  as  displayed  at,  26— 
27,  Sherman's  ability  displayed  at, 
129,  130,  239  ;  Thomas  not  engaged, 
178 ;  fighting  at,  not  comparable 
with  that  of  the  Wilderness,  35 ; 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  reorgan 
ized  after,  215. 

Sickles,  D.  E.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V-,  at 
Chancellorsville,  159;  in  command 
of  3d  Corps.  84. 

Sigel,  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  appointed 


310 


INDEX 


Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  May  IT,  1861, 
174. 

Sixth  Corps.  U.  S.  A.,  Hancock  pro 
moted  from  command  of  a  brigade 
of,  at  Antietam,  58  ;  at  the  capture 
of  the  Salient,  May  12,  1804,  62  ;  at 
Petersburg  and  Bermuda  Hundred, 
June  16.  15,  16  ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
91,  92,  94. 

Sixteenth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  under  A.  J. 
Smith,  with  Thomas  in  Tennessee, 
191. 

Slavery,  Thomas'  dislike  of,  197 ;  Mc- 
Clellan's  advice  to  Lincoln  concern 
ing,  114-115. 

Slocum,  H.  W.,  Maj.-Gen,  U.  S.  V., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1848-1852, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  169 ;  at 
Chancellorsville,  159;  at  Army  Re- 
Tinion,  Chicago,  1868,  198. 

Smith,  A.  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  command  of  16th  Corps,  with 
Thomas  in  Tennessee,  191 ;  at  Nash 
ville,  Nov.  30, 1864, 142 ;  his  strength, 
ib. 

Smith,  C.  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  on 
the  death  of,  his  place  filled  by 
Thomas,  178. 

Smith,  J.  E.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  17th  Corps, 
under  Sherman  at  Chattanooga,  237. 

Smith,  Kirby,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Davis'  project  to  continue  the  war 
by  uniting  Johnston's  with  forces  of, 
20. 

Smith,  M.  L.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  2d  division,  15th  Corps, 
under  Sherman  at  Chattanooga,  237. 

Smith,  W.  F.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  co-operation  with  Thomas  at  Chat 
tanooga,  183  ;  his  services  there,  255  ; 
desired  by  Grant  for  command  of 
Army  of  the  James,  ib.  ;  in  com 
mand  of  18th  Corps,  May  2-July  19, 
1864,  at  Cold  Harbor,  13  ;  sent  to 
attack  Petersburg,  14  ;  captured  out 
er  works  before  Petersburg,  June  15, 
14,  15 ;  Hancock  and  Meade  igno 
rant  of  plan  that  Petersburg  should 
be  taken  by,  88. 

Smithsonian  Institution,  Thomas'  con 
tributions  to,  170. 

Snake  Creek,  Tenn.,  in  battle  of  Shi- 
loh,  26. 

Snake  Creek  Gap,  Ga.,  in  Thomas'  plan 
of  movement  on  Resaca,  188,  191 ; 
McPherson's  operations  at,  135,  188  ; 
Sherman's  failure  to  move  on  Re 
saca,  through,  ib. 

Siiodgrass   House,  Chickamauga  Val 


ley,  road  to  Rossville  by  way  of, 
223. 

Somerset,  Ky.,  Schoepf  s  command  at, 
Dec.,  1861,  213,  215;  Thomas  at, 
Jan.  1862,  176. 

South  or  Southern  States,  see  United 
States,  Southern  States. 

Southampton  Co.,  Va.,  a  sword  given 
to  Thomas  for  services  in  Mexican 
War,  by  citizens  of,  168. 

South  Carolina,  Sherman's  proposition 
to  punish,  146,  147,  149. 

South  Mountain,  battle  of  Sept.  14, 
1862,  glorified  by  McClellan,  118, 
119. 

South  Side  Railroad,  Va.,  possession  of, 
gained  by  Miles,  91. 

Spottsylvania,  Va..  Grant's  strategy  at, 
36  ;  his  failure  at,  37  ;  extraordinary 
fighting  of  Union  army  at,  40  ;  men 
tioned,  6 1 ,  87. 

Spring  Hill,  Tenn.,  Schofield's  position 
at,  a  cause  of  risk  to  Thomas,  241. 

Stanley,  D.  S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1848-1852, 
under  Thomas'  instruction,  169. 

Stannard,  G.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  forces  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  July 
3,  1863,  50;  his  effective  flank  at 
tack,  51. 

Stanton,  E.  M.,  Sec'y  of  War,  1862- 
18(58,  his  congratulatory  order  after 
battle  of  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  177 ; 
McClellan's  announcement  of  his  dis 
position  of  the  army  to,  April  1,  1862, 
108 ;  Halleck's  refutation  of  charge 
that  the  Union  army  was  surprised 
at  Shiloh  in  report  to,  233  ;  McClel 
lan's  letter  of  June  28,  to,  111:  his 
letter  to,  resenting  McDowell's  inde 
pendent  command,  113;  charged  by 
McClellan  as  the  cause  of  his  failure, 
117  ;  his  attribution  of  Pope's  defeat 
at  Bull  Run  to  McClellan,  119  ;  his 
orders  disregarded  by  MeClellan, 
120 ;  Humphreys'  report  of  his 
march  to  Antietam  in  letter  to,  81  ; 
his  approbation  of  Thomas,  183. 

Steam-vessels,  their  aid  in  time  of  war, 
269-270. 

Stedman,  Fort,  see  Fort  Stedman. 

Steedman,  J.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
at  Chickamauga,  223  ;  Thomas'  most 
energetic  division  commander,  193  ; 
sent  to  intercept  Hood  in  retreat  to 
Tenn.  River,  ib. ;  his  detention  at 
Murfreesboro',  Dec.  20-22,  1864,  ib. ; 
failure  of  his  errand,  ib.  ;  injuries  to 
Hood  inflicted  by,  Dec.  31,  ib. 

Stevens'      Gap,     Lookout     Mountain, 


INDEX 


311 


Thomas'  Corps  sent  to,  Sept.,  1863, 
in  pursuit  of  Bragg,  220. 

Stevenson,  Tenn.,  193. 

Stewart,  A.  P.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  at 
Missionary  Ridge,  238  note  4. 

Stone,  C.  P.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  com 
manded  brigade  under  Patterson, 
July,  1801,  174 ;  appointed  May  17, 
ib.,  213. 

Stoneman,  G.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  en 
ergetic  cavalry  commander,  with 
Thomas,  1864,  194. 

Stone's  River,  near  Murfreesborough, 
Tenn.,  battle  of  Dec.  31, 1862,-Jan.  3, 
1863,179-180,217-220 ;  Confederates 
under  Bragg,  Union  forces  under 
Rosecrans,  217  ;  Union  strength,  218, 
Confederate  strength,  ib. ;  Thomas 
commanded  a  corps,  230  ;  his  posi 
tion  the  centre,  180 ;  his  strength, 
i b.,  Union  position  and  disposition 
of  forces,  218  ;  Confederate  position, 
ib.  ;  each  commander  planned  to  at 
tack  with  his  left  wing%  ib.  ;  Bragg's 
attack  so  vigorous  that  Rosecrans' 
was  suspended,  ib. ;  the  extreme 
Union  right  flank  turned,  ib.  ;  with 
in  hour  the  right  wing  driven  from 
the  field,  180;  Davis  and  Sheridan 
forced  back,  ib.,  218  ;  a  brigade  sent 
to  support  Sheridan  by  Thomas,  180  ; 
no  evidence  in  Record  that  the  brig 
ade  was  sent,  219  ;  the  right  wing 
strengthened  by  forces  from  centre 
and  left  wing,  218-219 ;  led  to  position 
by  Rosecrans,  219 ;  Rousseau  from  the 
centre  repulsed,  ib. ;  then  repulsed 
the  enemy,  ib. ;  Thomas  unmoved, 
180  ;  part  of  left  wing  only  kept 
their  original  position,  220  ;  the  left 
wing  not  threatened  with  disaster, 
219-220;  the  right  wing  not  saved 
by  Thomas  alone,  219 ;  his  loss,  180 ; 
he  was  not  in  command  of  battle, 
220  ;  his  firmness,  bravery  and  reso 
lution,  180,  220 ;  displayed  his  abil 
ity  in  an  emergency,  205,  219  ;  the 
bravery  and  resolution  of  Rosecrans, 
220  ;  aid  to  left  wing  given  by  Sheri 
dan,  ib.  ;  his  manoeuvres  like  Hum 
phreys'  at  Gettysburg,  85  ;  Thomas' 
successful  charge,  Jan.  2,  180;  the 
cause  of  Bragg's  retreat,  ib. ;  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  no  bat 
tle  to  fight  like  this,  131. 

Stone  Wall,  Marye's  Heights,  Freder- 
icksburg,  Hancock's  losses  at,  Dec. 
t3,  1862,  59;  Humphreys'  assault, 
82. 

Stuart,  J.  E.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 


his  Life  by  H.  B.  McClellan  reviewed, 
155-162;  a  cadet  at  West  Point, 
1850-1854,  under  Thomas'  instruc 
tion,  170 ;  with  Jackson  at  Falling 
Waters,  1861,  173;  at  Bull  Run, 
1861,  157 ;  his  raid  round  Union 
army,  June,  1862,  158;  his  August 
raid,  ib.  ;  his  Oct.  raid  in  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania,  158,  261,  its  futil 
ity,  ib.  ;  given  command  of  Jackson's 
Corps  at  Chancellorsville,  May  2, 
1863,  159  ;  his  distinguished  service 
there,  ib.  ;  his  service  at  Brandy  Sta 
tion,  1863,  157,  159 ;  at  Aldie  Gap, 

157,  159;  at  Middleburg,  157,  159; 
his   raid  in   Gettysburg   campaign, 
160-162 ;    criticized,   ib.,   261  ;   Lee 
deprived   of    his   aid   by   the   raid, 
161,    162,   261 ;    his  strength,  261 ; 
disregarded  by  Meade,  161,  261  ;  de 
fended  by  McClellan,  161 ;  in  com 
mand   of   the   Confederate   cavalry 
in   Virginia,    157;   poorly   equipped 
and  weak,  1863-1864,  162  ;  his  ser 
vices  brief  in  Wilderness  campaign, 
ib. ;    mortally   wounded    at   Yellow 
Tavern,  ib. ;  his  personal  appearance 
and  characteristics,  157 ;    a  natural 
leader  of  cavalry,  ib.  ;  his  most  dis 
tinguished   actions,    ib.,    159 ;    com 
mended  by  Johnston  and  Jackson,  at 
Bull   Run,  157 ;    the   policy   of   his 
raids  discussed:  their  futility,   158, 
160,  258,  261-2(52  ;  the  Confederates 
suffered    the   greater    disadvantage 
from,  261 ;  Lee's  policy  in  the  em 
ployment  of,  not  wise,  261-262  ;  his 
raid  of  Oct.  1862,  the  booty  acquired 
not  commensurate  with  the  risk  run, 

158,  26 1-;  his  strength,  ib.  ;  his  free 
dom  of   action  in  Gettysburg  cam 
paign,  ib.  ;  his  objects  in  the  expedi 
tion  not  explained,  ib. ;  his  failure  to 
aid  Lee,  ib.  ;  the  poor  results  of,  ib. 

Sumner,  E.  V.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Col.,  1st  cavalry  regt.,  1855,  170; 
Hancock  given  command  of  his  divi 
sion  at  Antietam,  58 ;  his  develop 
ment  of  the  division,  59. 

Sumter,  Fort,  see  Fort  Sumter. 

Susquehanna,  Department  of,  see  De 
partment  of  the  Susquehanna. 

Sutherlands  Station,  Va.,  engagement 
at,  April  2,  1865,  91. 

Swinton,  W.,  cited  as  to  approaching 
doom  of  the  Confederacy,  Feb.  1, 
1865,  18. 

Tactical  Study  of  the  Battlefield  of 
Chickamauga,  a  map  published  by 


812 


INDEX 


the  War  Department,  its  incorrect 
legend  in  the  first  issue,  230,  230 
note  1,  243-244. 

Tallahatchie  River,  Miss.,  available  for 
defensive  line,  in  an  advance  to 
Vicksburg,  28. 

Taylor,  R.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  un 
der  Beauregard's  command,  1804, 18. 

Taylor,  Z.,  Ma j. -Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  Thom 
as  with  in  Mexico,  108  ;  his  notice 
of  Thomas  in  report  of  Buena  Vista, 
169. 

Tennessee,  inadequate  provision  by 
Confederates  for  defence  in,  249 ; 
under  Union  control,  1802,  ib.,  250  ; 
Thomas'  expedition  to,  Jan.  1802, 
170  ;  the  evacuation  by  Confederates 
the  consequence  of  capture  of  Fort 
Donelson,  7,  129,  271  ;  the  eastern 
part  within  the  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi,  238  ;  Grant's  opera 
tions  in,  July-Oct.,  1802,  233  ;  234  ; 
Thomas  sent  to,  from  Georgia,  Sept. 
29,  18(54,  191  ;  a  retreat  to,  an  alter 
native  for  Sherman,  Oct.,  1804,  139  ; 
not  feasible,  a  confession  of  defeat, 
140 ;  the  control  of  the  U.  S.  in,  im 
perilled  by  Sherman,  144  ;  Sherman 
left  Thomas  in,  with  two  of  his 
weakest  corps,  191  ;  invaded  by 
Hood,  142-143 ;  Thomas  honored 
by,  after  Nashville,  200;  Thomas' 
success  in,  an  evidence  of  the  merit 
of  an  American  army,  208  ;  nomina 
tion  of  Thomas  for  Presidency,  1807, 
advocated  in,  201  ;  Thomas'  com 
mand  after  the  war,  in,  202. 

Tennessee  River,  Union  forces  on, 
1802,  129;  the  capture  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  ib.,  231  ; 
Grant's  advance,  1802,  to  Pittsburg 
Landing  on,  20  ;  his  position  on,  be 
fore  battle  of  Shiloh,  232 ;  Union 
army  forced  back  to,  April  0,  18(52, 
231  ;  Thomas  did  not  reach,  in  time 
to  participate  at  Shiloh,  178  ;  crossed 
by  Roseerans  in  Sept.  1803,  advan 
cing  on  Chickamatiga,  220  ;  Bragg 
forced  across,  into  Chattanooga,  181 ; 
forces  brought  up  to  Chattanooga, 
Nov.  25,  1803,  from,  234;  Hood's 
dangers  in  crossing-,  140 ;  Thomas 
expected  to  hold  the  line  of,  142  ; 
Schofield's  retreat  from,  Nov.  1804, 
ib. ;  Thomas'  pursuit  of  Hood  from 
Nashville  to,  192-193;  failure  of 
Steedman  to  intercept  Hood  at,  193 ; 
Thomas  reached,  Doc.  28,  193. 

Tennessee,  Volunteers,  drilled  at  Louis 
ville,  175. 


Tennessee,  Army  of,  see  Army  of  the 
Tennessee. 

Terry,  A.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,U.  S.  A., 
at  Army  Reunion,  Chicago,  1808, 
198. 

Texas,  Thomas'  service  in,  1850-1800, 
108,  171  ;  left  by  him,  Nov.  1,  1800, 
172 ;  his  regiment  in,  surrendered 
by  Twiggs,  ib. ;  A.  S.  Johnston 
joined  Confederate  army  in,  173. 

Third  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  under  Sickles  at 
Chancellorsville,  84,  159  ;  2d  division 
commanded  by  Humphreys,  84 ; 
driven  from  position,  July  2,  at 
Gettysburg,  101  ;  employed  in  cut- 
ing  Lee's  communications,  April 
1805,  90. 

Thomas,  G.  H.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A.,  a 
soldier  of  consummate  ability,  1(55, 
21 1-213  ;  his  patriotism  unimpeach 
able,  212-213  ;  born  in  Virginia, 
1810,  105 ;  his  ancestry,  107  ;  his  in 
herited  characteristics,  ib.  ;  his  edu 
cation  in  patriotism,  105  ;  his  loyalty 
to  the  Union  at  outbreak  of  the  civil 
war,  100  ;  he  was  like  Scott  in  sup 
porting  the  Govt.,  213  ;  one  of  seven 
loyal  Virginians  in  the  army  1802, 
100  ;  suspicion  excited  by  his  south 
ern  birth,  ib.  ;  his  loyalty  above  sus 
picion  by  the  Government,  213  ;  his 
merits  not  recognized  earlv,  1(50  ; 
promoted  from  rank  of  Major  to 
Colonel  between  April  10  and  May 
3,  1801,  213  ;  a  cadet  at  West  Point, 
1830-1840,  107;  his  interview  with 
J.  Y.  Mason,  ib. ;  his  rank  at  West 
Point,  ib.  ;  his  soubriquet  u  George 
Washington,"  ib.  ;  as  2d  Lieut.,  3d 
Artillery  in  Seminole  War,  ib.  ;  bre- 
vetted  1st  Lieut.,  108;  his  service  in 
Mexican  War,  168-109;  his  first 
post,  108;  complimented  at  Monte 
rey,  ib. ;  brevetted  Captain,  ib. ;  his 
service  at  Buena  Vista,  ib.  ;  brevet 
ted  Major,  109  ;  full  Captain,  1853, 
ib.  ;  his  varied  duties  and  places  of 
service,  1847—1851,  ib.  ;  Instructor 
at  West  Point,  1851-1854,  ib.,  170; 
cadets,  afterwards  distinguished, 
under  his  instruction,  1(58-170  ;  sent 
to  California,  1854,  170  ;  his  scienti 
fic  occupations  there,  ib. ;  appointed 
Major,  2d  Cavalry,  1855,  ib. ;  sta 
tioned  in  Texas,  171  ;  his  report  on 
the  Colorado  River,  July  7,  1857, 
ib.  ;  his  reputation  in  the  army,  ib.  l 
injured  in  a  railroad  accident,  172  ; 
left  Texas.  Nov.  1,  1800,  on  leave  of 
absence,  ib. ;  at  New  York,  winter 


INDEX 


313 


of  1800-1861,  t'6. ;  his  anxieties  be 
cause  of  political  affairs,  {6.;  his 
regiment  surrendered  by  Twiggs, 
ib.  ;  ordered  April  10,  18(51,  to  Car 
lisle  Barracks,  ib.  ;  renewed  his  oath 
of  allegiance,  ib. ;  unknown  at  Wash 
ington,  171 ;  promoted  April  25, 
1801,  to  lieut.-colonelcy  in  place  of 
R.  E.  Lee,  173 ;  promoted,  May  3, 
to  colonelcy,  in  place  of  A.  S.  John 
ston,  16.,  213;  May  29,  assigned  to 
command  of  brigade  under  Patter 
son,  173  ;  June  12,  led  advance  to 
Potomac,  ib.  ;  crossed  into  Va.,  July 
2,  ib. ;  in  engagement  at  Falling 
Waters,  ib. ;  not  under  fire,  213  ;  re 
commended  by  S.  J.  Randall,  Aug.  3, 
for  promotion  as  Brigadier-General, 
173;  not  promoted  until  Aug.  17,174; 
commissioned  prior  to  Abercrombie, 
213  ;  preceded  in  this  rank  by  three 
of  his  fellow  officers  of  1801  Va. 
campaign,  ib.  ;  transferred  to  Ander 
son's  command,  Dept.  of  the  Cum 
berland,  174 ;  disparity  of  his  pro 
motion  with  that  of  his  fellow  offi 
cers  of  regular  army,  175  ;  at  Louis 
ville,  Sept  0,  1801,  ib. ;  his  uninter 
rupted  devotion  to  duty,  ib.  ;  his 
services  in  organizing  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  ib.  ;  the  seizure  of  state 
arms  by  rebels,  prevented  by,  ib. ; 
in  Nov.  assigned  by  Buell  to  com 
mand  of  Union  line  from  London  to 
Columbia  in  Kentucky,  213 ;  Dec. 
29,  ordered  to  oppose  Confederate 
advance  at  Mill  Springs,  ib.  ;  arrived 
at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  Jan  17,  214. 
Battle  of  Logan's  Cross  Roads  or 
Mill  Springs:  attacked  by  Critten- 
den  at  daylight,  Jan.  19,  170,  214  ; 
his  advance  regiments  fell  back  be 
fore  attack,  170,  214  ;  lack  of  evi 
dence  to  indicate  a  repulse,  214  ;  a 
charge  at  10  A.  M.,  threw  Confeder 
ates  into  confusion,  170  ;  the  flank 
charge  was  made  by  McCook,  ib. ; 
Zollicoffer  killed,  170, 214  ;  a  relent 
less  pursuit,  170 ;  the  enemy's  guns 
and  supplies  captured,  177 ;  the 
Confederate  force  never  reorganized, 
ib. ;  the  termination  of  Crittenden's 
military  career,  ib. ;  the  Confederate 
strength,  214  ;  the  Union  strength, 
170,  214;  the  losses  of  each  side, 
177,  214;  the  effect  on  A.  S.  John 
ston,  177  ;  the  effect  at  Washington, 
ib.,  215  ;  the  first  Union  victory  since 
Bull  Run,  177  ;  Thomas'  first  vic 
tory  in  the  West,  191,  204,  205 ; 


230  ;  no  evidence  in  Record  that  his 
plan  was  changed  during  action 
from  defensive  to  offensive,  214  ;  his 
policy  of  delaying  engagement  from 
Jan.  17  to  Jan.  19,  questioned,  215  ; 
the  slowness  of  his  march  questioned, 
ib. ;  four  of  his  Colonels  promoted 
in  consequence  of  battle,  177,  215  ; 
his  services  slighted  by  the  Govern 
ment,  177 ;  his  promotion  to  rank  of 
Maj.-Gen.,  dependent  on  reputation 
earned  in  this  battle,  215. 

Feb.-Dee.  1802 :  transferred  to 
Shiloh,  but  did  not  participate  in 
battle,  178  ;  on  the  recommendation 
of  Buell  and  Halleck  appointed 
Major-General  of  .  Volunteers,  178, 
215  ;  chosen  by  Halleck  to  command 
right  wing,  April  9, 178,  215  ;  Grant 
made  second  in  command  of  the 
army,  210  ;  the  cause  of  his  differ 
ences  with  Grant,  178;  the  right 
wing  at  siege  of  Corinth  commanded 
by,  230  ;  the  engagement  of  May  28, 
1802,  fought  in  presence  of,  239; 
renounced  command  of  right  wing 
in  June,  and  rejoined  Buell,  178, 
210  ;  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  given  to,  179  ;  his  reasons  for 
refusing  the  command,  ib. ;  his 
magnanimity  in  declining  to  super 
sede  Buell,  210 ;  made  second  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
Sept.  30,  1802,  ib. ;  ordered  to  form 
line  of  battle  at  Perryville,  Oct.  7, 
1802,  ib. ;  not  engaged  in  battle  of 
Perryville,  179,  217  ;  ignorant  of  the 
battle,  ib. ;  surmise  that  his  inac 
tivity  caused  a  prejudice  at  Wash 
ington,  210  ;  on  removal  of  Buell,  the 
command  of  army  was  not  given  to, 
179  ;  the  action  of  Govt.  questioned, 
ib. ;  Rosecrans  given  Buell's  place, 
instead  of,  216,  217;  his  letter  to 
Halleck  of  Oct.  30,  1802,  216 ;  his 
plan  of  advance  to  Chattanooga  ig 
nored,  179. 

Battle  of  Stone's  River  :  Dec.  31, 
1862-Jan. 3, 1863, 179-180,  217-220 ; 
in  command  of  the  centre,  180,  218  ; 
his  strength,  180,  218,  230 ;  he  saved 
the  army,  Dec.  31,  180;  that  the 
day  was  saved  by,  questioned,  217— 
218  ;  Sheridan  re-enforced  by,  180  ; 
no  evidence  that  he  sent  a  brigade 
to  relieve  Sheridan,  219  ;  Rousseau's 
division  ordered  to  right  wing,  218 ; 
repulsed, 219;  successful  charge  made 
by  Rousseau,  by  permission  of,  ib.  ; 
his  line  did  not  remain  unmoved,  ib. ; 


314 


INDEX 


alone  did  not  save  the  right  wing, 
ib. ;  one  of  his  brigades  shattered 
Breckinridge's  division  Jan.  2,  1865, 
180 ;  his  losses,  ib.  ;  no  evidence  in 
Record  that  he  took  charge  of  the 
field,  Dec.  31,  220;  his  bravery  and 
resolution,  ib.  ;  immovable  in  battle 
and  council,  180-181 ;  refused  to  con 
sider  the  proposition  to  retreat,  Dec. 
31,  1862,  ib. 

Battle  of  Chickamauga  :  in  the 
Chickamauga  Campaign,  sent  in  pur 
suit  of  Bragg  to  Stevens'  Gap,  220 ; 
in  position  at  Stevens'  and  Cooper's 
Gaps,  ib. ;  the  battle  of  Chicka 
mauga,  Sept.  19-20,  1863,  181-182, 
220-230  ;  his  position  at  Chickamau 
ga,  132  ;  in  command  of  left  wing, 
221,  230  ;  the  surmise  of  Bragg's  in 
tention  to  block  road  to  Chattanooga 
questioned,  221-222,  223  ;  the  posi 
tion  of  his  forces,  Sept.  19,  222 ;  un 
aware  of  Bragg's  advance,  Sept.  19, 
ib.  ;  his  attack  near  Reed's  Bridge 
met  by  counter  attack  by  Bragg,  ib. ; 
Bragg  repulsed,  ib.  ;  the  plan  for 
battle  of  Sept.  20,  adopted  in  coun 
cil  at  midnight,  ib.  ;  the  Union  line 
inspected  at  daylight,  Sept.  20,  by 
Rosecrans  and,  244  ;  his  line  concen 
trated,  222  ;  still  further  revised,  ib.  ; 
at  his  request  Negley  ordered  to  the 
left  of,  223;  his  strength,  222-223, 
225  ;  Confederate  strength,  ib. ;  at 
tack  on  left  flank  by  Polk,  224  ;  the 
attack  extended  along  his  line,  ib. ; 
repulsed  everywhere,  ib. ;  attack  on 
Baird,  extreme  left,  most  serious,  ib.  ; 
re-enforcements  called  for,  ib. ;  re- 
enforcements  sent,  i7>.,  225  ;  the  at 
tack  repulsed  without  aid  of  re-en 
forcements,  226  ;  his  inability  to 
employ  his  reserves  questioned,  ib. ; 
the  mistake  caused  by  an  aide  of, 
226;  Capt.  Kellogg  on 'his  staff ,  229, 
230,  243  ;  the  misfortune  caused  by 
removal  of  Wood's  division  from  the 
line,  226-227,  229-230,  243-244; 
Wood  ordered  to  extreme  left  by, 
227 ;  Sheridan  diverted  by  attack 
from  Hood,  in  attempt  to  join,  227  ; 
the  body  of  the  army  sent  to  the 
support  of,  228 ;  his  right  attacked 
by  Longstreet,  ib. ;  the  attack  re 
pulsed,  ib. ;  his  strength  after  2  p.  M., 
ib.  ;  strength  of  enemy  opposed  to 
him,  ib.  ;  ordered  between  3  and  4 
P.  M.  to  a  new  position  at  Rossville, 
ib.  ;  his  retreat  about  5.30  p.  M.  to 
Rossville,  229 ;  the  attacks  on,  in 


retreat,  repulsed,  ib. ;  his  new  posi 
tion  at  Rossville,  ib. ;  his  great  qual 
ities  exhibited  in  resistance  of  Long- 
street,  ib. ;  the  message  carried  to 
Rosecrans  by  his  aide  not  mentioned 
in  his  report,  ib.  ;  the  question  of 
the  message  discussed,  229  -  230, 
243-244 ;  the  gravity  of  removal  of 
Wood  to  his  left,  230 ;  his  action 
questioned,  ib.  ;  his  great  services 
181-182;  saved  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  from  destruction,  181 ; 
Garfield's  tribute  to,  ib.  ;  Dana's 
tribute  to,  ib. ;  the  "  Rock  of  Chick 
amauga,"  182  ;  chosen  by  Grant,  to 
command  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
131,  182,  216,  230 ;  reluctant  to  ac 
cept  the  command,  182 ;  his  loyalty 
to  Rosecrans,  ib. ;  the  criticism  of 
choice  of  Grant  for  supreme  control 
at  Chattanooga  instead  of,  discussed, 
230,  234  ;  his  achievements  compared 
with  Grant's,  ib. ;  his  solution  of 
problem  of  supplying  army  at  Chat 
tanooga,  183  ;  his  letter  to  Halleck, 
Oct.  31,  ib. ;  the  Confederates  dis 
lodged  at  Brown's  Ferry,  ib. ;  the 
restraint  imposed  on,  under  Grant, 
183. 

Battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  Nov. 
23-25,  1S03  :  the  plan  of  battle  com 
municated  to,  Nov.  18,  184,  234 ;  the 
attack  delayed,  184  ;  given  command 
of  centre  and  right  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  185,  234  ;  ordered  to  co 
operate  with  Sherman,  184,  234- 
235 ;  ordered,  Nov.  23,  to  ascertain 
if  Bragg  was  retreating,  184  ;  cap 
tured  Orchard  Knob,  Nov.  23,  184, 

235  ;  gained  position  to  assault  the 
ridge,  184  ;  instructed  to  move  early 
morning,  Nov.  25,  235  ;  and  to  carry 
enemy's  rifle-pits,  z7>.,  236  ;    to  cre 
ate  a  diversion  for  Sherman's  benefit, 
132  ;  his  attack  on  rifle-pits  not  in 
tended   as  a   diversion    in  favor   of 
Sherman,   23(5 ;     Baird   sent    to   re- 
enforce  Sherman  by,  ib. ;  Baird  not 
being  required,  formed    on  left  of, 
ib. ;  informed  Sherman  of  his  posi- 
sition  at  1  P.  M.,  ib.  ;  his  troops  with 
out     orders      captured      Missionary 
Ridge,  33,  132,  133,  184,  185,  186, 

236  ;  if  the  charge  was  not  ordered 
by  him,  it  was  the  effect  of  his  in 
fluence,  186 ;  the  assertion  that  the 
spirit  which  inspired  the  assault  was 
due  to  his  influence  questioned,  237  ; 
the  troops  who   made  assault  were 
not  of  his  corps,  ib. ;  evidence  that 


INDEX 


315 


Grant  intended  an  assault  on  the 
Ridge,  ib.,  237  ;  one  of  his  staff  gave 
order  to  Baird  to  carry  rifle-pits, 
and  to  push  on  to  summit  of  Ridge, 
ib.  ;  the  assertion  that  Grant  in 
tended  Sherman  to  take  chief  part 
in  battle  questioned,  ib. ;  his  attack 
and  Sherman's  intended  to  be  con 
current,  ib. ;  the  total  strength  of 
Confederates,  238 ;  Sherman's  and 
Grant's  statements  that  the  lines 
were  weakened  in  front  of,  dis 
proved,  186;  the  strength  of  forces 
opposed  to  him,  185  ;  the  Confed 
erate  strength  opposed  to  Sherman 
less  than  that  opposed  to,  186,  288  ; 
his  strength  at  Mission  Ridge,  185 ; 
inferior  to  Sherman's,  186  ;  superior 
to  Sherman's,  237  ;  the  strength  of 
each,  ib. ;  his  loss,  33,  185-186 ;  the 
defensive  works  opposed  to  him, 
185 ;  his  statement  as  to  modifica 
tion  of  plan,  ib. ;  the  statements  of 
Grant  and  Sherman  as  to  the  duty 
of,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  distrusted, 
132,  133  ;  sustained,  237-238. 

Atlanta  Campaign  :  Sherman  pre 
ferred  for  command  of  Division  of 
the  Mississippi  instead  of,  187,  the 
proposition  that  the  command  should 
have  been  given  to,  discussed,  239 ; 
that  he  had  held  greater  responsibili 
ties  prior  to  March  12,  1864,  than 
Sherman,  questioned,  238 ;  Sherman 
his  junior,  187 ;  under  Sherman's 
command,  1864,  135  ;  his  proposition 
of  Feb.  28,  for  a  movement  to  At 
lanta,  187-188 ;  adopted  by  Sher 
man,  who  bungled  in  executing  it, 
ib. ;  the  plan  properly  executed 
would  have  been  successful,  135, 
187  ;  the  interests  of  his  army  sac 
rificed  by  Sherman  for  benefit  of 
his  own,  187  ;  given  the  hardest  work 
to  do,  189  ;  the  assault  at  Jonesboro', 
ib.,  190;  in  all  the  battles  of  the 
Atlanta  campaign  except  that  of 
July  22,  189;  excluded  from  that 
affair  because  of  jealousy  of  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  ib. ;  enumeration 
of  battles  and  engagements  in  which 
he  participated,  190  ;  his  successful 
affair  with  Hood  at  Peach  Tree 
Creek,  ib. ;  the  affair  slightly  noticed 
by  Sherman,  ib.  ;  Sherman's  preju 
dice  against,  ib. ;  his  plan  of  a  march 
to  the  sea  adopted  by  Sherman,  191. 

Tennessee  campaign :  sent  to 
Tennessee  to  expel  Forrest,  139, 191 ; 
the  destruction  of  Hood's  army  as 


signed  by  Sherman  to,  134, 140, 141, 
142,  191  ;  the  proposition  that  the 
national  cause  in  Tennessee  was  im 
perilled  by  the  Georgia  campaign  of 
1864,  discussed,  240  et  seq. ;  Sher 
man's  two  weakest  corps  given  to, 
191 ;  the  paucity  of  the  forces  as 
signed  to,  142,  144-145,  151 ;  the 
number  of  his  forces,  240,  240  note 
5 ;  Sherman  assured  by,  that  he 
would  have  men  enough,  241 ;  the 
force  sufficient,  ib.  ;  the  strengthen 
ing  of  the  army  of,  condition  of  con 
sent  to  Sherman's  project  against 
Savannah,  142  ;  not  possessed  of  an 
army  strong  enough  for  his  purposes, 
until  Nov.  30,  ib.,  191 ;  the  strength 
of  Hood's  army,  Nov.  1864,  240,  240 
note  5  ;  correspondence  with  Sher 
man,  241  ;  communications  between, 
broken  Nov.  15,  1864,  ib.;  Sher 
man's  expectations  from,  141-142  ; 
his  confidence  in,  justified,  152,  242  ; 
the  difficulties  of,  unknown  to  Sher 
man,  152  ;  the  only  risk  taken  by,  as 
to  Schofield's  position,  was  of  his  own 
choosing,  241  ;  the  resources  and 
men  of  the  North  available  to,  242  ; 
defeated  Hood  in  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  Nov.  30,  142,  143. 

Battle  of  Nashville,  Dec.  15-16, 
1864  :  the  last  of  the  great  victories 
of,  191  ;  the  strategy  of  the  battle, 
192  ;  fought  according  to  plan,  257  ; 
Hood  completely  defeated,  143-144, 
145, 152  ;  his  success  unprecedented, 
145  ;  prisoners  captured,  192  ;  his 
failure  to  capture  Hood's  entire 
army,  192-193  ;  the  conditions  differ 
ent  from  Grant's  after  Petersburg, 
ib. ;  ^obstacles  in  pursuit  of  Hood, 
193 ;  failure  of  his  plans  for  Steed- 
man,  ib. ;  his  losses  in  pursuit  com 
pared  with  Grant's  in  pursuit  of  Lee, 
194 ;  exultation  over  his  victory,  144 ; 
favored  in  his  campaign  by  luck,  143  ; 
the  disposition  to  minimize  the  risk 
and  victory,  152  ;  the  victory  his  chief 
claim  to  generalship,  191,  207  ;  com 
pared  with  other  victories,  192  ;  an 
evidence  of  the  possibilities  of  an 
American  army,  268 ;  included  by 
Swinton  among  the  decisive  battles, 
207. 

His  military  record  and  qualifica 
tions  :  his  variety  of  service,  203 ; 
the  number  of  actions  in  which  he 
took  part,  ib. ;  his  captures  of  guns 
and  prisoners,  ib. ;  his  generalship, 
204;  his  employment  of  cavalry 


316 


INDEX 


against  fortified  lines,  194  ;  his  uses 
of  cavalry,  194-195;  never  showed 
the  audacity  of  Csesar  and  Napoleon, 
204 ;  possessed  a  power  over  his 
army  like  Wellington's,  204-205 ; 
also  his  accuracy  of  judgment  in 
emergencies,  205 ;  instances  of  this 
faculty,  205-200;  his  attention  to 
details,  199  ;  praise  excited  by  his 
achievements,  20(5 ;  thanked  by  Ohio, 
after  Mill  Springs,  ib.  ;  by  Congress 
after  Nashville,  ib.  ;  by  Tennessee, 
ib. ;  his  portrait  painted  for  Tennes 
see,  and  a  gold  medal  given  him  by 
that  state,  ib.  ;  promoted  to  rank  of 
Major-General,  Dec.  15,  1804,  ib. ; 
Stanton's  letter  announcing  promo 
tion,  ib.  ;  the  office  of  Lieut.-Gen. 
declined  by  him,  202-203  ;  the  Sen 
ate  requested  by  him  not  to  confirm 
the  nomination,  203 ;  his  attitude  to 
wards  the  presidency,  200-201  ;  his 
letter  of  March,  1807,  refusing  nomi 
nation,  201-202  ;  his  feelings  to 
wards  the  South,  202  ;  his  exercise 
of  power  in  his  military  department 
after  the  war,  ib.  ;  his  study  of  U.  S. 
Constitution,  197 ;  present  at  Re 
union  of  Western  Armies  at  Chicago, 
1868,  198  ;  attention  commanded  by 
him  at.  ib.  ;  his  legal  acquirements, 
198-199  ;  his  power  of  commanding 
confidence  and  affection,  195-196; 
his  recognition  of  good  service,  195  ; 
his  care  for  his  army,  ib.  ;  his  hero 
ism  under  physical  sufferings,  ib.  ; 
his  personal  reconnaissances,  ib.  ;  his 
skill  in  wood  craft,  ib.,  196  ;  his  fear 
lessness  and  indifference  to  danger, 
196;  imperturbable  and  self-con 
tained,  ib. ;  not  given  to  display,  ib.  ; 
consideration  for  others,  ib.,  197 ; 
his  control  of  a  violent  temper,  ib.  ; 
his  humanity,  ib.  ;  his  gentleness, 
dignity,  humor,  ib.  ;  his  scholarly 
traits,  ib. ;  his  dislike  of  slavery, 
ib.  ;  his  liberation  of  his  slaves,  198  ; 
his  personal  habits,  199-200;  his 
temperance,  199 ;  his  personal  ap 
pearance,  200  ;  compared  with  Grant, 
Sherman  and  Sheridan,  203,  204 ; 
with  McClellan,  122;  with  Hum 
phreys,  95  ;  his  glory  obscured  by 
Grant's  and  Sherman's,  207  ;  the  lack 
of  good  relations  a  disadvantage  to 
Grant,  178  ;  made  by  Grant  to  suffer 
for  the  faults  of  Halleck,  ib. ;  Grant's 
imperfect  knowledge  of,  200 ; 
Grant's  comments  on,  cited,  200- 
207  ;  thought  by  Grant  less  compe 


tent  than  Sherman  for  command  of 
Atlanta  campaign,  206-207  ;  contra 
ry  opinion  entertained,  207  ;  Grant's 
praise  of,  ib. ;  Grant's  prejudice 
against,  184  ;  the  charge  of  a  preju 
dice  questioned  and  discussed,  215— 
216  ;  no  evidence  of  prejudice,  216; 
238 ;  the  claims  made  to  the  dis 
paragement  of  Grant  and  Sherman, 
examined,  21 1-244 ;  the  claims  stated, 
211-212  ;  tested  by  the  Official  Re 
cords,  212  et  seq. 

Thruston,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
Judge  Advocate,  Thomas'  staff,  cited 
as  to  the  General's  legal  acquire 
ments,  198-199. 

Tilghman,  L.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
escape  from  Fort  Henry,  25. 

Totopotomoy  River,  Va.,  (il,  87. 

Turchin,  J.  B.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  statement  as  to  fatal  message  to 
Rosecrans  at  Chickamauga,  cited, 
229. ' 

Twentieth  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  its  strength 
under  McCook  at  Chickamauga,  Sept. 
19-20,  1863,  225;  at  engagement  of 
Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20, 1864, 190. 

Twenty-third  Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  under 
Schofield,  re-enforced  Sherman  at 
Goldsboro',  March  25,  1865,  145. 

Twiggs,  D.  E.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Thomas  at  Monterey,  praised  by, 
168 ;  surrendered  U.  S.  forces  to 
Texas,  Feb.  23,  1861,  172. 

Underwood,  A.  B.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.,  wounded  in  affair  of  Look 
out  Valley,  Oct.  29,  186:),  183. 

United  States,  the  people  not  military, 
248  ;  their  comprehension  of  military 
situation,  1862,  250 :  Lincoln,  the 
wisest  and  most  sagacious  stateman 
in  the  history  of,  251-252. 

,  Northern    States :    realization 


of  the  magnitude  of  the  war,  after 
the  first  Bull  Run,  in,  248 ;  the  peo 
ple  trained  in  large  affairs,  ib.  ;  am 
ple  provision  for  the  support  of  Govt., 

249  ;    preparations  for  defence,   ib.  ; 
recruiting  in,   stopped,  April,  1862, 

250  ;   the  Governors  of,  counselled  a 
call  for  300,000  men,  250-251 ;  their 
vast  resources,  251  ;   their  capabili 
ties  in  the  ingenious  utilization   of 
steam  and  electricity,  271. 

-,  Southern  States  :   want  of  fa 


miliarity  with  large  affairs  in,  249  ; 
careless  confidence  of  siiccess  and 
contempt  of  their  adversaries  in, 
ib. ;  not  daunted  by  disasters  of 


INDEX 


317 


1862,  ib.;  their  military  strength 
wholly  employed,  ib. ;  their  patient 
endurance  under  deprivation  of  com 
forts,  ib.  ;  the  merits  of  their  gener 
als,  250  ;  unwilling  to  accept  defeat, 
ib.  ;  western  forces  united  under  A. 
S.  Johnnson  in  March,  1802,  ib. 

-,  Congress,  Thomas  thanked  by, 


after  Nashville,  206  ;  indifference  of, 
to  the  artillery  service,  203. 

,  Government :  failure  to  com 
prehend,  1861,  the  magnitude  of  the 
war,  247,  268 ;  did  not  heed  Sher 
man's  sagacious  advice,  248  ;  its  plans 
disconcerted  by  Stonewall  Jackson, 
250  ;  for  sake  of  economy  stopped 
recruiting,  April,  1862,  ib.  ;  the  need 
of  re-enforcements,  July,  1862,  ib. ; 
unwilling  consent  to  call  for  300,000 
men,  z6.,  251  ;  its  unnecessary  ex 
travagance,  ib. ;  its  lack  of  sound 
military  direction,  255  ;  the  incredu 
lity  of  foreign  nations  as  to  its  suc 
cess  in  the  war,  268  ;  the  problems 
it  was  called  on  to  solve,  ib.  ;  the  ad 
vantage  of  modern  scientific  agen 
cies  to,  269-270 ;  its  employment  of 
steam-vessels,  ib. ;  of  the  electric 
telegraph,  270 ;  of  railroads,  ib. ;  a 
navy  created  for  blockade,  by,  271  ; 
a  navy  created  to  operate  in  southern 
rivers,  ib. ;  blockade  made  reasonably 
effective,  ib. ;  Thomas  unknown  to, 
April  16, 1861,  171 ;  effect  on,  of  his 
victory  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  Jan., 
1862, 177;  surmise  of  prejudice  against 
Thomas,  because  of  his  inactivity  at 
Perryville,  Oct.  8,  1862,  216  ;  Rose- 
crans  chosen  to  succeed  Buell,  217  ; 
Halleck  made  General-in-Chief  by, 
27,  233  ;  scheme  of,  to  make  McCler- 
nand  commander  of  Mississippi  ex 
pedition,  1862,  28,  29,  30;  Grant's 
victory  at  Vicksburg  caused  him  to 
be  given  command  of  Military  Divi 
sion  of  Mississippi  by,  234. 

United  States  Military  Academy,  West 
Point,  N.  Y..  Jefferson  Davis  a  cadet 
at,  1824-1828,  252  ;  W.  S.  Hancock 
a  cadet  at,  1840-1844,  51;  A.  A. 
Humphreys,  a  cadet  at,  1827-1831, 
75  ;  W.  T." Sherman,  a  cadet  at,  1836- 
1840, 128 ;  G.  H.  Thomas,  a  cadet  at, 
1836-1840,  167  ;  Instructor  of  Cav 
alry  and  Artillery  at,  1851-1854, 1(59  ; 
distinguished  class  under  him,  169- 
170;  its  non-military  graduates,  75; 
Cullum's  Biographical  Register  of 
Officers  and  Graduates  of,  75,  76, 
203. 


United  States,  U.  S.  man-of-war,  built 
by  D.  Humphreys,  74. 

Upton,  E.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
compared  with  Humphreys,  95 ;  his 
great  tactical  ability,  ib. 

Utah,  expedition  to,  under  A.  S.  John 
ston,  1857,  171. 

Valley  Forge,  Pa.,  165. 

Van  Cleve,  H.  P.,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  V., 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  1827-1831, 
75  ;  in  command  of  3d  division,  left 
wing,  at  Stone's  River,  ordered  to 
re-enforce  right  wing,  Dec.  31,  1862, 
218  ;  ordered  to  support  Thomas  at 
Chickamauga,  Sept.  20,  225 ;  a  bri 
gade  of  his  division  carried  away  by 
Hood,  227 ;  the  strength  of  that 
brigade,  ib. ;  in  the  line  formed  to 
resist  Longstreet's  attack,  228. 

Van  Home,  T.  B.,  Chaplain,  U.  S.  A., 
his  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  published  prior  to  the  Me 
moirs  of  Grant  and  Sherman,  212 ; 
his  Life  of  Thomas  published  in 
1882,  112  note;  silent  as  to  bearer 
of  fatal  message  at  Chickamauga, 
229,  230. 

Vaughan  Road,  Va.,  engagement,  Feb. 
5-7,  1865,  90. 

Veazey,  W.  G.,  Col.  U.  S.  V.,  his  regi 
ment,  10th  Vermont,  at  Cemetery 
Ridge,  July  3,  1803,  49. 

Vermont  Volunteers,  13th  and  16th 
regts.  at  Cemetery  Ridge,  July  13, 
1803,  50. 

Veteran  regiments,  the  importance  of 
preserving'  organizations  disregard 
ed,  205;  the  organizations  preserved 
by  Wisconsin  and  Illinois,  ib. 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  the  Mississippi  River 
opened  to,  1862,  249 ;  Williams'  at 
tempt  to  capture,  1862,  27 ;  batter 
ies  run  by  Farragut,  27-28 ;  canal 
scheme  abandoned,  28 ;  Sherman's 
unsuccessful  expedition  to,  Dec., 
1862,  204,  239 ;  discussion  of  Grant's 
plans  against,  27-32  ;  their  indefi- 
niteness,  31,  39;  his  operations  at, 
Dec.,  1862-Jan.,  1863,  233 ;  his  oper 
ations  April-July,  1863,  233-234; 
routes  to,  28 ;  route  chosen  by  Grant, 
30;  surrendered,  July  4,  1863,  32, 
2(54 ;  Grant's  losses  in  the  campaign, 
34  ;  won  by  superior  strategy,  131  ; 
conditions  for  captures  at,  compared 
with  those  of  Nashville,  192  ;  conjec 
ture  as  to  results  had  Johnston  com 
manded  at,  256 ;  Sherman's  services 
in  the  campaign,  239. 


318 


INDEX 


Victoria,  U.  S.  gunboat,  103. 

Vining's  fetation,  Ga.,  Thomas  in  en 
gagement  of,  190. 

Vinton,  F.,  Rev.,  a  cadet  at  West 
Point,  1826-1830,  75. 

Virginia,  Thomas  born  in,  165 ;  its 
suffering  in  War  of  1812,  165  ;  Presi 
dents  provided  by,  ib. ;  statesmen 
provided  by,  166 ;  the  number  of 
men  from,  in  the  U.  S.  Army  Jan., 
1861,  who  remained  in  service,  Jan., 
1862, 166  ;  Lee's  devotion  to,  though 
deprecating  secession,  1(56  ;  prior  to 
Thomas,  no  cadet  from  his  district 
had  been  graduated  at  West  Point, 
167  ;  Stonewall  Jackson's  successful 
operations  in,  250  ;  re-enforcements 
sent  to  Bragg  in  Tennessee  from, 
220;  230;  Long-street  recalled  to, 
after  Missionary  Ridge,  266  ;  oper 
ations  against  Charleston  discon 
tinued  for  sake  of  1864  campaign  in, 
10 ;  Grant's  neglect  of  details  in  the 
battles  of  May  and  June,  1864,  in, 
257. 

Virginia  volunteers,  under  Longstreet 
re-enforced  Bragg  in  Tennessee,  181 ; 
defeated  by  Thomas,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  181,  182  ;  their  loss,  182 ; 
the  flower  of  Lee's  army,  ib. 

Wade,  R.  D.  A.,  Capt.,U.  S.  A.,  men 
tioned  Thomas  in  his  report,  Semi- 
nole  War,  168. 

Wadsworth,  J.  S.,  Brig. -Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
his  report  of  forces  left  for  defence 
of  Washington,  110;  in  the  Wilder 
ness,  May  6,  18(54,  62. 

Wales,  Gen.  Humphreys'  family  came 
from,  77  ;  Gen.  Thomas',  also,  1(57  ; 
its  people  not  conquered  by  Csesar,  ib. 

Walker,  F.  A..,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  V., 
concerned  in  episode  of  July  28, 18(55, 
at  Deep  Bottom,  64  ;  consideration 
received  when  a  prisoner  of  war, 
from  A.  P.  Hill,  (57  ;  83  ;  his  His 
tory  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  94. 

Walker,  W.  II.  T.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
his  strength,  Sept.  18,  225  ;  his  losses, 
Sept.  1D-20,  ib.;  attacked  Thomas 
under  Polk.  Sept.  20,  Chickamauga, 
ib.  ;  estimate  of  his  artillery  at  battle 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  237  note  1, 
mentioned,  //>.,  note  4. 

Wallace,  L.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  3d  division,  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  engaged  at  Shiloh, 
April  7,  1862,  231. 

War  Department,  its  publication,  Tac 
tical  Study  of  the  Battlefield  of 


Chickamauga,  220,  230,  230  note  1, 
243,  244  ;  dissatisfied  with  Rose- 
crans,  after  Chickamauga.  182. 

Warren,  G.  K.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
his  delay  and  disaster  on  White  Oak 
Road,  March  31.  1)1 ;  his  services  in 
ending  the  war,  67. 

Washburne,  E.  B.,  Member  of  Con 
gress,  the  early  recognition  of 
Grant's  merits  due  to,  1(50. 

Washington,  D.  C.,  Bureau  of  Topo 
graphical  Engineers,  76  ;  bridge 
built  by  Humphreys  at,  76-77 ; 
Beauregard's  plan,  July,  1861, 
against,  5,  (5 ;  in  Sept.,  7  ;  question 
of  the  defence  of,  1862,  107-118; 
McClellau's  insufficient  provision 
for,  107,  108, 1 10;  Banks  not  availa 
ble  for,  107-108  ;  McClellan's  belief 
that  he  had  saved,  118,  11;';  Hum 
phreys  hurried  to  Antietam  from, 
80 ;  Stuart  passed  between  Union 
army  and,  in  advance  of  Gettysburg, 
1(50;  U.  S.  Government  at,  see  U.S. 
Government. 

Washington,  George,  134,  165  ;  ap 
pointed  D.  Humphreys,  U.  S.  naval 
constructor,  74. 

Webb,  A.  S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
at  Cemetery  Ridge,  July  3,  1863, 
5 1  ;  succeeded  Humphreys  as  Chief- 
of -Staff  to  Meade,  8!). 

Weldon,  N.  C.,  Beauregard  at,  April 
22,  1864,  10. 

Weldon  and  Petersburg,  Railroad, 
affairs  at,  1865,  87  ;  Lee's  supply- 
line,  5)0  ;  captured,  ib. 

Wellington,  Thomas'  power  over  his 
army  and  accuracy  of  judgment  in 
emergencies  like,  204-205. 

West  Point,  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  Military 
Academy  at,  see  U-  S.  Military  Aca 
demy. 

West  Point,  Va.,  in  McClellan's  plans, 
117. 

West  Virginia,  in  Beauregard's  plan, 
1861,  6. 

Wheeler,  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
operations,  Sept.,  1864, 138. 

White's  Ferry  on  Potomac,  Stuart 
crossed  at,  returning  from  Oct.,  1862, 
raid,  158. 

White  House,  on  Pamunkey,  McClel 
lan's  base  of  supplies,  116. 

White  Oak  Road.  Va.,  engagement 
of  March  31,  1S(55,  <,)!. 

Whiting,  W.  H.  C.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Petersburg  occupied  by,  May,  18(54, 
1 1  ;  in  Beauregard's  plans,  ib.  ; 
failed,  ib. 


INDEX 


319 


Whittlesey,  C.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  a  cadet 
at  West  Point,  1827-1831,  75. 

Wilderness,  Va.,  battle  of,  35  ;  severity 
of  fighting,  35,  40 ;  Humphreys' 
criticism  of  advance  to,  87  ;  Union 
left  wing1  commanded  by  Hancock, 
52  ;  his  services  in,  May  5  and  G, 
18(34,  62 ;  Stuart's  service  in  the 
campaign  brief,  102  ;  61,  87. 

Williams,  T.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
attempt  to  capture  Vicksburg,  1862, 
27 ;  his  canal  scheme  abandoned, 
28  ;  his  return  to  Baton  Rouge,  ib. 

Williamsburg,  Va.,  battle  of  May  5, 
1862,  Hancock  at,  53;  Hill  and 
Early  defeated  by  Hancock  at,  56  ; 
Union  loss  at,  34. 

Wrilliamsport,  Pa.,  158;  Patterson 
crossed  the  Potomac  at,  July  2, 1861. 
173. 

Wilmington,  N.  C.,  Cornwallis'  retire 
ment  to,  after  battle  of  Guilford 
C.  H.,  145  ;  troops  called  to  Rich 
mond  from,  May,  1864,  11  ;  its 
abandonment  advocated,  1865,  by 
Beauregard,  18;  evacuated,  19. 

Wilson,  J.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  command  of  cavalry,  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  with 
Thomas  in  Tennessee,  11)1  ;  his 
force,  240  ;  Forrest  defeated  by,  at 
Franklin,  194  ;  his  raids  in  1864,  in 
Alabama  and  Georgia,  260  ;  90. 

Wilson,  W.  P.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  on  Han 
cock's  staff,  57. 

Winchester,  Va.,  in  Grant's  1865  plans 
for  Sheridan,  259. 

Windmill  Point,  James  River,  2d 
Corps  crossed  at,  May  14,  1864,  14. 

Wirt,  W.,  Attorney-General,  a  Vir 
ginian,  166. 

Wisconsin,  maintained  its  regimental 
organizations  through  the  war,  265. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade  at  Petersburg,  June,  1864, 
14. 

Wofford,  W.  T.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
his  brigade  not  present  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  228  note. 

Wood,  T.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  1st  division,  21st  Corps, 
his  position  Sept.  20,  at  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  226  ;  victim  of  unfor 
tunate  message,  ib.  ;  ordered  by 
Thomas  to  his  extreme  left,  227  ; 
his  withdrawal  left  the  gap  for 
Hood,  ib. ;  his  losses  from  Hood's 
assault,  ib. ;  f ormed  new  line  with 
Brannan  and  Van  Cleve,  to  resist 
Longstreet,  228  ;  censured  for  obey 


ing  order,  229 ;  the  propriety  of 
Thomas'  order  to  him  questioned, 
230 ;  in  command  of  3d  division, 
4th  Corps,  his  forces  participated  in 
the  capture  of  Orchard  Knob,  Nov. 
23, 1863,  184;  in  assault  and  capture 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  Nov.  25,  237 ; 
his  share  of  victory  at  Chattanooga, 
133. 

Wool,  J.  E.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
Thomas  at  Buena  Vista  mentioned 
by,  16!  >. 

Worth,  W.  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,U.S.A., 
Thomas  mentioned  by,  in  his  report, 
Senrinole  War,  168. 

Wright,  H.  G.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 
in  command  of  6th  Corps,  90 ;  the 
defences  before  Petersburg  captured 
by,  April  2,  1805,  ib. ;  at  Farmville, 
night  of  April  7,  94;  in  pursuit 
of  Lee,  April,  8,  ib. ;  his  services  in 
ending  the  war,  67. 

Wright,  M.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  238,  note 

1,  note  2. 

Yallobusha  River,  Miss.,  available  in 
an  advance  on  Vicksburg,  28  ;  29. 

Yazoo  River,  Miss.,  available  for  pro 
tection  in  advance  on  Vicksburg,  28. 

Yellow  Tavern,  Va.,  engagements  at, 
1864,  157  ;  Stuart  mortally  wounded 
at,  162. 

York  River,  Va.,  promise  of  the  Navy 
Dept.  that  the  M  errimac  should  not 
enter,  101, 102  ;  McClellan's  depend 
ence  on,  for  communication  with 
Fort  Monroe,  105  ;  his  reason  for 
taking  it  as  a  line  of  action,  116. 

Yorktown,  Va.,  Thomas'  birthplace 
nea"r.  165  ;  McClellan's  plan  for 
naval  co-operation  in  reduction  of, 
101  ;  his  ignorance  concerning,  102  ; 
vessels  not  promised  to  attack,  ib., 
103,  104,  105,  106,  110;  mentioned, 
112,  115. 

Young's  Point,  La.,  Grant's  uncertain 
ties  at,  31. 

Yuma,  Fort,  see  Fort  Yuma. 

Zolicoffer,  F.  K.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
in  position  before  Mill  Springs,  Dec. 

2,  1861,  213;    Thomas'    movement 
against,  ib. ;    in   battle   of   Logan's 
Cross   Roads,  Jan.    19,   1862,   176- 
177,  191,  204,  205,  206,  211,  214; 
killed,  176,  214. 

Zook,  S.  K.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
1st  division,  2d  Corps,  59  ;  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  1862,  ib. 


OFFICERS 

OF   THE   MILITARY  HISTORICAL   SOCIETY  OF   MASSACHUSETTS. 


1876. 

PRESIDENT. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

SECRETARY  AND  TREASURER. 
BREVET  CAPTAIN  EDWARD  B.  ROBINS. 

EXECUTIVE   COMMITTEE. 

JOHN   C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  CHARLES  DEVENS. 
COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 


1895. 

PRESIDENT. 
BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

SECRETARY. 
LIEUTENANT  CHARLES  H.  PORTER, 

TREASURER. 
BREVET  CAPTAIN  EDWARD  B.  ROBINS. 

EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

BREVET  CAPTAIN  HOWARD  STOCKTON. 

TRUSTEES. 

BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

LIEUTENANT  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 
BREVET  CAPTAIN  EDWARD  B.  ROBINS. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

BREVET  CAPTAIN  HOWARD  STOCKTON. 

BREVET  COLONEL  THOMAS  F.  EDMANDS. 


RESIDENT  MEMBERS. 

The  names  of  Members  who  have  died  are  indicated  by  an  atterisTc. 


CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

ADELBERT  AMES, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1866-1870. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  BEAN  AMORY, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  WALTER  AMORY, 

First  Lieutenant,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V.    Resigned  member 
ship. 

GEORGE  LEONARD  ANDREWS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.     Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Professor,  U.  S.  Millitary  Academy,  1871-1892. 

Second  Lieutenant  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.,  185-4-1855. 

NATHAN  APPLETON, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

Second  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Battery. 

*  JOHN  BADGER  BACHELDER, 

Government  Historian  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg.    Died  December  22, 1894. 

*  GEORGE  PEMBERTON  BANGS, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.    Died  June  28,  1893, 

GEORGE  MIDDLETON  BARNARD, 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Eighteenth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 


MEMBEES.  323 

*  WILLIAM  FRANCIS  BARTLETT, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  December  17, 1876. 

EDWARD  TRACY  BOUVE, 

Major,  Twenty-sixth  New  York  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

HENRY  PICKERING  BOWDITCH,  M.  D., 

Major,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

Professor  of  Physiology,  Harvard  University.    Resigned  membership. 

EDWARD  HICKLING  BRADFORD,  M.  D. 
EDWIN  HOWARD  BRIGHAM,  M.  D. 

EVERETT  CEPHAS  BUMPUS, 

First  Lieutenant,  Third  Massachusetts  Heavy  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 

ARTHUR  TRACY  CABOT,  M.D. 

EDWARD  CLARKE  CABOT, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Forty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

BENJAMIN  SHREVE  CALEF, 

Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

*  WILLIAM  LATHAM  CANDLER, 

Brevet  Colonel,  Captain,  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V.    Died  December  20,  1892. 

EDWARD  CHANNING,  PH.  D., 

Assistant  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College. 

ROBERT  FARLEY  CLARK, 

Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

*  JOHN  MURRAY  CORSE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  April  27, 1893. 

*  BENJAMIN  WILLIAM  CROWNINSHIELD, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry.    Died  January  17,  1892. 

CASPAR  CROWNINSHIELD, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 


824  MEMBERS. 

GREELY   STEVENSON  CURTIS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

HENRY  ROGERS   DALTON, 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

LORIN  FULLER  DELAND,  ESQ. 

*  CHARLES   DEVENS,  LL.  D. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  ;  Justice,  Supreme  Court  of  Massa 
chusetts.    Died  January  7,  1891. 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain,  U.  S.  A.    Retired. 

HENRY  GUSTAVUS  DORR, 

First  Lieutenant,  Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

WILLIAM  FRANKLIN   DRAPER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  RAYMOND   DRIVER, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

THEODORE  FRELINGHUYSEN  DWIGHT,  ESQ. 

THOMAS  FRANKLIN"  EDMANDS, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

EDWARD  WALDO  EMERSON,  M.  D. 

CHARLES  FAIRCHILD, 

Assistant  Paymaster,  U.  S.  N.,  1864. 

EDWARD  NICOLL  FENNO,  ESQ. 
JOHN  FISKE,  LITT.  D.,  LL.  D. 

WILLIAM   HATHAWAY  FORBES, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 


MEMBERS.  325 

REGINALD  FOSTER,  ESQ. 

JAMES  FRANCIS, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Major,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

*  GEORGE  HENRY  GORDON, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  August  30,  1886. 

JOHN  CHIPMAN  GRAY,  LL.  D. 

Major  and  Judge  Advocate,  U.  S.  V. 

Royall  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  University. 

NORWOOD  PENROSE  HALLOWELL, 

Colonel,  Fifty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

ALPHEUS  HOLMES  HARDY, 

First  Lieutenant  Forty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

ALBERT  BUSHNELL  HART,  PH.  D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College. 

FRANKLIN  HAVEN, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Second  California  Cavalry,  and  Aide-de-CamD,  U.  S.  V. 

JOHN  THEODORE  HEARD,  M.  D. 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Medical  Director,  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

FRANCIS  LEE  HIGGINSON, 

Captain  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

HENRY  LEE  HIGGINSON, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Major,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

THOMAS  WENTWORTH  HIGGINSON, 

Colonel,  Thirty-third  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

JOHN  ROMANS,  M.  D., 

First  Lieutenant,  and  Assistant  Surgeon,  U.  S.  A. 

JOHN  HOMANS,  2o,  M.  D. 


826  MEMBERS. 

CHARLES  PAINE  HORTON, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  HUNT, 

Captain  Forty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

JAMES  FREEMAN  HUNTINGTON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  First  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 

WILLIAM  JONES  LADD, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire  Infantry. 

JOHN  LATHROP, 

Captain,  Thirty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 
Justice  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts. 

THOMAS  LEONARD  LIVERMORE, 

Major  and  Brevet  Colonel,  Fifth  New  Hampshire  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Eighteenth  New  Hampshire  Volunteers. 

ABBOTT  LAWRENCE  LOWELL,  ESQ. 

*  EDWARD  JACKSON  LOWELL,  ESQ. 

Died  May  11,  1894. 

*  GEORGE  HINCKLEY  LYMAN,  M.  D., 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Medical  Inspector,  U.  S.  A.    Died  August  19,  1891. 
THEODORE  LYMAN,  S.  B., 

Colonel  and  Assistant    Adjutant-General,   Massachusetts  Volunteer  Militia, 
Volunteer  Aide-de-Camp  to  Major-General  George  G.  Meade. 

SILAS  MARCUS  MACVANE, 

McLean  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College. 

AUGUSTUS  PEARL  MARTIN. 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Third  Massachusetts  Battery. 

*  HERBERT  COWPLAND  MASON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V 

Captain,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry.    Died  September  24,  1884. 


MEMBERS.  327 

WILLIAM  POWELL  MASON, 

Captain  and  Additional  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

RICHARD  SWEET  MILTON", 

Captain,  Ninth  Massachusetts  Battery,  U.  S.  V. 

HENRY  STEDMAN  NOURSE, 

Captain,  Fifty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

WILLIAM  MILO  OLIN, 

Private,  Thirty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 
Secretary  of  State  of  Massachusetts. 

FRANCIS  AUGUSTUS  OSBORN, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  HENRY  OSBORNE, 

Private,  Twenty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  FRANCIS  WINTHROP  PALFREY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry.     Died  December  6,  1889. 

JOHN  CARVER  PALFREY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.,  1863-1866. 

Chief  Engineer,  Thirteenth  Army  Corps. 

FRANCIS  EVERETT  PEABODY,  ESQ. 
FRANCIS  HOWARD  PEABODY,  ESQ. 

CHARLES  LAWRENCE  PEIRSON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

*  WILLIAM  EDWARD  PERKINS, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.    Died  January  28,  1879. 

HENRY  GODDARD  PICKERING,  ESQ. 

CHARLES  HUNT  PORTER, 

First  Lieutenant,  Thirty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  SAMUEL  ALFRED  PORTER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brevet  Major  and  Captain,  U.  S.  A.    Retired.     Died  April  21,  1880. 


328  MEMBERS. 

*  WILLIAM  PRATT, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  March  29,  1893. 

GEORGE  PUTNAM,  ESQ. 

*  SAMUEL  MILLER  QUINCY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel  Eighty-first  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.    Died  March  24,  1887. 

ARNOLD  AUGUSTUS  RAND, 

Colonel,  Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

JAMES  FORD  RHODES,  ESQ. 
MAURICE  HOWE  RICHARDSON,  M.  D. 

ANDREW  ROBESON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  First  New  York  Engineers. 

EDWARD  BLAKE  ROBINS, 
Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 
First  Lieutenant,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

ALFRED  PERKINS  ROCKWELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Sixth  Connecticut  Infantry. 

HENRY  MUNROE  ROGERS, 

Acting  Assistant  Paymaster,  U.  S.  N.,  1862-1865. 

JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES,  ESQ. 

HENRY  STURGIS  RUSSELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

*  WILLIAM  GURDON  SALTONSTALL, 

Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant-Commander,  U.  S.  N.    Died  July  21,  1889. 

CHARLES  SPRAGUE  SARGENT, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

Arnold  Professor  of  Arboriculture,  and  Director  of  the  Arnold  Arboretum, 
Harvard  University. 


MEMBERS.  329 

MORRIS  SCHAFF, 

Captain  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A. 

NATHANIEL  SOUTHGATE  SHALER, 

Captain,  Independent  Kentucky  Battery,  Field  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 
Professor  of  Geology  and  Dean  of  the  Lawrence  Scientific  School,  Harvard 
University. 

THOMAS  SHERWIN, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-second  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  PRICE  SHREVE, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Second  U.  S.  Sharpshooters. 

*  HIRAM  SMITH  SHURTLEFF, 

Captain,  Fifty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.  Died  December  11, 1893. 

*  JACOB  HENRY  SLEEPER, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  Tenth  Massachusetts  Battery.    Died  August  19,  1891. 

JOHN  CODMAN  SOLEY, 

Lieutenant,  U.  S.  N.    Retired.    Resigned  membership. 

JOSEPH  LEWIS  STACKPOLE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  Y. 
Major  and  Judge  Advocate. 

HAZARD  STEVENS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

ROBERT  HOOPER  STEVENSON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

HOWARD  STOCKTON, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Lieutenant,  Ordnance  Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain  and  Additional  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 


330  MEMBERS. 

HENRY  STONE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  One  Hundredth  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

WILLIAM  WILLARD  SWAN, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Seventeeth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

FRANK  WILLIAM  TAUSSIG,  LL.  B.,  PH.  D., 

Professor  of  Political  Economy,  Harvard  College.    Resigned  membership. 

SAMUEL  LOTHROP  THORNDIKE,  ESQ. 

WILLIAM  HENRY  TURNER, 

Major,  First  Rhode  Island  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  ADIN  BALLOU  UNDERWOOD, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  January  14,  1888. 

*  CHARLES  FOLSOM  WALCOTT, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel,  Sixty-first  Massachusetts  Infantry.    Died  June  11,  1887. 

FRANCIS  AMASA  WALKER,  PH.  D.,  LL.  D., 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

President  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 

STEPHEN  MINOT  WELD, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

CHARLES  ALBERT  WHITTIER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  Seventeenth  and  Nineteenth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1866-1870. 

EDWARD  NEWTON  WHITTIER,  M.  D., 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Maine  Battery.    Acting  Inspector-General  of  Artillery. 

*  HENRY  WINSOR,  JR., 

Captain  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Acting  Assistant  Inspector-General 
Died  August  28,  1894. 


CORRESPONDING  MEMBERS. 


*  WILLIAM  ALLAN, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  of  Artillery,  C.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Ordnance,  Second  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Died  September  17,  1889. 

ARCHER  ANDERSON, 

Colonel  and  Adjutant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

ELISHA  BENJAMIN  ANDREWS,  D.D.,  LL.D. 

Second  Lieutenant,  First  Connecticut  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 
President  of  Brown  University. 

FRANCIS  CHANNING  BARLOW, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

JOHN  BIGELGW,  JR., 

Captain  of  Cavalry,  U.  S.  A. 

TASKER  HOWARD  BLISS, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Subsistence  Department,  U.  S.  A. 
Aide-de-Camp  to  the  Major-General  commanding  the  Army. 

X 

HENRY  VAN  NESS  BOYNTON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-fifth  Ohio  Infantry. 

JOHN  RUTTER  BROOKE, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U  S.  V. 

*  HENRY  ARMITT  BROWN, 

Died  August  21,  1878. 

CORNELIUS  CADLE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and   Assistant   Adjutant-General,  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps. 


332  MEMBERS. 

JOSHUA  LAWRENCE  CHAMBERLAIN,  LL.  D., 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Governor  of  the  State  of  Maine. 
Formerly  President  of  Bowdoin  College. 

WINFIELD  SCOTT  CHAPLIN, 

Second  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.,  1870-1882. 

SELDEN  CONNOR, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Nineteenth  Maine  Infantry. 

JACOB  DOLSON  COX, 

Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Commandant,  Twenty-third  Army  Corps. 

HARRY  COOKE  CUSHING, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Fourth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A. 

GEORGE  BRECKENRIDGE  DAVIS, 

Major  and  Judge  Advocate,  U.  S.  A. 

In  charge  of  publication  of  the  War  Records. 

*EPHRAIM  CUTLER  DA  WES, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  Fifty-third  Ohio  Infantry.     Died  April  23,  1895. 

GEORGE  DEWEY, 

Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

HENRY  KYD  DOUGLAS, 

Colonel,  Thirteenth  and  Forty -ninth  Virginia  Infantry,  C.  S.  A> 

GEORGE  BERNARD  DRAKE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Sixth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1864-1865. 

HENRY  ALGERNON  Du  PONT, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.,  1864-1.875. 

JOSEPH  GILES  EATON, 

Lieutenant-Commander,  U.  S.  N. 


NEMBEES.  333 

OSWALD  HERBERT  ERNST, 

Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

Superintendent  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  West  Point,  N.  Y. 

LUCIUS  FAIRCHILD, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1861-1863. 

Governor  of  the  State  of  Wisconsin,  E.  E.  and  M.  P.  of  the  United  States  to 
Spain,  1880-1882. 

DANIEL  WEBSTER  FLAGLER, 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Chief  of  Ordnance  Department,  U.  S.  A. 

CHARLES  WILLIAM  FOLSOM, 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Assistant  Quartermaster,  U.  S.  V. 

MANNING  FERGUSON  FORCE, 
Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

*  GUSTAVUS  VASA  FOX, 

Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

Assistant  Secretary,  Navy  Department,  1861-1866.    Died  October  29,  1883. 

WILLIAM  BUEL  FRANKLIN, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

*  JAMES  BARNET  FRY, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  July  11,  1894. 

JOSEPH  SCOTT  FULLERTON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

GEORGE  RIGGS  GAITHER, 

Captain,  First  Virginia  Cavalry,  C.  S.  A. 

GEORGE  LEWIS  GILLESPIE, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

ROBERT  HALE  IVES  GODDARD, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp. 

JOHN  MEAD  GOULD, 

Major,  Twenty-ninth  Maine  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 


334  MEMBERS. 

FRANCIS  MATHEWS  GREEN, 

Commander,  U.  S.  N. 

GEORGE  SEARS  GREENE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

EUGENE  GRIFFIN, 

Captain,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.,  1886-1889. 

SIMON  GOODELL  GRIFFIN, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

*  WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK, 

Major-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  February  9,  1886. 

ALFRED  STEDMAN  HARTWELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel  Fifty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

HARRY  LEROY  HAWTHORNE, 

First  Lieutenant,  First  Artillery,  U.  S.  A. 

HENRY  HETH, 

Major-General,  C.  S.  A. 

JAMES  JACKSON  HIGGINSON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry.     , 

HENRY  CLAY  HODGES,  JR., 

First  Lieutenant,  Twenty-second  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

JEDEDIAH  HOTCHKISS, 

Captain,  Engineer  Corps,  C.  S.  A. 

McHENRY  HOWARD, 

First  Lieutenant,  Aide-de-Camp  and  Assistant  Inspector-General,  C.  S.  A. 

HENRY  WILSON  HUBBELL, 

Captain,  First  Artillery,  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Lieutenant  Fortieth  New  York  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 


MEMBERS.  335 

*  ANDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.    Died  December  27,  1883. 

*  HENRY  JACKSON  HUNT, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  February  11,  1889. 

*  ROBERT  HUNTER, 

Captain,  Seventy-fourth  Ohio  Volunteers.    Died  December  2,  1894. 

THOMAS  WORCESTER  HYDE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  First  Maine  Veteran  Volunteers. 

JOHN  WILLIAM  JONES,  D.  D. 

Chaplain,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  C.  S.  A. 
Chaplain  of  the  University  of  Virginia. 

JOSEPH  WILLIAM  KIRKLEY, 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

GILBERT  CRAWFORD  KNIFFIN, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Commissary  of  Subsistence. 

ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE, 

Captain  of  Cavalry  and  Aide-de-Camp,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  C.  S.  A. 

WILLIAM  ROSCOE  LFVERMORE, 

Major,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

JAMES  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

STEPHEN  BLEECKER  LUCE, 

Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N.    Retired. 

WILLIAM  GORDON  McCABE, 

Captain  of  Artillery,  3d  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  C.  S.  A. 

ALEXANDER  CALDWELL  McCLURG, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.     Assistant  Adjutant-General,  and  Chief 
of  Staff,  Fourteenth  Army  Corps. 


336  MEMBERS. 

*  IRVIN  MCDOWELL, 

Major- General,  U.  S.  A.     Died  May  4,  1885. 
ALFRED   THAYER   MAHAN, 
Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

WILLIAM  MAHONE, 

Major-General,  C.  S.  A. 

CHARLES   MARSHALL, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  C.  S.  A.,  Aide-de-Camp  to  General  Robert  E.  Lee. 

GEORGE  MEADE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V.,  Captain,  U.  S.  V.     Captain,  U.  S.  A., 

1866-1874. 
Aide-de-Camp  to  Major-General  George  G.  Meade. 

*  MONTGOMERY  CUNNINGHAM  MEIGS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Quartermaster-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  January  2,  1892. 

NELSON  APPLETON  MILES, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

FREDERIC  CUSHMAN  NEWHALL, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

JOHN  PAGE  NICHOLSON, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Twenty-eighth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

*  EMERSON   OPDYCKE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  8.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  April  25,  1884. 

EPHRAIM  ALLEN  OTIS, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V, 
Chief  of  Staff  of  Major-General  Rousseau. 

CARL  FOLLEN  PALFREY, 

Captain,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

*  LE  COMTE  DE  PARIS, 

Died  September  8,  1894. 


MEMBERS.  \       337 

JOHN  GRUBB  PARKE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

*  FOXHALL  ALEXANDER  PARKER, 

Commodore,  U.  S.  N.    Died  June  10,  1879. 

*  LOUIS  HENRY  PELOUZE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  June  2,  1878. 

WILLIAM  BROOKE  RAWLE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

RICHARD  ROBINS, 

Captain,  Thirty-ninth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

ANDREW  HOWLAND  RUSSELL, 

Captain,  Ordnance  Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

DAVID  WARD  SANDERS, 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  French's  Division,  Stewart's  Corps, 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  C.  S.  A. 

*  ROBERT  NICHOLSON  SCOTT, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

Major,  Third  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.    In  charge  of  publication  of  the  War  Rec 
ords.     Died  March  5,  1887. 

WILLIAM  FORSE  SCOTT, 

Lieutenant,  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V.  x 

THOMAS  OLIVER  SELFRIDGE, 
Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

JAMES  SHAW,  JR., 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Seventh  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

*  WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN, 

General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  February  14,  1891. 


338  MEMBERS. 

WILLIAM  FARRAR  SMITH, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Major-General  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.    Retired. 

JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1890-1893. 

GEORGE  AUGUSTINE  THAYER, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  EDWARD  DAVIS  TOWNSEND, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Adjutant-General,  U.S.A.    Died  May  10,  1893. 

CHARLES  SCOTT  VENABLE, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

JOHN  GRIMES  WALKER, 
Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N. 

*  GOUVERNEUR  KEMBLE  WARREN, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A.     Died  August  8,  1882. 

ALEXANDER  STEWART  WEBB,  LL.  D. 

Brevet  Major- General,  U.  S.  A.  and  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York. 

SKIPWITH  WILMER, 

Lieutenant  and  Aide-de-Camp,  C.  S.  A. 

CHARLES  URQUHART  WILLIAMS, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  C.  S.  A. 
Aide-de-Camp  to  General  D.  R.  Jones  and  General  M.  D.  Corse. 

JAMES  HARRISON  WILSON, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

EDMUND  LOUIS  ZALINSKI, 

Captain,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.     Retired. 

Second  Lieutenant,  Second  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 


SINCE  its  organization,  reports  and  papers  have  been  read  before  the  Society  on 
the  following  subjects :  — 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY,   1861  AND  1862. 

1.  PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN,  1861. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.   LIVERMORE. 

2.  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  JACKSON,  FROM  WINCHESTER  TO  PORT  REPUBLIC, 

1862. 

BY  MAJOR  JAMES  F.  HUNTINGTON. 

THE  PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN  OF  McCLELLAN  IN  1862. 

1.  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN'S  PLANS  FOR  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862,  AND  THE 

ALLEGED  INTERFERENCE  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  WITH  THEM. 
JOHN  C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 

2.  THE  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 

GENERAL  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

3.  THE  PERIOD  WHICH  ELAPSED  BETWEEN  THE  FALL  OF  YORKTOWN  AND 

THE  SEVEN-DAYS'  BATTLES. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  W.  PALFREY. 

4.  THE  SEVEN-DAYS'  BATTLES:  — 

Mechanicsville, 
Gaines's  Mill, 
White  Oak  Swamp, 

Glendale. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  W.   PALFREY. 

5.  THE  SEVEN-DAYS'  BATTLES:  — 

Malvern  Hill. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  W.  PALFREY. 

6.  COMMENTS  ON  THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 

GENERAL  CHARLES  A.   WHITTIER. 

The  foregoing  form  Volume  1  of  the  Society's  Publications. 


340  EEPOETS  AND  PAPEES. 


GENERAL  POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN   VIRGINIA  IN  1862. 

1.  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  HALLECK'S  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATION  IN 
THE  SUMMER  OF  1862;  WITH  SPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  THE  REMOVAL, 
BY  ins  ORDER,  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  FROM  THE  PENINSULA, 
AND  TO  THE  SHARE  WHICH  BELONGS  TO  HIM  IN  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF 
GENERAL  POPE. 

GENERAL  SAMUEL  M.  QUINCY. 


THE  OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN. 

2.  FIRST  PART,  TO  THE  NINETEENTH  OF  AUGUST. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  CHARLES  P.  HORTON. 

3.  SECOND  PART,  TO  THE  TWENTY-EIGHTH  OF  AUGUST. 

JOHN  C.   ROPES,  ESQ. 

4.  THIRD  PART,  TO  THE  END  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

JOHN  C.   ROPES,  ESQ. 

5.  THE  TWENTY-SEVENTH  DAY  OF  AUGUST. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  H.   GORDON. 

6.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CIIANTILLY,  FIRST  OF  SEPTEMBER. 

GENERAL  CHARLES  F.   WALCOTT. 

7.  THE  NUMBERS  OF  THE  Two  ARMIES. 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

8.  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 

GENERAL  STEPHEN  M.   WELD. 

9.  THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERAL  MG-CLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA  IN  AUGUST,  1862; 

THE  NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  HIS  COMMAND;  AND  HIS  ALLEGED  NEG 
LECT  TO  SUPPORT  THE  ARMY  OF  GENERAL  POPE. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  FRANKLIN  HAVEN,  JUN. 

10.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

GENERAL  STEPHEN  M.   WELD. 

11.  REVIEW  OF  THE  REPORTS  OF  COLONEL  HAVEN  AND  GENERAL  WELD. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LYMAN. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS.  341 

12.  THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERALS  MCCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK  IN  AUGUST,  1862, 

AND  THE  CASE  OF  FlTZ-JoHN  PORTER. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.   LIVERMORE. 

13.  THE  HEARING  IN  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 

14.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN,  AUGUST  NINTH,  1862. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  L.  ANDREWS. 
,     The  foregoing  form  Volume  2  of  the  Society's  publications. 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC   UNDER  McCLELLAN  AND 
BURNSIDE,  SEPTEMBER   TO  DECEMBER,  1862. 

1.  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  W.   PALFREY. 

2.  THE  ALLEGED  DELAY  IN  THE  CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 

POTOMAC,  AND  THE  REASONS  WHY  THE  SECOND  CORPS  DID  NOT  ENTER 
INTO  THE  ACTION  EARLIER  ON  THE  DAY  OF  THE  BATTLE. 
MAJOR  JOHN  C.   GRAY. 

3.  STRATEGY  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHARPSBURG,  OR  ANTIETAM. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

4.  THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  FROM  THE  FIRST  TO 

FOURTEENTH  DAYS  OF  NOVEMBER. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  F.   SMITH. 

5.  FREDERICKSBURG,  DECEMBER  ELEVENTH  TO  FIFTEENTH. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  .ALLAN. 

6.  THE  LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION  AT  FREDERICKSBURG,  DECEMBER  THIRTEENTH, 

1862. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  F.   SMITH. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE  UNDER  HOOKER,  1863. 

1.  THE  DISASTER  TO  THE  ELEVENTH  CORPS  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

2.  THE  FIGHT  OF  SUNDAY,  MAY  THIRD,  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  A.   DODGE. 


342  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 

3.  SEDGWICK  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

4.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

These  papers,  by  Colonel  Dodge,  have  been  embodied  in  his  book  "  The  Campaign  of  Chancel- 

lorsville." 

5.  MEADE  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

GENERAL  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB. 

6.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.     (Contributed,  but  not  read  by) 

MAJOR  JAMES  F.  HUNTINGTON. 


THE   OPERATIONS    UNDER  MEADE  IN  1863. 

1.  THE  NUMBERS  OF  THE  Two  ARMIES  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

GENERAL  GREELY  S.   CURTIS. 

2.  THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  FAILURE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

GENERAL  GREELY  S.  CURTIS. 

3.  THE  STRATEGY  OF  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

4.  THE  LEFT  ATTACK  (SWELL'S)  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

CAPTAIN  EDWARD  N.   WHITTIER. 

5.  PICKETT'S  CHARGE. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  R.  DRIVER. 

6.  THE  REGULARS  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

CAPTAIN  RICHARD  ROBINS. 

7.  THE  BATTLE  OF  BRISTOE  STATION. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 
This  paper  has  been  printed  in  General  Walker's  "  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps." 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA    UNDER   GRANT  IN  1864. 

1.    GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA,  1864. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  ESQ. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS.  343 

2.  THE  USELESSNESS  OF  THE   MAPS  FURNISHED  TO  THE   STAFF  OF  THE  ARMY 

OF  THE  POTOMAC  PREVIOUS  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MAY,  1864. 
COLONEL  THEODORE  LTMAN. 

3.  NOTES  AND  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864, 

LIEUTENANT  McHENRY  HOWARD. 

4.  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 

LlEUTBNANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM    W.    SWAN. 

5.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LTMAN. 

6.  THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS. 

GENEBAL  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

7.  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  FROM  THE  SEVENTH 

TO  THE  ELEVENTH  DAYS  OF  MAY. 

GENEBAL  CHARLES  L.  PEIRSON. 

8.  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  AT  SPOTTSYLVANIA,  MAY  TWELFTH. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS    C.   BARLOW. 

9.  REVIEW  OF  GENERAL  BARLOW'S  PAPER. 

GENERAL  LEWIS  A.  GRANT. 

10.  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  R.   DRIVER. 

11.  THE  OPERATIONS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  FROM  MAY  THIR 

TEENTH  TO  JUNE  SECOND,  INCLUSIVE. 

MAJOR  WILLIAM  P.   SHREVE. 

12.  THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR,  JUNE  FIRST  TO  THIRD. 

CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

13.  SAME  SUBJECT. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

14.  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  FROM  THE  FIFTH  TO 

FIFTEENTH  OF  JUNE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LTMAN. 

15.  THE  FAILURE  TO  TAKE  PETERSBURG  ON  THE  FIFTEENTH  DAY  OF  JUNE. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LTMAN. 


344  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 

16.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

17.  THE  FAILURE  TO  TAKE  PETERSBURG  ON  THE  SIXTEENTH,  SEVENTEENTH, 

AND  EIGHTEENTH  DAYS  OF  JUNE. 

JOHN  C.    ROPES,  ESQ. 

18.  THE   OPERATIONS  AT   BERMUDA  HUNDRED  ON  THE   SIXTEENTH,  SEVEN 

TEENTH,  AND  EIGHTEENTH  DAYS  OF  JUNE. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  OSBORN. 

19.  THE  PETERSBURG  MINE,  JULY  TWENTY-NINTH. 

GENEEAL  STEPHEN  M.  WEED. 

20.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

21.  THE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETERSBURG. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  F.   SMITH. 

22.  THE  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  THE  WELDON  RAILROAD  IN  AUGUST. 

CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

23.  THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG  AFTER  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  WELDON  RAIL 

ROAD. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  R.   DRIVER. 

24.  THE  BATTLE  OF  REAM'S  STATION,  AUGUST  TWENTY-FIRST-TWENTY-SIXTH. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.   WALKER. 

25.  THE  EXPEDITION  TO  THE  BOYDTON  PLANK  ROAD  IN  OCTOBER. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.   WALKER. 

20.    THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  CAVALRY  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN 

1864. 

GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

27.  THE  VALLEY  (SHERIDAN'S)  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864. 

LIEUTENANT  L.  W.  V.  KENNON. 

28.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK,  OCTOBER  NINETEENTH. 

GENERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

29.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

COLONEL  BENJAMIN  W.   CROWNINSHIELD. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS.  345 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   VIRGINIA    UNDER   GRANT  IN  1865. 

1.  THE  NUMBERS  OF  GENERAL  LEE'S  ARMY  AT  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  CAM 

PAIGN,  MARCH  TWENTY-FIFTH. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LYMAN. 

2.  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  FIFTH  CORPS,  MARCH  TWENTY-SEVENTH  TO  THIRTY- 

FIRST  :  GRAVELLY  RUN. 

CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.   PORTER. 

3.  THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS,  APRIL  FIRST. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  W.  SWAN. 

4.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.   PORTER. 

5.  THE  STORMING  OF  THE  LINES  OF  PETERSBURG,  BY  THE  SIXTH  CORPS, 

APRIL  SECOND. 

GENERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

6.  THE  BATTLE  OF  SAILOR'S  CREEK,  APRIL  SIXTH. 

GENEBAL  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

7.  A  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  APPOMATTOX  CAMPAIGN. 

COLONEL  THOMAS   L.  LIVERMORE. 

8.  GRANT'S  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  LEE. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 


CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  SOME  OF  THE  FEDERAL  AND 
CONFEDERATE  COMMANDERS. 

GENERAL  GRANT  AS  A  SOLDIER. 

COLONEL  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

THE  MILITARY  CHARACTER  AND  SERVICES  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  WINFIELD 

SCOTT  HANCOCK. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  ANDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS. 
GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

GENERAL  RAWLINS. 

GENEBAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 


346  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS. 

COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

GENERAL  THOMAS  IN  THE  RECORD. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

With  the  exception  of  General  Wilson's  paper  on  General  Rawlins,  these  Sketches  of  Com- 
manders  have  been  printed  in  Volume  10  of  the  Society's  publications. 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN  KENTUCKY  AND   TENNESSEE,  1862-1863. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH,  APRIL  SIXTH-SEVENTH,  1862. 
COLONEL  HENRY   STONE. 

THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  EPHRAIM  C.  DAWES. 

THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862. 

CAPTAIN  N.  S.  SHALER. 

THE  OPERATIONS  OF  GENERAL  BUELL  IN  TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY  IN 

1862. 

COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

THE    CHICKAMAUGA    CAMPAIGN,    SEPTEMBER   NINETEENTH-TWENTIETH, 

1863. 

GENERAL  HENRY  V.   BOYNTON. 

THE  LAST  BATTLES  BEFORE  CHATTANOOGA,  OCTOBER-NOVEMBER,  1863. 
GENERAL  HENRY  V.   BOYNTON. 

AN  HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  ROUND  CHAT 
TANOOGA,  TENNESSEE,  SEPTEMBER  TWENTY-SECOND  TO  NOVEMBER 
TWENTY-SEVENTH,  1863. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  F.   SMITH. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS    UNDER  SHERMAN  AND   THOMAS  IN  1864. 

THE  OPENING  OF  THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN,  MAY  SIXTH,  1864. 
COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

FROM    THE   OOSTENAULA   TO   THE   ClIATTAHOOCHEE. 

COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS.  347 

THE  SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA,  JULY  NINTH,  SEPTEMBER  EIGHTH, 
1864. 

COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

A  REVIEW  OF  THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN,  MAY  FOURTH  TO  SEPTEMBER 
EIGHTH,  1864. 

BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN,  NOVEMBER  THIRTIETH,  1864. 
COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE,  DECEMBER  FIFTEENTH-SIXTEENTH,  1864. 
COLONEL  HENRY  STONE. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  PLANS  AFTER  THE  FALL  OF  SAVANNAH. 
GENERAL  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS. 

MAJOR  ANDERSON  AT  FORT  SUMTER,  1861. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  CHARLESTON,  1862. 
GENERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

OPERATIONS  AGAINST  CHARLESTON,  1863. 

GENERAL  ALFRED  P.   ROCKWELL. 

OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA,  1861-1862. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  F.  EDMANDS. 

THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA  UNDER  GENERAL  FOSTER,  1862-63. 
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  J.  LEWIS  STACKPOLE. 

PAPERS  ON  VARIOUS  SUBJECTS. 

THE  HOME  SQUADRON  IN  THE  WINTER  OF  1860-1861. 

REAR  ADMIRAL  GEORGE  E.   BELKNAP,  U.  S.  N. 

THE  CUMBERLAND. 

CAPTAIN  THOMAS  O.  SELFRIDGE,  U.  S.  N. 

THE  ASSAULT  ON  PORT  HUDSON,  MAY,  1863. 

GENERAL  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

THE  RED  RIVER  EXPEDITION,  MARCH-MAY,  1864. 
JOHN  -HOMANS,  M.  D. 


348  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAY,  AUGUST  FOURTH,  1864. 

COMMODOKE  FOXHALL  A.   PARKER,  U.  S.  N. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  MOBILE,  MARCH  TWENTY-SEVENTH  TO  APRIL  NINTH, 
1865. 

GENERAL  JOHN  C.   PALFREY. 

MODERN  BATTLES. 

MAJOB  WILLIAM  R.  LIVERMORE. 

ARTILLERY. 

GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUNT. 

CAVALRY  IN  VIRGINIA  DURING  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION. 
COLONEL  BENJAMIN  W.  CROWNINSHIELD. 

ASPECTS   OF   THE    MEDICAL    SERVICE    IN    THE   ARMIES   OF  THE  U.  S. 

DURING  THE   REBELLION. 

GEORGE  H.   LYMAN,  M.  D. 

THE  NORTHERN  VOLUNTEER. 

COLONEL  THOMAS  L.   LIVERMORE. 

THE  NEGRO  AS  A  SOLDIER  IN  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION. 
COLONEL  NORWOOD  P.   HALLOWELL. 

THE  NAVAL  BRIGADE. 

LIEUTENANT  JOHN  C.   SOLEY,  U.  S.  N. 


PERSONAL  NARRATIVES. 

MY  CAPTIVITY. 

GENERAL  SAMUEL  M.   QUINCY. 

PERSONAL  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  WAR,  1861-1865. 

COMMANDER  W.  G.  SALTONSTALL,  U.  S.  N. 

RECOLLECTIONS  OF  STAFF  AND  REGIMENTAL  LIFE. 
GENERAL  STEPHEN  M.  WELD. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  TEE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GREAT 
BRITAIN,  1812-1814. 

THE  FIGHT  BETWEEN  THE  JAVA  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION. 
LIEUTENANT  JOHN  C.   SOLEY,  U.  S.  N. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS.  349 


THE  CHESAPEAKE  AND  THE  SHANNON. 

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER  J.  G.  EATON,  U.  S.  N. 

THE    WAR  BETWEEN  THE    UNITED  STATES  AND  MEXICO. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA. 

GENERAL  WILLIE  M  B.  FRANKLIN. 

THE  BATTLES  OF  CONTRERAS  AND  CHERUBUSCO. 
GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

THE  BATTLES  OF  MOLING  DEL  KEY  AND  CHAPULTEPEC. 
GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

CAMPAIGNS   OF  NAPOLEON. 

THE  FIRST  CAMPAIGN  OF  BONAPARTE  IN  ITALY,  1796. 
MAJOR  WILLIAM  R.   LIVERMORE. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  WATERLOO:  THE  GROUCHY  CONTROVERSY. 
JOHN  C.   ROPES,  ESQ. 


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